॥ ब्रह्मसूत्रचतुःसूत्रीशाङ्करभाष्यम् ॥

Śrī Śaṅkarācārya's Commentary
on the Catuḥsūtrī of Brahmasūtra

Volume 1

[Adhyāsa-bhāṣya & Sūtra 1 – 3]

ब्रह्मसूत्रचतुःसूत्रीशाङ्करभाष्यम्

Brahmasūtracatuḥsūtrī-śāṅkarabhāṣyam

Śrī Śaṅkarācārya's Commentary
on the Catuḥsūtrī of Brahmasūtra

with

Sanskrit text, Transliteration, Word for Word Meaning,
English Translation and Annotation

by

Dr. S. Sankaranarayanan

Redacted by

Dr. Kanshi Ram

cif

Chinmaya International Foundation
Adi Sankara Nilayam, Veliyanad
Ernakulam, Kerala, India

Brahmasūtracatuḥsūtrī-śāṅkarabhāṣyam

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Dedicated unto

Pūjya Swami Chinmayananda

– Sage, Visionary and Guru –

॥ ॐ शास्त्रोद्धारकाय नमः ॥

नत्वा श्रीचिन्मयं देवं ज्ञानविज्ञानभास्करम्।
चतुःसूत्रार्थबोधाय कुर्वे शारीरभाष्यकम्॥

BENEDICTION

The *Brahma-sūtra* is one of the three principal canonical works of the Vedāntic tradition, the other two being the Upaniṣads and the *Bhagavad-gītā*. On the basis of the Sanskrit Commentaries of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya, Pūjya Gurudev Swami Chinmayanandaji has already written detailed commentaries in English on most of the principal Upaniṣads as well as the *Bhagavad-gītā*. I am very happy to see this exhaustive and student-friendly commentary on the *Brahmasūtra-catuḥsūtrī* that the Chinmaya International Foundation (CIF) has brought out as an offering of devotion to Pūjya Gurudev Swami Chinmayanandaji on the occasion of the Chinmaya Birth Centenary celebrations.

The Bhāṣyas of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya on the Upaniṣads, *Bhagavad-gītā* and the *Brahma-sūtra* are invaluable treasures of wisdom. Śrī Śaṅkarācārya's exposition of the first four aphorisms of the *Brahmasūtra*, the *Catuḥsūtrī*, is renowned for its depth and comprehensive coverage of the Vedāntic thoughts and concepts. We find here an exemplary and lucid summary of the entire philosophy of Advaita-vedānta. Any one who carefully studies this exposition of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya is sure to gain a crystal clear comprehension of Advaita-vedānta. The present work is an attempt to make the profound teachings of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya on the *Brahmasūtra-catuḥsūtrī* easily accessible to the modern student of Advaita-vedānta. I am sure that this lucid exposition will fulfill the long-felt need of the students.

The author of this work, the Late Dr. S. Sankaranarayanan, deserves our gratitude for his labour of love. He has thoroughly researched and presented all the salient thoughts and explanations offered by the numerous commentaries and sub-commentaries on the *Śaṅkarabhāṣya* of the *Brahmasūtra-catuḥsūtrī*. My hearty congratulations with deep gratitude to Dr. Kanshi Ram who took upon himself the onerous task of thoroughly revising and emending the initial draft that was prepared by Dr. S. Sankaranarayanan. This work has been verily his offering of devotion to the venerable Śaṅkarācārya.

Obliviousness of our true identity is the cause of all suffering and it is the Knowledge of the Self alone that can extricate us from this woeful plight. May this Knowledge of the Self shed by the effulgent Lamp of the *Brahma-sūtra* dispel the darkness of ignorance in our hearts and put an end to saṁsāra. The Advaita-darśana expounded by great masters of yore like Bhagavān Veda-vyāsa, and Śrī Śaṅkarācārya and modern masters like Pūjya Swami Chinmayanandaji is the panacea for the pathetic plight, specially in our present time of strife and discord globally fuelled by a brazen materialism.

I invoke the Grace of the Lord and the Blessings of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya and Pūjya Gurudev Swami Chinmayanandaji on all the seekers of Self-knowledge.

With Prem and Om,



Swami Tejomayananda
Head, Chinmaya Mission

May 8, 2015, Chinmaya Jayantī
Launch of Chinmaya Birth Centenary Celebrations
Ernakulam

GRATITUDE

This exhaustive treatise on the *Brahmasūtra-catuḥsūtrī-śāṅkarabhāṣyam*, a project that took almost a decade to complete, has been enriched by the work of many scholars, ācāryas, and sevaks associated with the Chinmaya International Foundation.

We begin with our immense gratitude to Late Dr. S. Sankaranarayanan, the author of this work. But for his tireless labour of love we will not be holding this precious book in our hand. He was ably assisted by Dr. A. Ramaswamy Iyengar, the then Director of Chinmaya International Foundation (CIF), under whose able guidance the team at CIF, comprising Smt. Sarala Suresh, Research Associate; Smt. Rajalekshmi, Librarian; and Research Assistants Sri Rajeev, Sri Sunil, Sri Krishnakumar, and Smt. Manjusha worked with full dedication on the project. Prof. R. Vasudevan Potti, renowned scholar from Kerala, also gave his assistance in the initial stages of the work. With contributions from this entire team, the initial manuscript with the text, variant readings, transliteration, word meaning and detailed notes was prepared.

This work required thereafter a thorough editing – both of language and content. For this formidable task, CIF needed a scholar of Advaita-vedānta, who had to be proficient in Vyākaraṇa, Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā, and also be competent in English. Indeed, the editing of such a rich philosophical book required a person with multiple proficiencies and in-depth knowledge of the vāst gamut of the Indian philosophical tradition.

It was divine providence that brought Dr. Kanshi Ram, a scholar of such immense capacities, to attend to this onerous task and bring the effort to a successful culmination. His contribution to this cause is indeed invaluable; but for his patient and steadfast labour of love this treatise would not have seen the light of the day.

A team from CIF comprising Swami Advayananda, Br. Sundar Chaitanya, Br. Kutastha Chaitanya relocated themselves to Delhi for almost a year and assisted Dr. Kanshi Ram in his work. Sri Ramachandran too was present in Delhi assisting the team in multiple ways. Br. Sarthak Chaitanya also pooled in, joining in with his keen eye and adroit skill. The treatise that finally took shape at Delhi was a redaction of the initial work prepared by Dr. S. Sankaranarayanan.

The final English proofreading and vetting of the language was done by Smt. Jasjit Mansingh, Delhi. Working with immense love and dedication, Smt. Mansingh has given the treatise much finesse. The contributions of Smt. Sarala Suresh, Smt. Ambika CP, Smt. Rajalekshmi, Dr. V. Shivani and Smt. Radhika Manoj during the final stages of work and proofreading deserve special mention and gratitude. The zeal of Br. Sundar Chaitanya in beautifully and meticulously paginating and setting the text deserves our special thanks.

A detailed index of the terms and topics was prepared by Sri Rahul Maini, USA, and then perfected by Br. Sarthak Chaitanya. Our special thanks to both of them. Swami Sharadananda has penned a simple and sweet Sanskrit verse of dedication at the beginning of the treatise and to him our loving gratitude.

Our appreciation is also due to printers Shri Garuda Graphics, Coimbatore. Sri Renjith designed the book cover and Smt. Shefali Arvind co-ordinated the design. Smt. Shamika from Central Chinmaya Mission Trust advised and guided the printing.

We thank also our donors and sponsors – Chinmaya Mission UK, Sri Krishna Bhamidipati (USA), Smt. Jayashree and Sri Amar Jaisinghani (Mumbai), Smt. Nirupama and Sri C.K. Guruprasad (Bengaluru), Sri Bhaskaran (Puducherry), Sri Patlolla Ram Reddy (Hyderabad), Smt. Usha and Sri (Dr.) A.L. Ananda (Singapore), Smt.Anita and Sri Jayaram Anand (Mumbai), Smt. Neelam Makhija (New Delhi), Smt. Maya and Sri R. Nandakishore (Mumbai), Smt. Karen Purswaney (Hong Kong) and Maini Family, Kumar Family, Tuli Family and Katyal Family (all from USA). Sri N.M. Sundar (Singapore), Smt. Priya Maini (USA), Sri Kamal Daswani (Hong Kong) and Smt. Manisha Makhecha Bhagat (Delhi) – all of whom not only themselves contributed but inspired many others to do so too. Our special gratitude is due to them and to all the others whose names have not been listed above.

An important part of the work was completed in Delhi. Valuable assistance was rendered by Pujya Swami Nikhilanandaji, Acharya of Chinmaya Mission, Delhi, and his team led by Ms. Shibani Khorana, Smt. Parveen Bahl, Smt. Rupa Anand, Sri Anil Chaudhary, and the family of Smt. Anjali Singh, Ms. Nanki Singh, and Sri Jujhar Singh, and Smt. Meera Seth who took care of all the needs of the CIF team in Delhi. We express our heartfelt gratitude to the Chinmaya Family at Delhi.

Smt. Kesar Kanshi Ram, the wife of Dr. Kanshi Ram, and Sri Vijay Vats and Smt. Rajni Vats – the family with whom the CIF team stayed at Delhi – have all served in numerous loving ways.

This work has been made possible by the blessings of Pujya Guruji Swami Tejomayanandaji, the Head of the Chinmaya Mission, whose encouragement for this project has been boundless. It is indeed his blessings and encouragement that has enabled Chinmaya International Foundation to complete this project befittingly during the Birth Centenary year (2015-16) of Pujya Gurudev Swami Chinmayanandaji.

We bow our heads in reverential salutations to the Jagadīśvara, the Lord of the Universe, and Pujya Gurudev Swami Chinmayanandaji, the modern Sage of Advaita, for making us all instruments in this tiny pādaseva unto Bhagavān Bhāṣyakāra Śrī Ādi Śaṅkarācārya.

May His Grace and blessings be with all those who have contributed their might to publish this gratifying labour of love.

In Śrī Guru Smṛti,

Swami Advayananda
Acharya, Chinmaya International Foundation

PREFACE

The detailed English commentary on the *Śaṅkara-bhāṣya* of the *Brahmasūtra-catuḥsūtrī* and its preamble, the *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya*, has been written keeping in mind primarily the modern student of Advaita-vedānta. Although it is prepared in a style easy to comprehend yet a working knowledge of Sanskrit, also accompanied by an acquaintance with the basic tenets of Advaita-vedānta, is a prerequisite for a fruitful perusal of the present work. Nevertheless the detailed exposition of the *Śaṅkara-bhāṣya* is so comprehensive that it would not only benefit the student but also a reader who is fairly conversant with the philosophy of Advaita-vedānta.

The Sanskrit text of the Bhāṣya and other references in Sanskrit are mostly kept in non-sandhi form for two reasons: (1) The footnote indicators for variant readings and other elucidatory notes may be marked in a manner that they are easily comprehended. (2) Even the reader with a modicum of familiarity with Sanskrit may also be able to understand the exposition.

The credit for nourishing the Indian Philosophical literature goes to the vast and rich commentarial literature comprising of commentaries (Bhāṣya), glosses (Ṭīkā) and notes (Ṭippaṇī). The detailed explanations in the present work are based on the renowned traditional commentaries and sub-commentaries on the *Brahmasūtra-śaṅkarabhāṣya*. Some of the important treatises that have been the bedrock for preparing the explanatory notes include the following: *Pañcapādikā* by Padmapādācārya, *Bhāmatī* by Vācaspati-miśra, *Bhāṣyaratnaprabhā* by Govindānanda, *Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa* by Prakāśātman, *Nyāyanirṇaya* by Ānandagiri, *Bhāṣyabhāvaprakāśikā* by Citsukhācārya, *Prakaṭārthavivaraṇa* by Anubhūtisvarūpācārya, *Tattvadīpana* by Akhaṇḍānanda (disciple of Ānandagiri), *Vārtika* by Nārāyaṇa-sarasvatī, *Ṛjuprakāśikā* by Akhaṇḍānanda, *Brahmavidyābharaṇa* by Advaitānanda and *Pradīpa* by Anantakrishna Shastri. The explanations in the text have been substantiated with copious relevant citations from the above-mentioned

commentaries. Consequently, it is hoped that these will provide the reader with definite pointers for further study and also ground for deliberation leading to contemplation, the main purpose of this kind of work.

Another distinctive feature that has enriched this text is the variant readings of the Bhāṣya text that have been included as footnotes marked with numerals in Devanāgarī. A total of sixteen manuscripts and books have been used in the preparation of these variant readings.

In order to facilitate the student who is not fully conversant with Sanskrit, an earnest effort has been made to provide within the text itself, in parentheses, translations of all the Sanskrit philosophical terms even though these may occur many times on a single page. Of course, there is also repetition of important ideas, concepts and citations (with their translations) throughout the text. This has been purposely done to make each sectional note as complete as possible. Needless to say, in such works as this, the repetition helps the reader comprehend the abstruse thoughts and subtle concepts of the text which is a *sine quo non* on the Vedāntic path of Self-realisation.

Structurally the Bhāṣya text has been divided into sub-sections based on the thought-flow of the Bhāṣya. Thereafter, there is a transliteration into Roman English (A), followed by a word-to-word meaning (B), this is accompanied by a translation marked (C) which is as close, and as literal as possible to the Ācārya's original text. Finally, the Bhāṣya sentences have been expounded in detail (D) in an effort to elucidate the Advaita concepts and bring out the import of the Ācārya's profound thoughts on the *Brahmasūtra-catuḥsūtrī*.

An extensive and in-depth content index of all the important concepts has been appended at the end of the book which will serve as a ready-reckoner and facilitate the reader revisit and easily refer to any portion of the commentary.

A work of this nature and presentation on the *Brahmasūtracatuḥsūtrī-śaṅkarabhāṣya* is not currently available for the students of Vedānta and is sure to fill a long felt need. The present exposition will be a valuable guide for comprehending the thought and spirit of the venerable Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the *Brahma-sūtra*, and Śaṅkarācārya, the revered Bhāṣyakāra.

The one who gains adequate familiarity with the thoughts expounded in the present work will be able to tread the spiritual path and surely come to gain a firm conviction on the nature of the non-dual Self, which alone is the chief purport of such a Vedāntic work.

If the students of philosophy and the seekers of Self-knowledge find this exposition useful in their pursuit, this labour of love offered with reverential devotion unto the Ācārya would be deemed to have found its fulfilment.

Dr. Kanshi Ram and Swami Advayananda
May 8, 2015, Chinmaya Jayantī

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS – MANUSCRIPTS

AA	–	Advaita Ashrama, Calcutta
ASS	–	Anandashram Sanskrit Series, Pune
AK	–	Achyutagranthamalakaryalay, Kashi
AL	–	Adyar Library and Research Centre, Chennai
C	–	Calcutta
CSS	–	Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Varanasi
KKK	–	Kamakotikosasthanam, Chennai
KP	–	Kadalankudi Publications, Chennai
MB	–	Motilal Banarsidass, New Delhi
MM	–	Munshiram Manoharlal Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi
NSP (I)	–	Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1909 Ed. B. M. Shastri (No.2 in Bibliography)
NSP (II)	–	Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1934 Ed. B. M. Shastri (also No.2 in Bibliography)
NSP (III)	–	Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1948 Ed. A. N. Ram (No.4 in Bibliography)
SES	–	Sanskrit Education Society, Chennai
VV	–	Vani Vilas Sanskrit Series, Srirangam
Tel	–	Bhāṣya in Telugu Script in possession with the author

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS – BOOKS

ईशावास्योपनिषद्	ईश.उ.	Iśāvāsyopaniṣad	Īśa.U.
ऋग्वेद	ऋ.वे.	Ṛgveda	Ṛ.Ve.
ऐतरेयोपनिषद्	ऐ.उ.	Aitareyopaniṣad	Ai.U.
ऐतरेयब्राह्मण	ऐ.ब्रा.	Aitareyabrāhmaṇa	Ai.Brā.
कठोपनिषद्	क.उ.	Kaṭhopaniṣad	Ka.U.
केनोपनिषद्	के.उ.	Kenopaniṣad	Ke.U
कैवल्योपनिषद्	कै.उ.	Kaivalyopaniṣad	Kai.U.
गौतमसूत्रम्	गौ.सू.	Gautamasūtram	–
छान्दोग्योपनिषद्	छा.उ.	Chāndogyopaniṣad	Chā.U.
तैत्तिरीयारण्यक	तै.आ.	Taittirīyāraṇyaka	Tai.Ā.
तैत्तिरीयोपनिषद्	तै.उ.	Taittirīyopaniṣad	Tai.U.
तैत्तिरीयब्राह्मण	तै.ब्रा.	Taittirīyabrāhmaṇa	Tai.Brā.
तैत्तरीयसंहिता	तै.सं	Taittarīyasaṁhitā	Tai.Saṁ
न्यायसूत्रम्	न्या.सू.	Nyāyasūtram	Nyā.Sū.
पूर्वमीमांसाभाष्यम्	पू.मी.भा	Pūrvamīmāṁsābhāṣyam	Pū.Mī.Bhā
पूर्वमीमांसासूत्रम्	पू.मी.सू.	Pūrvamīmāṁsāsūtram	Pū.Mī.Sū.
प्रश्नोपनिषद्	प्र. उ.	Praśnopaniṣad	Pra.U
बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्	बृ.उ.	Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad	Bṛ.U.
ब्रह्मसूत्रम्	–	Brahmasūtram	B.S.
भगवद्गीता	भ.गी.	Bhagavadgītā	B.G.
माण्डूक्योपनिषद्	मा.उ.	Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad	Mā.U
मुण्डकोपनिषद्	मु.उ.	Muṇḍakopaniṣad	Mu.U.
मैत्रायणीसंहिता	मै.सं.	Maitrāyaṇīsaṁhitā	Mai.Saṁ.
श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषद्	श्वे.उ.	Śvetāśvataropaniṣad	Śve.U.

Introduction to *Brahmasūtra-catuḥsūtrī*

Darśana

The term 'darśana', derived from the Sanskrit verbal root 'dṛś', literally means 'vision' or 'perspective'. In Indian philosophy the term refers to a śāstra, that is the means for the knowledge of truth.[1] Essentially, every Darśana broadly analyses the following six topics: (1) Jīva – Individual (e.g. Who am I?), (2) Jagat – World (e.g. What constitutes this world?), (3) Īśvara – God or Lord (e.g. Who created the individual and the world?), (4) Bandha – Bondage (e.g. What is the cause of sorrow?), (5) Mokṣa – Liberation (e.g. What is the nature of freedom from sorrow?) and finally (6) Sādhana – Means (e.g. How can I become liberated from sorrow?).

Āstika- and Nāstika-darśanas

Traditional Indian philosophy is broadly classified into two: Āstika and Nāstika. The difference between Āstika- and Nāstika-darśanas lies not in their belief or disbelief in the existence of God (Īśvara) but the touchstone is whether the Veda is, or is not, an authoritative means of knowledge (pramāṇa). This very classification of the Darśanas being Āstika or Nāstika based on the acceptance of the Veda as pramāṇa reveals the importance with which the Veda is held in the context of the Indian philosophical tradition.

The Āstika-darśanas are six in number and so too are the Nāstika-darśanas. The six Āstika-darśanas are: Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Pūrva-mīmāṁsā and Uttara-mīmāṁsā. The six Nāstika-darśanas are: Cārvāka, Sautrāntika, Vaibhāṣika, Yogācāra, Mādhyamika and Ārhata (Jaina). Of these six Nāstika-darśanas, the Sautrāntika, Vaibhāṣika, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika are all various sub-schools of Buddhism.

Thus, generally speaking, there are a total of twelve Darśanas or schools of philosophy in the Indian tradition.

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[1] Vide *"tattvajñānasādhanaṁ śāstraṁ darśanam."* (*Nyāyakośa*)

The Six Nāstika-darśanas

The Cārvāka school of Indian philosophy is completely materialistic in nature. The Cārvāka school does not believe in Ātman (soul), puṇya or pāpa, rebirth, other worlds (heaven or hell) or God (Īśvara). Their philosophy is captured well in this verse: *"yāvajjīvaṁ sukhaṁ jīved ṛṇaṁ kṛtvā ghṛtaṁ pibet, bhasmībhūtasya dehasya punarāgamanaṁ kutaḥ* – One ought to live life happily. It matters not if one runs even into debt if one can drink ghee (i.e. have delicacies dripping with ghee)! Indeed, where is the question of rebirth when the body (at death) has been burnt to ashes." Bādarāyaṇa, the author of *Brahma-sūtra,* identified in the Indian philosophical tradition with Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana Veda-vyāsa,[2] does not dwell at all upon the Cārvāka school in the *Brahma-sūtra,* for he holds the Cārvāka thesis to be unworthy of even refutation! Such is the repugnance with which the Cārvāka-darśana is held by all right thinking persons (śiṣṭa).

As mentioned before, the Sautrāntika-, the Vaibhāṣika-, the Yogācāra- and the Mādhyamika-darśanas are all different sub-schools of Buddhism. After the death of Buddha, his teachings were collected by a council established for this purpose and three treatises reflecting the Buddha's thought were brought out: (1) *Sutta-piṭaka,* which contains the statements of Buddha in an aphoristic form, (2) *Abhidhamma-piṭaka,* which endeavours to encapsulate the philosophical position of Buddha and (3) *Vinaya-piṭaka,* which deals with the code of conduct envisaged by Buddha. In course of time, divergent opinions crystalized as to what exactly is the true and the original teaching of Buddha. Four independent schools of Buddhism rose, each claiming to embody the actual spirit of Buddha's teachings: (1) the Sautrāntika school that lays emphasis on *Sutta-piṭaka,* (2) the Vaibhāṣika school that lays emphasis on *Abhidhamma-piṭaka,* (3) the Yogācāra school (Kṣaṇikavijñāna-vāda) which lays

[2] Veda-vyāsa is a well-known personage of the Indian tradition. He compiled and classified the Veda and authored the epic *Mahābhārata* and the various Purāṇas. He was born to Sage Parāśara and Satyavatī and is considered to be an incarnation of Lord Viṣṇu. That the author of the *Brahma-sūtra,* in Indian tradition, is held as being identical with Veda-vyāsa is evidenced by such statements as *"brahmasūtrakṛte tasmai vedavyāsāya vedhase, jñānaśaktyavatārāya namo bhagavato hareḥ." (Bhāmatī)*

emphasis on *Vinaya-piṭaka* and (4) Mādhyamika school (Śūnya-vāda) which claims to follow the middle path encompassing all the essential teachings of all the Piṭakas.[3] Bādarāyaṇa analyses and refutes all these four schools of Buddhism in his *Brahma-sūtra.*

The Ārhata-darśana was established by the Tīrthaṅkaras. They were altogether 24 in number, the first Tīrthaṅkara being Ṛṣabhadeva and the last one was Mahāvīra. The Tīrthaṅkaras are also called 'Jinas', that is those who have conquered the senses and the mind. Hence, their philosophy is also called the 'Jaina-darśana'. The Jaina-darśana has also been refuted by Bādarāyaṇa in the *Brahma-sūtra.*

Thus except for the Cārvāka-darśana, the *Brahma-sūtra* brings up for deliberation the various Nāstika schools for refutation.

The Six Āstika-darśanas

All the six Āstika-darśanas are founded on their respective aphoristic texts, the 'Sūtras', which have, in turn, been elaborately commented upon by their respective 'Bhāṣyakāras' (commentators). The following tabulation will give the reader an overview of all the six Āstika-darśanas:

S.No.	Āstika-darśana	Sūtrakāra	Bhāṣyakāra
1	Sāṅkhya	Kapila	Īśvarakṛṣṇa (the author of *Sāṅkhya-kārikā*)
2	Yoga	Patañjali	Vyāsa
3	Nyāya	Gautama	Vātsyāyana
4	Vaiśeṣika	Kaṇāda	Praśastapāda
5	Pūrva-mīmāṁsā	Jaimini	Śabarasvāmin
6	Uttara-mīmāṁsā	Bādarāyaṇa	Śaṅkarācārya (with respect to Advaita-vedānta)

Notwithstanding the fact that all the above-mentioned six Āstika-darśanas give credence to the Veda as being a pramāṇa (means of knowledge), the first four Āstika-darśanas – that is the Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika schools – give only a secondary importance to the Veda as being pramāṇa. These four schools use mainly tarka (reasoning) as the means to arrive at conclusions. It is for this reason that Śaṅkarācārya terms these Darśanas as 'tārkika'.

[3] The word 'piṭaka' means 'box' or 'basket'. It refers to a collection of writings.

As compared to these four Āstika-darśanas, the Pūrvamīmāṁsā- and Uttaramīmāṁsā-darśanas are strictly scriptural in nature; they keep the Veda as their primary source of authority and use reasoning only as a subsidiary means of knowledge.[4] Hence, these two – the Pūrvamīmāṁsā- and the Uttaramīmāṁsā-darśanas – are 'vaidika' in the truest sense of the term.

The Pūrvamīmāṁsā-darśana is based on the karma-kāṇḍa, the ritual section of the Veda, while the Uttaramīmāṁsā-darśana bases itself on the jñāna-kāṇḍa, the philosophical section of the Veda. The jñāna-kāṇḍa comprises of the Upaniṣads, which are termed 'Vedānta'.[5] Hence the Uttaramīmāṁsā-darśana is also called the Vedānta-darśana. Bādarāyaṇa, the Sūtrakāra of the Uttaramīmāṁsā-darśana (i.e. the Vedānta-darśana), takes up for analysis the philosophical doctrines of the other Āstika-darśanas and refutes them too in the *Brahma-sūtra*.

The term 'Sūtra'

The Sanskrit term 'Sūtra', translated as 'aphorism' in English, literally means 'thread' or a 'string'. The Sūtra strings together the important ideas and manifold thoughts pertaining to a particular topic.[6] Also, being aphoristic in structure, the Sūtra has to be pithy and concise. The Indian philosophical tradition defines the Sūtra thus: *"alpākṣaram asandigdhaṁ sāravad viśvatomukham, astobham anavadyaṁ ca sūtraṁ sūtravido viduḥ."* Accordingly, the Sūtra has the following six characteristics: (1) alpākṣaram – made of few words, (2) asandigdham – clear and unambiguous, (3) sāravat – contains the essence of the topic under deliberation, (4) viśvatomukham – having multiple facets, meaning it can be interpreted in more than one way, enabling thus more than one valid interpretation, (5) astobham – devoid of

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[4] Vide *"śrutimatastarko'nusandhīyatām."* (*Sādhana-pañcakam* of Śaṅkarācārya)

[5] The 'Upaniṣads' are termed the 'Vedānta', for they are found in the concluding or end portion (antima-bhāga) of the Veda. The term 'Vedānta' also means the essence (antaḥ – antaraḥ ÷ sāraḥ) of the Vedas.

[6] Thus the Bhāṣyakāra Śaṅkarācārya's statement on the *Brahma-sūtra*: *"vedāntavākyakusuma-grathanārthatvāt sūtrāṇām* – because the aphorisms have the purpose of stringing together the flowers of the Upaniṣadic passages." (Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Section 8)

redundant words (usually added for eulogy) that do not particularly add to the meaning of the sentence and (6) anavadyam – faultless (devoid of errors in grammar etc.) in the construction of the sentence or its meaning.[7]

The term 'Bhāṣya'

Bhāṣya is a term that is used in the Indian philosophical tradition to refer to a commentary. The term 'Bhāṣya' has been defined thus: *"sūtrārtho varṇyate yatra vākyaiḥ sūtrānukāribhiḥ, svapadāni ca varṇyante bhāṣyaṁ bhāṣyavido viduḥ* – Bhāṣya is a treatise that explains the meaning of the Sūtra (i.e. source text)[8] by statements compatible with the very words of the Sūtra and which also further elaborates its own words (i.e. the words used to explain the Sūtra)."

Bhāṣyas on the *Brahma-sūtra*

The *Brahma-sūtra* has been commented upon by Śaṅkarācārya as explicating the doctrine of Advaita. Rāmānujācārya has explained the *Brahma-sūtra* as explaining the doctrine of Viśiṣṭādvaita (qualified monism) while Madhvācārya has commented upon the *Brahma-sūtra* as explaining the doctrine of Dvaita (dualism). Rāmānujācārya's and Madhvācārya's Bhāṣyas are known as *Śrībhāṣya* and *Pūrṇaprajña-bhāṣya* respectively.

Commentators of the various other schools of Vedānta like Bhāskara (Bhedābheda), Nimbārka (Dvaitādvaita) have also written commentaries on the *Brahma-sūtra* to explicate their respective views on the Vedānta-darśana.

The following tabulation will give an overview of the important schools of Vedānta-darśana, their commentators (Bhāṣyakāra) and the names of their respective commentaries:

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[7] Vide *"alpākṣaram – mitaprāyaṁ vacanam; asandigdham – saṁśayarāhityena arthaprakāśanam; sāravat – sāravattvena arthābhidhānam; viśvatomukham – ekena vacasā bahūnām arthānāṁ saṁsūcanam; astobham – vyarthāpārthakaśabdarāhityam; anavadyam – vākye vākyārthe ca doṣarāhityam."* (*Bhakticandrikā* of Sacchidanandendra Saraswati). For a similar brief on 'Sūtra', refer to Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa, Section 2 D.

[8] The term 'Sūtra' here is indicative of all the source texts. Thus there can be Bhāṣyas on the Upaniṣads, the *Bhagavad-gītā* and other texts too.

S.No.	Vedāntic schools	Bhāṣyakāra	Name of the Bhāṣya
1	Advaita	Śaṅkara	Śārīrakamīmāṁsābhāṣya
2	Bhedābheda	Bhāskara	Bhāskarabhāṣya
3	Viśiṣṭādvaita	Rāmānuja	Śrībhāṣya
4	Dvaita	Madhva	Pūrṇaprajñabhāṣya
5	Dvaitādvaita	Nimbārka	Vedāntapārijātasaurabha
6	Śaivaviśiṣṭādvaita	Śrīkaṇṭha	Śaivabhāṣya
7	Śaktiviśiṣṭādvaita	Śrīpati	Śrīkarabhāṣya
8	Śuddhādvaita	Vallabha	Aṇubhāṣya
9	Avibhāgādvaita	Vijñānabhikṣu	Vijñānāmṛtabhāṣya
10	Acintyabhedābheda	Baladeva	Govindabhāṣya
11	Śaktyadvaita	Pañcānanatarkaratna	Śaktibhāṣya

Aphorisms in *Brahma-sūtra* – Total Number

The commentators differ in their opinion regarding the total number of aphorisms in the *Brahma-sūtra*. For example, according to Śaṅkarācārya, the number of aphorisms in *Brahma-sūtra* is a total of 555, while according to Rāmānujācārya, it is 562; and according to Madhvācārya it is 545. Rāmānujācārya, Madhvācārya and the other commentators are later in period to Śaṅkarācārya and they have arrived at the *Brahma-sūtra* as having a particular number of Sūtras by construing a Sūtra as more than one (by breaking it into shorter Sūtras) or by joining more than one Sūtra into a single Sūtra in order to delineate their respective theses.

The *Brahma-sūtra* – its Various Appellations

The term *Brahma-sūtra* indicates that the aphorisms of the treatise are meant to deliberate upon the true nature of Brahman. The *Brahma-sūtra* is known variously as the *Vedānta-sūtra* (for the text contains the aphorisms of the Vedānta-darśana), the *Uttaramīmāṁsā-sūtra* (as it deals with the Uttaramīmāṁsā-darśana), *Vedāntamīmāṁsā-śāstra* (as it inquires into Vedānta, the Upaniṣads) the *Bādarāyaṇa-sūtra* (since Bādarāyaṇa is the author), the *Śārīraka-sūtra* (as it delineates the nature of the 'śārīraka – the embodied soul') and as the *Bhikṣu-sūtra* (for the dispassionate monks are qualified to delve into its thoughts).

Brahma-sūtra – the Nyāya-prasthāna

Of the three foundational or canonical texts of the Uttaramīmāṁsā-darśana, that is the Vedānta-darśana, the *Brahma-sūtra* is one, the other two being the Upaniṣads and the *Bhagavad-gītā*. All these three – the Upaniṣads, the *Bhagavad-gītā* and the *Brahma-sūtra* – are together referred to in the Vedāntic tradition as the 'Prasthāna-traya'.

The Upaniṣads constitute the Śruti-prasthāna (by 'śruti – heard' is meant the 'revealed' primary source); the *Bhagavad-gītā* constitutes the Smṛti-prasthāna (by 'smṛti – remembered' is meant the authored secondary text); and the *Brahma-sūtra* constitutes the Nyāya-prasthāna, for it presents the teachings of Vedānta-darśana found in the Śruti- and Smṛti-prasthāna in a logical manner.

That the *Brahma-sūtra* is the Nyāya-prasthāna of the Vedānta-darśana is evident, for Bādarāyaṇa uses anumāna, the syllogism, while presenting the Sūtras. Often he merely states the hetu (probans), and by anuvṛtti, that is the process of bringing in the required information from a preceding Sūtra, the other aspects of the syllogistic statement like pakṣa (minor term or subject) and sādhya (probandum) are brought in to complete the sense of the Sūtra.[9]

Purpose Served by the *Brahma-sūtra*

Bādarāyaṇa has penned the *Brahma-sūtra* for the following reasons: (1) to resolve the apparent contradictions that are seen within the corpus of the Upaniṣadic literature, (2) to give clarity on the Upaniṣadic thought where the sentences of the Upaniṣads seem ambiguous, (3) to defend the Uttaramīmāṁsā-darśana from the criticisms of the other schools – both Āstika and Nāstika, and also (4) to bring to our attention the errors, fallacies and defects of the other Darśanas.

Structure of the *Brahma-sūtra*

The *Brahma-sūtra* is divided into four adhyāyas (chapters). Each adhyāya is in turn divided into four pādas (quarters) and each pāda is further sub-

[9] The Nyāya terms such as 'hetu', 'sādhya' and so on have been explained in the course of the text. One may refer to *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya*, Section 12, for an elaboration of these terms. For a detailed explanation of these terms one may refer to the *Tarkasaṅgraha* of Annambhaṭṭa.

divided into many adhikaraṇas (topical section).[10] There are altogether 191 adhikaraṇas in the *Brahma-sūtra*. It should be noted that there is no hard and fast rule about the number of Sūtras that an adhikaraṇa should contain. The following tabulation will help the reader grasp the arrangement of the *Brahma-sūtra*:

Adhyāya	First Pāda		Second Pāda		Third Pāda		Fourth Pāda		Total	
	Sūtra	Adhi-karaṇa	Sūtra	Adhi-karaṇa	Sūtra	Adhi-karaṇa	Sūtra	Adhi-karaṇa	Sūtra	Adhi-karaṇa
First	31	11	32	7	43	13	28	8	134	39
Second	37	13	45	8	53	17	22	9	157	47
Third	27	6	41	8	66	36	52	17	186	67
Fourth	19	14	21	11	16	6	22	7	78	38
Total	114	44	139	34	178	72	124	41	555	191

The First Four Adhyāyas of the *Brahma-sūtra*

The four chapters of the *Brahma-sūtra* are the Samanvaya-, Avirodha-, Sādhana- and Phala-adhyāyas.

In the first Samanvaya-adhyāya, which consists of 39 adhikaraṇas and 134 Sūtras, Bādarāyaṇa establishes that there is absolute harmony existing within the Upaniṣadic passages in concordantly revealing as their purport Brahman, the abhinna-nimittopādāna-kāraṇa (efficient cum material cause) of the world. By establishing this, the Sūtrakāra also thus proves that the Āstika-darśanas such as the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā, Sāṅkhya, Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika that respectively posit karma (sacrificial act) as the purport of the Veda, and Pradhāna, or Paramāṇu as the cause of the world are all built on faulty premises.

In the second Avirodha-adhyāya, which consists of 47 adhikaraṇas and 157 Sūtras, Bādarāyaṇa establishes that the Upaniṣads which explicate the Brahmātmaikya-vidyā (knowledge of the oneness of the Self and Brahman) is free of the three virodhas (i.e. inconsistencies): (1) paraspara-virodha – contradiction between the Upaniṣadic passages themselves, (2) smṛti-virodha – contradiction between the Upaniṣadic passages and the Smṛti texts

[10] An 'adhikaraṇa' is a thematic exposition with five limbs. For a detailed explanation on the term 'adhikaraṇa', refer to Jijñāsādhikaraṇa, Section 1.

and (3) yukti-virodha – contradiction between the Upaniṣads and reasoning. It is in the second Avirodha-adhyāya that the Sūtrakāra takes up for critical analysis all the Āstika- and Nāstika-darśanas and refutes them.

The third Sādhana-adhyāya consists of 67 adhikaraṇas and 186 Sūtras. Herein the Sūtrakāra discusses the various sādhanas (means), both antaraṅga-sādhana (śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana) and bahiraṅga-sādhana (karma and upāsanā).

The fourth and the last Phala-adhyāya consists of 38 adhikaraṇas and altogether 78 Sūtras. In this chapter, Mukti (Jīvan-mukti, Videha-mukti and Krama-mukti), the result, is deliberated upon.

The *Brahmasūtra-catuḥsūtrī* and Its Importance

The first four adhikaraṇas of the first Samanvayādhyāya are the Jijñāsādhikaraṇa, Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa and Samanvayādhikaraṇa. Each of these four adhikaraṇas contains only one Sūtra: the first Jijñāsādhikaraṇa consists of the first Sūtra *"athāto brahmajijñāsā"*; the second Janmādyadhikaraṇa consists of the second Sūtra *"janmādyasya yataḥ"*; the third Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa consists of the third Sūtra *"śāstrayonitvāt"*; and the fourth Samanvayādhikaraṇa consists of the fourth Sūtra *"tattu samanvayāt."* These four Sūtras are together termed the *Brahmasūtra-catuḥsūtrī.*

The entire treatise of the *Brahma-sūtra* truly speaking is only an amplification of these first four Sūtras. And, along with the detailed, analytical and lucid commentary of the Bhāṣyakāra Śaṅkarācārya on them, the *Brahmasūtra-catuḥsūtrī* forms the best compendium and the most comprehensive treatment on the Advaita-vedānta ever.

Any sincere student who makes a thorough and careful perusal of the *Brahmasūtra-catuḥsūtrī* is sure to get clarity of all the important concepts of the Advaitavedānta-darśana and is certain to attain the *summum bonum* of life.

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॥ ब्रह्मसूत्रचतुःसूत्रीशाङ्करभाष्यम् ॥

Brahmasūtracatuḥsūtrī-śāṅkarabhāṣyam

Śrī Śaṅkarācārya's Commentary
on the Catuḥsūtrī of Brahmasūtra

॥ उपोद्घातः – अध्यासभाष्यम् ॥

Upodghātaḥ – Adhyāsabhāṣyam

Preamble:
Commentary on Superimposition

Section 1 (Text in Devanāgarī)

[आक्षेपभाष्यम् – आत्मानात्मनोः परस्पराध्यासो मिथ्या]

युष्मदस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोः[1] विषयविषयिणोः[2] तमःप्रकाशवद्विरुद्धस्वभावयोः इतरेतरभावानुपपत्तौ[3] सिद्धायां,[4] तद्धर्माणामपि सुतराम् इतरेतरभावानुपपत्तिः — इत्यतः[5] अस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरे विषयिणि[6] चिदात्मके युष्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरस्य विषयस्य[7] तद्धर्माणां च अध्यासः, तद्विपर्ययेण[8] विषयिणः तद्धर्माणां च विषये अध्यासो मिथ्या इति भवितुं युक्तम्[9]।

Section 1 A (Text Transliterated)

[ĀKṢEPABHĀṢYAM – ĀTMĀNĀTMANOḤ PARASPARĀDHYĀSO MITHYĀ]

yuṣmadasmatpratyayagocarayoḥ viṣayaviṣayiṇoḥ tamaḥprakāśavadviruddhasvabhāvayoḥ itaretarabhāvānupapattau siddhāyāṁ, taddharmāṇāmapi sutarām itaretarabhāvānupapattiḥ — ityataḥ asmatpratyayagocare viṣayiṇi cidātmake yuṣmatpratyayagocarasya viṣayasya taddharmāṇāṁ ca adhyāsaḥ, tadviparyayeṇa viṣayiṇaḥ taddharmāṇāṁ ca viṣaye adhyāso mithyā iti bhavituṁ yuktam.

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[1] अत्र च युष्मदस्मद् इत्यादिः मिथ्येति भवितुं युक्तं इत्यन्तः शङ्काग्रन्थः। तथापि इत्यादिः परिहारग्रन्थः। तथापि इत्यभिसम्बन्धाच्छङ्कायां यद्यपीति पठितव्यम्। – भामती

मिथ्येति भवितुं युक्तं यद्यपि तथापीति योजना। – भामती

आदावध्यासमाक्षिपति—युष्मदस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोः इत्यादिना मिथ्येति भवितुं युक्तम् इत्यन्तेन भाष्येण। – न्यायनिर्णय

उत्तरत्र तथापीत्यभिसम्बन्धाद् यद्यपीति पूरणीयम्। तथा च युष्मदस्मदोरित्यादि युक्तमित्यन्तं शङ्काभाष्यं तथापीत्यादि परिहारभाष्यमिति निष्कर्षः। – प्रदीप

[2] चित्स्वभाव आत्मा विषयी, जडस्वभावा बुद्धीन्द्रियदेहविषया विषयाः। एते हि चिदात्मानं विसिन्वन्ति अवबध्नन्ति, स्वेन रूपेण निरूपणीयं कुर्वन्तीति यावत्। – भामती

विषयः – पराग्, इदंप्रतीतियोग्यं दृश्यं, शरीरान्तःकरणादि। विषयि – दृग्रूपं स्वयंप्रकाशमानं स्वव्यवहारे स्वेतरानपेक्षं शुद्धचैतन्यस्वरूपं, प्रत्यक्-चैतन्यमिति यावत्। – प्रदीप

[3] इतरेतरभावः इतरेतरत्वं, तादात्म्यमिति यावत्, तस्यानुपपत्ताविति। – भामती

इतरेतरभावानुपपत्तौ – तादात्म्यप्रतीत्यनुपपत्तौ। – प्रदीप

[4] तादात्म्यलक्षणकार्यस्यानुपपत्तौ सिद्धायामित्यर्थः। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

इतरेतरभावानुपपत्तौ सिद्धायां तादात्म्यप्रतीत्यनुपपत्तौ सिद्धायाम्। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

[5] इतिशब्दो हेत्वर्थः। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

[6] बुद्ध्यादिसाक्षिणीत्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

[7] साक्षिभास्यस्येत्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

[8] तद्विपर्ययेणेति उत्तरत्र अध्यासः इत्यनेन सम्बध्यते। एकत्र आत्मा अधिष्ठानं अन्यत्र जडोऽधिष्ठानं इत्यध्यासयोर्वैपरीत्यम्। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

[9] युक्तमिति वक्तव्ये इति भवितुमिति आक्षेपस्य सम्भावनैव मूलं, नात्र मानमिति दर्शयितुमुक्तम्। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

Section 1 B (Word Meaning)

युष्मदस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोः *yuṣmadasmatpratyayagocarayoḥ* – (between) the contents of the two notions 'thou' and 'I'; विषयविषयिणोः *viṣayaviṣayiṇoḥ* – the object and the subject; तमःप्रकाशवद्विरुद्धस्वभावयोः *tamaḥprakāśavadviruddhasvabhāvayoḥ* – that are by nature opposed to each other like darkness and light; इतरेतरभावानुपपत्तौ सिद्धायाम् *itaretarabhāvānupapattau siddhāyām* – (when) the impossibility of (their) mutual identity is certain; तद्धर्माणाम् अपि सुतराम् इतरेतरभावानुपपत्तिः *taddharmāṇām api sutarām itaretarabhāvānupapattiḥ* – the mutual transfer of their (respective) attributes is all the more impossible; इति अतः *iti ataḥ* – due to this reason; अस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरे विषयिणि चिदात्मके *asmatpratyayagocare viṣayiṇi cidātmake* – on the subject, the conscious Self, the content of 'I'-notion; युष्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरस्य विषयस्य *yuṣmatpratyayagocarasya viṣayasya* – of the object, the content of 'thou'-notion; तद्धर्माणां च *taddharmāṇāṁ ca* – and of its attributes; अध्यासः *adhyāsaḥ* – superimposition; तद्विपर्ययेण *tadviparyayeṇa* – conversely by implication; विषयिणः तद्धर्माणां च *viṣayiṇaḥ taddharmāṇāṁ ca* – of the subject and its attributes; विषये *viṣaye* – on the object; अध्यासः *adhyāsaḥ* – superimposition; मिथ्या इति भवितुं युक्तम् *mithyā iti bhavituṁ yuktam* – cannot be logically there

Section 1 C (Translation)

[THE OBJECTION: THE MUTUAL SUPERIMPOSITION OF THE SELF AND THE NOT-SELF IS AN IMPOSSIBILITY]

The contents of the two notions 'thou' and 'I', the object and the subject, are by nature opposed to each other like darkness and light.[1] Hence, it is certain that these two cannot be identified mutually;[2] accordingly it is all the more impossible[3] that their respective attributes too are mutually transferred.[4] Due to this reason, it must follow logically that there cannot be[5] any superimposition of the object, the content of 'thou'-notion, and the superimposition of its attributes on the subject, the conscious Self, the content of 'I'-notion; and conversely by implication,[6] there cannot be logically any superimposition of the subject and its attributes on the object.

Section 1 D (Notes)

Brahma-sūtra adopts the method of logical inquiry and critical analysis to demonstrate the sole purpose of all the Upaniṣads (Vedānta) as the unity of Self with Brahman. At the beginning of his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra,* Ācārya Śaṅkara takes up for exposition the fundamental topic of adhyāsa. Hence this introductory section is generally called *'Adhyāsa-bhāṣya'*. The term 'adhyāsa' denotes 'cognitional error'. It is generally translated as 'superimposition'. Erroneous cognition of taking something to be something else is superimposition. Vedānta aims at the Realisation of the unity of the Self with Brahman by destroying itaretara-adhyāsa, that is, the mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self. Hence a discussion on adhyāsa is a prerequisite. Thus it is apt that Śrī Śaṅkara takes up adhyāsa for discussion at the very outset. He commences the discussion by challenging the very concept of adhyāsa itself through the words of the opponent (Pūrvapakṣin).[10]

1. like darkness and light: The mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self is destroyed by the Realisation of the Self as being one with Brahman. But the opponent declares that the superimposition of the Self and the not-

[10] It is a time-honoured tradition among Indian writers to perform maṅgala (invocation) at the commencement of their works. But Ācārya Śaṅkara starts his *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* without any invocation. The commentators of the Bhāṣya however clarify the point: The very first sentence of the Bhāṣya begins with "the notions of thou and I" and ends as "these two cannot be mutually identified and their attributes cannot be mutually transferred." (Vide *"yuṣmadasmatpratyayagocarayoḥ viṣayaviṣayiṇoḥ tamaḥprakāśavadviruddhasvabhāvayoḥ itaretara-bhāvānupapattau siddhāyāṁ, taddharmāṇāmapi sutarām itaretarabhāvānupapattiḥ.")* Hence this sentence should actually be viewed as a proper invocation of the supreme Reality. This should certainly be so, because the ultimate purport (parama-tātparya) of the sentence is: The entity which is free from all evils and of the nature of homogeneous Consciousness is none other than the Self, the supreme Reality.

Cf. यत्तु मङ्गलाचरणाभावाद् अव्याख्येयमिदं भाष्यम् इति तन्न। 'युष्मदस्मद्' इत्यादि 'सुतरामितरेतरभावानुपपत्तिः' इत्यन्तभाष्यरचनार्थं तदर्थस्य सर्वोपप्लवरहितस्य विज्ञानघनप्रत्यगर्थस्य तत्त्वस्य स्मृतत्वात्। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. अर्थात् च 'सुतरामितरेतरभावानुपपत्तिः' इत्यन्तेन अनुपप्लुतं चिन्मात्रमात्मानम् अनुसन्दधानः तत्त्वानुस्मरणं मङ्गलाचरणं विघ्नोपशमनाद्यर्थं सम्पादयति। – न्यायनिर्णय

Also, cf. युष्मदस्मदित्यादिना मिथ्येति भवितुं युक्तमित्यन्तेन भाष्येणार्थाच्च सुतरामितरेतरभावानुपपत्तिरित्यन्तेन तत्त्वानुस्मरणलक्षणं मङ्गलाचरणं सम्पादयति। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

Self to be a logical impossibility. The reason is that the Self and the not-Self are absolutely dissimilar, and by nature are mutually opposed to each other, and as such cannot be mutually superimposed. In this context the analogy of darkness and light is given here to explain that the superimposition of the Self and the not-Self is a logical impossibility.[11] This analogy helps us to appreciate:

(1) the total dissimilarity between the object and the subject, and

(2) the utter impossibility of their reciprocal superimposition.

Indeed, never can darkness and light be mistaken for each other. They are dissimilar[12] by nature. It is well-known that the similarity (like glittering) between two given entities (shell and silver) accounts for the superimposition of one upon the other. In the present case the object (viṣaya) is not-Self which is jaḍa (inert). The subject (viṣayin) is Self, the pure Consciousness which is svayam-prakāśa (self-luminous). They are as opposed to each other as darkness and light. How can these two dissimilar entities be mistaken for each other?

The terms 'yuṣmad' and 'asmad' are used as words indicative of the 'object' and the 'subject' respectively. While it is clear that the term 'asmad' (I) is indicative of the subject, a doubt arises as to how the term 'yuṣmad' (thou) could be indicative of the object. Being a personal pronoun, 'yuṣmad' stands for a person rather than for an object. It appears that 'idam' (this) is a better word to indicate an object. But the Ācārya obviously prefers the word 'yuṣmad' to 'idam'. On careful examination we will realise that the word 'yuṣmad' is indeed better suited to bring out the contrast between the subject and the object. 'Idam', we observe, is often used in combination with 'asmad'

[11] Cf. परस्परानध्यासहेतौ अत्यन्तवैलक्षण्ये दृष्टान्तः—तमःप्रकाशवद् इति। न हि जातु कश्चित्समुदाचरद्वृत्तिनी प्रकाशतमसी परस्परात्मतया प्रतिपत्तुमर्हति। – भामती

Also, cf. तमःप्रकाशवद्विरुद्धस्वभावयोरिति। अनेन च सादृश्यज्ञानासम्भव उपक्षिप्यते। – प्रदीप

Also, cf. अत्र युष्मत्प्रययगोचरत्वं युष्मच्छब्दोल्लेखिप्रत्ययगोचरत्वं विषयस्य शरीरादेः। अस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरत्वं अस्मच्छब्दोल्लेखि-प्रत्ययगोचरत्वं विषयिणः आत्मनः। अनेन च विरुद्धप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तकशब्दप्रतिपाद्यत्वेन भेदग्रहो दर्शितः। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

[12] Cf. तमःप्रकाशवद् विरुद्धस्वभावयोः—तथाऽवगतयोः इति यावत्। भेदाग्रहाभावसिद्ध्यर्थं विरुद्धस्वभावत्वग्रहणमेव प्रतिपादनीयमिति तथा व्याख्यातम्। विरुद्धस्वभावत्वं च परस्परानात्मत्वम्। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

as in the usages like "aham idam" (I am this) and "ete vayam" (these we are).[13] But the word 'yuṣmad' is never combined with 'asmad'.

Apart from similarity being the basis, yet another basis for the superimposition of one thing on the other is the 'non-discrimination between those two things' (viveka-agraha). To emphasise that this is also missing in the mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self, the opponent uses the expressions 'viṣaya' (object) and 'viṣayin' (subject). The opponent's point is: In the case of superimposition like that of shell–silver, both the shell and the silver are only objects and neither of them is the subject, that is the superimposing person. Therefore, superimposition is very much possible. But in the case of the 'Self and not-Self error', since the Self is the subject and the not-Self falls under the category of object – how is superimposition ever possible? For the Self and the not-Self are dissimilar and their distinctiveness, too, is evident. However, the Ācārya will show later that in the case of mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self, the content of 'I'-notion is reduced to the status of an object[14] and therefore superimposition is very much possible.

2. cannot be identified mutually: *"dharmiṇoḥ itaretarabhāvaḥ itaretaratvaṁ tādātmyam."* Mutual identity is possible only between two similar substances.

3. all the more impossible: When two loci of given attributes are absolutely distinct and unrelated, like darkness and light, it automatically follows that their respective attributes should be much more unrelated. Hence, how can such attributes be mutually transferred by mistake? This is suggested by 'all the more impossible' (*"sutarām anupapattiḥ"*).[15]

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[13] Cf. इदमस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोरिति वक्तव्ये युष्मद्ग्रहणमत्यन्तभेदोपलक्षणार्थम्। यथा ह्यहङ्कारप्रतियोगी त्वङ्कारो नैवमिदङ्कारः, एते वयम् इमे वयमास्मह इति बहुलं प्रयोगदर्शनादिति। – भामती

Also, cf. इदमस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोरिति वक्तव्ये युष्मद्ग्रहणमत्यन्तभेदोपलक्षणार्थं, त्वङ्कारवदिदङ्कारस्याहङ्कारप्रतियोगित्वाभानाद्, एते वयम् इति प्रयोगदर्शनात्। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

Also, cf. यद्यपि इदंशब्दोल्लेखिप्रत्ययगोचरत्वमेव जडस्य वक्तुमुचितं, सम्बोध्यचेतनस्यैव हि युष्मच्छब्दोल्लेखिप्रत्ययगोचरत्वं, तथापि इदंशब्दोल्लेखिप्रत्ययगोचर एव स्वभिन्नत्वगुणयोगाद् अत्यन्तविरोधख्यापनाय तथोपचरितः। इदमस्मच्छब्दयोर्हि 'इमे वयं' 'अयमहमस्मि' (छा.उ.८.१.१.१) इति लौकिकवैदिकसामानाधिकरण्यव्यवहारप्राचुर्यात् तथा विरोधो न स्फुरति। युष्मदस्मच्छब्दयोस्तु प्रचुरसामानाधिकरण्यप्रयोगाभावात् स्फुरति विरोधः। अनेन च ममेदं शरीरं इति प्रतीतिर्दर्शिता। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

[14] न तावदयमेकान्तेनाविषयः, अस्मत्प्रत्ययविषयत्वाद् अपरोक्षत्वाच्च प्रत्यगात्मप्रसिद्धेः। – अध्यासभाष्य

[15] Cf. तदिह पारिशेष्याद्विषयविषयिणोः अन्योन्यात्मसम्भेदेनैव तद्धर्माणामपि परस्परसम्भेदेन विनिमयात्मना भवितव्यं, तौ

4. mutually transferred: *"dharmāṇām itaretarabhāvaḥ itarasya itaratra bhāvaḥ vinimayaḥ."*[16]

5. there cannot be: *"mithyāśabdaḥ apahnavavacanaḥ* – the word 'mithyā' denotes denial." (Vide *Bhāmatī.*) Thus according to the opponent, there is no possibility of any mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self and of their attributes because the factors necessary for generating superimposition do not exist at all.[17]

6. conversely by implication: The expression 'tadviparyayeṇa' is a 'tatpuruṣa' compound: 'tasya (viṣayasya) viparyayeṇa', which means 'the converse of the object', that is the 'viṣayin' (subject). The term 'viparyaya' generally means 'illusion' or 'error'. But 'viparyaya' here is used in the sense of 'converse'. The third case-ending denotes implication (itthambhūtalakṣaṇa-tṛtīyā). Thus the compound comes to mean 'converse of the object by implication', that is 'conversely by implication'.

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चेद्धर्मिणौ अत्यन्तविवेकेन गृह्यमाणौ असम्भिन्नौ, असम्भिन्नाः सुतरां तयोर्धर्माः, स्वाश्रयाभ्यां व्यवधानेन दूरापेतत्वात्। – भामती

Also, cf. ननु एवमात्मानात्मनोः पराक्प्रत्यक्त्वेन चिदचित्त्वेन ग्राह्यग्राहकत्वेन च विरोधात् तमःप्रकाशवदैक्यस्य तादात्म्यस्य वानुपपत्तौ सत्यां तत्प्रमित्यभावेऽपि तद्धर्माणां चैतन्यसुखजाड्यदुःखादीनां विनिमयेन अध्यासोऽस्तु इत्यत आह—तद्धर्माणामपीति। तयोरात्मानात्मनोर्धर्मास्तेषामपि इतरेतरभावानुपपत्तिः—इतरत्र धर्म्यन्तरे इतरेषां धर्माणां भावः संसर्गस्तस्य अनुपपत्तिरित्यर्थः। नहि धर्मिणोः संसर्गं विना धर्माणां विनिमयोऽस्ति। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. एवं स्थिते स्वाश्रयमतिरिच्य धर्माणामन्यत्र भावानुपपत्तिः सुप्रसिद्धेति दर्शयति। –पञ्चपादिका

Also, cf. तद्धर्माणामपि सुतरामितरेतरभावानुपपत्तिः इतरेतरभावः धर्माणां व्यत्यासः, तदध्यासानुपपत्तिः। धर्म्यभेदाध्यासाभावादेव धर्माध्यासाभावे अर्थसिद्धे पुनः प्रतिपादनं शङ्काविशेषनिराकरणार्थम्। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

[16] Cf. इतरत्र धर्मिणि धर्माणां भावः विनिमयः। – भामती

[17] Cf. मिथ्येति, नास्तीति भवितुं युक्तम्, अध्याससामग्र्यभावात्। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. मिथ्याशब्दो द्वयर्थः—अपह्नववचनोऽनिर्वचनीयतावचनश्चेति। अत्र च अपह्नवार्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. मिथ्या – असम्भवदुक्तिक इति पदार्थनिष्कर्षः। – प्रदीप

Also, cf. मिथ्याशब्दो द्वयर्थः—अपह्नववचनोऽनिर्वचनीयतावचनश्च। अत्र—अयमपह्नववचनः। मिथ्येति भवितुं युक्तम् – अभाव एवाध्यासस्य युक्त इत्यर्थः। – पञ्चपादिका

Also, cf. मिथ्येति भवितुं युक्तमिति। न सम्भवतीति यावत्। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

2

[अध्याससमर्थनभाष्यम्]

तथापि[1] अन्योऽन्यस्मिन् अन्योऽन्यात्मकताम् अन्योऽन्यधर्मांश्च अध्यस्य इतरेतरावि॒वेकेन[2] अत्यन्तविविक्तयोः धर्मधर्मिणोः,[3] मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तः,[4] सत्यानृते मिथुनीकृत्य,[5] 'अहम् इदम्',[6] 'मम इदम्'[7] इति नैसर्गिकः अयं[8] [ɪ]लोकव्यवहारः।

2 A

[ADHYĀSASAMARTHANABHĀṢYAM]

tathāpi anyo'nyasmin anyo'nyātmakatām anyo'nyadharmāṁśca adhyasya itaretarāvivekena atyantaviviktayoḥ dharmadharmiṇoḥ, mithyājñānanimittaḥ,

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[ɪ] ASS (fn.) -व्यवहारश्च

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[1] एतदनुरोधादादौ यद्यपीति पठितव्यम्। – रत्नप्रभा

यद्यप्येवं तथापि। – पञ्चपादिका

मम शरीरमिति विवेके सत्यपि नाहं मनुष्यः इत्येवंरूपस्य अपरोक्षस्य विवेकस्याभावाद् अध्यास उपपद्यत इति तात्पर्यम्। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

[2] विवेकाग्रहणेनेत्यर्थः। – भामती

[3] कोऽयमध्यासो यो विषयादिसिद्धिहेतुरित्याशङ्क्य तल्लक्षणमाह—अन्योन्यस्मिन् इत्यादिना धर्मधर्मिणोः इत्यन्तेन। – न्यायनिर्णय

[4] मिथ्या च तदज्ञानं च मिथ्याऽज्ञानं तद् निमित्तम् उपादानं यस्य स तन्निमित्तस्तदुपादानक इत्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

मिथ्या च तदज्ञानं च मिथ्याऽज्ञानम्। मिथ्येत्यनिर्वचनीयतोच्यते। अज्ञानमिति च जडात्मिकाऽविद्याशक्तिर्ज्ञानपर्युदासेनोच्यते। तन्निमित्तः – तदुपादान इत्यर्थः। – पञ्चपादिका

मिथ्याऽज्ञानमिति कर्मधारयसमासः। मिथ्या च तदज्ञानं, तन्निमित्तमुपादानं यस्येति विग्रहः। तत्र मिथ्येत्युक्ते भ्रान्तिज्ञानमिति शङ्का स्यात्, तन्निवृत्तये अज्ञानमित्युक्तम्। अज्ञानमात्रग्रहणे च ज्ञानाभाव इति शङ्केत, अतो मिथ्येति विशेषणम्। अतोऽनिर्वचनीयतयाऽभाव-विलक्षणमनादिसिद्धं ज्ञाननिवर्त्यमज्ञानमिति दर्शितम्। तन्निमित्तः तदुपादान इत्यर्थः। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

किं पुनरध्यासस्य कारणमित्याशङ्क्य निमित्तमात्रमुपादानं वा निमित्तविशेषो वा पृच्छ्यत इति विकल्प्याद्यौ प्रत्याह—मिथ्येति। मिथ्या च तदज्ञानं, च तद् निमित्तमुपादानं यस्य सोऽध्यासस्तथा। तत्र मिथ्येत्युक्ते भ्रान्तिज्ञानप्राप्तावज्ञानमित्युक्तम्। तन्मात्रग्रहे ज्ञानाभावशङ्कायां मिथ्येति। तेनानिर्वाच्यत्वेनाभावविलक्षणं ज्ञाननिवर्त्यमनाद्यज्ञानम्। तदुपादानोऽध्यास इत्यर्थः। – न्यायनिर्णय

मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्त इति। अनृताज्ञाननिबन्धन इत्यर्थः। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

[5] सत्यम् – अनिदं, चैतन्यम्। अनृतं – युष्मदर्थः। – पञ्चपादिका

विवेकाग्रहाद्ध्यस्येति योजना। सत्यं चिदात्मा, अनृतं बुद्धीन्द्रियदेहादि, ते द्वे धर्मिणी मिथुनीकृत्य युगलीकृत्येत्यर्थः। – भामती

सत्यमनिदं चैतन्यं, तस्य संसृष्टरूपेणाध्यस्तत्वेऽपि स्वरूपेणानध्यस्तत्वात्। अनृतमहङ्कारादिः, स्वरूपतोऽप्यध्यस्तत्वात्। तदुभयमिथुनीकरणरूपोऽध्यास इति यावत्। – न्यायनिर्णय

[6] अत्र अहमिदम् इत्यनेन मनुष्योऽहम् इति तादात्म्याध्यासो दर्शितः। – रत्नप्रभा

अत्र अन्योऽन्यस्मिन् अन्योन्यात्मकताध्यासस्योदाहरणम् अहमिति। – प्रदीप

[7] ममेदं शरीरम् इति संसर्गाध्यासः। – रत्नप्रभा

अन्योऽन्यधर्मांश्चाध्यस्येत्यस्योदाहरणं ममेदमिति। – प्रदीप

[8] अज्ञः कर्ता मनुष्योऽहम् इति प्रत्यक्षानुभवाद्ध्यासस्य अभानमसिद्धमित्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

नैसर्गिकः – प्रत्यक्चैतन्यसत्तामात्रानुबन्धी। अयं – युष्मदस्मदोरितरेतराध्यासात्मकः अहमिदं ममेदमिति लोकव्यवहारः। – पञ्चपादिका

अयमित्यनुभवसिद्धतामाह। लोक्यत इति लोकः, प्राणिसमूहः। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

satyānṛte mithunīkṛtya, 'aham idam', 'mama idam' iti naisargikaḥ ayaṁ lokavyavahāraḥ.

2 B

तथापि *tathāpi* – yet; अन्योऽन्यस्मिन् *anyo'nyasmin* – on each one of them; अन्योऽन्यात्मकताम् *anyo'nyātmakatām* – the nature of being the other; अन्योऽन्यधर्मान् च *anyo'nyadharmān ca* – and the attributes of the other; अध्यस्य *adhyasya* – after superimposing; इतरेतराविवेकेन *itaretarāvivekena* – on account of mutual non-discrimination; अत्यन्तविविक्तयोः *atyantaviviktayoḥ* – of those that are absolutely distinct; धर्मधर्मिणोः *dharmadharmiṇoḥ* – the attributes and the loci of attributes; मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तः *mithyājñānanimittaḥ* – as a result of the illusory cognition; सत्यानृते मिथुनीकृत्य *satyānṛte mithunīkṛtya* – through the coupling of the real and the unreal; 'अहम् इदम्', 'मम इदम्' *'aham idam', 'mama idam'* – 'I am this', 'this is mine'; इति *iti* – in this manner; नैसर्गिकः *naisargikaḥ* – natural; अयं लोकव्यवहारः *ayaṁ lokavyavahāraḥ* – (is) this usage by men of the world

2 C

[SUPERIMPOSITION ESTABLISHED]

Yet, there is[1] this natural usage[2] by men of the world[3] – 'I am this',[4] 'this is mine'[5] as a result of the illusory cognition,[6] (which is born) after superimposing on each the nature of being the other, and after superimposing on each the attributes of the other, on account of non-discrimination[7] of (their) attributes and the loci of attributes that are absolutely distinct,[8] through the coupling of the real and the unreal.

2 D

1. Yet, there is: This section consists of one single compound sentence. It is construed variously by different commentaries. Following *Bhāmatī*, it can be construed as follows:

तथापि अत्यन्तविविक्तयोः धर्मधर्मिणोः, सत्यानृते मिथुनीकृत्य, इतरेतराविवेकेन,

(1) अन्योऽन्यस्मिन् अन्योऽन्यात्मकताम् अध्यस्य मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तः 'अहम् इदम्' इति

(2) (तथैव अविवेकेन) अन्योऽन्यस्मिन् अन्योऽन्यधर्मांश्च अध्यस्य मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तः 'मम इदम्' इति च नैसर्गिकोऽयं लोकव्यवहारः (भवति)।

tathāpi atyantaviviktayoḥ dharmadharmiṇoḥ, satyānṛte mithunīkṛtya, itaretarāvivekena,

(1) *anyo'nyasmin anyo'nyātmakatām adhyasya mithyājñānanimittaḥ 'aham idam' iti*

(2) (*tathaiva avivekena*) *anyo'nyasmin anyo'nyadharmāṁśca adhyasya mithyājñānanimittaḥ 'mama idam' iti ca naisargiko'yaṁ lokavyavahāraḥ (bhavati).*[9]

2. this natural usage: The description of the usage (vyavahāra) as 'natural' (naisargika) indicates that the usage is beginningless (i.e. it has continued since eternity) and hence its cause superimposition is also naturally beginningless.[10]

3. usage by men of the world: Here the term 'usage' signifies the verbal usage – *lokānāṁ janānāṁ vyavahāraḥ, lokavyavahāraḥ.*[11] For details see Section 9 D, n.4.

4. 'I am this' refers to the usages like 'I am a man', 'I am so and so' and such others. In all these cases we find that the Self and the body are mutually superimposed.[12]

5. 'this is mine' stands for expressions such as 'I am dark', 'I am tall' and so on. In all such instances the colour, the height and so on of the body are superimposed on the Self.[13]

6. illusory cognition is the same as superimposition (adhyāsa) and is the cause of the usages like 'I am this' and 'this is mine' because the existence and

[9] The construal given by the *Pradīpa* commentary is as follows:
अत्यन्तविविक्तयोर्धर्मधर्मिणोरितरेतराविवेकेन अहमिति अन्योऽन्यस्मिन्नन्योन्यात्मकतां ममेदमिति अन्योन्यधर्मांश्चाध्यस्य सत्यानृते मिथुनीकृत्य मिथ्याऽज्ञाननिमित्तोऽयं लोकव्यवहारो नैसर्गिक इति योजना।

[10] Cf. स्वाभाविकोऽनादिरयं व्यवहारः। – भामती

Also, cf. प्रवाहरूपेण अनादिः। – न्यायनिर्णय

Also, cf. प्रत्यगात्मनि हेतुहेतुमद्भावेन अध्यासप्रवाहोऽनादिरित्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. व्यवहारनैसर्गिकत्वोक्त्या तत्कारणस्याध्यासस्य नैसर्गिकत्वमाक्षिप्तमिति प्रकृतशङ्कानिराकरणलाभः। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

[11] Cf. लोकव्यवहारः लोकानां व्यवहारः। स च अयमहम् इति व्यपदेशः। इतिशब्दसूचितश्च शरीराद्यनुकूलं प्रतिकूलं च प्रमेयजातं प्रमाणेन प्रमाय तदुपादानपरिवर्जनादिः। – भामती

Also, cf. लोक इति – मनुष्योऽहमित्यभिमन्यमानः प्राणिनिकाय उच्यते। व्यवहरणं व्यवहारः, लोक इति व्यवहारो लोकव्यवहारः, मनुष्योऽहमित्यभिमान इत्यर्थः। – पञ्चपादिका

Also, cf. व्यवहरणं व्यवहारः। अभिज्ञाभिवदने लोकव्यवहारः। लोकव्यवहारो मनुष्योऽहमिति शब्दसङ्केतितोऽभिज्ञानमित्यर्थः। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

[12] Cf. अन्योऽन्यस्मिन् धर्मिणि आत्मशरीरादौ अन्योऽन्यात्मकताम् अध्यस्य 'अहमिदं शरीरादि' इति। – भामती

[13] Cf. एतेन स्थूलोऽहं गच्छामीत्यादयोऽप्यध्यासतया व्याख्याताः। – भामती

non-existence of superimposition decide the existence and non-existence of these usages.[14] The same causal nature of superimposition is also indicated by the next expression 'adhyasya' (after superimposing).

7. non-discrimination is the cause of superimposition which, in turn, becomes the cause of the worldly usages – 'I am this' and 'this is mine'.

8. absolutely distinct: The distinctness in the case of the loci of attributes is their non-identity (atādātmya), and in the case of attributes, the distinctness signifies their non-confusion (asaṅkīrṇatā).[15]

The objection to the mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self that is presented by the opponent in Section 1 proceeds from the assumption that the not-Self (body, mind, intellect, etc.) is the object (or content) of the 'thou'-notion (yuṣmatpratyayagocara), and is hence diametrically opposed to the Self, the object of the 'I'-notion (asmatpratyayagocara). The present section establishes the existence of adhyāsa by elaborating its nature (svarūpa), cause (nimitta) and effect (phala):

(1) The nature of adhyāsa is described as 'superimposing on each the nature of being the other and on each the attributes of the other'.
(2) The cause of adhyāsa is the non-discrimination of the attributes and the loci of attributes that are absolutely distinct.
(3) The result of adhyāsa is the verbal usage 'I am this' and 'this is mine' made by men of the world.

Thus the passage under study establishes that the mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self is not an untenable one; but it is a fact, indisputable.

The fundamental question in the present context is: How could this *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya* serve as a relevant introduction to (*Brahma-sūtra,* 1.1.1) *"athāto brahmajijñāsā"*? Why, in this introduction, should the Ācārya establish that

[14] Cf. मिथ्याज्ञानमध्यासस्तन्निमित्तः। तद्भावाभावानुविधानाद्व्यवहारभावाभावयोरित्यर्थः। – भामती
[15] Cf. परमार्थतो धर्मिणोरतादात्म्यं विवेको धर्माणां चासङ्कीर्णता विवेकः। – भामती

empirical experiences such as 'I', 'I am a man', etc., are due to the mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self? The answer is: The author of the *Brahma-sūtra* begins his treatise by introducing the desire to know Brahman (brahma-jijñāsā) in the first aphorism. This desire naturally generates an inquiry into brahmātmaikya (Brahman–Ātman identity) the subject desired to be known – and it is this inquiry that is being presented by the author from the second aphorism onwards. But men of intelligence desire to know a given thing and conduct an inquiry for gaining knowledge about that thing only under two conditions:

(1) When they have a doubt about the subject.

(2) When they are sure that the knowledge gained through the inquiry would be purposeful.

Indeed, we do not entertain a desire to know about a pot existing in broad day light and which can easily be seen, for we do not have any doubt about it; or about the number of teeth of a crow since an inquiry in this case is purposeless.[16] This being the case, brahma-jijñāsā presupposes the above two conditions: (1) doubt or misconception about Brahman, and (2) a definite purpose to be served by the knowledge obtained through the inquiry.

The Pūrvapakṣin (opponent) claims that both these conditions are absent in the present context as we shall see below.

(1) The final conclusion of Advaita-darśana is that the individual Self is the same as the supreme Brahman. The Self is well ascertained by one and all without an iota of doubt or misconception. Indeed, no one entertains a doubt about the existence of his own Self as 'I am' or 'I am not'. Neither does any one have a misconception about the Self as 'this is not me at all'. Thus, as there is no doubt or misconception about one's own Self, and since Advaita-darśana postulates the Self as being one with Brahman, no brahma-jijñāsā is called for.[17]

[16] Cf. अथ यदसन्दिग्धमप्रयोजनं च न तत्प्रेक्षावत्प्रतिपित्सागोचरः, यथा समनस्केन्द्रियसन्निकृष्टः स्फीतालोकमध्यवर्ती घटः, करटदन्ता वा, तथा चेदं ब्रह्मेति व्यापकविरुद्धोपलब्धिः। – भामती

[17] Cf. स चायमा कीटपतङ्गेभ्य आ च देवर्षिभ्यः, प्राणभृन्मात्रस्येदङ्कारास्पदेभ्यो देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिविषयेभ्यो विवेकेन अहम् इत्यसन्दिग्धाविपर्यस्तापरोक्षानुभवसिद्ध इति न जिज्ञासास्पदम्। न हि जातु कश्चिदत्र सन्दिग्धे अहं वा नाहं वा इति। न च विपर्यस्यति नाहमेव इति।...तस्मादिदङ्कारास्पदेभ्यो देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिविषयेभ्यो व्यावृत्तः स्फुटतराहमनुभवगम्य आत्मा संशयाभावादजिज्ञास्य इति सिद्धम्। – भामती

(2) The Upaniṣads claim that the purpose of the Knowledge of Brahman is Liberation, that is termination of the cycle of transmigration (saṁsāra-nivṛtti). But, because Brahman is none other than the Self and since we all clearly experience our Self as 'I', it must be accepted that all of us have had Brahman–Ātman experience since eternity. At the same time, the transmigration has also continued to be with us since eternity. Because Brahman–Ātman experience and transmigration have co-existed since eternity there is no evident opposition between Brahman–Ātman experience and transmigration. Thus Liberation cannot be the result of inquiry into Brahman.

The opponent contests the Siddhāntin's (exponent) claim that the experienced 'I-notion' is based on superimposition. He asserts that it is futile to argue that our 'I'-experience is illusory as it is contradicted by the Upaniṣads that describe the Self as the supreme Brahman, free from the notions of doership and enjoyership. For, our experience of 'I am a man, a doer, an enjoyer and so on' is a well-established fact and is never sublated by any of our subsequent experiences. Even thousands of Upaniṣadic utterances cannot falsify our experience of doership and enjoyership of the Self. Hence, the opponent argues that the Upaniṣadic utterances that contradict our direct experience have to be understood figuratively as in the case of Vedic utterances like *"ādityo yūpaḥ, yajamānaḥ paśuḥ* – Sun is the sacrificial stake, the individual sacrificer is the sacrificial animal." Thus, though we have the right experience of Ātman-Brahman, yet we continue to transmigrate. Consequently the Knowledge of Brahman cannot be deemed to have Liberation as the purpose. Hence brahma-jijñāsā (inquiry into Brahman) is purposeless and, therefore, it need not be undertaken – so avers the opponent.[18]

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[18] Cf. अप्रयोजनत्वाच्च। तथा हि—संसारनिवृत्तिरपवर्ग इह प्रयोजनं विवक्षितम्। संसारश्च आत्मयाथात्म्यानुभवनिमित्त आत्मयाथात्म्यज्ञानेन निवर्तनीयः। स चेदयमनादिरनादिना आत्मयाथात्म्यज्ञानेन सहानुवर्तते, कुतोऽस्य निवृत्तिः अविरोधात्, कुतश्चात्मयाथात्म्याननुभवः। न हि अहम् इत्यनुभवादन्यदात्मयाथात्म्यज्ञानमस्ति। न च अहम् इति सर्वजनीनस्फुटतरानुभवसमर्थित आत्मा देहेन्द्रियादिव्यतिरिक्तः शक्य उपनिषदां सहस्रैरप्यन्यथयितुम्, अनुभवविरोधात्। न ह्यागमाः सहस्रमपि घटं पटयितुमीशते। तस्मादनुभवविरोधादुपचरितार्था एवोपनिषद् इति युक्तमुत्पश्याम इत्याशयवानाशङ्क्य परिहरति—युष्मदस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोः इति। – भामती

Also, cf. न चेदं प्रत्यक्षं कर्तृत्वादौ प्रमेति वाच्यम्। अपौरुषेयतया निर्दोषेण उपक्रमादिलिङ्गावधृततात्पर्येण च तत्त्वमसि (छा.उ.६.८.७) इत्यादिवाक्येन अकर्तृत्वब्रह्मात्मबोधनेन अस्य भ्रमत्वनिश्चयात्। न च ज्येष्ठप्रत्यक्षविरोधाद् आगमज्ञानस्यैव बाध

In order to show the necessity and the purpose of brahma-jijñāsā (inquiry into Brahman), the Ācārya proceeds to dismantle the opponent's argument by establishing that it is based on the erroneous assumption that the real nature of the Self is manifest in our 'I'-experience. The true nature of the Self is revealed in Upaniṣads as being devoid of all limiting adjuncts, never-changing, infinite, bliss, consciousness, indifferent, unattached, and is one without a second. It is this Self that is the purport (tātparya) of the Scriptures because they repeatedly and consistently declare the Self to be so in many contexts. Consistent repetition precludes figurativeness (upacāra) and always enhances the eminence of the character repeatedly acclaimed. A repetition like 'How beautiful! How beautiful!' indicates that the aim of the speaker is to present the given entity as exquisitely beautiful. Our perceptive experience of the Self undoubtedly contradicts the above Scriptural revelations by presenting the Self as finite and overwhelmed by grief and sorrow. But, wherever the purport (tātparya) of the Scriptures and the worldly perception are found at variance with each other, particularly in non-empirical matters, the Scriptures carry more weight (*tātparyavatī śrutiḥ prabalā*) and supercede the worldly perception. Hence, it is to be concluded that our 'I'-perception is a result of the mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self.[19]

However, the opponent is not prepared to allow the Advaitin to use the above argument. He argues with force that such mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self is absolutely impossible because neither similarity (sādṛśya) nor non-discrimination (bhedāgraha) exists between the Self and the not-Self. When the cause is absent how can the effect be admitted to exist? (Vide Section 1.) Refuting the opponent, the Ācārya convincingly establishes

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इति वाच्यं, देहात्मवादप्रसङ्गात्। मनुष्योऽहम् इति प्रत्यक्षविरोधेन अथायमशरीरः (बृ.उ.४.४.७) इत्यादिश्रुत्या देहादन्यात्मासिद्धेः। तस्माद् इदं रजतम् इतिवत् सामानाधिकरण्यप्रत्यक्षस्य भ्रमत्वशङ्काकलङ्कितस्य न आगमात् प्राबल्यमित्यास्थेयम्। – रत्नप्रभा

[19] Cf. इदमत्राकूतं—भवेदेतदेवं यदि अहम् इत्यनुभवे आत्मतत्त्वं प्रकाशेत। न त्वेतदस्ति। तथा हि समस्तोपाध्यनवच्छिन्नानन्तानन्दचैतन्यैकरसमुदासीनमेकमद्वितीयमात्मतत्त्वं श्रुतिस्मृतीतिहासपुराणेषु गीयते। न चैतान्युपक्रमपरामर्शोपसंहारैः क्रियासमभिहारेणेदृगात्मतत्त्वमभिदधति तत्पराणि सन्ति शक्यानि शक्तेणाप्युपचरितार्थानि कर्तुम्। अभ्यासे हि भूयस्त्वमर्थस्य भवति यथा अहो दर्शनीया अहो दर्शनीया इति, नाल्पत्वमपि प्रागेवोपचरितत्वमिति। अहमनुभवस्तु प्रादेशिकमनेकविधशोकदुःखादिप्रपञ्चोपप्लुतमात्मानमादर्शयन् कथमात्मतत्त्वगोचरः कथं वानुपप्लवः। न च ज्येष्ठप्रमाणप्रत्यक्षविरोधादाम्नायस्यैव तदपेक्षस्याप्रामाण्यमुपचरितार्थत्वं वेति युक्तं तस्यापौरुषेयतया निरस्तसमस्तदोषाशङ्कस्य, बोधकतया च स्वतःसिद्धप्रमाणभावस्य स्वकार्ये प्रमितावनपेक्षत्वात्। – भामती

the undeniability of such a superimposition because it has a definite nature, has a clearly identifiable cause, and its effect is universally experienced. (Vide Section 2.)

Once the mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self is established it would follow that the real nature of the Self, revealed in the Upaniṣads as being one with Brahman, constitutes the subject matter of brahma-jijñāsā. Because this pure Self is taught in the Upaniṣads alone and is not known by our worldly experiences, an investigation into the Upaniṣadic utterances is being instituted in the *Brahma-sūtra* by aptly prefacing it with the desire to know Brahman, in the form of the aphorism (1.1.1) *"athāto brahmajijñāsā."* Thus the detailed discussion on superimposition establishes the existence of a subject matter – the brahmātmaikya (identity of Brahman–Ātman).

The mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self is natural and has been with us since eternity as a perennial source of all miseries. Therefore, every prudent man after acquiring the fourfold means (sādhana-catuṣṭaya) becomes a mumukṣu (seeker of Liberation) and undertakes the inquiry into Brahman. Since the oneness of the Self with Brahman seems to go counter to our worldly experience, the aspirant (mumukṣu) must have a sustained strong desire (tīvra-jijñāsā) for Brahman–Ātman knowledge that could, by overcoming the influences of the superimposition, culminate in the Brahman–Ātman Realisation. The word 'atha' in the aphorism on brahmajijñāsā (1.1.1) suggests the necessity and the attainability of sādhana-catuṣṭaya that alone could generate this jijñāsā. The Brahman–Ātman knowledge, the content of the above desire of the aspirant, culminates in the Brahman–Ātman Realisation if he passes through the stages of manana (inquiry) and nididhyāsana (deep constant meditation) on the Upaniṣadic truth he has learnt (śravaṇa) from his master. The word 'ataḥ' in the aphorism on brahmajijñāsā (1.1.1) contains a reference to this important fact also. The *Brahma-sūtra* helps the aspirant, by leading him step by step, through inquiries into several Upaniṣadic teachings so that his brahma-jijñāsā (desire to know Brahman) could culminate in the Brahman–Ātman Realisation.

This Realisation is the supreme fruit (parama-puruṣārtha), for this alone

is capable of rooting out and destroying completely the beginningless natural mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self, the root cause of all evils. Since eternity man has continued to remain in the grip of mutual superimposition. As a result he has assumed a false identity. He is just like a log of wood that has been buried deep for years in the salt mine and hence has assumed the salt-identity!

As superimposition is the root of all miseries, it is imperative to investigate it in all aspects – its cause, its nature and its result – so that its remedy of Brahman–Ātman knowledge could be attained. Hence the *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya* serves as a highly purposeful and necessary prologue to the *Brahma-sūtra* in general and the jijñāsā aphorism (1.1.1) in particular. A conscientious physician after first identifying the causative virus existing in the body of his patient and investigating it in all its aspects then prescribes the right medicine. Similarly, the Ācārya identifies adhyāsa (superimposition) as the root cause of all our maladies, investigates it and then prescribes the medicine of Brahman–Ātman Knowledge. It is precisely these two jobs – that is proving the existence of superimposition (the cause of malady) and investigating its nature – that are being undertaken in a systematic way by the Ācārya in this section on superimposition, the *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya*.

Many Darśanas, like the Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya and so on, take for granted the mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self and embark upon teaching in their own respective ways what they consider to be the right knowledge of the Self. They too aver that a proper discrimination of the Self and the not-Self would put an end to saṁsāra. But no Bhāṣyakāra (commentator) of any of the above Darśanas has ever undertaken the responsibility of questioning the very possibility of such a fundamental superimposition, and establishing its existence firmly, as Ācārya Śaṅkara does in the *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya*. Hence one could, without any fear of exaggeration, evaluate the *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya* as a sort of an effective introduction to many other Darśanas because it formulates the very doctrine of superimposition that constitutes what the ancient Naiyāyika would call 'sarvatantra-siddhānta' (a tenet postulated and established in one Darśana but acceptable to all).

The first two sections of the *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya* seek to lay a firm foundation for the doctrine of superimposition, the fulcrum on which balances the Vedānta-darśana.

The first section makes it clear that the opponent believes that the two basic causes of every error are:

(1) similarity (sādṛśya) between the object and the substratum of error, and
(2) the non-apprehension (bhedāgraha) of the mutual distinction between the object and the substratum of error.

For example, we mistake the shell for silver because of their similarity of brightness and we do not mistake a black potsherd for silver because of their dissimilarity. Likewise, the shell–silver error cannot occur when the distinct nature of the shell and the silver is apprehended. The contention of the opponent is that the mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self is impossible because the said twin causes are absent. The opponent's words *"tamaḥprakāśavad viruddhasvabhāvayoḥ yuṣmadasmatpratyayagocarayoḥ itaretarabhāvānupapattiḥ"* clearly indicate the above line of argument.

While replying, the Ācārya points out that in spite of the absence of the said twin causes (vide *"atyantaviviktayoḥ itaretarāvivekena"*), the mutual superimposition is substantiated by its result, the natural worldly usage 'I am this', 'this is mine' (*"'aham idam' 'mama idam' iti naisargiko'yaṁ lokavyavahāraḥ"*). Certain errors do happen even without the two causes cited by the opponent. For example, there is no marked similarity between the hot sun-rays and the cold water, and we recognise their distinction too. Yet, we mistake the former for the latter and have the mirage illusion.

It is seen that an impression (saṁskāra) born of a prior cognition (pūrvadṛṣṭa) of the object persists invariably as a cause in every subsequent case of superimposition. Indeed, the shell–silver error does not happen in the case of the one who has not cognised the silver earlier and the one who has no mental impression born of silver-cognition.

Basing on this factor of prior cognition (pūrvadṛṣṭa), the Ācārya himself builds up a definition of error and the theory of anirvacanīya-khyāti in the next section. It is also to be noted that this prior cognition need not always be a true cognition. People are often found attributing to, or superimposing on, a person or a place what is known to them only through some unfounded rumours or traditions.[20] In the present case of mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self, the prior cognition of the superimposed object does exist in the form of an identical mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self experienced before. This prior superimposition too has its cause in a still earlier error, that too again in a still earlier one and so on. In this way, the mutual cause–effect chain of the reciprocal superimposition of the Self and the not-Self (ātmānātmanoḥ itaretarādhyāsaḥ) and its resultant empirical usage (loka-vyavahāra) have continued to exist since eternity. Indeed, it is a perfect case of seed–sprout analogy (bījāṅkuravad anādiḥ).[21]

[20] Cf. अप्रतीतस्यारोपायोगादारोप्यस्य प्रतीतिरुपयुज्यते न वस्तुसत्तेति। – भामती

[21] Cf. व्यवहारानादितया तत्कारणस्याध्यासस्य अनादितोक्ता, ततश्च पूर्वपूर्वमिथ्याज्ञानोपदर्शितस्य बुद्धीन्द्रियशरीरादेः उत्तरोत्तराध्यासोपयोग इत्यनादित्वाद् बीजाङ्कुरवन्न परस्पराश्रयत्वमित्यर्थः। – भामती

Also, cf. ननु अध्यासमिथुनीकरणलोकव्यवहारशब्दानामेकार्थत्वे अध्यस्य मिथुनीकृत्येति पूर्वकालत्ववाचिकत्वाप्रत्ययादेशस्य ल्यपः कथं प्रयोग इति चेद्, न, अध्यासव्यक्तिभेदात्। तत्र पूर्वपूर्वाध्यासस्य उत्तरोत्तराध्यासं प्रति संस्कारद्वारा पूर्वकालत्वेन हेतुत्वद्योतनार्थं ल्यपः प्रयोगः। – रत्नप्रभा

3

[अध्यासलक्षणभाष्यम्]

आह – कोऽयम्[1] अध्यासो नाम [1]इति[2]। उच्यते – स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः[3]।

3 A

[ADHYĀSALAKṢAṆABHĀṢYAM]

āha – ko'yam adhyāso nāma iti. ucyate – smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ.

3 B

आह *āha* – (one) asks; कः अयम् *kaḥ ayam* – what is it; अध्यासः नाम इति *adhyāsaḥ nāma iti* – that is termed 'superimposition'; उच्यते *ucyate* – (we) reply; स्मृतिरूपः *smṛtirūpaḥ* – having a nature similar to that of recollection; परत्र *paratra* – on a different locus; पूर्वदृष्टावभासः *pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ* – a cognition of what has been experienced earlier

3 C

[SUPERIMPOSITION DEFINED][1]

(One) asks – What is it that is termed 'superimposition'?[2] We reply: (Superimposition) is a cognition, on a different locus, having a nature similar to that of recollection, and cognising what has been experienced earlier.[3]

3 D

1. Superimposition defined: All philosophical treatises are expected to consist of three parts:

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[1] ASS (fn.) omits इति

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[1] कः इत्याक्षेपे। – भामती

किंशब्द आक्षेपार्थः। अध्यासो न सम्भवतीत्याक्षेपतात्पर्यम्। – प्रदीप

[2] अध्यास इति कोऽयं पदार्थ इति योजना। – प्रदीप

[3] अध्यास इति अनुषङ्गः। – रत्नप्रभा

अत्र प्रश्नवाक्यस्थाध्यासपदानुषङ्गान्न साकाङ्क्षत्वम्। – न्यायनिर्णय

अत्र विशेष्यतया प्रश्नवाक्यस्थाध्यासपदानुषङ्गान्न साकाङ्क्षत्वम्। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

(1) uddeśa – the enunciation in clear terms of the subject matter of the treatise,

(2) lakṣaṇa – the definition of what has been enunciated and

(3) parīkṣā – the examination of (a) the correctness of the definition, (b) the feasibility of the subject, and (c) the necessary proof (pramāṇa) for establishing the subject.

These divisions help the students to grasp clearly the theme (viṣaya) of the treatise. Hence the teachers of the Darśanas in general and the Logicians in particular declare – *'trividhā ca śāstrasya pravṛttiḥ uddeśo lakṣaṇaṁ parīkṣā ceti'*. The *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya* is a very brief but effective treatise on superimposition. Having enunciated the theme of superimposition in the previous sections, the Ācārya takes up herein the definition of superimposition.

2. (One) asks – What is it that is termed 'superimposition'? Instead of offering the intended definition straight away, the Ācārya prefers to present the matter in the form of question and answer dramatisation. The question about superimposition (*ko'yamadhyāso nāma*) can be considered either from the learner's point of view or from that of a determined opponent.[4]

After learning the cause of superimposition and how its effects are universally experienced, a student of Vedānta naturally seeks to know what the term 'superimposition' precisely means. Hence in all humility he asks: "What is it that is termed superimposition?"[5]

Further, while examining the concept of superimposition, it was postulated that the expressions like *'aham idam* – I am so and so', *'mama*

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[4] Cf. आह कोऽयमध्यासो नामेति किंवृत्तस्य प्रश्न आक्षेपे च प्रयोगदर्शनादुभयस्य चेह सम्भवात् तन्त्रेण वाक्यमुच्चरितम्। तत्रापि प्रथमं प्रश्नस्य प्रतिवचनं स्वरूपमारव्याय पुनस्तस्यैव सम्भवमाक्षिप्य प्रतिविधत्ते। तत्रैवम्भूते विषये श्रोतॄणां सुखप्रबोधार्थं व्याचक्षाणाः प्रतिवादिनं तत्रस्थमिव समुत्थाप्य तेनाक्षिप्तमनेन पृष्टमिति मत्वा प्रत्युक्तं, पुनरसौ स्वाभिप्रायं विवृणोतीति आक्षेपमवतार्य प्रतिविधानं प्रतिपद्यते। सर्वत्रैवंविधे ग्रन्थसन्निवेशे एष एव व्याख्याप्रकारः। – पञ्चपादिका

Also, cf. शास्त्रारम्भहेतुविषयादिसाधकमध्यासमाक्षेपसमाधिभ्यां सङ्क्षिप्य तमेव लक्षणसम्भावनाप्रमाणैः स्फुटीकर्तुं चोदयति—आहेति। शास्त्रस्य तत्त्वनिर्णयार्थतया वादत्वात्, तत्र गुरुशिष्ययोरधिकारात्, पुरःस्थितमिव शिष्यं गृहीत्वा परोक्तिः। इत आरभ्य कथं पुनः प्रत्यगात्मनि इत्यतः प्रागध्यासलक्षणपरं भाष्यं, तस्मादारभ्य तमेतमविद्याख्यम् इत्यतः प्राक्तनं तत्सम्भावनायाः, एतदादि सर्वलोकप्रत्यक्ष इत्यन्तं तन्निर्णयायेति विभागः। समाधानभाष्येऽध्यासलक्षणनिर्देशोऽपि प्रसिद्धाध्यासलक्षणे निर्णीते प्रागुक्तलक्षणस्य तद्विशेषतया सिद्धिरिति मत्वा प्रसिद्धाध्यासं पृच्छति—कोऽयमिति। किंशब्दस्याऽऽक्षेपेऽपि सम्भवादत्र सोऽपि विवक्ष्यते। – न्यायनिर्णय

[5] Cf. ननु अनिर्वचनीयख्यातिवाद एव यद्यभिमन्यते, तर्हि निरूप्यतां किंलक्षणकोऽयमध्यास इति लक्षणप्रतिपादनपरो वाऽयं ग्रन्थः—आह कोऽयमध्यासो नामेति। किंशब्दोऽत्र प्रश्नाभिप्रायः। कीदृशोऽयमनिर्वचनीयख्यात्यभिमतोऽध्यास इति। – प्रदीप

Also, cf. स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः इति प्रश्नवाक्यस्थितमध्याससमुद्दिश्य लक्षणमभिधीयते। – पञ्चपादिका

idam – this is mine,' etc. are fundamentally the results of coupling the real (the Self) and the unreal (the not-Self, i.e. the body, mind, senses and so on). To this postulation the opponent raises an objection and argues: It is to be accepted that an entity is real if it manifests; for there is no other logical way of explaining reality. The hare's horn (śaśa-śṛṅga) is unreal because it can never manifest. The conscious Self manifests and hence is real.

Likewise, being manifest like the Self, the physical body, mind, senses and the rest are also real. So, in the notion *'aham idam* – I am so and so', how can there be a coupling of the real and the unreal when both the Self and the not-Self (body, mind, etc.) are real? How then can there be any superimposition at all? Having this in mind, the opponent questions: *"ko'yamadhyāso nāma* – what is it that you call superimposition?" In this question the interrogative pronoun 'kaḥ' implies the denial of superimposition.

In Section 4, the Ācārya will address himself to the concept of superimposition as conceived by other schools of philosophy and establish how the core point of their definitions does not go beyond that of the definition now being offered by him. If viewed from that angle, the present question may as well represent the common objection raised by different philosophers against the Vedāntic position of adhyāsa involving the 'coupling of the real and the unreal' (satyānṛtamithunīkaraṇa).[6]

3. We reply: (Superimposition) is a cognition, on a different locus, having a nature similar to that of recollection, and cognising what has been experienced earlier: The Ācārya directly answers the humble student by

[6] Cf. यद्वा ननु इदं रजतमिति ज्ञानानन्तरं रजतार्थिनामिदङ्काराभिमुखप्रवृत्तिनिर्वाह्यो हि सत्यस्थलीयेदंरजतमितिज्ञानवद् इदंपदार्थस्य रजततादात्म्यप्रतीतिं विना न सम्भवति, ज्ञानद्वयत्वे हि रजतस्मरणाद् आपणाभिमुख्येव प्रवृत्तिः स्यात्। नेदं रजतमिति बाधज्ञानमपि रजतस्य बाधं गोचरयद् ज्ञानद्वयत्वपक्षे न समञ्जसम्, अतो नाख्यातिवादोऽयं विकल्पसह इति चेद्, भवतु नाम नाख्यातिवादः सम्भवदुक्तिक इति, न तु तावता सत्यानृतमिथुनीकरणरूपोऽध्यासः सम्भवति, देशान्तरीयरजतस्य ज्ञानलक्षणप्रत्यासत्त्या सन्निकृष्टस्य संसर्गाध्यासमात्रं भ्रमे कल्प्यत इत्यङ्गीकारादन्यथाख्यातिवाद एव श्रेयान्। अस्मिन् हि पक्षे नेदं रजतमिति रजतसंसर्ग एव बाध्यते, न रजतमिति, नेदङ्काराभिमुखप्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तिः, न वा नेदं रजतमिति बाधानुपपत्तिः। अङ्गीकृतं ह्यनिर्वचनीयख्यातिवादिभिरपि चैतन्यस्यान्तःकरणे संसर्गाध्यासमात्रेणापि परस्पराध्यासव्यवहार इति। तथा च पुरोऽवस्थितेदंपदार्थसंसर्गमात्रं रजते यथा कल्प्यते, एवं ज्ञानलक्षणप्रत्यासत्तिसन्निकृष्टरजतसंसर्गमात्रमेवेदंपदार्थेऽपि स्वीक्रियतां, किमिति मिथ्यारजतान्तरकल्पनम्, अन्यथाख्यातिवादिनां वाऽऽक्षेपमनुवदति आह कोऽयमध्यासो नामेति। अयमध्यासः – सत्यानृतमिथुनीकरणरूपः। को नाम, किमाक्षेपे। एतादृशोऽध्यासो न सम्भवति। सत्यं भ्रमज्ञानं प्रमातिरिक्तं वर्तते – इदं रजतमित्यादिरूपं, परन्तु नात्र सत्यानृतमिथुनीकरणमिति भावः। असत्ख्यातिवाद आत्मख्यातिवादो वा लोकवेदविरुद्धत्वाद् नाशङ्कामप्यर्हतीति तु हृदयम्। अथवेमावपि वादावन्यथाख्यातिवादस्यैवावान्तरभेदाविति न दोषः। आक्षेपद्वयमपि समाधत्ते—स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभास इति। – प्रदीप

giving a general definition of superimposition. While doing so, he does not however ignore the opponents since this definition offered by the Ācārya takes into account all their possible objections.

The great commentaries, like *Bhāmatī*, take the word 'avabhāsa' by itself as a definition of superimposition because the word could signify a cognition that is 'sublated' or 'disregarded';[7] and view the rest of the definition as its elucidation (upavyākhyāna).[8] But if we take into account the whole definition – *smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ* – the word 'avabhāsa' denotes 'cognition' in general. 'Avabhāsa' (cognition) becomes adhyāsa (superimposition) when it has the following three attributes:

(1) On a different locus (paratra): This word signifies that the cognition here occurs on a locus which is different from the one in which the content of the cognition actually exists.[9]

(2) Having the nature similar to that of recollection (smṛtirūpa): The nature of this cognition is similar to the nature of recollection – '*smṛteḥ rūpam iva rūpaṁ yasya saḥ smṛtirūpaḥ avabhāsaḥ*'. The fundamental nature of recollection (smṛti) is that it cognises an object which is not present. Likewise the present cognition (avabhāsa) also cognises the non-present object (asannihitaviṣayatvam or avidyamānaviṣayatvam).[10] The superimposing cognition has also another equally important similarity with recollection. It is also born as a result of an

[7] Cf. अवसन्नः अवमतो वा भासः अवभासः। प्रत्ययान्तरबाधाच्चास्य अवसादः अवमानो वा। एतावता मिथ्याज्ञानमित्युक्तं भवति। – भामती

[8] Cf. तस्येदमुपव्याख्यानं पूर्वदृष्ट इत्यादि। – भामती

Also, cf. अत्र परत्र अवभास इत्येव लक्षणं, शिष्टं पदद्वयं तदुपपादनार्थम्। – रत्नप्रभा

[9] Cf. आरोपविषयं सत्यमाह परत्र इति। परत्र शुक्तिकादौ परमार्थसति। – भामती

Also, cf. परत्र अधिष्ठाने। – प्रदीप

Also, cf. तत्र परत्रेत्युक्तेऽर्थात्परस्यावभासमानता सिद्धा। – पञ्चपादिका

[10] Cf. स्मृतेः रूपमिव रूपमस्येति स्मृतिरूपः। असन्निहितविषयत्वं च स्मृतिरूपत्वम्। – भामती

Also, cf. स्मृतिरूपः – स्मृतिसदृशः, न तु स्मृतिरेवांशतोऽपीत्यख्यातिवादनिरासः। – प्रदीप

Also, cf. स्मर्यमाणरूपमिव रूपमस्य, न पुनः स्मर्यत एव, स्पष्टं पुरोऽवस्थितत्वावभासनात्। पूर्वदृष्टावभास इत्युपपत्तिः स्मृतिरूपत्वे। न हि पूर्वमदृष्टरजतस्य शुक्तिसम्प्रयोगे रजतमवभासते। यतोऽर्थात्तद्विषयस्यावभासस्यापीदमेव लक्षणमुक्तं भवति। कथं, तदुच्यते—स्मृतेः रूपमिव रूपमस्य, न पुनः स्मृतिरेव, पूर्वप्रमाणविषयविशेषस्य तथानवभासकत्वात्। – पञ्चपादिका

Also, cf. स्मर्यत इति स्मृतिः स्मर्यमाणोऽर्थः। भावे अकर्तरि च कारके संज्ञायाम् इति सूत्रद्वयमधिकृत्य स्त्रियां क्तिन् इति सूत्रेण भावे कर्तृव्यतिरिक्ते कर्मादौ च कारके संज्ञायामसंज्ञायां च क्तिन्विधानादु, अकर्तरि चेति चकारस्य संज्ञाव्यभिचारित्वाङ्गीकारात्। स्मर्यमाणस्य रूपमिव रूपमस्येति स्मृतिरूपः, न तु स्मर्यत एव, स्पष्टं पुरोऽवस्थितत्वेन भानात्। ज्ञानपक्षे स्मरणं स्मृतिः, भावे क्तिन्विधानात्। स्मृतेः रूपमिव रूपमस्येति स्मृतिरूपः, न पुनः स्मृतिरेव। अनुभूतस्य तथाऽनवभासकत्वात्। स्मृतिरूपता त्वसन्निहितविषयत्वादु, दोषादित्रयोत्थत्वात्, तादृग्धीविषयत्वाद्वा। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

earlier experience of the object. But, that feature is separately indicated by the third adjective 'pūrvadṛṣṭa'. Hence, in the context of this second adjective, this feature need not be taken into account.

(3) What has been experienced earlier (pūrvadṛṣṭa): Something which has been cognised somewhere else is now being cognised here, on the present locus.[11]

We shall see how the above comprehensive definition of adhyāsa (superimposition) illustrates the well-known shell–silver superimposition: (1) It is a cognition (avabhāsa) occurring on a locus (shell) which is different from silver (a different locus-paratra). (2) It cognises silver that has been experienced earlier (pūrvadṛṣṭa) somewhere else. (3) Like recollection (smṛtirūpa) the cognition also has a non-present silver as its object.

The same definition without the adjective 'smṛtirūpa' would be faulty. Suppose one recognises (pratyabhijñā)[12] at Varanasi (paratra) someone whom one has seen earlier (pūrvadṛṣṭa) in Mathura, his cognition is a valid one and it is not a superimposition. Besides 'pūrvadṛṣṭa', the inclusion of the term 'smṛtirūpa' in the definition of adhyāsa is to exclude all such cases of pratyabhijñā.[13]

The expression 'pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsa' (cognition of what has been experienced earlier) signifies that the entity, like silver, that constitutes the object of the superimposition which does not really exist in its locus and hence it is unreal (anṛta). The word 'dṛṣṭa' (experienced) indicates that in the case of superimposition, the superimposed object, like silver, is needed only as an entity experienced earlier and not as a real thing actually existing.[14] In fact, if that entity (silver) were to exist really in its locus, it cannot at all be

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[11] Cf. दृष्टं दर्शनम्। संस्कारद्वारा पूर्वदर्शनाद् अवभास्यते इति पूर्वदृष्टावभासः। – रत्नप्रभा

[12] Vide *"tattedantāvagāhinī pratītiḥ pratyabhijñā* – 'Pratyabhijñā' consists in the cognition which has 'thatness' and 'thisness' as its content." E.g. This is that person whom I saw at Mathura.

[13] Cf. परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभास इत्यलक्षणम्, अतिव्यापकत्वात्। अस्ति हि स्वस्तिमत्यां गवि पूर्वदृष्टस्य गोत्वस्य परत्र कालाक्ष्यामवभासः। अस्ति च पाटलिपुत्रे पूर्वदृष्टस्य देवदत्तस्य परत्र माहिष्मत्यामवभासः समीचीनः। अवभासपदं च समीचीनेऽपि प्रत्यये प्रसिद्धं, यथा नीलस्यावभासः पीतस्यावभास इति। अत आह—स्मृतिरूप इति। स्मृतेः रूपमिव रूपमस्येति स्मृतिरूपः। असन्निहितविषयत्वं च स्मृतिरूपत्वम्। सन्निहितविषयं च प्रत्यभिज्ञानं समीचीनमिति नातिव्याप्तिः। – भामती

Also, cf. पूर्वदृष्टावभासोऽध्यास इत्येतावति लक्षणे स्मृतावतिव्याप्तिः स्यात्। तदर्थमाह—स्मृतिरूप इति। – प्रकटार्थविवरण

[14] Cf. पूर्वदृष्टावभासः – पूर्वदर्शनजन्यसंस्कारोद्बोधितस्यैवाभासः, न तु पूर्वदृष्टसंसर्गमात्रस्यावभासः। अनेन चान्यथाख्यातिवादो निरस्यते। – प्रदीप

superimposed. Thus, what is superimposed, though real (satya) in its own nature, is unreal (anṛta) as a superimposed entity.[15]

The other adjective 'paratra' (on a different locus) indicates that the locus (adhiṣṭhāna) of the superimposition is real. If the locus too were to be unreal, nothing could be superimposed on it at all.

The Pūrvapakṣin (opponent) had argued that there cannot be any coupling of the real and the unreal (satyānṛtamithunīkaraṇa) as the body, mind, senses and the rest are also real since they manifest. The Ācārya has with the above definition of adhyāsa (superimposition) established that mere manifestation cannot constitute reality (satyatva). If manifestation alone could be counted as reality then one could quench one's thirst with the mirage water! Therefore, one has to accept that the superimposed entity, even though it is capable of being experienced, is not absolutely real.

While discussing the nature and status of the superimposed entity, *Bhāmatī* has defined reality (satyatva or sattva) in terms of both manifestation (pratīyamānatva) and non-sublation (abādhyatva). But in the case of a superimposed entity, like shell–silver, we cannot say that it is entirely unreal (asat) since it is manifest as it is being experienced. For an unreal thing (asat) like hare's horn (śaśa-śṛṅga) never becomes an object of experience (asat cet na pratīyeta). Being manifest, the shell–silver also cannot be described as real (sat) since it is sublated and ceases to be experienced when the locus (adhiṣṭhāna) of the superimposed silver, that is the shell, is rightly cognised (sat cet naiva bādhyeta). As such the shell–silver can neither be described as real (sat) nor unreal (asat); and to describe it as real and unreal (sad-asat) at the same time would be logically untenable since it involves contradiction. As the superimposed entity defies being classified either as real (sat) or as unreal (asat), it has been rightly described as anirvacanīya (indescribable) in Advaita-vedānta (sadasad-vilakṣaṇam anirvacanīyam).

[15] Cf. पूर्वदृष्टस्यावभासः पूर्वदृष्टावभासः। मिथ्याप्रत्ययश्च आरोपविषयारोपणीयमिथुनमन्तरेण न भवतीति पूर्वदृष्टग्रहणेनानृतम् आरोपणीयमुपस्थापयति। तस्य च दृष्टत्वमात्रमुपयुज्यते न वस्तुसत्तेति दृष्टग्रहणम्। तथापि वर्तमानं दृष्टं दर्शनं नारोपोपयोगीति पूर्व—इत्युक्तम्। तच्च पूर्वदृष्टं स्वरूपेण सदप्यारोपणीयतया अनिर्वाच्यमित्यनृतम्। – भामती

In the context of mutual superimposition of the Self and not-Self (ātmānātmādhyāsa) the physical body, sense organs and the rest that are superimposed on the Self, cannot be classified as unreal (asat) because they are manifest (pratīyamānatvāt). Nor can they be classified as real (sat) because they are negated (bādhyamānatvāt) on attaining the Brahman–Ātman Realisation.

The above definition of adhyāsa given by the Ācārya has been the subject of intensive research for various commentators.

The silver which had become the content of our previous cognition (pūrvadṛṣṭa) is not the same silver which has now become an object of our illusory cognition (adhyāsa). In other words, the content of our illusory cognition was not actually experienced earlier. It may consequently be concluded that the nature and status of the illusory shell–silver is novel (apūrva). Though it is novel, yet it is 'like' the real silver which was experienced before.[16] The definition *"adhyāso nāma paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ"* therefore comes to mean that 'superimposition is a cognition on a different locus of what looks like something experienced earlier (pūrvadṛṣṭasya iva avabhāsaḥ)'. In fact, the above analysis of the definition would indicate that the adjective 'smṛtirūpaḥ' (having the nature similar to that of recollection) may be only of explanatory nature. For, its purpose of excluding recollection (smṛti) has been well served by the expression 'pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ' – as explained now afresh. That is why the Ācārya himself later redefines adhyāsa in its concise form as *"atasmiṁstadbuddhiḥ* – cognition of that which is not that," by dropping the expression 'smṛtirūpaḥ'.[17]

The word 'paratra' (on a different locus) may be better construed with the immediately preceding 'smṛtirūpaḥ' that signifies 'avidyamāna-viṣayaka'

[16] Cf. पूर्वदृष्टपदं तज्जातीयपरम् अभिनवरजतादेः पूर्वदृष्टत्वाभावात्। – रत्नप्रभा
Also, cf. पूर्वदृष्टः पूर्वदृष्टसदृश इत्यर्थः। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

[17] Refer Section 14.

(cognising a thing not present) rather than with 'avabhāsa'. The definition of adhyāsa would now be: Superimposition is a cognition with two adjectives namely:

(1) Smṛtirūpaḥ: Having as its object an entity that does not exist in the locus (paratra-adhiṣṭhāne avidyamānaviṣayakaḥ) and

(2) Pūrvadṛṣṭaḥ: Cognising the same as if it belongs to the class of the entity seen earlier (pūrvadṛṣṭasajātīyaviṣayakaḥ avabhāsaḥ).

Since these two adjectives qualify one and the same cognition (avabhāsa) and because the essential import of these two adjectives is not basically different, we may conclude that the earlier seen entity (pūrvadṛṣṭa) is the same as the entity which does not exist in the locus (smṛtirūpaḥ–avidyamānaviṣayakaḥ paratra–adhiṣṭhāne) of the superimposition. Thus the underlying idea of the definition of superimposition given by the Ācārya would be:

अध्यासो नाम परत्र (अधिष्ठाने) अविद्यमानस्य पूर्वदृष्टसजातीयस्य (अर्थस्य) अवभासः।

adhyāso nāma paratra (adhiṣṭhāne) avidyamānasya pūrvadṛṣṭasajātīyasya (arthasya) avabhāsaḥ.

"Superimposition is a cognition which has as its object an entity which looks as if it belongs to the class of the thing seen earlier and which does not exist on the locus where it is being cognised."[18]

The main purpose of this second interpretation of the definition of adhyāsa (superimposition) is to establish that where a superimposed entity is experienced, its negation also exists there in that very substratum. That is to say, when silver is being cognised in the shell, the negation of silver exists in the same shell. Likewise, when the body, mind and the rest are being experienced in the Self, their negation also exists in the Self alone.

Both Padmapāda and Vācaspati-miśra[19] describe the *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya*

[18] Cf. प्रश्नं समाधत्ते—स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभास इति। स्मृतिरूपः – अविद्यमानविषयकः। परत्र – अधिष्ठाने। पूर्वदृष्टावभासः – पूर्वदृष्टसजातीयप्रतीतिः। अधिष्ठानेऽविद्यमानः पूर्वदृष्टसजातीयश्च योऽर्थः, तद्विषयकज्ञानम्। अधिष्ठानविषमसत्ताकारोऽप्यज्ञानत्वम् अध्यासत्वमनिर्वचनीयख्यात्यभिमतमिति भावः। – प्रदीप

[19] Padmapāda was the direct disciple of the Ācārya. He wrote *Pañcapādikā* on *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* which became the basis for the Vivaraṇa school of Advaita-vedānta. Vācaspati-miśra, the author of the *Bhāmatī* commentary on the *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya*, was the founder of the *Bhāmatī* school of Advaita-vedānta.

of Śrī Śaṅkara as 'simple, yet profound' (*bhāṣyaṁ prasannagambhīram*) and this definition of adhyāsa is a classic illustration of the same.

Great masters of Advaita logic like Citsukhācārya, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and so on of later times conducted extensive deliberations on the illusoriness of the phenomenal world (jaganmithyātvavicāra). Their inspiration must have been the Ācārya's above definition of superimposition.

4

[मतान्तरोक्ताध्यासलक्षणसङ्ग्रहभाष्यम्]

तं केचिद् अन्यत्र अन्यधर्माध्यासः इति वदन्ति। केचित् तु यत्र यदध्यासः तद्विवेकाग्रहनिबन्धनो भ्रम इति[1]। अन्ये तु यत्र यदध्यासः तस्यैव [2]विपरीतधर्मत्वकल्पनाम् [3]आचक्षते। सर्वथापि तु अन्यस्य अन्यधर्मावभासतां न व्यभिचरति।

4 A

[MATĀNTAROKTĀDHYĀSALAKṢAṆASAṄGRAHABHĀṢYAM]

taṁ kecid anyatra anyadharmādhyāsaḥ iti vadanti. kecit tu yatra yadadhyāsaḥ tadvivekāgrahanibandhano bhrama iti. anye tu yatra yadadhyāsaḥ tasyaiva viparītadharmatvakalpanām ācakṣate. sarvathāpi tu anyasya anyadharmāvabhāsatāṁ na vyabhicarati.

4 B

तम् *tam* – that; केचित् *kecit* – some; अन्यत्र *anyatra* – on some other (locus); अन्यधर्माध्यासः *anyadharmādhyāsaḥ* – the superimposition of the attributes of something else; इति वदन्ति *iti vadanti* – define as; केचित् तु *kecit tu* – but others (say); यत्र *yatra* – where (on a given substratum); यदध्यासः *yadadhyāsaḥ* – (there is) the superimposition of an entity; तद्विवेकाग्रहनिबन्धनः *tadvivekāgrahanibandhanaḥ* – based on the non-apprehension of their distinction; भ्रमः इति *bhramaḥ iti* – illusion (confusion); अन्ये तु *anye tu* – still others; यत्र *yatra* – where (on a substratum); यदध्यासः *yadadhyāsaḥ* – (there is) superimposition of an entity; तस्य एव *tasya eva* – in respect of that very (substratum); विपरीतधर्मत्वकल्पनाम् *viparītadharmatvakalpanām* – the assumption of opposite attributes; आचक्षते *ācakṣate* – declare; सर्वथा अपि तु *sarvathā api tu* – but in all cases; अन्यस्य

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[2] AL -धर्मकल्पनाम्

[3] All editions आचक्षत इति, VV drops इति rightly omitted

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[1] वदन्तीत्यनुषज्यते। – प्रदीप

यत्र यस्याध्यासः, तयोर्विवेकस्याग्रहणात्तन्निबन्धनोऽयमेकत्वभ्रम इति वदन्तीत्यनुषङ्गः। – पञ्चपादिका

अन्यधर्मावभासताम् *anyasya anyadharmāvabhāsatām* – the nature of a cognition of one thing as having the attribute of another; न व्यभिचरति *na vyabhicarati* – (the superimposition) does not transgress

4 C

[LIST OF DEFINITIONS OF SUPERIMPOSITION OFFERED BY OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS][1]

Some speak of that as superimposition of the attribute of one thing on the other (thing).[2] But others (say): That the superimposition of an entity on a given substratum is (only) an illusion (confusion) resulting from the non-apprehension of the distinction between those two.[3] Still others declare: The superimposition of an entity on a given substratum is (only) a misapprehension ascribing a contrary attribute to that very substratum.[4] But, in any case (superimposition) does not fail to be of the nature of an erroneous cognition of one thing as having the attribute of another.[5]

4 D

1. List of definitions of superimposition offered by other philosophical schools: The goal of every Indian philosophy (Darśana) is Emancipation (Mokṣa), the total Liberation from saṁsāra. Saṁsāra will disappear only when its root cause, namely avidyā (adhyāsa–superimposition),[2] is destroyed, just as a disease is completely cured only when its basic cause is removed. Every school of Indian philosophy conducts a detailed analysis of all aspects of avidyā so that this root cause and its innumerable effects could be eradicated effectively.

Ācārya Śaṅkara too commences his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* with such an investigation into avidyā. He has established the existence of avidyā (adhyāsa–superimposition) and has defined it as: *"smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ."* As an impartial investigator, the Ācārya compares in the present section his definition of avidyā with those offered by philosophers of

[2] The Ācārya terms 'adhyāsa' as 'avidyā'. Vide *"tametamevaṁlakṣaṇamadhyāsaṁ paṇḍitā avidyeti manyante."* (*Adhyāsa-bhāṣya*, Section 8)

other schools. He does this in order to highlight their basic agreement with his own definition of avidyā (adhyāsa as anirvacanīya).[3]

The theory of error (illusion or superimposition) in the Darśanas is known as 'khyāti-vāda'. A traditional verse lists five khyāti-vādas:

(1) Ātma-khyāti (Vijñāna-vāda)
(2) Asat-khyāti (Śūnya-vāda)
(3) Akhyāti (Prābhākara-mīmāṁsā)
(4) Anyathā-khyāti (Nyāya)
(5) Anirvacanīya-khyāti (Advaita-vedānta)

आत्मख्यातिरसत्ख्यातिरख्यातिः ख्यातिरन्यथा।
तथाऽनिर्वचनीयख्यातिरित्येतत् ख्यातिपञ्चकम्॥
ātmakhyātirasatkhyātirakhyātiḥ khyātiranyathā,
tathā'nirvacanīyakhyātirityetat khyātipañcakam.

The term 'khyāti' literally means 'cognition' (darśana).[4] Philosophers like Maṇḍana-miśra, Vācaspati-miśra and others of the post-Śaṅkara age, use the term 'khyāti-vāda' to refer to the 'theory of error'. The Ācārya calls this error 'adhyāsa' (superimposition).

2. Some speak of that as superimposition of the attribute of one thing on the other (thing): The first definition given by the Ācārya covers Ātma-khyāti (erroneous cognition of consciousness as external) of the Buddhist Vijñāna-vādins. The following is a delineation of the same based on the *Bhāmatī*, a commentary on the *Śaṅkara-bhāṣya* by Vācaspati-miśra.

The Vijñāna-vādin holds ātman (i.e. consciousness or cognition) as the only metaphysical reality (pāramārthika-sat) and discounts the existence

[3] Cf. स चायमेवंलक्षणकोऽध्यासः अनिर्वचनीयः सर्वेषाम् एव सम्मतः परीक्षकाणां, तद्भेदे परं विप्रतिपत्तिरित्यनिर्वचनीयतां द्रढयितुमाह—तं केचिद् इति। – भामती

Also, cf. ननु अध्यासे वादिविप्रतिपत्तेः कथमुक्तलक्षणसिद्धिः इत्याशङ्क्य अधिष्ठानारोप्यस्वरूपविवादेऽपि परत्र परावभासः इति लक्षणे संवादाद्युक्तिभिः सत्याधिष्ठाने मिथ्यार्थावभाससिद्धेः सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्ते इदं लक्षणमिति मत्वा अन्यथात्मख्यातिवादिनोर्मतमाह—तं केचिदिति। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. अध्यासे वादिविप्रतिपत्तेः उक्तं तल्लक्षणं कथमित्याशङ्क्य आरोप्यदेशादौ विवादेऽपि लक्षणसंवादाद्, न्यायतश्च तल्लक्ष्येऽनिर्वाच्यतासिद्धेः सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्तोऽयमिति विवक्षित्वा वादिविवादानुपन्यस्यन् केषाञ्चिदन्यथाख्यातिवादिनामात्मख्याति-वादिनां चाभिप्रायमाह—तं केचिदिति। – न्यायनिर्णय

[4] That the term 'khyāti' refers to a 'cognition' is evidenced in the following aphorism of *Pātañjala-yogasūtra* (2.5): *"anityāśuciduḥkhānātmasu nityaśucisukhātmakhyātiravidyā."*

of any external reality which he terms 'alīka' (non-existent). He views that the external reality, having the attribute of 'idantā – thisness', is projected by the latent tendencies (vāsanā) of the beginningless nescience (avidyā). The projected external object (i.e. alīkaṁ bāhyaṁ vastu with 'idantā' as its attribute) becomes the locus (adhiṣṭhāna) upon which the cognitive silver, in the particular instance of shell–silver illusion, is superimposed. The illusion of silver consists in the absence of accordance with the function of the object (arthakriyāsaṁvādābhāva).[5]

This interpretation of Ātma-khyāti by Vācaspati in the *Bhāmatī* renders it consonant with the Ācārya's construal and intent when he concludes his

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[5] This comes to mean that perceiving an object that has accordance with the function of the object empirically perceived (arthakriyāsaṁvāda) does not constitute an illusion. To explain: When there is a correspondence between the cognitive object, to wit, the silver in this instance with the external silver (alīkaṁ bāhyavastu) that has been projected by the latent tendencies (vāsanā), the cognised silver can be said to have an accordance with the function of silver (arthakriyākāritva), that is it can be sold in the market or it can be used for making ornaments and so on.

Except in the Ātma-khyāti, the theory of error of the Vijñāna-vādin, almost in every other theory of error, the cognition of the superimposed object is sublated by the perceptual cognition of the real nature of the presented object lying in front of the perceiver. This means that the object which is not there, yet superimposed, is sublated. But in Ātma-khyāti, the superimposed cognitive object (i.e. the consciousness or ātman), which is real, according to Vijñāna-vādin, is not sublated. This unusual sublating phenomenon has been elucidated by Vācaspati-miśra in his *Bhāmatī* as follows: It is a general principle that whatever becomes the object of experience in a specific form should be accepted in that form since its being in a form other than that which has been experienced ensues owing to a stronger cognition which sublates it. In the sublating cognition 'this is not silver', the sublation of 'thisness' (idantā) suffices to explain the fact of correcting the illusory cognition. As such, the sublation of the superimposed silver is not needed since the sublation of the silver would warrant the sublation of 'thisness' also which is the silver's attribute (dharma). Consequently, it should be preferable to sublate 'thisness' as it alone is the projection of nescience. After the sublation of 'thisness', that is the externality of the cognitive silver, the real silver settles down in the form of cognition, which was superimposed on the projected external object (which is represented by 'idantā – thisness').

Cf. अन्यधर्मस्य ज्ञानधर्मस्य रजतस्य, ज्ञानाकारस्येति यावत्। अध्यासः अन्यत्र बाह्ये। सौत्रान्तिकनये तावद्बाह्यमस्ति वस्तुसत्, तत्र ज्ञानाकारस्यारोपः। विज्ञानवादिनामपि, यद्यपि न बाह्यं वस्तुसत् तथाप्यनाद्यविद्यावासनारोपितमलीकं बाह्यं, तत्र ज्ञानाकारस्यारोपः। उपपत्तिश्च—यद्यादृशमनुभवसिद्धं रूपं तत्तादृशमेव अभ्युपेतव्यमित्युत्सर्गः, अन्यथात्वं पुनरस्य बलवद्बाधकप्रत्ययवशाद्, नेदं रजतम् इति बाधकस्य इदन्तामात्रबाधेनाप्युपपत्तौ न रजतगोचरतोचिता। रजतस्य धर्मिणो बाधे हि रजतं च तस्य धर्म इदन्ता च बाधिते भवेतां, तद्दरमिदन्तैवास्य धर्मो बाध्यतां, न पुना रजतमपि धर्मि, तथा च रजतं बहिर्बाधितमर्थादान्तरे ज्ञाने व्यवतिष्ठत इति ज्ञानाकारस्य बहिरध्यासः सिध्यति। – भामती

view on adhyāsa saying that illusion, in general, does not in any way deviate from the appearance of the attributes or properties of one object in the other (*"sarvathāpi tu anyasya anyadharmāvabhāsatāṁ na vyabhicarati"*).[6]

3. But others (say): That the superimposition of an entity on a given substratum is (only) an illusion (confusion) resulting from the non-apprehension of the distinction between those two: This is the second definition and pertains to the Prabhākara's Akhyāti-vāda (the theory of no-superimposition). The proponents of the Prabhākara's school of thought hold that all cognitions are self-luminous and valid. There is no place for an illusory cognition in this system. However, the empirical behaviour due to the illusion, as conceived by other systems, is explained by them as follows: In the shell–silver illustration, there are two cognitions, to wit, the immediate awareness (pratyakṣa) of 'something presented' and the memory-awareness (smṛti) of the 'unpresented' silver which jointly bring about the perceiver's desire with reference to the desired piece of silver when accompanied by the non-apprehension of the distinction (bhedāgraha or vivekāgraha) between these two valid cognitions.[7]

To explain: According to Prabhākara, the erroneous usage such as 'This is silver' is said to occur not because reality (shell) is misapprehended but because we fail to apprehend the distinction between two valid cognitions – perceptual cognition (pratyakṣa) and recollection (smṛti). In the case of shell–silver confusion, the shell is cognised generically (sāmānyataḥ) and its specific features (viśeṣa-dharma), which render it distinct from silver, are not apprehended because of being suppressed due to some defect (defective sense organ or environmental conditions). The memory image of silver (rajata-smṛti) is then suggested to the mind because of similarity (sādṛśya), while the character of its being a memory image is forgotten (pramuṣṭa-tattāka) on account of some mental weakness (greed, anxiety and so on).

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[6] Cf. अपरत्र त्वन्यत्र बाह्ये शुक्त्यादावन्यस्य ज्ञानस्य धर्मौ रजतादिस्तस्याध्यासः बहिरिव तदभेदेन धीः, इत्यात्मख्याति-वादिनस्तमध्यासमाहुरिति योजना। – न्यायनिर्णय

[7] रजतस्मृतिपुरोवर्तिज्ञानाभ्यामेव प्रवृत्तिसम्भवाद् उपस्थितभेदाग्रहस्यैव सर्वत्रप्रवर्तकत्वेन नेदं रजतमित्यादावतिप्रसङ्गाभावात्। – तर्कसङ्ग्रहदीपिका

In this way, the object of recollection, that is the silver, is not distinguished (vivekāgraha or bhedāgraha) from the object of perception, that is the shell that is cognised generically.

To explain: The silver is a memory image (smṛtyātmaka) while the shell that is cognised generically is a perceptual content (pratyakṣātmaka) – both are valid – but they are not differentiated from each other and give rise to the verbal usage 'This is silver' and the corresponding empirical activity. The object of recollection belongs to the past. It is always referred to as 'that' in contrast with the object of perceptual cognition which is referred to as 'this'. But when it is stripped of 'thatness' (pramuṣṭa-tattāka), the memory becomes obscured (smṛti-pramoṣa) and due to non-apprehension of distinction between the recollective and perceptual cognitions, the appositional usage regarding 'this' and 'silver' (i.e. 'This is silver') ensues and the empirical behaviour to pick up the silver takes place.

Thus according to the Prābhākaras the so called illusion is only a case of non-apprehension of two valid cognitions and not that of superimposing one on the other. Hence their theory is called the doctrine of no-superimposition – 'Akhyāti-vāda'.[8] Since the Prābhākaras hold that the empirical behaviour to pick up the wrong object comes into being by virtue of the absence of discrimination (vivekāgraha or bhedāgraha), their theory of error is also called 'Vivekākhyāti'.[9]

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[8] Cf. तथा च रजतम्, इदम् इति च द्वे विज्ञाने स्मृत्यनुभवरूपे। तत्र इदम् इति पुरोवर्तिद्रव्यमात्रग्रहणं, दोषवशात्तद्गतशुक्तित्व-सामान्यविशेषस्याग्रहात् तन्मात्रं च गृहीतं सदृशतया संस्कारोद्बोधकमेण रजते स्मृतिं जनयति। सा च गृहीतग्रहणस्वभावापि दोषवशाद्गृहीतत्वांशप्रमोषाद् ग्रहणमात्रमवतिष्ठते। तथा च रजतस्मृतेः पुरोवर्तिद्रव्यमात्रग्रहणस्य च मिथः स्वरूपतो विषयतश्च भेदाग्रहात्, सन्निहितरजतगोचरज्ञानसारूप्येण इदं, रजतम्, इति द्वे एते अपि ग्रहणस्मरणे अभेदव्यवहारं सामानाधिकरण्यव्यपदेशं च प्रवर्तयतः।... तदिदमुक्तं—यत्र यदध्यास इति। यस्मिन् शुक्तिकादौ यस्य रजतादेरध्यास इति लोकप्रसिद्धिः नासावन्यथाख्यातिनिबन्धना, किन्तु गृहीतस्य रजतादेस्तत्स्मरणस्य च गृहीततांशप्रमोषेण गृहीतमात्रस्य यः इदम् इति पुरोऽवस्थिताद्रव्यमात्रात्तत्प्रज्ञानाच्च विवेकः, तदग्रहणनिबन्धनो भ्रमः। भ्रान्तत्वं च ग्रहणस्मरणयोरितरेतरसामानाधिकरण्यव्यपदेशो रजतादिव्यवहारश्चेति। – भामती

Also, cf. यत्र – इदमि। यदध्यासः – रजताध्यास इति प्रसिद्धिः, तद्विवेकाग्रहबन्धनः तयोरिदम्पदार्थरजतयोरनुभूयमानस्मर्य-माणयोर्भेदाग्रहप्रयुक्तः, भ्रमः – भ्रम इति व्यवहारमात्रं, न तु वस्तुगत्या भ्रमज्ञानं नाम किञ्चिदस्तीति योजना। – प्रदीप

Also, cf. अख्यातिमतमाह—केचित्त्विति। वदन्तीत्यनुषज्यते। यत्र शुक्त्यादौ यस्य रजतादेरध्यासो लोके प्रसिद्धस्तयोस्तद्विवेकाग्रहे दोषवशाद् विवेकाग्रहे तत्कृतो रजतमिदमित्यादिसंसर्गव्यवहार इत्यख्यातिवादिनः। तैरपि संसर्गव्यवहाराय तद्धीरुपास्या। वस्तुग्रहे तदभिन्नविवेकाग्रहायोगात्, तस्य तत्कृतत्वासम्भवाद्, अविद्येतरदोषस्य भाति वस्तुन्यभानहेतुतानुपलम्भात्। अतः परत्र परावभासे तेषामप्यस्ति सम्मतिरिति भावः। – न्यायनिर्णय

[9] As explained above, the Prābhākaras hold the view that the non-apprehension between 'what is presented' (upasthita) and 'what is desired' (iṣṭa) is the causal condition for the rise of

Although the Prābhākaras only speak of the lack of distinction on the part of the perceiver in causing the erroneous empirical behaviour, the Advaitin ascribes the phenomenon of the illusory cognition (adhyāsa) to the Prābhākaras saying that the evident empirical behavior to pick the piece of silver proves beyond any doubt (i.e. arthāpatti) the incidence of the illusory cognition of silver. Otherwise, how could the perceiver be prompted to pick up silver if he did not see silver in front of him.[10] This attribution of illusory cognition (adhyāsa) paves the way to justify the Ācārya's common characteristic of adhyāsa. (*"sarvathāpi tu anyasya anyadharmāvabhāsatāṁ na vyabhicarati."*)

4. Still others declare: The superimposition of an entity on a given substratum is (only) a misapprehension ascribing a contrary attribute to that very substratum: The third definition of the Ācārya illustrates the Nyāya theory of illusion. The Naiyāyikas are known as 'Viparītakhyāti-vādins' or 'Anyathākhyāti-vādins'. According to them, illusion consists in the cognition of a property in something which does not have that property. In other words, where there is superimposition of one on another, there is assumption in the latter of an attribute which does not belong to it. To illustrate, in the case of the shell–silver illusion, there is assumption in the shell of an opposite attribute (viparītadharmatva-kalpanā) of its being silver.[11]

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the desire to possess the piece of silver. Thus, actually speaking there are three causal factors – smaraṇa, pratyakṣa and aviveka – involved in the theory of Akhyāti to explain the empirical behaviour of the perceiver to pick up the piece of silver, which fact evidently incurs the defect of prolixity (gaurava-doṣa). This theory thus disregards the law of parsimony (lāghava) when a single complex illusory cognition can satisfactorily account for such an empirical behaviour. Moreover, the protagonist of the Prābhākara school fails to explain why the two cognitions of perception and recollection cannot be treated as one complex cognition for bringing about one's volition to make an attempt to possess silver when the valid cognition (silver as silver) – which is also complex – is admitted to prompt a person to pick up the piece of silver. The law of parsimony demands that instead of having two or three causal factors for bringing about the said empirical activity with reference to silver in this case, it is preferable to postulate a single complex cognition, that is an illusory cognition to account for the empirical behaviour.

[10] Cf. अख्यातिमतमाह—केचिदिति। यत्र यस्य अध्यासो लोकसिद्धस्तयोरर्थयोः, तद्विषयोश्च भेदाग्रहे सति तन्मूलो भ्रमः, इदं रूप्यमिति विशिष्टव्यवहार इति वदन्ति इत्यर्थः। तैरपि विशिष्टव्यवहारान्यथानुपपत्त्या विशिष्टभ्रान्तेः स्वीकार्यत्वात् परत्र परावभाससम्मतिरिति भावः। – रत्नप्रभा

[11] Cf. यत्र शुक्तिकादौ यस्य रजतादेरध्यासस्तस्यैव शुक्तिकादेर्विपरीतधर्मकल्पनां रजतत्वधर्मकल्पनामिति योजना। – भामती

The Naiyāyikas say that the person who sees silver in the shell commits the mistake on account of the similarity (sādṛśya) of brightness between the silver and the shell. The brightness of the shell arouses the impression of the silver (rajata-smṛti) which he had perceived before. This impression becomes a contact (jñānalakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa) between his visual sense organ and the external silver wherever it may be (in the shop or house and so on). As a result he erroneously perceives silver in place of the shell. In other words he sees the shell lying in front of him as having the opposite property of silver which he is seeing at present (in the shop or house and so on).[12]

The Bhāṭṭa theory of error can be accommodated here as it does not differ much from the Nyāya theory of illusion except in the case of the postulation of extraordinary contact (alaukika-sannikarṣa).

5. But, in any case (superimposition) does not fail to be of the nature of an erroneous cognition of one thing as having the attribute of another: Having enumerated the different theories of error, as advocated by the philosophers of other schools, the Ācārya in the present sentence draws our attention to one important point: The common characteristic found in all these theories happens to be the core part of the Ācārya's own definition of superimposition as 'a cognition assuming the attribute of one thing as the attribute of another'.[13]

This points to the feature of anṛtatā (falsehood) which has been interpreted by Vācaspati, the author of the *Bhāmatī*, as 'anirvacanīyatā' (indeterminability). In one way or the other this anirvacanīyatā (indeterminability) of superimposition is accepted by all the systems of Indian philosophy. Thus, this Anirvacanīya-khyāti is 'sarvatantra-siddhānta' (a tenet postulated and established in a Darśana but acceptable to all).[14]

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[12] It is the compulsion of the Naiyāyikas that they have to postulate the extraordinary contact (alaukika-sannikarṣa) in order to establish the perceptual status of the content of the illusory perception. Vide *"dṛṣṭaṁ ca duṣṭānāṁ kāraṇānāmautsargikakāryapratibandhena kāryāntaropajananasāmarthyaṁ, yathā dāvāgnidagdhānāṁ vetrabījānāṁ kadalīkāṇḍajanakatvaṁ, bhasmakaduṣṭasya caudaryasya tejaso bahvannapacanamiti."* (*Bhāmatī*)

[13] अन्यस्य अन्यधर्मावभासतामिति – अन्यस्य अधिष्ठानस्य शुक्त्यादेः, अन्यस्य अध्यस्तस्य रजतादेः यो धर्मः रजतात्मत्वादिः तद्वत्तया अवभासः कल्पना तस्य भावः ताम्।

[14] Cf. ननु सन्तु नाम परीक्षकाणां विप्रतिपत्तयः, प्रकृते तु किमायातमित्यत आह—सर्वथापि इति। अन्यस्यान्यधर्मकल्पना अनृतता,

How could this Advaitic position of indeterminability of error be accepted by the Prābhākaras who advocate Akhyāti-vāda, the 'no-error' theory? The Ācārya's intention in the present context is that even these advocates of the theory of 'no-error' do accept this indeterminability of error (anirvacanīyatā), for while observing the shell–silver, the observer declares – 'this is silver' by putting 'this' (i.e. the shell) and 'silver' in an appositional statement (sāmānādhikaraṇya-vyapadeśa) – and acts accordingly by bending to pick up 'this silver'. This is not possible unless the person has been, in his mind, connecting the shell (real) with the silver (unreal) in the appositional relation (sāmānādhikaraṇya-sambandha).[15] This verily is what the Advaitins call superimposition which cognises one as the other through the coupling of the real and the unreal (satyānṛta-mithunīkaraṇa).

The above delineation is a brief exposition according to the *Bhāmatī* of the different theories of error that has been encapsulated in the Bhāṣya sentences of this section. The chart overleaf tabulates how the various traditional

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सा च अनिर्वचनीयतेत्यधस्तादुपपादितं तेन सर्वेषामेव परीक्षकाणां मते अन्यस्यान्यधर्मकल्पनानिर्वचनीयावश्यम्भाविनीत्यनिर्वचनीयता सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्त इत्यर्थः। – भामती

Also, cf. एतेषु मतेषु परत्र परावभासत्वलक्षणसंवादमाह—सर्वथापि तु इति। अन्यथाख्यातित्वादिप्रकारविवादेऽपि अध्यासः परत्र परावभासत्वलक्षणं न जहाति इत्यर्थः। शुक्तौ अपरोक्षस्य रजतस्य देशान्तरे बुद्धौ वा सत्त्वायोगात्, शून्यत्वे प्रत्यक्षत्वायोगात्, शुक्तौ सत्त्वे बाधायोगाद् मिथ्यात्वमेवेति भावः। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. ततश्च स्मृतिरूपः परत्रेति लक्षणवाक्यं सर्ववादिसम्प्रतिपन्नमित्याह—सर्वथाऽपित्विति। अविद्यमानस्यैव भ्रमे भानं ज्ञानलक्षणप्रत्यासत्त्यादिनेति विशेषे सत्यपि अन्यत्रान्यधर्मावभासताम् – अन्यत्राविद्यमानान्यविषयकत्वं, न व्यभिचरति – न जहाति, ख्यातिमात्रसाधारणमिति भावः। तदेवमन्यत्राविद्यमानस्य तत्र भानमनिर्वचनीयख्यातिं विना नोपपद्यत इत्यनिर्वचनीयख्यातिवाद एव पर्यवसानं वक्तव्यमिति निगूढो भावः। – प्रदीप

Also, cf. सर्वथापि त्विति स्वमतानुसारित्वं सर्वेषां कल्पनाप्रकाराणां दर्शयति। – पञ्चपादिका

Also, cf. मतान्तराण्युपन्यस्य स्वमतानुसारित्वं तेषां निगमयति—सर्वथेति। सर्वेषु पक्षेषु प्रकारविशेषविवादेऽपि पुरोवर्तिनो रजतादित्वेनैव वेद्यतामध्यासो न व्यभिचरतीति युक्तमुक्तलक्षणस्याध्यासस्य सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्तत्वम्। न च तस्य सत्त्वं, बाध्यत्वाद्, अन्यत्र रजतादिसत्त्वस्याभानत्वात्। न च तदसत्त्वम्, अपरोक्षत्वात्। नापि विरोधादेकस्य सदसत्त्वम्। अतोऽनिर्वाच्यतेति भावः। – न्यायनिर्णय

Also, cf. एवं मतान्तराण्युपन्यस्य प्रकृतं स्वमतानुसारित्वं तेषां निगमयति—सर्वथेति। सर्वेषु पक्षेषु प्रकारविशेषविवादेऽपि पुरोवर्तिनो रजतादित्वेन वेद्यतामध्यासो न व्यभिचरति, इति युक्तमुक्तलक्षणाध्यासस्य सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्तत्वम्। न च तस्य सत्त्वं, बाधाद्, अन्यत्र रजतादिसत्त्वस्याभातत्वात्। न च तदसत्त्वम्, अपरोक्षत्वाद्, नापि विरोधादेकस्य सदसत्त्वम्। अतोऽनिर्वाच्यतेति भावः। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

[15] Cf. अख्यातिवादिभिरकामैरपि सामानाधिकरण्यव्यपदेशप्रवृत्तिनियमस्नेहादिदमभ्युपेयमिति भावः। – भामती

commentaries have construed the Bhāṣya sentences of this section in delineating various theories of error (khyāti-vāda).

Commentary	तं केचिद् अन्यत्र अन्यधर्माध्यासः इति वदन्ति	केचित् तु यत्र यदध्यासः तद्विवेकाग्रहनिबन्धनो भ्रम इति	अन्ये तु यत्र यदध्यासः तस्यैव विपरीतधर्मत्वकल्पनाम् आचक्षते
Pañcapādikā	Anyathākhyāti & Ātmakhyāti	Akhyāti	Anyathākhyāti (ekadeśimata) & Asatkhyāti
Bhāmatī	Ātmakhyāti	Akhyāti	Anyathākhyāti
Ratnaprabhā	Anyathākhyāti & Ātmakhyāti	Akhyāti	Asatkhyāti
Nyāyanirṇaya	Anyathākhyāti & Ātmakhyāti	Akhyāti	Anyathākhyāti (ekadeśimata) & Asatkhyāti
Bhāṣyabhāvaprakāśikā	Anyathākhyāti & Ātmakhyāti	Akhyāti	Anyathākhyāti (ekadeśimata) & Asatkhyāti
Prakaṭārthavivaraṇa	Anyathākhyāti & Ātmakhyāti	Akhyāti	Asatkhyāti
Vārtika	Anyathākhyāti	Akhyāti	Ātmakhyāti & Asatkhyāti
Brahmavidyābharaṇa	Ātmakhyāti	Akhyāti	Anirvacanīyakhyāti
Pradīpa	Anyathākhyāti	Akhyāti	Anirvacanīyakhyāti

It may be noted that the *Bhāmatī* does not construe any of the Bhāṣya sentences in this section as delineating the Asatkhyāti-vāda of the Śūnya-vādin while certain commentaries such as the *Pañcapādikā* and the *Ratnaprabhā* have taken the Bhāṣya sentence *"anye tu yatra yadadhyāsaḥ tasyaiva viparītadharmatvakalpanām ācakṣate"* as explaining the Śūnya-vādin's Asatkhyāti-vāda.

The Śūnya-vādins (Mādhyamika Buddhist) advocate the emptiness or voidness (śūnyatā) of all existence. Accordingly, they explain illusion as the cognition of dharma (attributes) of one non-existent object in another non-existent object. As such, in the illusory cognition 'This is silver', 'this' is non-existent (asat), 'silver' is also non-existent (asat) and their relation too is absolutely non-existent (asat). Hence, the theory of illusion of the Śūnya-vādin is termed 'Asatkhyāti-vāda'.

To clarify, the upholders of Anyathākhyāti-vāda negate only the relation

between the illusory object and the locus (because the illusory object is real in a different place and time) whereas the Śūnya-vādins negate all the three – both the relata (i.e. the locus and the superimposed object) and the relation between them.[16]

Then, how can an absolutely non-existent object become the cause of perceptual cognition? Everybody knows that a sky-flower is absolutely non-existent (asat or śūnya) and it can never become the object of our cognition. Hence, the silver, though misapprehended, cannot be absolutely non-existent like a sky-flower.[17]

As such, the definition of error given by the Śūnya-vādin does not deviate from the tenor of the concluding observation of the Ācārya that error consists in the apprehension of the attributes of one entity (although asat) in another (*"sarvathāpi tu anyasya anyadharmāvabhāsatāṁ na vyabhicarati"*). However, the absurdity of Asatkhyāti-vādin's explanation of illusion can never be overemphasised!

As indicated earlier the Ācārya's intention in citing the different theories of error in the present context is to highlight the all-comprehensiveness of the Advaitin's Anirvacanīya-khyāti. Thus the core part of his theory runs as a common thread through all the other well-known theories of error (illusion). The commentators on the Ācārya's Bhāṣya go further and take extra pains in establishing the superiority of the Ācārya's Anirvacanīya-khyāti over all the other theories of error.

[16] Vide *"asatkhyātivādinastu saṁsargiṇo'pyapalapantīti viśeṣaḥ."* (*Śāstradīpikā* of Pārthasārathi-miśra)

[17] Vide *"nirūpākhyānasyāparokṣābhāsagocaratvānupapatteḥ."* (*Siddhāntacandrikā* of Rāmakṛṣṇa)

5

[अध्यासस्वरूपे लोकानुभवः]

तथा च लोके [1]अनुभवः – शुक्तिका हि रजतवद्[1] अवभासते,[2] एकश्चन्द्रः सद्वितीयवद् – इति[3]।

5 A

[ADHYĀSASVARŪPE LOKĀNUBHAVAḤ]

tathā ca loke anubhavaḥ – śuktikā hi rajatavad avabhāsate, ekaścandraḥ sadvitīyavad – iti.

5 B

तथा च *tathā ca* – and that is why; लोके अनुभवः *loke anubhavaḥ* – (is) the experience in the world; शुक्तिका हि *śuktikā hi* – the shell indeed; रजतवत् *rajatavat* – as if silver; अवभासते *avabhāsate* – appears; एकः चन्द्रः *ekaḥ candraḥ* – the single moon; सद्वितीयवत् *sadvitīyavat* – as if with a double (as if having a second); इति *iti* – thus

5 C

[WORLDLY EXPERIENCE CORROBORATES THIS NATURE OF SUPERIMPOSITION]

That is why the worldly experience is:[1] The shell indeed appears as if silver;[2] and the single moon appears as if with a double.[3]

5 D

1. That is why the worldly experience is: The Ācārya concluded the last section by showing logically that the various theories of error upheld by different philosophical schools uniformly point to the unreal nature of the

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[1] ASS (fn.) अनुभावः

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[1] सम्यग्धीसिद्धाधिष्ठानरूपाभिप्रायेण शुक्तिकाग्रहणम्। सम्प्रयुक्तस्य मिथ्यारजतत्वभानधीबोधनाय वत्करणम्। अनुभवप्रसिद्ध्यर्थो हिशब्दः। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

[2] न पुना रजतमिदमिति शेषः। – भामती

[3] लक्षणप्रकरणोपसंहारार्थः इति शब्दः। – रत्नप्रभा

content of superimposition. In this section the Ācārya establishes that our experience also corroborates the same fact.[4]

2. The shell indeed appears as if silver: The commentators of the Bhāṣya differ on the exact context of these experiences. Some commentators identify them as arising after the superimposed object is negated (bādhāntara-kālīna) by realising the substratum – 'this is not silver' (nedaṁ rajatam).[5] Other commentators hold that the experiences cited are with reference to the error itself (bhrāntyapekṣayā).[6] Both these views have their respective difficulties. If the latter alternative were to be accepted, then the erroneous experience would be of the form 'this is silver' (idaṁ rajatam) and not of the form 'the shell appears as if silver' (śuktikā hi rajatavad avabhāsate). In fact, neither 'the shell' (śuktikā) nor 'as if' (vat) could figure in the shell–silver error. If the former alternative were to be accepted, the experience after negation of the silver will be of the form 'the shell appeared as if silver' (śuktikā hi rajatavad avābhāsiṣṭa). In such an experience the present tense 'appears' (avabhāsate) cannot figure. Hence the former alternative too may not be totally free from difficulty.

In view of all this, one could as well suggest this: The Ācārya's sentences may better represent the observation of a knowledgeable bystander on hearing the gleeful shout 'this is silver' of an erring, greedy man and on hearing the statement 'the moon has a double' of a wonderstruck person affected by the timira-doṣa (cataract sort of blindness). These observations show that the intelligent bystander clearly observes the unreal nature (anṛtatā) and inexplicability (anirvacanīyatā) of the superimposed content

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[4] Cf. न केवलमियमनृतता परीक्षकाणां सिद्धा, अपि तु लौकिकानामपि। – भामती

Also, cf. आरोप्यमिथ्यात्वे न युक्त्यपेक्षा, तस्य अनुभवसिद्धत्वाद् इत्याह—तथा चेति। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. आरोप्यानिर्वचनीयत्वं चेदं न केवलयुक्तिसाध्यं, किन्तु लोकानुभवसिद्धमपीत्याह—तथा च लोकेऽनुभव इति। तथा च – आरोप्यमिथ्यात्वावगाहे च। लोके – आबालगोपालमित्यर्थः। – प्रदीप

Also, cf. तथा च लोकेऽनुभवः इत्युदाहरणद्वयेन लौकिकसिद्धमेवेदमध्यासस्य स्वरूपं लक्षितं, किमत्र युक्त्या इति कथयति—शुक्तिका हि रजतवदवभासत इति। – पञ्चपादिका

Also, cf. न केवलं वादिनामेवायमध्यासः सम्मतः, अपि तु लौकिकानामपीत्याह—तथा चेति। – न्यायनिर्णय

[5] Cf. बाधानन्तरकालीनोऽयमनुभवः, तत्पूर्वं शुक्तिकात्वज्ञानायोगाद् रजतस्य बाधप्रत्यक्षसिद्धं मिथ्यात्वं वच्छब्देन उच्यते। – रत्नप्रभा

[6] Cf. अनुभवमाकारतो निर्दिशति—शुक्तिका हि रजतवदवभासत इति। अत्र रजतवदिति वच्छब्देन वस्तुगत्या न रजतमत्रेति बोधनाद् रजतानिर्वचनीयत्वमनुभूयत इति भावः। – प्रदीप

in the above two errors. Hence the Ācārya adds these observations as corroborative evidences to his Anirvacanīya-khyāti.[7]

3. and the single moon appears as if with a double: The citation of the first experience – 'the shell appears as if silver' – is itself quite enough to illustrate Anirvacanīya-khyāti. Yet, the Ācārya gives one more experience of a different nature – 'one moon having a double' – to illustrate how due to certain defect of a person, the single entity appears as if many. This example illustrates how due to our ignorance of Reality, one consciousness-Self (cidātmā) that has no second (*ekam evādvitīyam*) appears as many individual selves (asaṅkhyā jīvāḥ), even though jīvas are not different from one Cidātmā.[8]

The Advaitic tradition classifies adhyāsa (superimposition) under two heads:[9] (1) Sopādhika-adhyāsa: A superimposition (adhyāsa) that arises as a result of adjuncts or external factors (upādhi) is termed 'sopādhika-adhyāsa'. The classic illustration of this adhyāsa is the superimposition of the red colour of the japā-kusuma (Hibiscus) on the sphaṭika (crystal). In this example the Hibiscus plays the role of an external factor or adjunct (upādhi). It is because of the Hibiscus that its red colour is superimposed on the crystal and the crystal appears red. Sopādhika-adhyāsa is also called 'dharmādhyāsa' (superimposition of property). The Ācārya uses the illustration of 'one moon having a double' to explain this adhyāsa. In the above illustration of the Hibiscus and crystal, the property of the Hibiscus is superimposed on the crystal. But the property that is superimposed in

[7] Cf. ननु न शुक्तिका प्रतिभासते, रजतमेव प्रतिभासते, तेन शुक्तिकेति, रजतवदिति चोभयं नोपपद्यते, उच्यते, शुक्तिकाग्रहणमुपरितन-सम्यग्ज्ञानसिद्धं परमार्थतः शुक्तिकात्वमपेक्ष्य, वतिग्रहणं तु सम्प्रयुक्तस्यारजतस्वरूपस्य मिथ्यारजतसम्भेद इवावभासनमङ्गीकृत्य। मिथ्यात्वमपि रजतस्याऽऽगन्तुकदोषनिमित्तत्वादनन्तरबाधदर्शनाच्च कथ्यते, न पुनः परमार्थाभिमताद्रजतादन्यत्वमाश्रित्य। तत्रासम्प्रयुक्तत्वाद्रजतस्य नेदन्तावभासस्तद्गतः, किन्तु सम्प्रयुक्तगत एव। अपरोक्षावभासस्तु संस्कारजन्मनोऽपि रजतोल्लेखस्य दोष बलादिन्द्रियजज्ञानान्तर्भावाच्चेति द्रष्टव्यम्। तत्र शुक्तिकोदाहरणेन सम्प्रयुक्तस्यानात्मा रजतमिति दर्शितम्। – पञ्चपादिका

[8] Cf. अन्यस्य अन्यात्मताविभ्रमो लोकसिद्धः, एकस्य त्वभिन्नस्य भेदभ्रमो न दृष्ट इति कुतः चिदात्मनोऽभिन्नानां जीवानां भेदविभ्रम इत्यत आह – एकश्चन्द्रः सद्वितीयवदिति। – भामती

Also, cf. जीवानां वस्तुगत्याऽभिन्नानां भेदभ्रमोऽपि नानुपपन्न इति दृष्टान्तनिर्देशेन सूचयति—एकश्चन्द्र इति। – प्रदीप

Also, cf. निरञ्जनस्य चैतन्यस्यास्मदर्थेऽनिदमंशस्यानात्मा तदवभास्यत्वेन युष्मदर्थलक्षणापन्नोऽहङ्कारोऽध्यस्त इति प्रदर्शनार्थं द्विचन्द्रोदाहरणेन जीवेश्वरयोर्जीवानां चानात्मरूपो भेदावभास इति दर्शितम्। – पञ्चपादिका

Also, cf. बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बयोः, प्रतिबिम्बानां च मिथो भेदधीवद् जीवब्रह्मणोर्जीवानां च भेदधियः सोपाधिकभ्रमस्य दृष्टान्तमाह—एक इति। एकत्वग्रहणवतिग्रहणे पूर्ववत्। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

[9] Cf. निरुपाधिकाहङ्काराद्यतद्व्यारोपस्य प्रथममुदाहरणं, चरमं जीवेश्वरभेदारोपस्य। – प्रकटार्थविवरण

Also, cf. अत्र वियदादेर्ब्रह्मण्यारोपं सम्भावयितुं आद्यो दृष्टान्तः। एकस्यैव ब्रह्मणो जीवेश्वररूपेण भेदे अपरो दृष्टान्तः। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

sopādhika-adhyāsa need not necessarily be that of the upādhi (adjunct); what is necessary is that the superimposed property is occasioned by the upādhi. In the illustration of 'one moon having a double', the illusory dual nature of the moon is a consequence of timira-doṣa (cataract) or a finger pressing the eyeball. The experiences 'mama idam' – 'I am stout', 'I am deaf' and so on – that are occasioned by the superimpostion of the properties of the upādhis such as body, senses and so on fall under the category of sopādhika-adhyāsa.

(2) Nirupādhika-adhyāsa: A superimposition which is not caused by an external adjunct (upādhi) is called 'nirupādhika-adhyāsa'. In this superimpostion an entity appears as another. The rope–snake and shell–silver are the classic examples to illustrate this adhyāsa. The rope itself appears as snake and the shell itself appears as silver. Since one propertied entity (dharmin) appears as another propertied entity, this type of adhyāsa is also termed 'dharmi-adhyāsa'. The experience of 'aham idam' – 'I am the body', 'I am the mind' and so on – are all the result of this adhyāsa. The error of 'ahaṅkārādhyāsa', that is 'the superimposition of ego, the object of 'I'-notion on the Self' is brought under this nirupādhikādhyāsa.[10] Of course, in the ahaṅkārādhyāsa even though ignorance (avidyā – ajñāna) plays the important role of upādhi, yet because ignorance is the common factor in all errors and because it is included in the substratum itself, it is not regarded as an upādhi.[11]

For further elaboration on 'aham idam' and 'mama idam' refer to Section 2 D, n.4 & 5.

The verb 'avabhāsate' (appears) is supplied here from the previous sentence. In these illusory experiences cited by the Ācārya, the element 'as if' (vat-pratyaya) signifies the unreality of the content of the superimposition. That is, its content does not exist in, or is unconnected with the substratum (adhiṣṭhāna). For details see Section 9 D, n.2.

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[10] Cf. आत्मनि निरुपाधिके अहङ्काराध्यासे दृष्टान्तमुक्त्वा ब्रह्मजीवावान्तरभेदस्य अविद्याद्युपाधिकस्य अध्यासे दृष्टान्तमाह—एक इति। चन्द्रसहितवदेक एव अङ्गुल्या द्विधा भाति इत्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

[11] Cf. अनुपहितेदमंशे रजतादिसंस्कारसहितावियया रजताद्यध्यासवत् पूर्वपूर्वाहङ्कारादिवासितानाद्यविद्यया चिदात्मन्यनुपहिते भवत्यहङ्काराद्यध्यास इति निरुपाधिकाहङ्काराद्यध्यासे दृष्टान्तमाह शुक्तिकेति। सोपाधिकभ्रमस्य दृष्टान्तमाह एक इति। – न्यायनिर्णय

6

[प्रकारान्तरेण अध्यासाक्षेपभाष्यम्]

कथं पुनः प्रत्यगात्मनि अविषये अध्यासो विषयतद्धर्माणाम्। सर्वो हि [१]पुरोऽवस्थिते[1] विषये[2] विषयान्तरम् अध्यस्यति, युष्मत्प्रत्ययापेतस्य[3] च प्रत्यगात्मनः अविषयत्वं ब्रवीषि।

6 A

[PRAKĀRĀNTAREṆA ADHYĀSĀKṢEPABHĀṢYAM]

kathaṁ punaḥ pratyagātmani aviṣaye adhyāso viṣayataddharmāṇām. sarvo hi puro'vasthite viṣaye viṣayāntaram adhyasyati, yuṣmatpratyayāpetasya ca pratyagātmanaḥ aviṣayatvaṁ bravīṣi.

6 B

कथं पुनः *kathaṁ punaḥ* – how again (can there be); प्रत्यगात्मनि *pratyagātmani* – on the inner Self; अविषये *aviṣaye* – the non-object; अध्यासः *adhyāsaḥ* – superimposition; विषयतद्धर्माणाम् *viṣayataddharmāṇām* – of the object and its attributes; सर्वः *sarvaḥ* – all; हि *hi* – for; पुरः अवस्थिते विषये *puraḥ avasthite viṣaye* – on an object that is present in front; विषयान्तरम् *viṣayāntaram* – another object; अध्यस्यति *adhyasyati* – superimposes; युष्मत्प्रत्ययापेतस्य *yuṣmatpratyayāpetasya* – that falls beyond the 'thou'-notion; च *ca* – but; प्रत्यगात्मनः *pratyagātmanaḥ* – for the inner Self; अविषयत्वम् *aviṣayatvam* – to be a non-object; ब्रवीषि *bravīṣi* – you declare

6 C

[ANOTHER OBJECTION TO SUPERIMPOSITION]

Again, how can there be superimposition of the object and of its attributes on the inner Self, the non-object?[1] For, all superimpose one object on another object that exists in front.[2] But, you declare the inner Self,[3] falling outside the 'thou'-notion, to be a non-object.

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[१] VV पुरोऽवस्थिते एव विषये

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[1] पुरोऽवस्थिते – अपरोक्षे। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

[2] विषये – सामान्यात्मना गृहीते। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

[3] युष्मत्प्रत्ययः – युष्मच्छब्दोल्लेखी प्रत्ययः, इदमित्येवंरूप इति यावत्। तदपेतः—इदमित्येवमप्रतीयमानः। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

6 D

1. Again, how can there be superimposition of the object and of its attributes on the inner Self, the non-object? In the earlier sections the opponent has objected twice to the possibility of the mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self. The first time, he objected because he found the causes of superimposition absent. According to him the causes are: (1) similarity (sādṛśya) between the substratum (like shell) and the superimposed object (like silver), and (2) non-apprehension (bhedāgraha) of the distinction between them. The second time, he raised objection on the ground that there cannot be any coupling of the real and the unreal (satyānṛta-mithunīkaraṇa) – a factor considered by the Vedāntin as the root cause of superimposition. These objections have been successfully answered by the Ācārya by showing the nature, cause and effect of the mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self in section two, and by offering an all comprehensive definition of error (anirvacanīya-khyāti) in section three.

In the present section the opponent (Pūrvapakṣin) objects for the third and final time against the possibility of mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self.[4] He opines that in every error (like the shell–silver error), the substratum (shell) along with the superimposed object (silver) should be an object of cognition generated by a sense organ. Since the Vedāntin declares the inner Self to be effulgence (prakāśa), seer (dṛk), self-manifest (svayam-prakāśa) and consciousness (cit), the opponent questions – how can such a self-manifesting, seer-consciousness, inner-Self be an object of cognition? For the perceiver (viṣayin – dṛk) is diametrically opposed to the object perceived (viṣaya – dṛśya) and the perceiver cannot be the perceived object simultaneously.[5]

It may be observed that the shell – which is the substratum of the shell–silver error – consists of two parts, that is this-ness (idantva) and the shell-ness

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[4] Cf. एतावता कारणत्रयाभावनिबन्धनाध्यासासम्भवशङ्का विशदं परिहृता, साम्प्रतन्तु अधिष्ठानाज्ञानरूपतुरीयकारणाभावान्नाध्यास आत्मन्यन्तःकरणस्येत्यभिप्रायेणाक्षिपति—कथं पुनरिति। – प्रदीप (कारणत्रयम् – भेदाग्रहः, सादृश्यज्ञानं, पूर्वतनप्रमाहितसंस्कार इति)

[5] Cf. यत्रापरोक्षाध्यासाधिष्ठानत्वं तत्रेन्द्रियसंयुक्तत्वं विषयत्वं चेति व्याप्तिः शुक्त्यादौ दृष्टा। तत्र व्यापकाभावादात्मनोऽधिष्ठानत्वं न सम्भवतीत्यभिप्रेत्याह – प्रत्यगात्मनीति। – रत्नप्रभा

(śuktitva). In the shell–silver error the former part alone shows up and not the latter part. Hence we experience the error as 'this is silver' (idaṁ rajatam). The opponent argues that the same cannot be said of the inner Self, the pure Consciousness because the Self consists of no parts (niraṁśa) and is one only (ekam eva). Hence the Self cannot be the substratum on which the not-Self (the body, senses, etc.) and its attributes can be superimposed. Conversely, the Self also cannot be superimposed on the not-Self. In this way the opponent argues that the mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self is impossible.[6]

2. on another object that exists in front: This expression signifies 'on a thing contacted by sense organ' (indriyasaṁyukte vastuni).[7] The point here is: The silver is superimposed on the shell because the latter is in contact with the senses. When the shell itself is not contacted by the sense organs it cannot be the substratum of the shell–silver error.[8]

3. the inner Self: In contrast to the indeterminable assemblage of the body, sense organs and so on, the inner Self is called 'pratyagātman' because It is

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[6] Cf. स चापराधीनप्रकाशत्वाद् अनंशत्वाच्च अविषयः, तस्मिन्नध्यासो विषयधर्माणां, देहेन्द्रियादिधर्माणां कथम्। किमाक्षेपे। अयुक्तोऽयमध्यास इत्याक्षेपः। कस्मादयमयुक्त इत्यत आह—सर्वो हि पुरोऽवस्थिते विषये विषयान्तरमध्यस्यति। एतदुक्तं भवति—यत्पराधीनप्रकाशमंशवच्च तत्सामान्यांशग्रहे करणदोषवशाच्च विशेषाग्रहे अन्यथा प्रकाशते। प्रत्यगात्मा तु अपराधीनप्रकाशतया न स्वज्ञाने कारणान्यपेक्षते, येन तदाश्रयैर्दोषैर्दुष्येत्। न चांशवान्, येन कश्चिदस्यांशो गृह्येत, कश्चिन्न गृह्येत। न हि तदेव तदानीमेव तेनैव गृहीतमगृहीतं च सम्भवतीति न स्वयम्प्रकाशतापक्षे अध्यासः। – भामती

Also, cf. भवत्वध्यासः शुक्त्यादौ, आत्मनि तु न सम्भवति इति आक्षिपति—कथं पुनरिति। यत्र अपरोक्षाध्यासाधिष्ठानत्वं तत्र इन्द्रियसंयुक्तत्वं विषयत्वं च इति व्याप्तिः शुक्त्यादौ दृष्टा, तत्र व्यापकाभावाद् आत्मनोऽधिष्ठानत्वं न सम्भवति इति अभिप्रेत्य आह—प्रत्यगात्मनीति। प्रतीचि पूर्णे इन्द्रियाग्राह्ये विषयस्य अहङ्कारादेः तद्धर्माणां च अध्यासः कथमित्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. प्रत्यगात्मनस्त्वात्मत्वादेवाविषयत्वाद्पुरोऽवस्थितत्वाच्चाधिष्ठानत्वायोग्यत्वात् परत्रेति लक्षणांशो न सम्भवतीत्यर्थः। – प्रकटार्थविवरण

Also, cf. इदानीं स्वप्रकाशस्य निरंशस्य ब्रह्मणोऽधिष्ठानत्वं न सम्भवतीति आक्षेपः क्रियते—कथं पुनरिति। अयमाशयः—अपरोक्षाध्यासे आरोप्यवस्तुविनिर्मुक्ततया अधिष्ठानस्य सामान्यांशगोचरं अपरोक्षज्ञानं विशेषांशाज्ञानं च अपेक्षितम्। इदं रजतम् इत्याद्यध्यासेषु तथादर्शनात्। न सर्वात्मनैव भासमानत्वं, न वा सर्वात्मनैवाभासमानत्वम्। इदं च प्रत्यगात्मनि अन्तःकरणाध्यासे न सम्भवति। यस्य हि सांशस्य ज्ञानान्तरेण जन्येन भानं तस्य अंशभेदसम्भवात् करणदोषेण विशेषांशज्ञानप्रतिबन्धे सति सामान्यांशगोचरं इन्द्रियेण ज्ञानं जायत इति युक्तम्। प्रत्यगात्मा तु निरंशः नापि जन्यं ज्ञानं तद्विषयम्। तव मते तस्य स्वप्रकाशतया स्वरूपभूतेन नित्यज्ञानेनैव भानाभ्युपगमात्। अतो नित्यज्ञानस्य करणदोषवशात् सामान्यांशमात्रावगाहित्वं विशेषांशानवगाहित्वमिति तावद्वक्तुं न शक्यते। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

[7] Cf. पुरोऽवस्थितत्वम्—इन्द्रियसंयुक्तत्वम्। – रत्नप्रभा

[8] Cf. सदातनेऽप्यप्रकाशे पुरोऽवस्थितत्वस्य अपरोक्षत्वस्याभावान्नाध्यासः। न हि शुक्तौ अपुरःस्थितायां रजतमध्यस्यति इदं रजतम् इति। तस्मादत्यन्तग्रहे अत्यन्ताग्रहे च नाध्यास इति सिद्धम्। – भामती

Also, cf. आरोप्येण सह तुल्येन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वमधिष्ठानस्य दृष्टम्, इह तद्भावान्नाध्यास इत्यर्थः। – न्यायनिर्णय

the innermost (pratyak) Self (Ātman) and is aware of Itself (pratīpam añcati jānāti).[9] Thus the very term 'pratyagātman' by denoting the innermost Self, *ipso facto*, makes it clear that the Self cannot be an object of any cognition, much less a substratum of the not-Self error.[10]

◈

One of the fundamental causes of superimposition is the non-apprehension of the distinction between the substratum and the object superimposed (adhiṣṭhānāropyayoḥ bhedāgrahaḥ). In the very first section the opponent had objected that being the seer and the pure Consciousness, the Self cannot be mistaken for the not-Self.[11] Now, in the present section the same point is elaborated from the point of view that the inner Self defies being an object of any cognition.

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[9] Cf. अशक्यनिर्वचनीयेभ्यः देहेन्द्रियादिभ्यः आत्मानं प्रतीपं अञ्चति जानाति इति प्रत्यङ् स च आत्मेति प्रत्यगात्मा। – भामती

[10] Cf. अविषयत्वे हि चिदात्मनो नाध्यासः, विषय एव तु चिदात्मा अस्मत्प्रत्ययस्य, तत्कथं नाध्यास इत्यत आह—युष्मत्प्रत्ययापेतस्य इति। विषयत्वे हि चिदात्मनोऽन्यो विषयी भवेत्। तथा च यो विषयी स एव चिदात्मा। विषयस्तु ततोऽन्यो युष्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरोऽभ्युपेयः। तस्मादनात्मत्वप्रसङ्गादनवस्थापरिहाराय युष्मत्प्रत्ययापेतत्वम्, अत एव अविषयत्वमात्मनो वक्तव्यं, तथा च नाध्यास इत्यर्थः। – भामती

Also, cf. ननु आत्मनोऽपि अधिष्ठानत्वार्थं विषयत्वादिकमस्तु इत्यत आह—युष्मदिति। इदंप्रत्ययानर्हस्य प्रत्यगात्मनो 'न चक्षुषा गृह्यते' (मु.उ.३.१.८) इत्यादिश्रुतिमनुसृत्य त्वमविषयत्वं ब्रवीषि। सम्प्रति अध्यासलोभेन विषयत्वाङ्गीकारे श्रुतिसिद्धान्तयोः बाधः स्यादित्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. नह्यविषयेऽध्यासो दृष्टपूर्वः सम्भवी वा। – पञ्चपादिका

Also, cf. प्रत्यक्त्वादात्मत्वाच्चास्याविषयत्वम्। – न्यायनिर्णय

[11] Cf. अस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरे विषयिणि चिदात्मके युष्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरस्य विषयस्य तद्धर्माणां च अध्यासः, तद्विपर्ययेण विषयिणः तद्धर्माणां च विषये अध्यासो मिथ्या इति भवितुं युक्तम्। – अध्यासभाष्य

7

[आक्षेपनिराकरणभाष्यम्]

उच्यते[1] – न तावदयमेकान्तेन अविषयः,[2] अस्मत्प्रत्ययविषयत्वाद् अपरोक्षत्वाच्च[3] [१]प्रत्यगात्मप्रसिद्धेः। न चायमस्ति नियमः – पुरोऽवस्थित एव विषये विषयान्तरम् अध्यसितव्यम् – इति। अप्रत्यक्षेऽपि हि[4] आकाशे बालाः[5] तलमलिनतादि[6] अध्यस्यन्ति। एवम् अविरुद्धः प्रत्यगात्मन्यपि [२]अनात्माध्यासः।

7 A

[ĀKṢEPANIRĀKARAṆABHĀṢYAM]

ucyate – na tāvadayamekāntena aviṣayaḥ, asmatpratyayaviṣayatvād aparokṣatvācca pratyagātmaprasiddheḥ. na cāyam asti niyamaḥ – puro'vasthita eva viṣaye viṣayāntaram adhyasitavyam – iti. apratyakṣe'pi hi ākāśe bālāḥ talamalinatādi adhyasyanti. evam aviruddhaḥ pratyagātmanyapi anātmādhyāsaḥ.

7 B

उच्यते *ucyate* – (we) reply; अयम् *ayam* – this (inner Self); न तावद् एकान्तेन *na tāvad ekāntena* – not absolutely; अविषयः *aviṣayaḥ* – non-object; अस्मत्प्रत्ययविषयत्वात् *asmatpratyayaviṣayatvāt* – because of Its being the object of 'I'-notion; अपरोक्षत्वात् च *aparokṣatvāt ca* – and because of Its immediacy of experience; प्रत्यगात्मप्रसिद्धेः *pratyagātmaprasiddheḥ* – since this inner Self is a well-established fact; न च अयम् अस्ति नियमः *na ca ayam asti niyamaḥ* – nor is it necessary; पुरः अवस्थिते एव विषये *puraḥ avasthite eva viṣaye* – only on an object that is in front; विषयान्तरम् *viṣayāntaram* – another object; अध्यसितव्यम् *adhyasitavyam* – should be superimposed; इति *iti* –

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[१] AL प्रत्यगात्मसिद्धेः

[२] AL अनात्मनामध्यासः(?)

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[1] आत्मन्यध्याससम्भावनां प्रतिजानीते—उच्यत इति। – प्रदीप

[2] अयम् – प्रत्यगात्मा। एकान्तेन – नियमेन। नाविषयः – नाप्रकाशमानः। – प्रदीप

[3] च शब्दः शङ्कानिरासार्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

[4] हिर्यस्मादर्थे। – भामती

[5] बाला अविवेकिनः परदर्शितदर्शिनः। – भामती

बालाः अयथार्थदर्शिनः। – पञ्चपादिका

[6] तलम् – इन्द्रनीलतमालपत्रसदृशं, मलिनताच्च – धूमादिकमन्यच्च नीलोत्पलसमानवर्णतादि। – पञ्चपादिका

that; अप्रत्यक्षे अपि हि *apratyakṣe api hi* – since even though not perceptible; आकाशे *ākāśe* – on the space; बालाः *bālāḥ* – the credulous; तलमलिनतादि *talamalinatādi* – surface, impurities and so on; अध्यस्यन्ति *adhyasyanti* – superimpose; एवम् *evam* – thus; अविरुद्धः *aviruddhaḥ* – (it is) not contrary to logic; प्रत्यगात्मनि अपि *pratyagātmani api* – (that) even on the inner Self; अनात्माध्यासः *anātmādhyāsaḥ* – (there is) the superimposition of the not-Self

7 C

[OBJECTION ANSWERED]

We reply – In fact this (inner Self) is not absolutely (i.e. in every respect) a non-object since this inner Self is a well-established fact because of Its being an object of 'I'-notion[1] and (also) because of Its immediacy of experience.[2] Nor is it necessary[3] that it is only on an object in front[4] that another object should be superimposed. For the credulous superimpose on the space, though it is not perceptible, the surface, impurity and so on.[5] Thus, even the superimposition of not-Self on the inner Self is not contrary to logic.

7 D

1. We reply – In fact this (inner Self) is not absolutely (i.e. in every respect) a non-object since this inner Self is a well-established fact because of Its being an object of 'I'-notion: The underlying idea is: The inner Self is not an object at all because being the self-manifest partless pure Consciousness it is the innermost Self. In this form it is not an object of any cognition whatsoever. Yet, on account of its being conditioned by the upādhis (conditioning factors or adjuncts) – the intellect, mind, sense organs, body and so on – the pure Self attains the status of jīva (individual Self) and becomes an object of knowledge. It is to be noted that the upādhis being contrived (parikalpita) by the inexplicable nescience are illusory. Hence the perceived jīvabhāva of the Self is also illusory. Thus, though the pure Self is unconditioned, non-agent, non-enjoyer and non-object, yet as a jīva, the Self is seemingly conditioned,

becomes an apparent agent and enjoyer and appears as the object of 'I'-notion (asmatpratyaya-viṣaya). The idea of the unconditioned appearing as though conditioned can be well-illustrated by the example of unconditioned total space (mahākāśa) appearing conditioned as pot space (ghaṭākāśa), room space (maṭhākāśa) and so on because of the external adjuncts (upādhis)[7] like pot, room and so on.

But for the inner conscious-Self (conditioned by the said adjuncts) figuring as object of 'I'-notion, we cannot have the most common experience of 'I know', since the adjuncts like the mind, body and so on being inert (jaḍa) cannot be the subject for the verb 'to know'. This experience 'I know' (aham jānāmi) may be compared with another well-known illustration – 'Iron scorches' (ayo dahati). Here too the subject (the agent) of the verb 'scorches' (dahati) can only be fire and not the adjunct iron – though iron alone is expressed herein as the agent of scorching.

2. and (also) because of Its immediacy of experience: Everyone is sure that in his 'I'-notion (as in his experience 'I know') he is aware of his own knowing

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[7] Cf. अयमर्थः—सत्यं प्रत्यगात्मा स्वयम्प्रकाशात्वादविषयोऽनंशश्च। तथाप्यनिर्वचनीयानाद्यविद्यापरिकल्पितबुद्धि-मनःसूक्ष्मस्थूलशरीरेन्द्रियावच्छेदेन अनवच्छिन्नोऽपि वस्तुतः अवच्छिन्न इव, अभिन्नोऽपि भिन्न इव, अकर्तापि कर्तेव, अभोक्तापि भोक्तेव, अविषयोऽप्यस्मत्प्रत्ययविषय इव, जीवभावमापन्नोऽवभासते, नभ इव घटमणिकमल्लिकाद्यवच्छेदभेदेन भिन्नमिवानेकविधधर्मकमिवेति।...तस्माच्चिदात्मनः स्वयम्प्रकाशस्यैव अनवच्छिन्नस्य अवच्छिन्नेभ्यो बुद्ध्यादिभ्यो भेदाग्रहात् तदध्यासेन जीवभाव इति। तस्य च अनिदमिदमात्मनः अस्मत्प्रत्ययविषयत्वमुपपद्यते। तथा हि—कर्ता भोक्ता चिदात्मा अहंप्रत्यये प्रत्यवभासते। न च उदासीनस्य तस्य क्रियाशक्तिर्भोगशक्तिर्वा सम्भवति। यस्य च बुद्ध्यादेः कार्यकरणसङ्घातस्य क्रियाभोगशक्ती न तस्य चैतन्यम्। तस्माच्चिदात्मैव कार्यकरणसङ्घातेन ग्रथितो लब्धक्रियाभोगशक्तिः स्वयम्प्रकाशोऽपि बुद्ध्यादिविषयविच्छुरणात् कथञ्चिदस्मत्प्रत्ययविषयः अहङ्कारास्पदं जीव इति च जन्तुरिति च क्षेत्रज्ञ इति च आख्यायते। न खलु जीवश्चिदात्मनो भिद्यते।... जीवो हि चिदात्मतया स्वयम्प्रकाशतया अविषयोऽपि औपाधिकेन रूपेण विषय इति भावः। – भामती

Also, cf. अस्मत्प्रत्ययोऽहमिति अध्यासः तत्र भासमानत्वाद् इत्यर्थः। अस्मदर्थः चिदात्मा प्रतिबिम्बितत्वेन यत्र प्रतीयते सोऽस्मत्प्रत्ययोऽहङ्कारः तत्र भासमानत्वाद् इति वा अर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. आत्मन्यध्याससम्भावनां प्रतिजानीते—उच्यत इति। अध्यासं प्रति सत्यमधिष्ठानज्ञानमपेक्ष्यते, नत्वारोप्याधिष्ठानयोरेक-जातीयज्ञानमपेक्ष्यते। तथा च स्वयम्प्रकाशमानस्य चैतन्यस्य स्वतोऽन्तःकरणस्य च वृत्त्यभिव्यक्तचैतन्यभास्यत्वेऽप्यध्यासो न विरुद्धः। स्वतो भासमानमधिष्ठानात्मकमेव चैतन्यमहमाकारवृत्त्यभिव्यक्तमपीत्युभयोरप्येकज्ञानविषयत्वं न क्षतं, यथेदमाकारवृत्त्यभिव्यक्तं रजताकारवृत्त्यभिव्यक्तं च चैतन्यमेकमिति भावः। अत्रान्तःकरणमिव तदाकारवृत्तिरप्याविद्यकैव, अथवाऽन्तःकरणपरिणाम-रूपेत्यन्यदेतत्। शुद्धचैतन्यं चेदं साक्षिरूपमिति नाज्ञानविषयत्वविरोधः। अन्तःकरणवृत्त्युपहितमध्यस्तं चैतन्यमेव शबलितं साक्षीति न दोषः। – प्रदीप

Also, cf. अस्मदर्थश्चिदात्मा साक्षितया प्रतीयते प्रतिबिम्बतेऽस्मिन्नित्यस्मत्प्रत्ययोऽहङ्कारः। तत्सम्बन्धाल्लब्धपरिच्छेदः सन्नात्मा स्वरूपस्फुरणेन स्फुरन्नपि तद्विषयो निरुच्यते। – न्यायनिर्णय

Also, cf. अस्मच्छब्दोल्लिखितः प्रत्ययो नाम जीवाकाराहंवृत्तिः। अहंवृत्त्याकारपरिणतं हि अन्तःकरणं जीवाभिव्यङ्गकमिष्यते। अन्यथा सदा अहमहमिति जीवावभासप्रसङ्गात्। तस्याः स्वरूपेणाविषयोऽपि अध्यस्ताहङ्कर्तृत्वादिविशिष्टरूपेण विषयो भवतीत्यधिष्ठानत्वयोग्यो भवतीत्यर्थः। – प्रकटार्थविवरण

Self. That is why no one doubts his own existence. The conscious-Self (Cidātmā) is admitted to be directly perceived (aparokṣa) as 'I am'. In fact, in all our experiences, with no exception, Cidātmā is invariably manifesting. In other words, it is this Cidātmā that forms the basis in all our experiences. But for this experience of the inner Self (pratyagātmā), the factor that illumines the objects of the world, the entire universe would not become an object of our experiences and hence would remain utterly unknown.[8] That is why the Upaniṣad affirms: "When the Self shines, then following It everything else shines; by Its light all this (universe) is illumined."[9]

Thus, by Scripture (Śruti), logic (yukti) and experience (anubhava) it is established that the inner Self is perceived and hence to superimpose the not-Self on the Self is not an impossibility.

3. Nor is it necessary: Even assuming the imperceptibility of the Self, the Ācārya invokes the illustration of space in order to drive home the point that imperceptible entities also become the locus of superimposition just as perceptible ones do. Just as the space which is admitted to be imperceptible to the senses[10] by all the schools of Indian philosophy becomes the locus for superimposing the properties of surfacehood, impurities and so on, the Self though imperceptible, yet can be accepted to be the locus of the act of superimposition.[11]

The present section shows that the opposition has proceeded under the assumption that only those entities can serve as substratum and object of

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[8] Cf. अवश्यं चिदात्माऽपरोक्षोऽभ्युपेतव्यः, तदप्रथायां सर्वस्याप्रथनेन जगदान्ध्यप्रसङ्गात्। – भामती

Also, cf. स्वप्रकाशत्वाद् इत्यर्थः। स्वप्रकाशत्वं साधयति—प्रत्यगिति। आबालपण्डितम् आत्मनः संशयादिशून्यत्वेन प्रसिद्धेः स्वप्रकाशत्वम् इत्यर्थः। अतः स्वप्रकाशत्वेन भासमानत्वाद् आत्मनोऽध्यासाधिष्ठानत्वं सम्भवति इति भावः। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. अस्मत्प्रत्ययाविषयत्वेऽप्यपरोक्षत्वादेकान्तेनाविषयत्वाभावात् तस्मिन्नहङ्काराध्यास इत्यर्थः। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

[9] तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वं तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति। – कठोपनिषद् (२.२.१५)

[10] The Advaitins hold that though space is atīndriya (not perceived by senses), yet it is sākṣibhāsya (illumined by the witness-Self).

Cf. सिद्धान्ते आलोकाकारचाक्षुषवृत्त्यभिव्यक्तसाक्षिवेद्यत्वं नभसि इति ज्ञेयम्। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. साक्षिवेद्यतया सम्प्रयोगमन्तरेणापरोक्षेऽपीति यावत्। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

Also, cf. आकाशोऽचाक्षुषः, सर्वगतद्रव्यत्वाद्, नीरूपद्रव्यत्वाद्वा, आत्मवत्। – प्रकटार्थविवरण

[11] Cf. नभो हि द्रव्यं सद् रूपस्पर्शविरहान्न बाह्येन्द्रियप्रत्यक्षम्। नापि मानसं, मनसोऽसहायस्य बाह्ये अप्रवृत्तेः, तस्माद्प्रत्यक्षम्। अथ च तत्र बाला अविवेकिनः परदर्शितदर्शिनः कदाचित्पार्थिवच्छायां श्यामतामारोप्य, कदाचित्तैजसं शुक्लत्वमारोप्य, नीलोत्पलपलाशश्याममिति वा राजहंसमालाधवलमिति वा निर्वर्णयन्ति। तत्रापि पूर्वदृष्टस्य तैजसस्य वा तामसस्य वा रूपस्य परत्र नभसि स्मृतिरूपोऽवभास इति। एवं तदेव तलमध्यस्यन्ति अवाङ् मुखीभूतमहेन्द्रनीलमणिमयमहाकटाहकल्पमित्यर्थः। – भामती

superimposition which are objects of perception produced by one and the same sense organ (samānendriyajanya-pratyakṣa-yogyatvam). The space analogy exposes the illogical nature of such an assumption.[12]

4. in front: As in Section 6, here too the expression *'puro'vasthita'*, signifies 'that which is perceivable' (pratyakṣa-yogya).[13] The phrase *'apratyakṣe'pyākāśe'* in the next sentence makes this point clearer.

5. surface, impurity and so on: We too experience 'the surface of the sky' (nabhas-tala) and talk about the 'sky as blue' (nīlaṁ nabhaḥ).[14]

[12] Cf. यदुक्तम् अपरोक्षाध्यासाधिष्ठानत्वस्य इन्द्रियसंयुक्ततया ग्राह्यत्वं व्यापकमिति तत्र आह—न चायम् इति। तत्र हेतुमाह—अप्रत्यक्षेऽपि इति। इन्द्रियाग्राह्ये अपि इत्यर्थः। बाला अविवेकिनः तलम् इन्द्रिनीलकटाहकल्पं नभो मलिनं पीतमित्येवम् अपरोक्षमध्यस्यन्ति। तत्र इन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वं नाऽस्ति इति व्यभिचाराद् न व्याप्तिः। एतेन आत्मानात्मनोः सादृश्याभावाद् न अध्यास इति अपास्तम्। नीलनभसोः तदभावे अपि अध्यासदर्शनात्। – रत्नप्रभा

[13] Cf. पुरोऽवस्थित एव, अपरोक्ष एव। – भामती

[14] Cf. न हि नभो द्रव्यत्वे सत्यस्पर्शत्वाद् बाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्यम्। नापि मनसोऽसहायस्य बाह्ये वृत्तिः। तेन प्रसिद्धप्रत्यक्षत्वहीनेऽपि नभसि, अविवेकिनः, तलम् इन्द्रनीलकटाहकल्पं, मलिनतां धूम्रतामन्यच्च पीताद्यध्यस्यन्ति। तथा चाधिष्ठानारोप्ययोर्नैकेन्द्रिय-ग्राह्यत्वनियतिरिति भावः। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

8

[अध्यासः अविद्या]

तमेतम् एवंलक्षणम्[1] अध्यासं पण्डिताः[2] 'अविद्या' इति मन्यन्ते। तद्विवेकेन[3] च वस्तुस्वरूपावधारणं[4] 'विद्याम्'[5] आहुः[6]।

8 A

[ADHYĀSAḤ AVIDYĀ]

tametam evaṁlakṣaṇam adhyāsaṁ paṇḍitāḥ 'avidyā' iti manyante. tadvivekena ca vastusvarūpāvadhāraṇaṁ 'vidyām' āhuḥ.

8 B

तम् एतम् एवंलक्षणम् *tam etam evaṁlakṣaṇam* – this (thing) of the said character; अध्यासम् *adhyāsam* – superimposition; पण्डिताः *paṇḍitāḥ* – the learned persons; अविद्या इति *avidyā iti* – to be 'nescience'; मन्यन्ते *manyante* – hold; तद्विवेकेन च *tadvivekena ca* – and by discriminating therefrom; वस्तुस्वरूपावधारणम् *vastusvarūpāvadhāraṇam* – the determination of the true nature of a thing; विद्याम् आहुः *vidyām āhuḥ* – they call 'knowledge'

8 C

[SUPERIMPOSITION IS NESCIENCE]

The learned persons[1] hold this superimposition[2] of the said character[3] to be 'nescience';[4] and the determination of the true nature of the thing by discrimination, they call, 'knowledge'.

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[1] आक्षिप्तत्वं, समाहितत्वं, लक्षितत्वं च विशेषणार्थः। (विशेषणार्थः – क्रमेण तम्, एतम्, एवंलक्षणमिति विशेषणत्रयार्थः) – न्यायनिर्णय

[2] पण्डिताः – प्रमाणकुशलाः। – पञ्चपादिका

[3] तस्याध्यस्तस्य बुद्ध्यादेः, विवेको विलापनं, तेन रूपेण। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

[4] वस्तुस्वरूपावधारणं, निर्विचिकित्सं ज्ञानम्। – भामती

[5] तस्याध्यस्तस्य बुद्ध्यादेर्विवेको विलापनं, तेन रूपेण, आत्मनोऽसाधारणरूपस्येदमित्थमेवेत्यवधारणं विद्या। – न्यायनिर्णय

[6] विद्यामाहुः पण्डिताः। प्रत्यगात्मनि खलु अत्यन्तविविक्ते बुद्ध्यादिभ्यः बुद्ध्यादिभेदाग्रहनिमित्तो बुद्ध्याद्यात्मत्वतद्धर्माध्यासः। तत्र श्रवणमननादिभिर्यद्विवेकविज्ञानं तेन विवेकाग्रहे निवर्तिते, अध्यासापबाधात्मकं वस्तुस्वरूपावधारणं विद्या चिदात्मरूपं स्वरूपे व्यवतिष्ठत इत्यर्थः। – भामती

8 D

1. The learned persons: The term 'paṇḍitāḥ' is derived from the word 'paṇḍā' which means 'the intellect (buddhi) that inquires into the Self'.[7]

It was clearly established in Section 4 that the doctrine of adhyāsa (superimposition) is a tenet accepted in general by all schools of Indian philosophy (sarvatantra-siddhānta) even though they sharply differ from one another with regard to the details. Not only the Vedāntins, but also Patañjali and the exponents of other schools of Indian philosophy, who inquire into the nature of the Self, identify this adhyāsa (superimposition) as the source of all afflictions (kleśāḥ). But they call this adhyāsa as 'avidyā' (nescience).[8] The term 'avidyā' in the present Bhāṣya passage denotes by implication (upalakṣaṇa-vidhayā) also the terms 'mithyājñānam' (illusory cognition), 'viparyayajñānam' (contrary cognition), and so on which have been used by Gautama, the author of the *Nyāya-sūtra* and by Vātsyāyana, the author of *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, to denote error.

The word 'paṇḍitāḥ' (learned) in the Bhāṣya passage refers to these great Ācāryas of various Darśanas.

2. this superimposition: The word 'adhyāsa' which is usually translated as 'superimposition' is derived from the root 'as' – 'to throw' with the prefix 'adhi'.

3. of the said character: No one would deny the common superimpositions of shell–silver (śukti-rajata-bhrama), rope–snake (rajju-sarpa-bhrama), post–thief (stambhe cora-bhrama) and so on. They need not be discussed – except by way of illustration – in a philosophical work like the *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya*. The Ācārya is concerned here only with the mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self (ātmānātmanoḥ parasparādhyāsaḥ), for it is this error alone that is the source of all miseries. This nature of adhyāsa as the source of all evils is indicated by the expression 'evaṁlakṣaṇam' (of the said character)

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[7] Vide *"paṇḍā ātmaviṣayā hi buddhiryeṣāṁ te hi paṇḍitāḥ."* (*Śāṅkara-bhāṣya* on *Bhagavad-gītā*, 2.11)

[8] Cf. अविद्याऽस्मितारागद्वेषाभिनिवेशाः क्लेशाः। अविद्या क्षेत्रमुत्तरेषाम् प्रसुप्ततनुविच्छिन्नोदाराणाम्। अनित्याशुचिदुःखानात्मसु नित्यशुचिसुखात्मख्यातिरविद्या। – योगसूत्र (२.३-५)

in the present Bhāṣya passage.[9] The whole of Upaniṣads (Vedānta) aims at rooting out this evil of Self–not-Self superimposition.[10]

4. nescience: 'avidyā', generally translated as 'ignorance' or 'nescience', is 'nañ-tatpuruṣa' (na vidyā) and means the opposite of 'vidyā'. This nescience is a positive entity and not mere 'absence of knowledge'.

The Upaniṣads (Vedānta) are taught to impart vidyā (knowledge) of the oneness of the Self (ātmaikatva) so that avidyā (ignorance) could be eradicated. Instead of starting his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* with avidyā (nescience), why should the Ācārya start with adhyāsa and then take the additional trouble of equating this adhyāsa with avidyā?[11]

Why should the Ācārya make the statement that the words 'adhyāsa' and 'avidyā' are synonyms? Is he introducing the term 'adhyāsa' in place of 'avidyā' when the learned prefer the latter term to indicate nescience?[12]

Padmapāda, the author of *Pañcapādikā* gives the answer: The word 'avidyā' (nescience) denotes the function of concealing (ācchādakatvam) the inner Self. This function by itself is not a source of any misery. For, during the deep sleep state (suṣupti) this avidyā persists by concealing the inner Self, without causing any affliction.[13] The word 'adhyāsa' (superimposition) on the other hand – from the derivation point of view – denotes the function of projecting (āropaṇam or atadrūpāvabhāsitvam) the unreal not-Self on the concealed inner Self (ācchādite sadrūpe). It is this projecting aspect (adhyāsa) which is

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[9] Cf. ननु सन्ति च सहस्रमध्यासाः, तत्किमर्थमयमेवाध्यास आक्षेपसमाधानाभ्यां व्युत्पादितः नाध्यासमात्रमित्यत आह—तमेतमेवंलक्षणमध्यासं पण्डिता अविद्येति मन्यन्ते। अविद्या हि सर्वानर्थबीजमिति श्रुतिस्मृतीतिहासपुराणादिषु सुप्रसिद्धं, तदुच्छेदाय च वेदान्ताः प्रवृत्ता इति वक्ष्यति। प्रत्यगात्मन्यनात्माध्यास एव सर्वानर्थहेतुः न पुना रजतादिविभ्रमा इति स एवाविद्या, तत्स्वरूपं चाविज्ञातं न शक्यमुच्छेत्तुमिति तदेव व्युत्पाद्यं नाध्यासमात्रम्। अत्र च 'एवंलक्षणम्' इत्येवंरूपतया अनर्थहेतुतोक्ता। यस्मात् प्रत्यगात्मन्यशनायादिरहिते अशनायाद्युपेतान्तःकरणाद्यहितारोपेण प्रत्यगात्मानमदुःखं दुःखाकरोति, तस्मादनर्थहेतुः। – भामती

[10] Cf. अस्यानर्थहेतोः प्रहाणाय आत्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये सर्वे वेदान्ता आरभ्यन्ते। – अध्यासभाष्य

[11] Cf. ननु ब्रह्मविद्योद्यत्वेन सूत्रितामविद्यां हित्वा किमित्यध्यासो वर्ण्यते। तत्राह—तमेतमिति। – न्यायनिर्णय
Also, cf. ननु ब्रह्मविद्यामनर्थहेतुनिबर्हणीं प्रतिजानताऽविद्याऽनर्थहेतुः सूचिता, ततः सैव कर्तृत्वाद्यनर्थबीजमुपदर्शनीया, किमिदमध्यासः प्रपञ्च्यते, इत्याशङ्क्याह—तमेतमेवंलक्षणमध्यासम्। – पञ्चपादिका

[12] Cf. यद्येवम् अध्यास इति प्रक्रम्य पुनस्तस्याविद्याभिधानव्याख्याने यत्नगौरवाद् वरमविद्येत्येवोपक्रमः कृतः। – पञ्चपादिका

[13] Cf. मूलाविद्यायाः सुषुप्तौ अनर्थत्वादर्शनात् कार्यात्मना तस्या अनर्थत्वज्ञापनार्थं तद्वर्णनमिति भावः। – रत्नप्रभा

the direct cause (sākṣāt-kāraṇa) of all miseries. So, had the Ācārya also begun his commentary with avidyā – as others have done – then the student would have missed here the projecting aspect (adhyāsa) which is the direct cause of miseries. It is to root out this source that the Upaniṣads (Vedānta) are actually taught. The Ācārya himself says (in Section 15) – *"asya (adhyāsasya) anarthahetoḥ prahāṇāya ātmaikatvavidyāpratipattaye sarve vedāntā ārabhyante* – It is for the eradication of this source of evils – to attain the Realisation of the oneness of the Self that all the Upaniṣads (Vedānta) are commenced."

The learned (paṇḍitāḥ) rightly feel concerned about rooting out avidyā because it is this avidyā (nescience) which by concealing Reality, prepares the ground for adhyāsa (superimposition). This rooting out of avidyā has been indicated by the Ācārya's statement: *"tadvivekena vastusvarūpāvadhāraṇaṁ vidyāmāhuḥ."* The common man suffering from countless miseries is more concerned with eradicating them by destroying their immediate cause adhyāsa. Looking at the problem of miseries, the Ācārya has preferred to begin his Bhāṣya with adhyāsa.[14] He, later on, is careful to undertake the additional effort of asserting that this adhyāsa is verily what the learned call 'avidyā'.[15]

There arises a question: How can these two, that is avidyā and adhyāsa, be identical when their functions – concealment and projection respectively – are different?

Though there is functional difference between the two, yet adhyāsa (superimposition) can be certainly equated with avidyā (nescience) for:

(1) Adhyāsa is born of and is also sustained by avidyā.[16]

(2) No adhyāsa takes place when the reality is not concealed by avidyā.[17]

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[14] Cf. अध्यासमित्यनुभवानुसारिण्यनर्थतोक्ता। – न्यायनिर्णय

[15] Cf. अविद्येत्युच्यमाने आच्छादकत्वं नाम यत् तस्याः तत्त्वं, तदेवाभिहितं स्याद्, न अतद्रूपावभासितया अनर्थहेतुत्वम्। अतः अतद्रूपावभासित्वम् अध्यासशब्देन प्रकृतोपयोगितया उपक्षिप्य पुनस्तस्य अविद्याशब्दिततया विद्यामात्रापनोदनार्हत्वं दर्शनीयम्। – पञ्चपादिका

[16] Cf. अविद्याकार्यत्वादविद्याशब्देनाध्यासोऽपि व्यवह्रियते। – प्रदीप

Also, cf. आक्षिप्तं समाहितम् उक्तलक्षणलक्षितम् अध्यासम् अविद्याकार्यत्वाद् अविद्या इति मन्यन्ते इत्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. अविद्याकार्यत्वादध्यासमविद्यां मन्यन्ते। – प्रकटार्थविवरण

[17] Cf. अतोऽविद्याद्वारकमेवाधिष्ठानत्वमित्यर्थः। – प्रकटार्थविवरण

(3) Both avidyā and adhyāsa disappear the moment the reality, the substratum of adhyāsa is recognised.

(4) The functional difference mentioned above does not stand in the way of the identification between avidyā and adhyāsa, for avidyā is bi-functional. It has both the power of concealing the real (āvaraṇa-śakti) and the power of projecting the unreal (vikṣepa-śakti). Because concealing is the cause of projection, the concealing avidyā is termed 'kāraṇāvidyā' (the causal nescience) and the projecting avidyā (adhyāsa) is termed 'kāryāvidyā'. (Vide *Ratnaprabhā* of Govindānanda & *Nyāyanirṇaya* of Ānandagiri.)

In this way Padmapāda logically substantiates the Ācārya equating adhyāsa and avidyā.

ॐ

9

[सिद्धान्तभाष्यम्]

तत्रैवं सति यत्र यदध्यासः, तत्कृतेन दोषेण गुणेन वा अणुमात्रेणापि[1] [1]स न सम्बध्यते[2]।

तमेतम्[3] अविद्याख्यम् आत्मानात्मनोः इतरेतराध्यासं पुरस्कृत्य[4] सर्वे प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहाराः[5] लौकिकाः [2]वैदिकाश्च प्रवृत्ताः, सर्वाणि च शास्त्राणि विधिप्रतिषेधमोक्षपराणि[6]।

9 A

[SIDDHĀNTABHĀṢYAM]

tatraivaṁ sati yatra yadadhyāsaḥ, tatkṛtena doṣeṇa guṇena vā aṇumātreṇāpi sa na sambadhyate.

tametam avidyākhyam ātmānātmanoḥ itaretarādhyāsaṁ puraskṛtya sarve pramāṇaprameyavyavahārāḥ laukikāḥ vaidikāśca pravṛttāḥ, sarvāṇi ca śāstrāṇi vidhipratiṣedhamokṣaparāṇi.

9 B

तत्र एवं सति *tatra evaṁ sati* – such being the case; यत्र *yatra* – where (on a substratum); यदध्यासः *yadadhyāsaḥ* – (there is) superimposition of an entity;

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[1] C न स सम्बध्यते

[2] *Vārtika*, VV and ASS omit वैदिकाश्च rightly (?)

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[1] तत्रैवं सति – अध्यासाविद्यात्वे सतीत्यर्थः। दोषः – दुःखादिः प्रतिकूलत्वाद्, गुणः – सुखादिः अनुकूलत्वाद्, अणुमात्रेणापि – अत्यल्पेनापीत्यर्थः। – वार्तिक

अणुमात्रेणापि – लेशतोऽपि। – प्रदीप

[2] न सम्बध्यते – परमार्थगत्येति शेषः। – प्रदीप

[3] तं वर्णितमेतं साक्षिप्रत्यक्षसिद्धम्। – रत्नप्रभा

एतम् – प्रत्यक्षसिद्धमित्यर्थः। – प्रदीप

एवं तावद् युष्मदस्मदित्यादिना मिथ्याऽज्ञाननिमित्तः सत्यानृते मिथुनीकृत्याहमिदं ममेदमिति नैसर्गिकोऽयं लोकव्यवहारः इत्यन्तेन भाष्येण सिद्धवदुपन्यस्तमात्माऽनात्मनोरितरेतरविषयमविद्याख्यमध्यासं सिषाधयिषुः, तस्य लक्षणमभिधाय, तत्सम्भवं चात्मनि दर्शयित्वा, पुनस्तत्र सद्भावनिश्चयमुपपत्तित उपपादयितुमिच्छन्नाह—तमेतमविद्याख्यमात्माऽनात्मनोरितरेतराध्यासं पुरस्कृत्य सर्वे प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारा लौकिका वैदिकाश्च प्रवृत्ताः, सर्वाणि च शास्त्राणि विधिप्रतिषेधमोक्षपराणीति। – पञ्चपादिका

[4] पुरस्कृत्य – हेतुं कृत्वा। – रत्नप्रभा

[5] प्रमाणप्रमेयग्रहणं प्रमात्रादेरुपलक्षणम्। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

[6] मोक्षपराणि विधिनिषेधशून्यानि वस्तुमात्रनिष्ठानीत्यर्थः। – न्यायनिर्णय

तत्कृतेन दोषेण गुणेन वा अणुमात्रेण अपि *tatkṛtena doṣeṇa guṇena vā aṇumātreṇa api* – even by an iota of the bad or good property brought about by that (superimposed entity); सः *saḥ* – it (substratum); न सम्बध्यते *na sambadhyate* – is not associated

तम् एतम् *tam etam* – this above-mentioned; अविद्याख्यम् *avidyākhyam* – that which is designated as nescience; आत्मानात्मनोः *ātmānātmanoḥ* – of the Self and the not-Self; इतरेतराध्यासम् *itaretarādhyāsam* – mutual superimposition; पुरस्कृत्य *puraskṛtya* – presupposing; सर्वे प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहाराः *sarve pramāṇaprameyavyavahārāḥ* – all transactions (centring around) the means and the objects of valid cognitions; लौकिकाः *laukikāḥ* – the empirical (secular); वैदिकाः च *vaidikāḥ ca* – as well as those prescribed by the Vedas; प्रवृत्ताः *pravṛttāḥ* – proceed; सर्वाणि च शास्त्राणि *sarvāṇi ca śāstrāṇi* – so also all the Scriptures; विधिप्रतिषेधमोक्षपराणि *vidhipratiṣedhamokṣaparāṇi* – concerned with injunctions, prohibitions and Liberation

9 C

[LOGICAL CONCLUSION]

Such being the case,[1] where there is superimposition of an entity on a substratum, the latter remains absolutely unassociated[2] with the bad or good property brought about by that (superimposed entity).

Presupposing[3] this above-mentioned mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self, designated as 'nescience', proceed all transactions, empirical (secular) as well as those prescribed by the Vedas,[4] centring around the means and the objects of valid cognitions; so also are all the Scriptures[5] concerned with injunctions, prohibitions and Liberation.[6]

9 D

1. Such being the case: After establishing adhyāsa (superimposition) and avidyā (nescience) as identical and showing that it can be negated only by vidyā (knowledge) the Ācārya proceeds further.[7]

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[7] Cf. तस्मिन् अध्यासे उक्तन्यायेन अविद्यात्मके सति इत्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. तस्मिन्नध्यासे पूर्वोक्तप्रकारेण विवेकज्ञानबाध्ये सति। तथा च तत्त्वज्ञानबाध्यत्वाद् अविद्या, तत्कार्योऽध्यासः, अध्यस्यमानः प्रपञ्चो वा मिथ्येति न ब्रह्माद्वैतविरोध इति भावः। – प्रदीप

2. the latter remains absolutely unassociated: The expression *'aṇumātreṇa api'*, which literally means 'even without an iota', connotes that there is no association whatsoever – in all the three periods of time – between the locus (adhiṣṭhāna) and the entity which is superimposed (adhyasta). The substratum (adhiṣṭhāna) ever remains unaffected by the superimposed entities and their properties. To illustrate with an example: The illusory snake has absolutely no association or contact with its substratum–rope, not to speak of the snake's poisonous nature being transferred to the rope or the rope being affected by its poison! In the same way Brahman–Ātman which is the locus (adhiṣṭhāna) of the superimposed illusory world (adhyasta) is unassociated with the world and its various modifications – such as birth, death and so on.[8]

The later teachers of Advaita-vedānta have based their definition of 'jaganmithyātva' (illusoriness of the world) on this expression of the Ācārya – *'aṇumātreṇāpi na sambadhyate'*. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his *Advaita-siddhi* defines 'jaganmithyātva' as *"pratipannopādhau traikālikaniṣedhapratiyogitvam"* that is, "illusoriness of the world consists in being the pratiyogin[9] (correlate or absentee) of the negation – existing in the known substratum (Brahman)."

From the ultimate point of view (paramārtha-dṛṣṭi), the inner Self, which is of the nature of Consciousness is unassociated and untouched by the properties of the not-Self such as hunger, thirst and so on even though the not-Self and its properties are superimposed on the Self. Conversely, the not-Self too remains unconnected with such good features like Consciousness, Bliss and so on of the pure Self, even though the Self is superimposed on the not-Self.[10]

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[8] Cf. अध्यस्तकृतगुणदोषाभ्याम् अधिष्ठानं न लिप्यते इति अक्षरार्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

[9] The meaning of 'pratiyogin' in this context is 'virodhin'. If the 'absence of a book' exists on the table, then the book being the counterpositive (virodhin) of the 'absence of book' is termed as the pratiyogin of the 'absence of a book'. Similarly 'ghaṭa' is the pratiyogin of the 'absence of ghaṭa,' 'paṭa' is the pratiyogin of the 'absence of paṭa' and so on.

[10] Cf. अन्तःकरणादिदोषेण अशनायादिना चिदात्मा, चिदात्मनो गुणेन चैतन्यानन्दादिना अन्तःकरणादि च न सम्बध्यते। – भामती

The 'I'-notion or jīva-bhāva is a superimposition on the pure Self. This notion gives rise to many other wrong notions such as agentship (kartṛtva), enjoyership (bhoktṛtva) and so on. By the expression *"aṇumātreṇāpi na sambadhyate,"* the Ācārya draws our attention to the fact that the pure Self is not touched in the least by the 'I'-notion and its off-shoots since they are merely superimposed and hence are illusory (mithyā).[11] They are put to an end by the knowledge (vidyā or jñāna)[12] of the adhiṣṭhāna (substratum) and hence their status is 'jñāna-nivartya'. Thus another definition of 'jaganmithyātva' consists in its being eradicated by knowledge of the substratum – *"jñānanivartyatvaṁ mithyātvam."* (*Advaita-siddhi*)

There is a marked difference between the errors such as rope–snake and that of the Self–not-Self. In every case of error there are two aspects: locus (āśraya) and object (viṣaya). In the rope–snake error, the object of ignorance (viṣaya) is the rope and the Self is its locus (āśraya). In the shell–silver error, though the object of ignorance is the shell yet the locus of ignorance remains the Self alone. The Self thus always remains the locus of ignorance in all cases of error. But in the case of Self–not-Self error – since the ignorance pertains to the Self – the Self assumes both the objecthood (viṣayatā) and locushood (āśrayatā) of ignorance.

How can the Self then preserve Its purity when It has become the locus of ignorance? It is in this context that the expression *"aṇumātreṇāpi na sambadhyate"* assumes significance and absolves the Self of this contingency. For the Self being the locus is merely superimposed (adhyasta) and as such Its purity remains untainted.

[11] Cf. तस्मिन्नध्यासे उक्तरीत्याऽविद्यात्मके सत्याच्छादकाविद्यायाः स्वापादौ स्वतोऽनर्थत्वादर्शनात् कर्तृत्वाद्यध्यासात्मना तस्या जागरादौ तथात्वात् कार्याविद्या वर्ण्यते। यत्रात्मनि, बुद्ध्यादौ वा यस्य बुद्ध्यादेरात्मनो वाऽध्यासः तेन बुद्ध्यादिनाऽऽत्मना वा कृतेनाशनायादिदोषेण चैतन्यगुणेन वाऽऽत्माऽनात्मा वा वस्तुतो न स्वल्पेनापि युज्यत इत्यतो विद्यया तन्निवृत्तिरित्यर्थः। – न्यायनिर्णय
Also, cf. एवं च यत् शास्त्रानारम्भवादिनोक्तं – कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वयुक्तस्य कथं तद्राहित्यमिति, तत्तस्य मिथ्यात्वनिरूपणेन परिहृतमित्याह—तत्रैवं सतीति। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

[12] Cf. तद्विवेकेन च वस्तुस्वरूपावधारणं 'विद्याम्' आहुः। – अध्यासभाष्य

The critics of Advaita-vedānta raise another objection against the doctrine of pure Self allowing Itself to be both the locus and object of ignorance. They highlight the fact that if the pure Self lets Itself become the locus of ignorance, the ignorance about the pure Self cannot be terminated as there remains no opposition between Self and ignorance. As a consequence the contingency of the impossibility of Liberation (anirmokṣa-prasaṅga) would be incurred.[13]

In this context it should be borne in mind that Vedānta asserts that it is Knowledge (vidyā) of the Self alone which puts an end to ignorance (avidyā) and not the pure Self. To explain: It is the 'knowledge' of the rope that puts an end to the ignorance of rope and not the mere 'rope'. Similarly it is the Knowledge (vidyā) of the Self that puts an end to ignorance (avidyā) of the Self and not the mere Self. It is to emphasise this fact that the Ācārya has defined vidyā (knowledge) as *"vastusvarūpāvadhāraṇam* – the determination of the true nature of a thing by proper discrimination." The significance of defining 'vidyā' in this fashion lies in the fact that it is not the pure Self which is opposed to ignorance but it is vidyā which is opposed to avidyā and eradicates it altogether.[14]

3. Presupposing: The word 'puraskṛtya' literally denotes 'by keeping (a given thing) in front', that is in point of space and/or time. Indeed the effect keeps its cause in that way. Hence the word 'puraskṛtya' is rendered as 'presupposing (it)'.[15] This word could as well signify 'by honouring (it)'. The Ācārya says that all human activities centred around the pramāṇa (means of knowledge) and prameya (objects of knowledge) are consequent upon superimposition.[16]

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[13] Cf. ननु एवं सति चैतन्यस्याध्यासाविरोधित्वे, चैतन्येनाध्यासस्य सुतरां तन्मूलभूतमिथ्याज्ञानस्य च न निवृत्तिः, निवर्तकान्तराभावाद्, इति श्रीभाष्याद्यापादितनिवर्तकानुपपत्तिशङ्कानवसरं सूचयन्नध्यासनिवर्तकमुपक्षिपति। – प्रदीप

[14] Cf. अनेन चेदमेवाभिप्रेयते—यद् इदमवच्छिन्नचैतन्यं केनचन रूपेणावृतं रूपान्तरेण च गृहीतं नाध्यासनिवर्तकं, किन्तु प्रमाण-जन्यविशेषांशावगाहिवृत्त्यभिव्यक्तचैतन्यमेव तदध्यासनिवर्तकमिति। तथा च न केवलं चैतन्यं विशेषानवगाहिवृत्त्यभिव्यक्त-चैतन्यं वा नाध्यासस्याज्ञानस्य वा विरोधि, किन्तु प्रमाणजन्यविशेषांशावगाहिवृत्त्यभिव्यक्तचैतन्यमेवाध्यासस्याज्ञानस्य वा विरोधि, इति न निवर्तकानुपपत्तिः, न वा चैतन्ये शुद्धेऽज्ञानाश्रयत्वविषयभावानुपपत्तिः। अयं भावः – वृत्तिः, वृत्त्यभिव्यक्तं चैतन्यं वाऽज्ञानविरोधि, न तु शुद्धचैतन्यमात्रम्। – प्रदीप

[15] Cf. तं वर्णितमेतं साक्षिप्रत्यक्षसिद्धं पुरस्कृत्य, हेतुं कृत्वा, लौकिकः, कर्मशास्त्रीयः, मोक्षशास्त्रीयश्चेति त्रिविधो व्यवहारः प्रवर्तत इत्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

[16] Cf. सर्वाणि तु प्रमाणानि प्रमातारमाश्रित्य प्रवर्तमानानि प्रमातुरध्यस्तस्य सिद्धिं विना नोपपन्नानि, इति प्रमात्रध्यासमाक्षिपन्तीति भावः। – प्रदीप

4. proceed all transactions, empirical (secular) as well as those prescribed by the Vedas: In the present section all human activities or transactions (sarvavyavahārāḥ) – both secular and Vedic – are said to be the outcome of the mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self. No doubt these activities are meaningful (arthavantaḥ) from the empirical point of view and they are true cognitions (yathārthajñānāni) generated by the means of knowledge (pramāṇa). Yet, in the ultimate analysis they are found to be the products of superimposition.

The statement of the Ācārya – *"sarve pramāṇaprameyavyavahārāḥ"* – strikes at the very basis of the concept of validity of pramāṇa. All means of knowledge, including the Scriptures – as the Ācārya is going to show in the sequel – function by being propelled or influenced by the mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self. All the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) enjoy validity as long as the mutual superimposition of the Self and not-Self persists and they lose their validity the moment the Knowledge of the pure Self dawns. To explain: The rope–snake enjoys reality, as long as the rope-ignorance and its resultant snake-superimposition exist, but the superimposed snake loses its reality at once when the rope, the substratum (adhiṣṭhāna) of the superimposition, is realised. Thus all these pramāṇas carry a superimposed or assumed validity (adhyasta-prāmāṇya) called otherwise as empirical validity (vyāvahārika-prāmāṇya) till one attains Self-realisation. The Ācārya himself tells us at end of the Bhāṣya on the Samanvaya-sūtra (1.1.4): *"laukikaṁ tadvadevedaṁ pramāṇaṁ tvātmaniścayāt."*

5. so also are all the Scriptures: According to Indian tradition, the Vedas are 'anādi' (existing since eternity) and 'apauruṣeya' (not the creations of any human agency) and hence they are infallible and carry absolute and unquestionable validity.[17] The above Bhāṣya passage asserts that even the activities that are centred on the Scriptures are consequent upon superimposition.

6. injunctions, prohibitions and Liberation: The Vedic teachings are broadly classified into: (1) vidhi (injunctions) like *"jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta,"*

[17] Cf. अपौरुषेयत्वेन विशेषं मत्वा शास्त्राणां पृथग्ग्रहणम्। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

"kāle sandhyāmupāsīta" and so on, (2) niṣedha (prohibitions) like *"na brāhmaṇo hantavyaḥ," "na surāṁ pibet"* and so on and (3) mokṣaparāṇi-vākyāni like *"ayam ātmā brahma," "tat tvam asi"* and so on, which are intended to lead man to Liberation.[18]

The present section contains two sentences. The first sentence *"tatraivaṁ sati yatra yadadhyāsaḥ tatkṛtena doṣeṇa guṇena vā aṇumātreṇāpi sa na sambadhyate"* concerns adhyāsa which has been the pivotal point for analysis from the very beginning till now. The rest of the *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya* is devoted to a detailed and methodical discussion of the second sentence of the present section.

[18] Cf. तत्र विधिप्रतिषेधपराणि कर्मशास्त्राण्यृग्वेदादीनि, विधिनिषेधशून्यप्रत्यग्ब्रह्मपराणि मोक्षशास्त्राणि वेदान्तवाक्यानीति विभागः। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. विधिप्रतिषेधपराणि – कर्मकाण्डोपासनाकाण्डगतानि वाक्यानि। मोक्षपराणि – विधिप्रतिषेधशून्यप्रत्यग्ब्रह्मैक्यनिरूपण-पराणि वाक्यानि। – प्रदीप

10

[सिद्धान्ताक्षेपभाष्यम्]

कथं पुनः अविद्यावद्विषयाणि[1] प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि[2] शास्त्राणि च इति।

10 A

[SIDDHĀNTĀKṢEPABHĀṢYAM]

kathaṁ punaḥ avidyāvadviṣayāṇi pratyakṣādīni pramāṇāni śāstrāṇi ca iti.

10 B

कथं पुनः *kathaṁ punaḥ* – but how is it; अविद्यावद्विषयाणि *avidyāvadviṣayāṇi* – pertain to those who are ignorant; प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि *pratyakṣādīni pramāṇāni* – perception and other means of valid cognitions; शास्त्राणि च इति *śāstrāṇi ca iti* – and also the Scriptures

10 C

[RATIONALE OF THE CONCLUSION QUESTIONED]

But, how is it[1] that perception and other means of valid cognitions and also the Scriptures[2] pertain to those who are ignorant?

10 D

1. But, how is it: The Ācārya uses the question answer method to put in proper perspective the illusory nature of pramāṇaprameya-vyavahāra (epistemology). Every epistemological domain consists of four entities:

(1) pramātā (knower),

(2) pramāṇa (means of knowledge),

(3) prameya (object of knowledge) and

(4) pramā (knowledge).

The Ācārya has made it clear in Section 9 that all human activities

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[1] अविद्यावानहम् इति अध्यासवान् आत्मा प्रमाता, स विषयः आश्रयो येषां तानि अविद्यावद्विषयाणि इति विग्रहः। – रत्नप्रभा
अविद्यावत्पुरुषविषयाणि—तादृशपुरुषाश्रयाणि—तत्प्रमातृकाणीत्यर्थः। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

[2] प्रमातारमेवापेक्षमाणानीति शेषः। – प्रदीप

centring around the above four entities are consequent upon the mutual superimposition of the Self and not-Self.

The problem is: How does a person under the influence of 'avidyā' have 'knowledge' (pramā). Two contradictory entities – pramā and avidyā – cannot inhere in one and the same pramātā (knower). If this fact is not taken into consideration, the distinction between valid and invalid cognitions would cease to exist.[3]

Nonetheless the Ācārya is going to establish in the following sections that the validity of the epistemological system (pramāṇaprameya-vyavahāra) is only empirical (vyāvahārika) and not absolute (pāramārthika).

2. also the Scriptures: Cognitions having a human origin can turn faulty. Mirage, misunderstanding due to wrong perception or faulty inference are quite common. The opponent claims that the Vedas not being of human origin (apauruṣeya), *ipso facto*, are free from human errors. Also their purpose is to teach the highest good. How then could Scriptural teachings be summarily included in the gamut of ignorance?[4]

Thus in this section the opponent questions the rationale of the doctrine established in the last section.

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[3] Cf. तत्त्वपरिच्छेदो हि प्रमा विद्या, तत्साधनानि प्रमाणानि कथमविद्यावद्विषयाणि। नाविद्यावन्तं प्रमाणान्याश्रयन्ति, तत्कार्यस्य विद्याया अविद्याविरोधित्वाद् इति भावः। – भामती

Also, cf. अविद्यावद्विषयत्वे सत्याश्रयदोषानुगमादप्रमाणान्येव स्युरित्याक्षेपः। – पञ्चपादिका

Also, cf. अथवा प्रमातारमाश्रित्य प्रवर्तमानानि प्रमाणानि यदि परम्परया पूर्वोक्तप्रकारेणाविद्यावद्विषयाणीति मन्यते, तर्हि मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तत्वात् प्रमाणत्वमेव तेषां न स्याद्, अतः प्रमाणानां प्रमाणत्वनिर्वाहार्थमविद्याविरोधित्वमेवोरीकर्तव्यं, न तु तत्साधकत्वमित्यभिप्रायेण शङ्कते—कथं पुनरविद्यावद्विषयाणीति। – प्रदीप

[4] Cf. सन्तु वा प्रत्यक्षादीनि संवृत्यापि यथा तथा, शास्त्राणि तु पुरुषहितानुशासनपराणि अविद्याप्रतिपक्षतया नाविद्यावद्विषयाणि भवितुमर्हन्तीत्याह—शास्त्राणि च इति। – भामती

Also, cf. ननु—अविद्यायाः दोषरूपत्वाद् दुष्टपुरुषसंयुक्तानां इन्द्रियादीनां प्रमां प्रति करणत्वासम्भवात् प्रत्यक्षादीनां प्रामाण्यप्रसिद्धिः कथं, कथं वा श्रुतिस्मृत्यादीनां शास्त्रत्वप्रसिद्धिः। अलौकिकार्थप्रमापकं हि शास्त्रमित्युच्यते – इत्यभिप्रेत्य शङ्कते—कथमिति। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

11

[सिद्धान्तसाधकतर्कभाष्यम्]

उच्यते[1] – देहेन्द्रियादिषु[2] [१]अहंममाभिमानरहितस्य[3] प्रमातृत्वानुपपत्तौ प्रमाण-प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः। न हि इन्द्रियाणि[4] अनुपादाय[5] प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारः[6] सम्भवति। न च अधिष्ठानमन्तरेण इन्द्रियाणां [२]व्यवहारः सम्भवति। न च अनध्यस्तात्मभावेन[7] देहेन कश्चिद् व्याप्रियते। न च एतस्मिन् सर्वस्मिन् असति [३]असङ्गस्य[8] आत्मनः प्रमातृत्वम् उपपद्यते। न च प्रमातृत्वम् अन्तरेण प्रमाणप्रवृत्तिः अस्ति। तस्माद् अविद्यावद्विषयाण्येव प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि शास्त्राणि [४]च।

11 A

[SIDDHĀNTASĀDHAKATARKABHĀṢYAM]

ucyate – dehendriyādiṣu ahaṁmamābhimānarahitasya pramātṛtvānupapattau pramāṇapravṛttyanupapatteḥ. na hi indriyāṇi anupādāya pratyakṣādivyavahāraḥ sambhavati. na ca adhiṣṭhānamantareṇa indriyāṇāṁ vyavahāraḥ sambhavati. na ca anadhyastātmabhāvena dehena kaścid vyāpriyate. na ca etasmin sarvasmin asati asaṅgasya ātmanaḥ pramātṛtvam upapadyate. na ca pramātṛtvam antareṇa pramāṇapravṛttiḥ asti. tasmād avidyāvadviṣayāṇyeva pratyakṣādīni pramāṇāni śāstrāṇi ca.

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[१] AL -अभिमानहीनस्य
[२] AL व्यापारः
[३] AL आत्मनः असङ्गस्य
[४] AL -इति

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[1] व्यवहारहेतुमध्यासमनुमानादिना साधयितुमारभते—उच्यते इति। – न्यायनिर्णय
[2] आदिशब्देन बाह्याद्यवयवग्रहणम्। – पञ्चपादिका
इन्द्रियादीत्यादिपदेनान्तःकरणपरामर्शः। – प्रदीप
सशिरस्कोऽवयवी त्वगिन्द्रियस्यानपेक्षाधारो देहः। तत्र मनुष्यत्वादिजातिविशिष्टेऽहमित्यभिमानः। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका
[3] सुषुप्तस्येति शेषः। – प्रदीप
[4] इन्द्रियाणि इति इन्द्रियलिङ्गादीनीति द्रष्टव्यं दण्डिनो गच्छन्ति इतिवत्। एवं हि प्रत्यक्षादि इत्युपपद्यते। – भामती
इन्द्रियपदं लिङ्गादेरपि उपलक्षणं, प्रत्यक्षादीत्यादिपदप्रयोगात्। – रत्नप्रभा
इन्द्रियपदं प्रमाणमात्रोपलक्षणम्। प्रत्यक्षादीत्यादिपदमनुमित्यादिसङ्ग्राहकम्। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण
[5] अनुपादायेति ममत्वेनागृहीत्वेत्यर्थः। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका
[6] व्यवहियते अनेनेति व्यवहारः फलं, प्रत्यक्षादीनां प्रमाणानां फलमित्यर्थः। – भामती
[7] अनध्यस्त आत्मभावः आत्मतादात्म्यं यस्मिन् तेन इत्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा
[8] सर्वथा सर्वदा सर्वधर्मधर्मिवियुक्तस्य। – भामती

11 B

उच्यते *ucyate* – (we) reply; देहेन्द्रियादिषु *dehendriyādiṣu* – on (the substrata like) the body, sense organs and so on; अहंममाभिमानरहितस्य *ahaṁmamābhimānarahitasya* – (in the case) of one who is free from the notions of 'I' and 'mine'; प्रमातृत्वानुपपत्तौ *pramātṛtvānupapattau* – (when) the state of being an agent of knowledge is incongruous; प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः *pramāṇapravṛttyanupapatteḥ* – (because) the functioning of the means of knowledge becomes incongruous; हि *hi* – indeed; इन्द्रियाणि अनुपादाय *indriyāṇi anupādāya* – without employing the sense organs; न प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारः सम्भवति *na pratyakṣādivyavahāraḥ sambhavati* – activity like perception is not possible; च *ca* – and; अधिष्ठानम् अन्तरेण *adhiṣṭhānam antareṇa* – without a locus (the physical body where one experiences pleasure and pain); इन्द्रियाणां व्यवहारः न सम्भवति *indriyāṇāṁ vyavahāraḥ na sambhavati* – functioning of sense organs is not possible; च *ca* – and; अनध्यस्तात्मभावेन देहेन *anadhyastātmabhāvena dehena* – with the physical body on which the Self is not superimposed; न कश्चिद् व्याप्रियते *na kaścid vyāpriyate* – no one acts; च *ca* – and; एतस्मिन् सर्वस्मिन् असति *etasmin sarvasmin asati* – when this is all absent; असङ्गस्य आत्मनः *asaṅgasya ātmanaḥ* – of the unattached Self; प्रमातृत्वम् *pramātṛtvam* – the knowership; न उपपद्यते *na upapadyate* – (is) not intelligible; च *ca* – and; प्रमातृत्वम् अन्तरेण *pramātṛtvam antareṇa* – without the knowership; प्रमाणप्रवृत्तिः *pramāṇapravṛttiḥ* – the functioning of the means of knowledge; न अस्ति *na asti* – is not (there); तस्मात् *tasmāt* – hence; अविद्यावद्विषयाणि एव *avidyāvadviṣayāṇi eva* – pertain only to those who are ignorant; प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि शास्त्राणि च *pratyakṣādīni pramāṇāni śāstrāṇi ca* – perception and other means of knowledge as well as the Scriptures

11 C

[RATIONALE OF THE CONCLUSION EXPLAINED]

We reply:[1] In the case of one who is free from the notions of 'I' and 'mine' in the body, sense organs and so on[2] the agent of knowledge being incongruous, the functioning of the means of knowledge becomes incongruous[3] as well. Indeed, no activity like perception ensues without employing the sense organs. In the absence of a locus[4] (the physical body),

the functioning of sense organs is not possible. With the physical body on which the Self is not superimposed, no one engages himself in any activity.[5] When this is all absent,[6] the knowership of the unattached Self is not intelligible[7] and without knowership the functioning of the means of knowledge is not there.[8] Hence it follows that perception and other means of knowledge as well as the Scriptures pertain only to those who are ignorant.

11 D

1. **We reply:** In this section the Siddhāntin (exponent) explains the logic behind his assertion[9] *"tametam avidyākhyam ātmānātmanoḥ itaretarādhyāsaṁ puraskṛtya sarve pramāṇaprameyavyavahārāḥ laukikāḥ vaidikāśca pravṛttāḥ* – presupposing this above-mentioned mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self, designated as 'nescience', proceed all transactions, secular as well as those prescribed by the Vedas."[10]

The present section forms the crux of the answer to the objection raised by the opponent in Section 10.

2. **In the case of one who is free from the notions of 'I' and 'mine' in the body, sense organs and so on:**[11] That is, if one does not superimpose the Self on one's body, sense organs and so on and vice versa, no epistemological behaviour (pramāṇaprameya-vyavahāra) is possible.[12] The Ācārya is elaborating this concept in the sequel.

3. **the agent of knowledge being incongruous, the functioning of the means of knowledge becomes incongruous:** The logic of this sentence is as follows: The functioning of an inert karaṇa (instrument) depends on a sentient kartā (agent). An axe does not cut wood by itself and presupposes the existence of a sentient woodcutter. Using the logic, the Ācārya establishes

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[9] Cf. तत्रानुमानं वक्तुं व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिमाह—देहेन्द्रियादिष्विति। – न्यायनिर्णय

[10] Vide Section 9.

[11] Cf. तादात्म्यतद्धर्माध्यासहीनस्य। – भामती

Also, cf. तथा च प्रत्यक्षलिङ्गादिप्रयुक्तो यो व्यवहारो द्रष्टा अनुमाता श्रोताऽहमित्यादिरूपः स इन्द्रियादीनि ममतास्पदानि अगृहीत्वा न सम्भवतीत्यर्थः। यद्वा, तानि ममत्वेन अनुपादाय यो व्यवहारः स नेति योजना। – रत्नप्रभा

[12] सत्यानृते मिथुनीकृत्य 'अहमिदम्', 'ममेदम्' इति नैसर्गिकोऽयं लोकव्यवहारः। – अध्यासभाष्य

that the instruments of knowledge (pramāṇa) like sense organs, mind and so on cannot function without a sentient cogniser (pramātā) wielding them.

That the instruments[13] (karaṇa) produce cognition only when they are employed by the agent can be explained by invoking the illustration of deep sleep state.[14] During this state the sense organs are inactive, for in the absence of superimposition, there is no agent during that state and hence the senses are not used to bring about any cognition whatsoever. This leads us to the conclusion that without the superimposition of the nature of 'I am this' (aham idam) and 'this is mine' (mama idam), there is no employment of the sense organs by the agent of knowledge (pramātā).[15]

The present sentence *"dehendriyādiṣu ahaṁmamābhimānarahitasya pramātṛtvānupapattau pramāṇapravṛttyanupapatteḥ"* constitutes the 'vastusaṅgraha-vākya' (summary sentence).[16] Compare the wording of the Bhāṣya passage *"pramātṛtvānupapattau pramāṇapravṛttyanupapatteḥ"* with the wording in the concluding portion of this section *"na ca pramātṛtvam antareṇa pramāṇapravṛttiḥ asti."*

4. In the absence of a locus: The word 'adhiṣṭhānam' (locus) is interpreted as 'śarīra' (physical body).[17] This is made amply evident in the next Bhāṣya sentence[18] as well as in the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad*.[19]

[13] कर्त्रधिष्ठितत्वे सति कार्यासाधारणकारणत्वं करणत्वम् – Being an instrument consists in its being employed by an agent and in its being a specific cause of the result.

[14] Cf. सुषुप्तेऽपि व्यापारप्रसङ्गादिति भावः। – भामती

[15] Cf. अयमर्थः—प्रमातृत्वं हिप्रमांप्रतिकर्तृत्वम्। तच्चस्वातन्त्र्यम्। स्वातन्त्र्यंचप्रमातुरितरकारकाप्रयोज्यस्यसमस्तकारकप्रयोक्तृत्वम्। तदनेन प्रमाकरणं प्रमाणं प्रयोजनीयम्। न च स्वव्यापारमन्तरेण करणं प्रयोक्तुमर्हति। न च कूटस्थनित्यश्चिदात्मा अपरिणामी स्वतो व्यापारवान्। तस्मादु व्यापारवद्बुद्ध्यादितादात्म्याध्यासाद् व्यापारवत्तया प्रमाणमधिष्ठातुमर्हतीति भवत्यविद्यावत्पुरुष-विषयत्वमविद्यावत्पुरुषाश्रयत्वं प्रमाणानामिति। – भामती

[16] Cf. देहेन्द्रियादिष्वहंममाभिमानहीनस्य प्रमातृत्वानुपपत्तौ प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेरिति भाष्यकारस्य वस्तुसङ्ग्रहवाक्यम्। अस्यैव प्रपञ्चः—नहीन्द्रियाण्यनुपादायेत्यादिः। – पञ्चपादिका

[17] *Bhāmatī* has interpreted the term 'adhiṣṭhāna' as 'adhiṣṭhātā' (pramātā) whereas *Ratnaprabhā* takes it to mean the 'physical body'.
Cf. न जातु करणान्यनधिष्ठितानि कर्त्रा स्वकार्ये व्याप्रियन्ते, मा भूत्कुविन्दरहितेभ्यो वेमादिभ्यः पटोत्पत्तिरिति। अथ देह एवाधिष्ठाता कस्मान्न भवति, कृतमत्रात्माध्यासेनेत्यत आह न चानध्यस्तात्मभावेन देहेन कश्चिद् व्याप्रियते। – भामती
Also, cf. इन्द्रियाणामधिष्ठानम् आश्रयः शरीरमित्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

[18] न चानध्यस्तात्मभावेन देहेन कश्चिद् व्याप्रियते। – अध्यासभाष्य

[19] मघवन् मर्त्यं वा इदं शरीरमात्तं मृत्युना तदस्यामृतस्याशरीरस्यात्मनोऽधिष्ठानम्। – छान्दोग्योपनिषद् (८.१२.१)

5. With the physical body on which the Self is not superimposed, no one engages himself in any activity: The principle used to explain the Ācārya's present statement: *"na ca anadhyastātmabhāvena dehena kaścid vyāpriyate"* is 'vyatireka-sahacāra'. This term often used by the Naiyāyikas (Logicians) means 'concomitance (sahacāra or vyāpti) of the absence (vyatireka) of cause (kāraṇa) and effect (kārya)'. If the cause is absent, the effect is invariably absent. With the physical body on which the Self is not superimposed (kāraṇa) the sense organs do not function (kārya).

The opposite of 'vyatireka-sahacāra' is 'anvaya-sahacāra' – 'the concomitance (sahacāra) of the presence (anvaya) of cause (kāraṇa) and effect (kārya)'. If the cause is present, the effect too is present. The waking and dream states illustrate this principle of anvaya-sahacāra. During these two states when there is 'superimposition of the Self on the senses' (kāraṇa), the superimposed Self acts as an agent, employs the sense organs and thereby generates cognition (kārya).[20]

6. When this is all absent: By 'all' is meant the above-mentioned superimpositions of the Self on the body, senses, mind and so on and the superimposition of the body, senses, mind and so on on the Self (itaretarādhyāsa).[21]

7. the knowership of the unattached Self is not intelligible: The Ācārya's description of the Self as 'asaṅga' (unattached) aims at drawing a distinction between the object of analogy (dṛṣṭānta–woodcutter and woodcutting) and the subject of analogy (dārṣṭāntika–the inner Self and the means of knowledge like the sense organs, mind and so on). The woodcutter operates without superimposing himself on his tools but such is not the case with the inner Self which is absolutely unattached. An absolutely unattached entity cannot

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[20] Cf. देवदत्तकर्तृको व्यवहारः तदीयदेहादिषु अहंममाध्यासमूलः, तदन्वयव्यतिरेकानुसारित्वाद्, यदित्थं तत्तथा, यथा मृन्मूलो घट इति प्रयोगः। तत्र व्यतिरेकं दर्शयति—देहेति। देवदत्तस्य सुषुप्तौ अध्यासाभावे व्यवहाराभावो दृष्टः। जाग्रत्स्वप्नयोरध्यासे सति व्यवहार इत्यन्वयः स्फुटत्वाद् न उक्तः। अनेन लिङ्गेन कारणतया अध्यासः सिद्ध्यति, व्यवहाररूपकार्यानुपपत्त्या वेति भावः। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. यत्र नाध्यासस्तत्र न व्यवहारः यथा सुषुप्ताविति व्याप्तिः। देवदत्तस्य जागरादिकालः तस्यैवाध्यासाधीनव्यवहारवान्, तस्यैव स्वापादिकालादन्यकालत्वाद्, व्यतिरेके तस्यैव स्वापादिकालवदिति भावः। – न्यायनिर्णय

[21] Cf. इतरेतरात्माध्यासे इतरेतरधर्माध्यासे च। – भामती

Also, cf. न च सुषुप्तौ प्रमातृत्वापत्तिः, करणोपरमाद् इति तत्राह—न चैतस्मिन्निति। – रत्नप्रभा

at all operate until and unless it has entered into some kind of association (saṅga) with something which it operates (pravṛtti). In other words without mutual superimposition of the Self and the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) the inner Self can never be a pramātā (agent of knowledge).[22] It is this pramātā who has been defined by Vātsyāyana (author of *Nyāya-bhāṣya*) as "one who engages himself in an activity when propelled by a desire to obtain or to relinquish."[23] This desire to obtain or relinquish, as explained herein by the Ācārya, is produced by mutual superimposition (itaretarādhyāsa).

8. without knowership the functioning of the means of knowledge is not there: Without a pramātā (knower) no pramāṇa (means of knowledge) can generate pramā (knowledge).[24] This sentence is a reiteration of the point contained in the vastusaṅgraha-vākya (summary sentence) occurring at the beginning of the section – *"pramātṛtvānupapattau pramāṇapravṛttyanupapatteḥ."* The repetition is to emphasise the idea that ignorance (adhyāsa–avidyā) is the cause of our epistemological behaviour (pramāṇaprameya-vyavahāra).

[22] Cf. व्यापारवन्तो हि कुविन्दादयो वेमादीनधिष्ठाय व्यापारयन्ति, अनध्यस्तात्मभावस्य तु देहादिष्वात्मनो न व्यापारयोगोऽसङ्गत्वादित्यर्थः। – भामती

[23] यस्य ईप्साजिहासाप्रयुक्तस्य प्रवृत्तिः स प्रमाता। – न्यायभाष्य (१.१.१)

Cf. न जातु करणान्यनधिष्ठितानि कर्त्रा स्वकार्ये व्याप्रियन्ते अनध्यस्तात्मभावस्य तु देहादिषु आत्मनो न व्यापारयोगोऽसङ्गत्वात्। – भामती

[24] Cf. अहमित्यध्यासस्य प्रमात्रन्तर्गतत्वेन अदोषत्वाद् अविद्यावदाश्रयाण्यपि प्रमाणानि एव इति योजना। – रत्नप्रभा

12

[सिद्धान्तसाधकतर्कान्तरम्]

पश्वादिभिश्चाविशेषात्[1]। यथा हि पश्वादयः[2] शब्दादिभिः श्रोत्रादीनां सम्बन्धे सति शब्दादिविज्ञाने प्रतिकूले [१]जाते ततो निवर्तन्ते अनुकूले च प्रवर्तन्ते – यथा दण्डोद्यतकरं पुरुषम् अभिमुखम् उपलभ्य 'मां हन्तुम् अयम् इच्छति' इति पलायितुम् आरभन्ते, हरिततृणपूर्णपाणिम् उपलभ्य तं प्रति अभिमुखीभवन्ति। एवं पुरुषा अपि व्युत्पन्नचित्ताः[3] क्रूरदृष्टीन् आक्रोशतः खड्गोद्यतकरान् बलवतः उपलभ्य ततो निवर्तन्ते, तद्विपरीतान् प्रति [२]प्रवर्तन्ते। अतः[4] समानः[5] पश्वादिभिः पुरुषाणां प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारः। पश्वादीनां च [३]प्रसिद्धः अविवेकपुरःसरः प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारः। तत्सामान्यदर्शनाद्[6] व्युत्पत्तिमतामपि पुरुषाणां प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारः तत्कालः[7] समानः इति निश्चीयते।

12 A

[SIDDHĀNTASĀDHAKATARKĀNTARAM]

paśvādibhiścāviśeṣāt. yathā hi paśvādayaḥ śabdādibhiḥ śrotrādīnāṁ sambandhe sati śabdādivijñāne pratikūle jāte tato nivartante anukūle ca pravartante – yathā daṇḍodyatakaraṁ puruṣam abhimukham upalabhya 'māṁ hantum ayam

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[१] CSS ज्ञाते wrongly (?)

[२] VV अभिमुखीभवन्ति instead of प्रवर्तन्ते; ASS (fn.) प्रवर्तन्ते, अभिमुखीभवन्ति

[३] VV, ASS (fn.), CSS and AL प्रसिद्ध एव अविवेकपूर्वकः

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[1] च शब्दः शङ्कानिरासार्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

विदुषामिति शेषः। – प्रदीप

[2] आदिशब्देन शकुन्तादिरुक्तः। – न्यायनिर्णय

[3] व्युत्पन्नचित्ता अपि इत्यन्वयः। विवेकिनोऽपि इत्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

आगमोपपत्तिप्रतिपन्नप्रत्यगात्मतत्त्वानां व्युत्पन्नानाम्। – भामती

पित्रादित्रितयशिक्षाजन्यपदवाक्याभिज्ञता व्युत्पन्नचित्तता। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

[4] फलितमाह—अत इति। अनुभववलाद् इत्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

अनुभवार्थोऽतश्शब्दः। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

[5] समान इति। अध्यासकार्यत्वेन तुल्य इत्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

[6] निगमयति—तत्सामान्येति। तैः पश्वादिभिः सामान्यं व्यवहारवत्त्वं तस्य दर्शनाद् विवेकिनामपि अयं व्यवहारः समान इति निश्चीयते इति सम्बन्धः। – रत्नप्रभा

तैः पश्वादिभिः सामान्यं व्यवहारवत्त्वं, तस्य विवेकिषु भानादिति यावत्। – न्यायनिर्णय

[7] पश्वादिभिरिति शेषः। – न्यायनिर्णय

icchati' iti palāyitum ārabhante, haritatṛṇapūrṇapāṇim upalabhya taṁ prati abhimukhībhavanti. evaṁ puruṣā api vyutpannacittāḥ krūradṛṣṭīn ākrośataḥ khaḍgodyatakarān balavataḥ upalabhya tato nivartante, tadviparītān prati pravartante. ataḥ samānaḥ paśvādibhiḥ puruṣāṇāṁ pramāṇaprameyavyavahāraḥ. paśvādīnāṁ ca prasiddhaḥ avivekapuraḥsaraḥ pratyakṣādivyavahāraḥ. tatsāmānyadarśanād vyutpattimatāmapi puruṣāṇāṁ pratyakṣādivyavahāraḥ tatkālaḥ samānaḥ iti niścīyate.

12 B

पश्वादिभिः च अविशेषात् *paśvādibhiḥ ca aviśeṣāt* – also because there is no distinction from animals etc.; यथा *yathā* – just as; हि *hi* – indeed; पश्वादयः *paśvādayaḥ* – animals etc.; शब्दादिभिः श्रोत्रादीनां सम्बन्धे सति *śabdādibhiḥ śrotrādīnāṁ sambandhe sati* – when (their) ear etc. come in contact with sound etc.; शब्दादिविज्ञाने प्रतिकूले जाते *śabdādivijñāne pratikūle jāte* – if the cognition of sound etc. becomes unfavourable; ततः निवर्तन्ते *tataḥ nivartante* – go away from there; अनुकूले च *anukūle ca* – when favourable (cognition arises); प्रवर्तन्ते *pravartante* – they approach; यथा *yathā* – for example; दण्डोद्यतकरं पुरुषम् *daṇḍodyatakaraṁ puruṣam* – a person with a stick held aloft in his hand; अभिमुखम् उपलभ्य *abhimukham upalabhya* – (on) seeing in front; मां हन्तुम् अयम् इच्छति *māṁ hantum ayam icchati* – he intends to hurt me; इति *iti* – thinking thus; पलायितुम् आरभन्ते *palāyitum ārabhante* – they start running away; हरिततृणपूर्णपाणिम् *haritatṛṇapūrṇapāṇim* – a person with hands full of green grass; उपलभ्य *upalabhya* – on seeing; तं प्रति अभिमुखीभवन्ति *taṁ prati abhimukhībhavanti* – approach him; एवम् *evam* – in the same way; पुरुषाः अपि व्युत्पन्नचित्ताः *puruṣāḥ api vyutpannacittāḥ* – persons of cultivated mind also; क्रूरदृष्टीन् आक्रोशतः *krūradṛṣṭīn ākrośataḥ* – fierce-looking shouting persons; खड्गोद्यतकरान् *khaḍgodyatakarān* – with swords raised in their hands; बलवतः *balavataḥ* – mighty; उपलभ्य *upalabhya* – on observing; ततः निवर्तन्ते *tataḥ nivartante* – go away from them; तद्विपरीतान् प्रति *tadviparītān prati* – towards those of opposite character; प्रवर्तन्ते *pravartante* – approach; अतः *ataḥ* – therefore; समानः *samānaḥ* – similar; पश्वादिभिः *paśvādibhiḥ* – with animals etc.; पुरुषाणाम् *puruṣāṇām* – of human beings; प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारः *pramāṇaprameyavyavahāraḥ* – the empirical affairs concerning the means and objects of knowledge; पश्वादीनां

च *paśvādīnāṁ ca* – and of the animals etc.; प्रसिद्धः *prasiddhaḥ* – well-known; अविवेकपुरःसरः *avivekapuraḥsaraḥ* – due to non-discrimination; प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारः *pratyakṣādivyavahāraḥ* – the affairs related to perception etc.; तत्सामान्यदर्शनात् *tatsāmānyadarśanāt* – because (we) observe a similarity (of behaviour) in them (animals); व्युत्पत्तिमताम् अपि पुरुषाणाम् *vyutpattimatām api puruṣāṇām* – even in the case of men of learning; प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारः *pratyakṣādivyavahāraḥ* – the affairs concerning perception etc.; तत्कालः *tatkālaḥ* – during that time; समानः *samānaḥ* – of the same nature; इति *iti* – in this way; निश्चीयते *niścīyate* – ascertained

12 C

[ADDITIONAL LOGIC IN DEFENCE OF THE DOCTRINE][1]

(We say so) also because there is no distinction from animals etc.[2] Indeed, just as the animals (like cows) etc. when their ears etc. come in contact with sound etc. if the sensation of sound etc. is unfavourable,[3] (they) go away from there; and if favourable, they approach. For example, on seeing a person approach with a raised stick in hand, they begin to run away thinking 'he intends to hurt me';[4] (but) on seeing a person with hands full of green grass, they approach him. In the same way, persons of cultivated mind also, on observing fierce-looking shouting strong men, carrying raised swords in their hands, run away from them, while they approach those of opposite character.[5] Therefore, (it is established that) the empirical affairs concerning the means and objects of knowledge of men are similar with those of the animals etc. It is certainly well-known that the affairs of the animals concerning perception etc. are due to non-discrimination.[6] Because we observe similarity in the nature (of men and animals), it is ascertained that even in the case of men of learning, the affairs concerning perception etc. are of the same nature[7] during that period (of non-discrimination).[8]

12 D

1. Additional logic in defence of the doctrine: In the last section the Ācārya established by arthāpatti (postulation) that the inert senses cannot function

unless they are wielded by the sentient Self and that this operation of wielding the senses (pramāṇaprameya-vyavahāra) and the experience of knowership (pramātṛtva) in the Self cannot occur without postulating the superimposition of the Self on the not-Self. In arthāpatti (postulation) an apparent incongruity leads to the knowledge of a fact that does away with the incongruity. To explain: Devadatta is fat but he is not seen eating during the day. The fact that Devadatta is fat without eating is incongruous. This incongruity leads to the 'postulation' that since Devadatta does not eat during the day, he must be eating during the night. The knowledge that Devadatta eats during the night is arrived at through arthāpatti. The Ācārya has taken recourse to arthāpatti (postulation) to prove that our epistemological behaviour (pramāṇaprameya-vyavahāra) owes its incidence to superimposition. But arthāpatti (postulation) as a means of knowledge (pramāṇa) does not enjoy universal acceptance across the Indian philosophical systems.[8] In this section the Ācārya uses the universally accepted inferential argument (anumāna) to prove that it is superimposition which is at the root of all epistemological behaviour (pramāṇaprameya-vyavahāra).

While using arthāpatti to establish that epistemological behaviour is rooted in superimposition, the illustration of the 'woodcutter and woodcutting' is generally invoked[9] in order to prove that woodcutting comes into existence only when the axe is used by the sentient woodcutter. But in this illustration the woodcutter does not superimpose himself on the axe, the means of woodcutting. Therefore this illustration (dṛṣṭānta) does not accord fully well with the inner Self (dārṣṭāntika) since in this case there exists the superimposition of the Self on the instruments of knowledge. The inferential argument (anumāna) provided in this section removes this anomaly.

[8] Arthāpatti (postulation) is accepted as a valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) by the Mīmāṁsakas and Advaitins alone.

[9] Refer to Section 11 D, n.3 & 7.

Except Cārvāka philosophy, every system of Indian philosophy (Darśana) subscribes to inference (anumāna) as a valid means of knowledge. Inference centres on the knowledge of invariable concomitance (vyāptijñāna). To explain: Many instances of smoke where fire is invaribly present give the knowledge that smoke is invariably related to fire. When we see smoke on a distant hill, the knowledge of the invariable concomitance (vyāptijñāna) between smoke and fire helps us arrive at the knowledge of fire from the perception of smoke even when the fire is beyond the perceptual sense organ (pratyakṣa). The Nyāya system of philosophy uses a five-membered syllogism (pañcāvayavaṁ vākyam) to explain the process of inferential knowledge:

(1) Hypothesis (pratijñā) – The hill has fire (parvato vahnimān).
(2) Reason (hetu) – Because it has smoke (dhūmavattvāt).
(3) Illustration (udāharaṇa) – Where there is smoke there is fire e.g. kitchen (yatra yatra dhūmaḥ tatra tatra vahniḥ yathā mahānase).
(4) Reiteration (upanaya) – This hill has the smoke which is invariably concomitant with fire (vahnivyāpyadhūmavān ayaṁ parvataḥ).
(5) Conclusion (nigamana) – Therefore this hill has fire (tasmād vahnimān ayaṁ parvataḥ).

Unlike the Naiyāyikas, the Mīmāṁsakas and the Advaitins use a three-membered syllogism (tryavayavaṁ vākyam) for inference.[10]

The Advaitin's syllogism for establishing that all human transactions (pramāṇaprameya-vyavahāra) are based on superimposition can be demonstrated as follows:

(1) Hypothesis (pratijñā) – All human transactions are based on superimposition (sakalāḥ manuṣyavyavahārāḥ adhyāsamūlāḥ).
(2) Reason (hetu) – Because their presence and absence are regulated by those of superimposition (tadanvayavyatirekānuvidhāyi-anvayavyatirekitvāt).

[10] The three-membered syllogism of the Mīmāṁsakas and Advaitins is derived from the five-membered syllogism used by the Naiyāyikas. They use either the first three or the last three members of the Nyāya syllogism to arrive at the inferential knowledge. In this section we have used the first three members of the Nyāya syllogism to explain the inferential process.

(3) Illustration (udāharaṇa) – In all instances where the presence (anvaya) and absence (vyatireka) of one thing is regulated by the presence and absence of another thing, the former is the effect (kārya) and the latter is the cause (kāraṇa). The presence and the absence of the pot being regulated by the presence and absence of clay, the pot is the effect and the clay is the cause (yad yadanvayavyatirekānuvidhāyyanvaya-vyatirekavat tat tat kāryaṁ yathā mṛdanvayavyatirekānuvidhāyyanvayavyatirekavān ghaṭaḥ mṛtkāryam).

An opponent may try to impress the point that the ordinary people (pāmara) alone are ignorant and are under the spell of superimposition, but not those learned in the Scriptures despite the presence of their epistemological behaviour (pramāṇaprameya-vyavahāra).[11] This opponent's syllogism can be expressed as follows:

(1) Hypothesis (pratijñā) – The transactions of the learned are not rooted in superimposition (vidvadvyavahārāḥ nādhyāsamūlāḥ).

(2) Reason (hetu) – Because they co-exist with a person having knowledge which destroys superimposition (adhyāsanāśakavidyāvatpuruṣāśrayatvāt).

(3) Illustration (udāharaṇa) – A thing which co-exists with another entity which is opposed to the third cannot be rooted in the third one. For instance, the light which co-exists with a lamp which is opposed to darkness can never be rooted in darkness.

In this way the opponent argues that the Siddhāntin's (exponent) argument of inference suffers from inconstancy (vyabhicāra-doṣa).[12]

All these points mentioned above cumulatively suggest the necessity for additional reasoning to substantiate the tenet of adhyāsa being the root cause of epistemological behaviour of humans (pramāṇaprameya-vyavahāra).

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[11] Cf. भवतु पृथग्जनानामेवम्, आगमोपपत्तिप्रतिपन्नप्रत्यगात्मतत्त्वानां व्युत्पन्नानामपि पुंसां प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारा दृश्यन्त इति कथमविद्यावद्विषयाण्येव प्रमाणानीत्यत आह—पश्वादिभिश्चाविशेषाद् इति। – भामती

[12] Cf. ननु—प्रमाणानि, नाविद्यावत्पुरुषाश्रितानि, अविद्याविरुद्धविद्यावत्पुरुषाश्रितत्वाद्, यद् यद्विरुद्धयद्वदाश्रितं, तत् तद्वदनाश्रितं, यथा तमोविरुद्धप्रदीपवद्देशाश्रितः प्रकाशो न तमोवद्देशाश्रितः, इति कथं प्रमाणान्यविद्यावत्पुरुषाश्रितानीति। न, व्यवहाराः, अध्यासमूलकाः, तदन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधायित्वादित्यनुमानेन सत्प्रतिपक्षितत्वाद्, अथवा विद्वद् व्यवहारे व्यभिचाराद्, इत्याशङ्क्य समाधत्ते—पश्वादिभिश्चाविशेषादिति। – प्रदीप

2. because there is no distinction from animals etc.: This is a vastusaṅgraha-vākya (summary sentence). The expression *"vyutpattimatāmapi puruṣāṇām"* (of the learned)[13] needs to be added to the present sentence to bring out the intended meaning. The similarity of the epistemological behaviour (pramāṇaprameya-vyavahāra) of the learned with that of animals suggests the following syllogism:

(1) Hypothesis (pratijñā) – The learned persons are ignorant (vyutpannāḥ puruṣāḥ avidyāvantaḥ).

(2) Reason (hetu) – Because they are the agents of epistemological behaviour (vyavahārakartṛtvāt).

(3) Illustration (udāharaṇa) – Where there is epistemological behaviour there is ignorance as in the case of animals (yatra vyavahārakartṛtvaṁ tatra avidyāvattvaṁ yathā paśvādiṣu).

The rest of the section is devoted to demonstrate in detail the authenticity of this inference.[14]

3. Indeed, just as the animals (like cows) etc. when their ears etc. come in contact with sound etc. if the sensation of sound etc. is unfavourable: This sentence demonstrates the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between epistemological behaviour–pramāṇaprameya-vyavahāra (hetu–reason or

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[13] Refer to the last sentence of this section.

[14] Cf. किं विद्वत्त्वं ब्रह्मास्मि इति साक्षात्कारः, उत यौक्तिकम् आत्मानात्मभेदज्ञानम्। आद्ये बाधिताध्यासानुवृत्त्या व्यवहारः इति समन्वयसूत्रे वक्ष्यते। द्वितीये—परोक्षज्ञानस्य अपरोक्षभ्रान्त्यनिवर्तकत्वाद्, विवेकिनामपि व्यवहारकाले पश्वादिभिः अविशेषाद् अध्यासवत्त्वेन तुल्यत्वाद् व्यवहारोऽध्यासकार्यं इति युक्तमित्यर्थः। अत्रायं प्रयोगः—विवेकिनोऽध्यासवन्तः, व्यवहारवत्त्वात्, पश्वादिवद् इति। तत्र सङ्ग्रहवाक्यं व्याकुर्वन् दृष्टान्ते हेतुं स्फुटयति—यथा हीति। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. विदन्तु नाम आगमोपपत्तिभ्यां देहेन्द्रियादिभ्यो भिन्नं प्रत्यगात्मानं, प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारे तु प्राणभृन्मात्रधर्मत्वं नातिवर्तन्ते। यादृशो हि पशुशकुन्तादीनामविप्रतिपन्नमुग्धभावानां व्यवहारस्तादृशो व्युत्पन्नानामपि पुंसां दृश्यते। तेन तत्सामान्यात्तेषामपि व्यवहारसमये अविद्यावत्त्वमनुमेयम्। चशब्दः समुच्चये। उक्तशङ्कानिवर्तनसहिता पूर्वोक्तोपपत्तिः अविद्यावत्पुरुषविषयत्वं प्रमाणानां साधयतीत्यर्थः। एतदेव विभजते—यथा हि पश्वादय इति। – भामती

Also, cf. तथा च पश्वादयः प्रमातृत्वादिव्यवहारकाले प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्यौदासीन्यं भजमानाः कार्यकारणसङ्घात एवाहंमानं कुर्वन्तीति प्रसिद्धं लोके। तदेकरूपयोगक्षेमा हि मनुष्या जन्मत एव पश्वादिभ्योऽधिकतरविवेकमतयः शास्त्राधेयसाम्परायिकमतिसामर्थ्या अपि, अतस्तदेकरूपकार्यदर्शनात् कार्यकारणसङ्घातेऽप्यात्माभिमानः समानो युक्तः। – पञ्चपादिका

Also, cf. व्यवहर्तारो विद्वांसोऽपि पश्वादिवदविद्यावन्त एवेति न व्यभिचारः, न वा सत्प्रतिपक्षानुमानावकाश इति भावः। अनेन चेदमेव सूच्यते—यद् अपरोक्षज्ञानमेवाध्यासविरोधि, न परोक्षज्ञानमिति। आगमादिप्रतिपन्नप्रत्यगात्मतत्त्वव्यवहर्तारश्च पुरुषा नापरोक्षज्ञानिनः, इति सत्प्रतिपक्षानुमानमसिद्धमेव। अत्रायमनुमानप्रयोगो विवक्षितः—विपश्चितः, अविद्यावन्तः, व्यवहर्तृत्वात्, पश्वादिवदति। दृष्टान्ते हेतुसाध्यसमन्वयप्रदर्शनार्थमुदाहरणवाक्यं निर्दिशति—यथा हीति। – प्रदीप

probans) and ignorance–avidyā/adhyāsa (sādhya–probandum)[15] which exists respectively as cause and effect in animals: This is expressed as – 'yo yo vyavahārakartā saḥ saḥ avidyāvān iti hetusādhyayoḥ vyāptiḥ'.

Further in the present sentence, the expression 'when their ears etc. come in contact with sound etc.' indicates that the instruments of perception (pratyakṣa-pramāṇa) are in action. The words 'if the sensation of sound etc. becomes unfavourable' prove that the perceptual cognition (pratyakṣa-jñāna) has resulted. There, too, the term 'unfavourable' is meant to demonstrate that the above perception has led to inferential knowledge (anumiti). To explain: After cognising by perceptual process (pratyakṣa) the nature of the sound (śabdasvarūpa) heard, the unfavourable nature of some other sound of the same class earlier experienced is recalled and the animal infers the unfavourbleness of the present sound.[16] Thus, besides perception, inference also has a role in the animal behaviour.

4. For example, on seeing a person approach with a raised stick in hand, they begin to run away thinking 'he intends to hurt me': This sentence also demonstrates like the earlier sentence (vide Section n.3) the invariable concomitance between epistemological behaviour (hetu–probans) and ignorance (sādhya–probandum) by another illustration. In the present example, the eye (cakṣurindriya) is found to be at work while in the earlier case it was the ear (śrotrendriya). The second example is provided to indicate that not only the ear but all the other sense organs also play their respective roles in the animal's behaviour as and when the occasion arises.

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[15] The term 'sādhya' or 'probandum' denotes the 'entity to be established'. In the 'smoke–fire illustration,' fire is the sādhya and smoke is the hetu (reason or probans). In the present context, ignorance is the sādhya and the agency of epistemological behaviour (vyavahārakartṛtva) is the hetu.

[16] Cf. अत्र च शब्दादिभिः श्रोत्रादीनां सम्बन्धे सति इति प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणं दर्शितम्। शब्दादिविज्ञाने इति तत्फलमुक्तम्। प्रतिकूले इति च अनुमानफलम्। तथा हि—शब्दादिस्वरूपमुपलभ्य तज्जातीयस्य प्रतिकूलतामनुस्मृत्य तज्जातीयतयोपलभ्यमानस्य प्रतिकूलतामनुमिमत इति। – भामती

Also, cf. शब्दादिभिः श्रोत्रादीनां सम्बन्धे सतीत्यर्थेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षात्मकमध्यक्षमुक्तम्। शब्दादिविज्ञान इति तत्फलम्। प्रतिकूले अनुकूल इत्यनुमानम्। ते हि शब्दाद्युपलभ्य तज्जातीयस्य प्रातिकूल्यमानुकूल्यं वाऽनुस्मृत्यास्यापि तंजातीयत्वात् तथात्वमनुमिन्वन्ति। तत्र प्रतिकूलत्वानुमानफलं निवृत्तिः, अनुकूलत्वानुमानफलं प्रवृत्तिरिति विवेकः। – न्यायनिर्णय

In the present sentence the phrase 'thinking he intends to hurt me' is more explicit in demonstrating the parts played by inference in the behaviour of the animals.

5. In the same way, persons of cultivated mind also, on observing fierce-looking shouting strong men, carrying raised swords in their hands, run away from them, while they approach those of opposite character: In the above account detailed by the Ācārya, we can notice the four common stages in the epistemological behaviour of both animals and learned men:

(1) means of knowledge (pramāṇa) operate,

(2) knowledge (pramā) of the object is born,

(3) desire to obtain (īpsā) or to give up (jihāsā) the object arises and

(4) this leads to action (pravṛtti) or withdrawal (nivṛtti).

While delineating the behaviour of animals and the learned men, the Ācārya's exposition resembles the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana.[17]

The Naiyāyikas (Logicians) give importance to the validity of knowledge (prāmāṇya) and relegate the cogniser (pramātā) to an insignificant status. However, the Ācārya in the present section clearly establishes the pivotal role played by the pramātā (cogniser) even while according due importance to the means of knoweldge (pramāṇa) and its validity (prāmāṇya).

6. It is certainly well-known that the affairs of the animals concerning perception etc. are due to non-discrimination: This statement reiterates the invariable concomitance (vyāpti), the probans (vyavahārakartṛtva) has with the probandum (avidyā) in the illustration (udāharaṇa): 'avidyā-vyāpyavyavahārakartṛtvavattvād vidvāṁsaḥ avidyāvantaḥ.' This, the Logicians call 'nigamana' (conclusion), and this is the fifth limb in their inferential syllogism.[18]

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[17] Cf. प्रमाणतः अर्थप्रतिपत्तौ प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्यादु अर्थवत् प्रमाणम्। प्रमाणमन्तरेण नार्थप्रतिपत्तिः, नार्थप्रतिपत्तिमन्तरेण प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्यम्। प्रमाणेन खल्वयं ज्ञाता अर्थम् उपलभ्य तमर्थम् अभीप्सति, जिहासति वा। तस्य च ईप्साजिहासाप्रयुक्तस्य समीहा प्रवृत्तिरित्युच्यते। सामर्थ्यं पुनः अस्याः फलेनाभिसम्बन्धः। – न्यायभाष्य

[18] The present section can be used to construct a full-fledged syllogism with all the five limbs of inferential proposition of Nyāya (pañcāvayavaḥ anumānaprayogaḥ):

7. even in the case of men of learning, the affairs concerning perception etc. are of the same nature: By the 'learned' the Ācārya does not mean men of direct Realisation (aparokṣajñānavantaḥ) but those who have a mere intellectual comprehension. Hence their nescience remains intact. In all their epistemological behaviour (pramāṇaprameya-vyavahāra) they are in no way better than other ordinary living beings (prāṇabhṛnmātradharmāṇaḥ).

8. during that period (of non-discrimination): Here 'tatkālaḥ' means 'existing only during the time of superimposition.' The analysis (vigraha) of this compound word is: tasya adhyāsasya kāla eva kālaḥ yasya saḥ tatkālaḥ vyavahāraḥ. This adjective signifies that all activities of living beings – learned, ordinary persons and animals – exist till superimposition exists.[19]

ॐ

(1) Hypothesis (pratijñā) – The learned persons are ignorant (vyutpannapuruṣāḥ avidyāvantaḥ).
(2) Probans (hetu) – Since they are agents of worldly transactions (vyavahārakartṛtvāt).
(3) Illustration (udāharaṇa) – Just as the animals etc. are (paśvādivat).
The explanation of concomitance (vyāptipradarśanam): Whosoever is the agent of the wordly transactions, he is ignorant (yo yo vyavahārakartā saḥ saḥ avidyāvān).
(4) Reiteration (upanaya) – These learned persons are also agents of the worldy transactions (avidyāvyāpyavyavahārakartṛtvavantaḥ ime vyutpannāḥ puruṣāḥ).
(5) Conclusion (nigamana) – Therefore the learned have nescience (tasmādavidyāvantaḥ vyutpannāḥ puruṣāḥ).

[19] Cf. तस्य अध्यासस्य काल एव कालो यस्य सः तत्कालः। यदा अध्यासः, तदा व्यवहारः, तदभावे सुषुप्तौ तदभाव इति उक्तान्वयादिमान् इति यावत्। अतो व्यवहारलिङ्गाद् विवेकिनामपि देहादिषु अहंममाभिमानोऽस्ति इत्यनवद्यम्। – रत्नप्रभा
Also, cf. तैः पश्वादिभिः सामान्यं व्यवहारवत्त्वं, तस्य विवेकिषु भानादिति यावत्। अपरोक्षाध्यासस्य व्यवहारपुष्कलकारणत्वात् तस्याध्यासस्य काल एव कालो यस्य व्यवहारस्य, स तत्कालः समानः। – न्यायनिर्णय

13

[सिद्धान्तसाधकतर्कशेषः]

शास्त्रीये तु[1] व्यवहारे यद्यपि बुद्धिपूर्वकारी न अविदित्वा आत्मनः परलोकसम्बन्धम् अधिक्रियते, तथापि न वेदान्तवेद्यम् अशनायाद्यतीतम् अपेतब्रह्मक्षत्रादिभेदम् असंसारि आत्मतत्त्वम् अधिकारे अपेक्ष्यते, अनुपयोगाद् अधिकारविरोधाच्च। [2]प्राक् च तथाभूतात्मविज्ञानात् प्रवर्तमानं शास्त्रम् अविद्यावद्विषयत्वं न अतिवर्तते। तथा हि – "ब्राह्मणो यजेत" इत्यादीनि शास्त्राणि [3]आत्मनि वर्णाश्रमवयोऽवस्थादिविशेषाध्यासम् आश्रित्य [4]प्रवर्तन्ते।

13 A

[SIDDHĀNTASĀDHAKATARKAŚEṢAḤ]

śāstrīye tu vyavahāre yadyapi buddhipūrvakārī na aviditvā ātmanaḥ paralokasambandham adhikriyate, tathāpi na vedāntavedyam aśanāyādyatītam apetabrahmakṣatrādibhedam asaṁsāri ātmatattvam adhikāre apekṣyate, anupayogād adhikāravirodhācca. prāk ca tathābhūtātmavijñānāt pravartamānaṁ śāstram avidyāvadviṣayatvaṁ na ativartate. tathā hi – 'brāhmaṇo yajeta" ityādīni śāstrāṇi ātmani varṇāśramavayo'vasthādiviśeṣādhyāsam āśritya pravartante.

13 B

शास्त्रीये तु व्यवहारे *śāstrīye tu vyavahāre* – but (in case of) the Scriptural injunctions; यद्यपि *yadyapi* – even though; बुद्धिपूर्वकारी *buddhipūrvakārī* – the one who habitually acts with forethought; न *na* – not; अविदित्वा *aviditvā* – without knowing; आत्मनः *ātmanaḥ* – of the Self; परलोकसम्बन्धम् *paralokasambandham* – the relation with the other world; अधिक्रियते *adhikriyate* – becomes eligible for it; तथापि *tathāpi* – yet; न *na* – not; वेदान्तवेद्यम् *vedāntavedyam* – capable of being known from the Upaniṣads (Vedānta); अशनायाद्यतीतम् *aśanāyādyatītam* – as being free from

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[1] ASS (fn.) प्राक् तथा; *Bhāṣyabhāvaprakāśikā* प्राक् तु तथा

[3] CSS (fn.) *Pañcapādikā* आत्मनि अतद्ध्यासम् आश्रित्य

[4] ASS वर्तन्ते

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[1] तुशब्दः प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहाराद्विनत्ति शास्त्रीयम्। – भामती

तुशब्देन लौकिकव्यवहारवैलक्षण्यप्रदर्शनाद् व्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तः सूच्यते। – प्रदीप

hunger etc.; अपेतब्रह्मक्षत्रादिभेदम् *apetabrahmakṣatrādibhedam* – as devoid of the distinctions like brāhmaṇa, kṣatriya, etc.; असंसारि *asaṁsāri* – (and) as non-transmigrating; आत्मतत्त्वम् *ātmatattvam* – of the nature of the Self; अधिकारे अपेक्ष्यते *adhikāre apekṣyate* – is required for eligibility; अनुपयोगात् *anupayogāt* – for it is of no use; अधिकारविरोधात् च *adhikāravirodhāt ca* – and also because it is opposed to the eligibility; प्राक् च तथाभूतात्मविज्ञानात् *prāk ca tathābhūtātmavijñānāt* – and prior to the Realisation of the above-described Self; प्रवर्तमानं शास्त्रम् *pravartamānaṁ śāstram* – the ensuing Scripture; अविद्यावद्विषयत्वं न अतिवर्तते *avidyāvadviṣayatvaṁ na ativartate* – does not transgress its being concerned with the ignorant; तथा हि *tathā hi* – that is to say; ब्राह्मणः यजेत *brāhmaṇaḥ yajeta* – A brāhmaṇa shall perform sacrifice; इत्यादीनि शास्त्राणि *ityādīni śāstrāṇi* – Scriptural injunctions like; आत्मनि *ātmani* – on the Self; वर्णाश्रमवयोऽवस्थादिविशेषाध्यासम् *varṇāśramavayo'vasthādi-viśeṣādhyāsam* – the superimposition of the differentiating factors like caste, stage of life, age, etc.; आश्रित्य *āśritya* – depending on; प्रवर्तन्ते *pravartante* – operate

13 C

[THE REMAINING PART OF THE LOGIC IN SUPPORT OF THE DOCTRINE][1]

But in the case of Scriptural injunctions,[2] even though the one who habitually acts with forethought[3] and who has the definite knowledge of the Self's relation with the other world becomes eligible for carrying out the Scriptural injunctions, yet (the Knowledge of) the real nature of the Self, capable of being known from the Upaniṣads (Vedānta)[4] as being free from hunger etc., as devoid of the distinctions like brāhmaṇa, kṣatriya, etc. and as non-transmigrating is not required for the eligibility (to perform Scriptural acts). For such knowledge is of no use (in performing those Scriptural acts) and also because it is opposed to the eligibility (to perform them).[5] And prior to the Realisation of the above-described Self, the ensuing Scripture does not transgress its being concerned with the ignorant.[6] That is to say the Scriptural injunctions like "A brāhmaṇa shall perform sacrifice" etc. operate depending on the superimposition of the differentiating factors like caste, stage of life, age, etc. on the Self.[7]

13 D

1. The remaining part of the logic in support of the doctrine: In the last section it has been established by inference (anumāna) that all human transactions – secular and Vedic – are on a par with those of animals as far as superimposition, their cause, is concerned.

The opponent might argue that the Vedas being of non-human origin (apauruṣeya) are free from all human deficiencies and errors and hence it is not logically possible to bring activities based on them within the jurisdiction of nescience. By excluding Vedic activities, the opponent's argument aims at pointing out the defect of inconstancy (vyabhicāra-doṣa) in the Vedāntin's original inference that all human activities are rooted in nescience.

It is this part of the opponent's argument that the Ācārya refutes in the present section.

2. But in the case of Scriptural injunctions: Before answering the opponent's argument, the Ācārya structures the opponent's argument in a more logical form.

The karma-kāṇḍa (the ritual portion of the Vedas) prescribes acts presupposing the distinction between the Self and the physical body. To explain: The Vedic injunction – *"jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta* – One who is desirous of heaven should perform the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice" is not based on the notion of the identity between the Self and the body since the performer is well aware that at death the physical body is reduced to ashes and ceases to exist much less enjoy any pleasure in heaven. So it is logically entailed that the injunction for Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice is based on the distinction between the body and the Self. Thus the eligibility conferred by all Vedic injunctions on the performers pre-supposes a clear knowledge (vidyā) of the distinction between the Self and the body. The opponent thus tries to point out the defect of inconstancy (vyabhicāra-doṣa) in the Siddhāntin's doctrine that all human transactions including those of the Vedas are rooted in nescience.[2]

[2] Cf. भवन्तु प्रत्यक्षादीन्यविद्यावद्विषयाणि। शास्त्रं तु ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत इत्यादि न देहात्माध्यासेन प्रवर्तितुमर्हति। अत्र हि आमुष्मिकफलोपभोगयोग्यः अधिकारी प्रतीयते। तथा च पारमर्षं सूत्रं—शास्त्रफलं प्रयोक्तरि तल्लक्षणत्वात्तस्मात्स्वयं प्रयोगे स्यादु इति। न च देहादि भस्मीभूतं पारलौकिकाय फलाय कल्पत इति देहाद्यतिरिक्तं कञ्चिदात्मानमधिकारिणमाक्षिपति शास्त्रं, तदवगमश्च विद्या, इति कथमविद्यावद्विषयं शास्त्रमित्याशङ्क्याह—शास्त्रीये त्विति। – भामती

Also, cf. ननु लौकिकव्यवहारस्य आध्यासिकत्वेऽपि ज्योतिष्टोमादिव्यवहारस्य न अध्यासजन्यत्वं, तस्य देहातिरिक्तात्मज्ञान-पूर्वकत्वाद् इत्याशङ्क्य हेतुममङ्गीकरोति—शास्त्रीये त्विति। – रत्नप्रभा

(Vide *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya* Section 9: *"tametam avidyākhyam ātmānātmanoḥ itaretarādhyāsaṁ puraskṛtya sarve pramāṇaprameyavyavahārāḥ laukikāḥ vaidikāśca pravṛttāḥ sarvāṇi ca śāstrāṇi vidhipratiṣedhamokṣaparāṇi."*)

The opponent's argument can be presented in the following inferential syllogism:

(1) Hypothesis (pratijñā): The human activities based on the Scriptures are not rooted in nescience (śāstriyāḥ vyavahārāḥ na avidyāmūlāḥ).

(2) Reason (hetuḥ): Because they are undertaken by those who are definite about the distinction between the Self and the body (dehātma-bhedaniścayapūrvakatvāt).

(3) Example–positive (udāharaṇam–anvayi):[3] Like the spiritual practices of those learned in the Vedic lore (yadevaṁ tadevaṁ yathā mahatām ādhyātmikavyavahārāḥ).

Example–negative (udāharaṇaṁ–vyatireki):[4] Unlike the activities of men of worldly pursuit and those of animals (yad naivaṁ tad naivaṁ yathā laukikānāṁ paśvādīnāṁ ca vyavahārāḥ).[5]

The opponent's ultimate aim is to assert: Because the Vedic rituals are thus found to be based on vidyā (the knowledge of the distinction between the body and inner Self), one could as well follow the path of karma to get rid of avidyā. Hence no one needs to forsake karma-mīmāṁsā and take to Vedānta. Consequently there is no need of brahma-jijñāsā and the whole Vedānta-darśana is purposeless and redundant.

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[3] Example–positive (udāharaṇam–anvayi) is the illustration of invariable concomitance (vyāpti) in terms of the presence of the probans (hetu) and the probandum (sādhya) – 'where there is smoke (probans), there is fire (probandum)' – yatra yatra dhūmaḥ (hetu) tatra tatra vahniḥ (sādhya).

[4] Example–negative (udāharaṇaṁ–vyatireki) is the illustration of invariable concomitance (vyāpti) in terms of the absence of the probandum (sādhya) and the probans (hetu) – 'where there is the 'absence of fire' (vyāpya), there is the 'absence of smoke' (vyāpaka)' – yatra yatra 'vahnyabhāvaḥ' (vyāpya) tatra tatra 'dhūmābhāvaḥ' (vyāpaka).

[5] Cf. ज्योतिष्टोमादिव्यवहाराः, अध्यासपूर्वका न, देहात्मविवेकजन्यत्वाद्, यन्नैवं तन्नैवं, यथा पश्वादिव्यवहाराः, इत्यनुमानविधया वैदिकव्यवहाराणामध्यासपूर्वकत्वमाक्षिपति—शास्त्रीये तु व्यवहार इति। तुशब्देन लौकिकव्यवहारवैलक्षण्यप्रदर्शनाद् व्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तः सूच्यते। नाविदित्वाऽत्मनः परलोकसम्बन्धमिति देहात्मविवेकज्ञानपूर्वकत्वरूपहेतोः पक्षधर्मता ज्ञाप्यते। तथा च शास्त्रीयव्यवहारः, नाध्यासपूर्वकः, देहात्मविवेकजन्यत्वाद्, व्यतिरेकेण लौकिकव्यवहारवदिति शङ्कास्वरूपं प्रदर्शितं भवति। – प्रदीप

3. one who habitually acts with forethought: 'Buddhipūrvakārīn' is one who undertakes important actions after planning and after thorough analysis of the pros and cons. The dissolution (vigrahavākya) of this compound word (samāsa) is: 'niścayātmikāṁ buddhiṁ pūrvāṁ pūrvataḥ prathamataḥ kṛtvā svīyaṁ kāryaṁ kartuṁ śīlam asyeti buddhipūrvakārī'. Here the suffix 'ṇini' signifies 'habit' (tācchīlya).[6]

4. (the Knowledge of) the real nature of the Self, capable of being known from the Upaniṣads (Vedānta): The Self as an entity distinct from the body is not directly dealt with in the karma-kāṇḍa of the Veda. Therefore the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā-sūtra* of Jaimini also does not deal with this point. By postulation they take the Self to be distinct from the body. Śabara-svāmin, in his *Pūrvamīmāṁsā-bhāṣya*, discusses the topic of the Self in detail and establishes the existence of a permanent Self as distinct from the impermanent body and describes it as transmigratory in character and as the enjoyer of fruits of the sacrifices in another world. In doing so, his main aim has been to refute logically the contrary stand maintained by the atheists like the Cārvāka. Kumārila-bhaṭṭa, the author of the *Mīmāṁsā-vārtika* (*Śloka-vārtika*) draws our attention to this limited purpose of the *Śābara-bhāṣya* and recommends a study of the Vedānta (Upaniṣads) for those who are interested in understanding the true nature of the Self.[7]

Whenever occasion arises in his Prasthānatraya-bhāṣyas, the Ācārya refutes the following theories:

(1) Karma is an independent means for Liberation (karmaṇo mokṣakāraṇatvavādaḥ),

(2) Karma and jñāna as joint means of Liberation (jñānakarma-samuccaya-vādaḥ) and

(3) Karma-mīmāṁsā (Pūrvamīmāṁsā-darśana) and the brahma-mīmāṁsā (Uttara-mīmāṁsā or Vedānta-darśana) constitute one composite Darśana (pūrvottaramīmāṁsayoḥ ekaśāstratvavādaḥ).

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[6] सुप्यजातौ णिनिस्ताच्छील्ये। – अष्टाध्यायी (३.२.७८)

[7] Cf. इत्याह नास्तिक्यनिराकरिष्णुरात्मास्तितां भाष्यकृदत्र युक्त्या । दृढत्वमेतद्विषयश्च बोधः प्रयाति वेदान्तनिषेवणेन ॥ – श्लोकवार्तिक (१.१.५), आत्मवादः (१४८)

The substance of his refutation is: Karma is rooted in avidyā (nescience) and hence it cannot be the means for Liberation. Karma cannot also join jñāna to bring about Liberation because the latter invalidates the former and consequently the two mīmāṁsās (Pūrva-mīmāṁsā and Uttara-mīmāṁsā) also cannot make one homogeneous Darśana.

5. For such knowledge is of no use (in performing those Scriptural acts) and also because it is opposed to the eligibility (to perform them): The eligibility (adhikāra) consisting in the enjoyership with regard to the fruit (phalasvāmya)[8] postulates by implication a necessary conviction on the part of the sacrificer about the transmigratory nature of the Self. But the real nature of Self as taught in the Vedānta (Upaniṣads) is devoid of transmigration (asaṁsārī) and free from the notions of doership and enjoyership (akartā and abhoktā). This nature of the Self, the injunction (vidhi) does not, and cannot postulate by implication. The reason is: Such a nature of the Self serves no purpose (anupayogāt) for the injunction, either for maintaining its own validity or for enforcing the eligibility contained in it. In truth, the real nature of the Self as mentioned above is diametrically opposed to the eligibility and therefore nullifies it.[9]

Doership (kartṛtva), enjoyership (bhoktṛtva) and transmigratory nature (saṁsāritva) are the attributes of the not-Self and they are superimposed on the inner Self through the agency of ignorance making him eligible for performing the sacrificial rites. Thus the very eligibility contained in the injunction cannot but presuppose the said superimposition on the part of the sacrificer. This presupposition of superimposition is applicable to both the karma-kāṇḍa and the jñāna-kāṇḍa uniformly.[10]

[8] The above cited sentence "*jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta*" is technically called 'adhikāravidhi' which is defined as an injunction explaining the enjoyership of the sacrificer with regard to the fruit of the rite (*phalasvāmyabodhako vidhiḥ adhikāravidhiḥ*).

[9] Cf. तर्हि कथं वैदिककर्मणोऽध्यासजन्यत्वसिद्धिः इत्याशङ्क्य किं तत्र देहान्यात्मधीमात्रम् अपेक्षितमुत आत्मतत्त्वज्ञानम्। आद्ये तस्य अध्यासाबाधकत्वात् तत्सिद्धिरित्याह— तथापीति। न द्वितीय इत्याह—न वेदान्तेति। क्षुत्पिपासादिग्रस्तो जातिविशेषवान् अहं संसारी इति ज्ञानं कर्मण्यपेक्षितं, न तद्विपरीतात्मतत्त्वज्ञानम्, अनुपयोगात्, प्रवृत्तिबाधात् च इत्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

[10] Jñāna-kāṇḍa addresses itself to an individual who longs for Liberation. The longing for Liberation presupposes the superimposition of transmigration on the inner Self. Further, no one becomes eligible for the study of Upaniṣads unless he superimposes knowership on the Self. Hence jñāna-kāṇḍa (Vedānta or Uttara-mīmāṁsā) also addresses itself to the ignorant.

6. And prior to the Realisation of the above-described Self, the ensuing Scripture does not transgress its being concerned with the ignorant: This sentence is meant to clear a doubt: If the real nature of the Self as taught in the Upaniṣads, that is jñāna-kāṇḍa, is opposed to the eligibility prescribed in the karma-kāṇḍa, then the former would entirely cancel the authority (prāmāṇya) of the latter. Likewise, in view of the eligibility conferred by the karma-kāṇḍa on the sacrificer, the jñāna-kāṇḍa too would lose its validity. Thus, as a result of this mutual annulment of validity, will not both the kāṇḍas, that is the entire Veda, become aprāmāṇya (invalid)?[11]

The Ācārya's reply to this question is: The Realisation of the true nature of the Self is indeed entirely opposed to the eligibility and annuls ultimately the validity of the Scriptural injunctions. But, prior to the rise of such Realisation, those injunctions have empirical authenticity and bestow eligibility on those who desire fruits. Hence the question of mutual annulment of the validity of the karma- and jñāna-kāṇḍas does not arise at all.

While concluding his detailed discussion under the Samanvaya-sūtra (1.1.4), the Ācārya avers that, besides the Scriptural injunctions, the other worldly means of cognition also like perception, inference and so on do enjoy empirical validity till the Self is realised (*pramāṇaṁ tu ā ātmaniścayāt*).

The difference between karma-kāṇḍa and jñāna-kāṇḍa is: The karmakāṇḍa-injunctions have relevance and validity with regard to the persons characterised by avidyā (nescience). On the other hand the Upaniṣads (jñāna-kāṇḍa) have relevance to the persons distinguished by their desire for vidyā (knowledge).[12]

Cf. अधिकारशास्त्रं हि स्वर्गकामस्य पुंसः परलोकसम्बन्धं विना न निर्वहति इति तावन्मात्रमाक्षिपेद्, न त्वस्यासंसारित्वमपि, तस्याधिकारेऽनुपयोगात्, प्रत्युत औपनिषदस्य पुरुषस्य अकर्तुरभोक्तुः अधिकारविरोधात्। प्रयोक्ता हि कर्मणः कर्मजनितफलभोगभागी कर्मण्यधिकारी स्वामी भवति। तत्र कथमकर्ता प्रयोक्ता, कथं च अभोक्ता कर्मजनितफलभोगभागी। तस्मादनाद्यविद्यालब्धकर्तृत्व-भोक्तृत्वब्राह्मणत्वाद्यभिमानिनं नरमधिकृत्य विधिनिषेधशास्त्रं प्रवर्तते। एवं वेदान्ता अप्यविद्यावत्पुरुषविषया एव। नहि प्रमात्रादिविभागातृते तदर्थाधिगमः। ते तु अविद्यावन्तम् अनुशासन्तो निर्मृष्टनिखिलाविद्यमनुशिष्टं स्वरूपे व्यवस्थापयन्तीत्येतावानेषां विशेषः। तस्मादविद्यावत्पुरुषविषयाण्येव शास्त्राणीति सिद्धम्। – भामती

[11] Cf. यद्यपि विरोधानुपयोगाभ्यामौपनिषदः पुरुषोऽधिकारे नापेक्ष्यते, तथाप्युपनिषद् भ्यो अवगम्यमानः शक्नोत्यधिकारं निरोद्धुम्। तथा च परस्परापहतार्थत्वेन कृत्स्न एव वेदः। प्रामाण्यमपजह्यादित्यत आह—प्राक् च तथाभूतात्मेति। – भामती

[12] There are some parallel instances for a better appreciation of the present point: The prohibitory injunction – *"ātmānaṁ na hanyāt* – One should not commit suicide" pertains to the persons of normal physical health, whereas the statement – *"apratisamādheyavyādhīnāṁ*

7. That is to say the Scriptural injunctions like "A brāhmaṇa shall perform sacrifice" etc. operate depending on the superimposition of the differentiating factors like caste, stage of life, age, etc. on the Self: In the earlier part of this section it has been affirmed that the Scriptural injunctions are applicable invariably to men of nescience, that is the applicability of the injunctions has an invariable concomitance with superimposition. This point is illustrated by the present sentence: *"brāhmaṇo yajeta* – A brāhmaṇa shall perform sacrifice." It pertains to one who superimposes the caste–brāhmaṇya (varṇa) of the not-Self on the Self. The teaching: *"gṛhasthaḥ sadṛśīṁ bhāryām upeyāt* – A house-holder shall approach a wife of equal status" presupposes a superimposition of a gārhasthya (āśrama or stage of life) of the not-Self on the Self. The command: *"aṣṭavarṣaṁ brāhmaṇam upanayīta* – A brāhmaṇa of eight years shall be initiated into Vedic study by the upanayana rite" is meant for the one who superimposes age on the Self. Examples could be multiplied indeed.[13]

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jalādipraveśena prāṇatyāgaḥ – One who is suffering from an incurable disease may give up his life by entering waters" is meant for men suffering from an incurable ailment. There is no mutual annulment of the validity of these prescriptions as they are meant for two different sets of persons. In the same manner, the karma- and the jñāna-kāṇḍas of the Veda pertain individually to two different sets of persons, the first set comprising persons with avidyā and the second set consisting of those who have desire for vidyā.

[13] Cf. अविद्यावत्पुरुषविषयत्वं नातिवर्तत इति यदुक्तं तदेव स्फुटयति—तथा हि इति। वर्णाध्यासः 'राजा राजसूयेन यजेत' इत्यादिः। आश्रमाध्यासः 'गृहस्थः सदृशीं भार्यां विन्देत' इत्यादिः। वयोऽध्यासः 'कृष्णकेशोऽग्नीनादधीत' इत्यादिः। अवस्थाध्यासः 'अप्रतिसमाधेयव्याधीनां जलादिप्रवेशेन प्राणत्यागः' इत्यादिः। आदिग्रहणं पातकोपपातकसङ्करीकरणापात्रीकरणमलिनीकरणाद्यध्यासोपसङ्ग्रहार्थम्। – भामती

Also, cf. अध्यासे आगमं प्रमाणयति—तथा हीति। यथा प्रत्यक्षानुमानार्थापत्तयोऽध्यासे प्रमाणं तथा आगमोऽपि इत्यर्थः। 'ब्राह्मणो यजेत', 'न ह वै स्नात्वा भिक्षेत', 'अष्टवर्षं ब्राह्मणमुपनयीत', 'कृष्णकेशोऽग्नीनादधीत' इति आगमो ब्राह्मणादिपदैरधिकारिणं वर्णाद्यभिमानिनमनुवदन् अध्यासं गमयति इति भावः। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. न केवलमुक्तप्रमाणैरेवाध्याससिद्धिः, किन्त्वागमोऽपि विधेर्बोद्धारमधिकारिणं ब्राह्मणादिशब्दैरुपदिशंश्चेतनाचेतनयोः ऐक्याभासं दर्शयतीत्याह—तथा हीति। तत्र वर्णवयोऽध्यासः—अष्टवर्षं ब्राह्मणमुपनयीत इत्यादिः, आश्रमाध्यासः—न ह वै स्नात्वा भिक्षेतेत्यादिः, अवस्थाध्यासः—ज्योगामयावी यजेत इति, ज्योगामयः उज्वलामयवानित्यर्थः। [आदिपदेन] यावज्जीवं जुहुयाद् इति जीवनाध्यासो गृह्यते। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

14

[अध्यासलक्षणसमन्वयः]

अध्यासो नाम अतस्मिंस्तद्बुद्धिः इत्यवोचाम। तद्यथा पुत्रभार्यादिषु विकलेषु सकलेषु वा 'अहमेव विकलः सकलो वा' इति बाह्यधर्मान् आत्मनि अध्यस्यति, तथा देहधर्मान् – स्थूलोऽहं, कृशोऽहं, गौरोऽहं, तिष्ठामि, गच्छामि, लङ्घयामि च इति, तथा इन्द्रियधर्मान् – मूकः, काणः, क्लीबः, बधिरः, अन्धोऽहम् इति, तथा अन्तःकरणधर्मान् कामसङ्कल्प-विचिकित्साध्यवसायादीन्। एवमहंप्रत्ययिनम् अशेषस्वप्रचारसाक्षिणि प्रत्यगात्मनि[1] अध्यस्य तं च प्रत्यगात्मानं सर्वसाक्षिणं तद्विपर्ययेण[2] अन्तःकरणादिषु अध्यस्यति।

14 A

[ADHYĀSALAKṢAṆASAMANVAYAḤ]

adhyāso nāma atasmiṁstadbuddhiḥ ityavocāma. tadyathā putrabhāryādiṣu vikaleṣu sakaleṣu vā 'ahameva vikalaḥ sakalo vā' iti bāhyadharmān ātmani adhyasyati, tathā dehadharmān – sthūlo'haṁ, kṛśo'haṁ, gauro'haṁ, tiṣṭhāmi, gacchāmi, laṅghayāmi ca iti, tathā indriyadharmān – mūkaḥ, kāṇaḥ, klībaḥ, badhiraḥ, andho'ham iti, tathā antaḥkaraṇadharmān kāmasaṅkalpavicikitsādhyavasāyādīn. evamahaṁpratyayinam aśeṣasvapracārasākṣiṇi pratyagātmani adhyasya taṁ ca pratyagātmānaṁ sarvasākṣiṇaṁ tadviparyayeṇa antaḥkaraṇādiṣu adhyasyati.

14 B

अध्यासः *adhyāsaḥ* – superimposition; नाम *nāma* – is indeed; अतस्मिन् *atasmin* – in what it is not; तद्बुद्धिः *tadbuddhiḥ* – cognition of that thing; इति *iti* – thus; अवोचाम *avocāma* – we defined; तद् यथा *tad yathā* – as (in the following case); पुत्रभार्यादिषु विकलेषु सकलेषु वा *putrabhāryādiṣu vikaleṣu sakaleṣu vā* – when one's son, wife, etc. are sound or unsound; अहम् एव विकलः सकलः वा *aham eva vikalaḥ sakalaḥ vā* – I am myself sound or unsound; इति *iti* – thus; बाह्यधर्मान् *bāhyadharmān* – attributes of the external objects; आत्मनि *ātmani* – on the Self; अध्यस्यति *adhyasyati* – superimposes; तथा *tathā* – so; देहधर्मान् *dehadharmān* – attributes

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[1] प्रति—प्रातिलोम्येन असज्जडदुःखात्मकाहङ्कारादिविलक्षणतया सच्चित्सुखात्मकत्वेन अञ्चति—प्रकाशते इति प्रत्यक्। – रत्नप्रभा
स एव देहादिष्विदन्तया बहिर्भावमापद्यमानेषु प्रातिलोम्येनाञ्चतीवोपलक्ष्यते, इति प्रत्यगुच्यते, आत्मा च। – पञ्चपादिका

[2] अन्तःकरणादिविपर्ययेण—अन्तःकरणाद्यचेतनं, तस्य विपर्ययः चैतन्यं, तेन इत्थम्भूतलक्षणे तृतीया। – भामती
तस्य अध्यस्तस्य जडस्य विपर्ययोऽधिष्ठानत्वं, चैतन्यं च तदात्मना स्थितमिति यावत्। – रत्नप्रभा

of the body; स्थूलः अहम् *sthūlaḥ aham* – I am fat; कृशः अहम् *kṛśaḥ aham* – I am thin; गौरः अहम् *gauraḥ aham* – I am fair; तिष्ठामि *tiṣṭhāmi* – I stand; गच्छामि *gacchāmi* – I go; लङ्घयामि *laṅghayāmi* – I jump; च *ca* – and; इति *iti* – thus; तथा *tathā* – likewise; इन्द्रियधर्मान् *indriyadharmān* – the attributes of the organs; मूकः *mūkaḥ* – dumb; काणः *kāṇaḥ* – one-eyed; क्लीबः *klībaḥ* – impotent; बधिरः *badhiraḥ* – deaf; अन्धः *andhaḥ* – blind; अहम् *aham* – I (am); इति *iti* – thus; तथा *tathā* – likewise; अन्तःकरणधर्मान् *antaḥkaraṇadharmān* – the attributes of the internal organ; कामसङ्कल्प-विचिकित्साध्यवसायादीन् *kāmasaṅkalpavicikitsādhyavasāyādīn* – desire, resolve, doubt, determination, etc.; एवम् *evam* – in this way; अहंप्रत्ययिनम् *ahaṁpratyayinam* – the locus of 'I'-notion; अशेषस्वप्रचारसाक्षिणि *aśeṣasvapracārasākṣiṇi* – on the Witness of all the activities (of the internal organ); प्रत्यगात्मनि *pratyagātmani* – on the inner Self; अध्यस्य *adhyasya* – having superimposed; तं च प्रत्यगात्मानम् *taṁ ca pratyagātmānam* – and that inner Self; सर्वसाक्षिणम् *sarvasākṣiṇam* – the Witness of all; तद्विपर्ययेण *tadviparyayeṇa* – conversely by implication; अन्तःकरणादिषु *antaḥkaraṇādiṣu* – on the internal organ etc.; अध्यस्यति *adhyasyati* – (one) superimposes

14 C

[DEMONSTRATION OF THE DEFINITION OF SUPERIMPOSITION]

We have already defined superimposition as a cognition of one thing in what is not that thing.[1] For instance:[2]

(1) When (one's) son, wife, etc. are sound or unsound, one superimposes on the Self the attributes of the external objects, as 'I am myself sound or unsound'.[3]

(2) In the same way, one superimposes on the Self, the attributes of the body as 'I am fat', 'I am thin', 'I am fair', 'I stand', 'I go' and 'I jump'.[4]

(3) Likewise one superimposes on the Self the attributes of the organs as 'I am dumb', 'I am one-eyed', 'I am impotent', 'I am deaf' (and) 'I am blind'.[5]

(4) Similarly one superimposes on the Self the attributes of the internal organ such as desire, resolve, doubt, determination, etc.[6]

(5) **In this way, one superimposes the internal organ etc. (the locus of 'I'-notion) on the 'Witness of all the activities of the internal organ' (namely, the inner Self);[7] and conversely by implication one superimposes that inner Self, the Witness of all, on the internal organ etc.[8]**

14 D

1. We have already defined superimposition as a cognition of one thing in what is not that thing: The Ācārya's exposition of the theory of the mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self in the earlier sections included:

(1) objection against the possibility of superimposition,
(2) defence in support of superimposition,
(3) a comprehensive definition of superimposition accompanied by illustrations and
(4) demonstration of how superimposition lies at the root of all human transactions – both secular and Vedic.

In the next section the Ācārya is going to point out that this superimposition is the cause of all evils (anarthahetu). By way of preparing the ground for elucidating this point (anarthahetutā), the Ācārya, in this section reiterates the definition of superimposition as *"atasmiṁstadbuddhiḥ* – the cognition of one thing in what is not that thing." While doing so the Ācārya has dropped the term 'smṛtirūpaḥ' (having the nature of recollection) from the earlier definition – *"smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ"* – as it is merely descriptive in nature.[3] Hence the definition of superimposition presented in this section does not essentially differ from the earlier one.[4]

Commentators such as Padmapāda and Ānandagiri have justified this reiteration of the definition by explaining that it prepares the background and builds the context to answer the specific query about the exact objects of mutual superimposition (yuṣmadartha and asmadartha).[5]

[3] Refer to Section 3.

[4] Cf. तदेवमात्मानात्मनोः परस्पराध्यासमाक्षेपसमाधानाभ्यामुपपाद्य प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारप्रवर्तनेन च दृढीकृत्य तस्यानर्थ-हेतुत्वमुदाहरणप्रपञ्चेन प्रतिपादयन् तत्स्वरूपमुक्तं स्मारयति—अध्यासो नाम अतस्मिंस्तद्बुद्धिरित्यवोचाम। स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः इत्यस्य सङ्क्षेपाभिधानमेतत्। – भामती

[5] Cf. अध्यासो नामातस्मिंस्तद्बुद्धिरित्यवोचामेति परामृशति—कस्य युष्मदर्थस्य कस्मिन्नयुष्मदर्थे तद्विपर्ययेण चाध्यास इति विवेकतः

2. For instance: In this section the Ācārya gives five instances of superimposition. The first four fall under the category of dharma-adhyāsa (sopādhika-adhyāsa) and the last one under dharmi-adhyāsa (nirupādhika-adhyāsa).[6] Though dharmi-adhyāsa alone is the cause of dharma-adhyāsa, yet the Ācārya first gives many instances of dharma-adhyāsa and shows that it is dharma-adhyāsa which is directly the source of all evils (sarva-anarthahetu).[7]

Before we proceed to analyse various instances of adhyāsa given by the Ācārya in this section, it would be of value to take note of the levels of dharmi-adhyāsa:

(1) superimposition of antaḥkaraṇa on the inner Self (which is conditioned by nescience),

(2) superimposition of the senses on the conglomerate of inner Self and antaḥkaraṇa,

(3) superimposition of the body on the conglomerate of the inner Self, antaḥkaraṇa and senses and

(4) superimposition of external objects owned (svāmya) on the conglomerate of inner Self, antaḥkaraṇa, senses and the body.

For each of the succeeding superimpositions the preceding conglomerate becomes the Ātman (inner Self).[8] In the act of superimposition of the preceding conglomerate on the succeeding one, the Self stands out and other members of the conglomerate recede to the background.[9]

प्रदर्शयितुम्। अतस्मिन्नयुष्मदर्थेऽनिदञ्चिति तद्बुद्धिर्युष्मदर्थावभास इत्यर्थः। – पञ्चपादिका

Also, cf. उक्तप्रमाणैः सिद्धेऽप्यध्यासे कस्य युष्मदर्थस्य कस्मिन् अस्मदर्थे वैपरीत्येन वा अध्यास इति विशेषबुभुत्सायां तदर्थमध्यासलक्षणं परामृशति। – न्यायनिर्णय

Also, cf. कस्य युष्मदर्थस्य कस्मिन्नस्मदर्थे, तद्विपर्ययेण वाऽध्यास इति विशेषतः प्रदर्शयितुमुपपादितस्याध्यासस्य लक्षणं परामृशति—अध्यासो नामेति। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

[6] For details of dharma-adhyāsa and dharmi-adhyāsa refer to Section 5.

[7] Cf. तत्र अहम् इति धर्मितादात्म्याध्यासमात्रं मम इत्यनुत्पादितधर्माध्यासं नानर्थहेतुरिति धर्माध्यासमेव ममकारं साक्षादशेषानर्थ-संसारकारणमुदाहरणप्रपञ्चेनाह—तद्यथा पुत्रभार्यादिषु इति। – भामती

Also, cf. ममेत्यनुत्पादितधर्माध्यासः—अहमितिधर्मिमात्राध्यासो नानर्थहेतुः, इति धर्म्यध्यासमेकरूपत्वाद्विभजनानर्हं मत्वा धर्माध्यासं सोदाहरणप्रपञ्चमुपक्षिपति—पुत्रभार्यादिष्विति। – प्रदीप

[8] Cf. अत्र उत्तरोत्तराध्यासविशिष्टः पूर्वपूर्वाध्यास इति। – पञ्चपादिकाविवरण

[9] अन्तःकरणं सचितिकमेव अध्यस्यमानं यत्र इन्द्रियशरीरादिषु अध्यस्यते, तस्यैव आत्मनः कार्यकरत्वमापाद्य स्वयमविद्यमानमिव तिरस्कृतं तिष्ठति, चिद्रूपमेव सर्वत्राध्यासे, स्वतः परतो वा न विशिष्यते। – पञ्चपादिका

The above-mentioned dharmi-adhyāsas are explained by the Bhāṣyakāra with corresponding illustrations of dharma-adhyāsa (albeit in the reverse order). The Bhāṣyakāra starts with the superimposition of the most external object (son, wife, etc.) on one's Self and proceeds to different stages of superimposition upto the innermost superimposition of antaḥkaraṇa on the inner Self. This technique of taking the student from the gross to the subtle enables the student to comprehend the intricate structure of superimposition.

3. When (one's) son, wife, etc. are sound or unsound, one superimposes on the Self the attributes of the external objects, as 'I am myself sound or unsound': The expression *"ātmani adhyasyati"* (superimposes on the Self) occurring in this illustration is intended to be read with the other subsequent illustrations also.

The term 'Self' in the present sentence connotes the conglomerate of the inner Self, antaḥkaraṇa, senses and the body. The father through the relation of ownership (svāmya) superimposes the son on himself. The ownership is complete when the owned thing is complete. The father feels honoured or dishonoured when his child is honoured or dishonoured. Thus the attributes of health, honour and so on are transferred to the father through the channel or adjunct (upādhidvārā) of ownership.[10]

The father is aware of being different from the child even when he superimposes the child's attributes on himself. In all the instances of superimposition mentioned here, the difference between the substratum (adhiṣṭhāna) and the object of superimposition (adhyasta) is recognised even during the time of superimposition unlike the case of primary superimposition (mukhya-adhyāsa) such as rope–snake wherein such difference is blurred and not felt at all. Hence the instances of superimposition mentioned by the Ācārya in this sentence are to be considered as cases of secondary superimposition (gauṇa-adhyāsa).[11]

[10] Cf. देहतादात्म्यमात्मन्यध्यस्य देहधर्मं पुत्रकलत्रादिस्वाम्यं च कृशत्वादिवदारोप्याह—अहमेव विकलः सकलः इति। स्वस्य खलु साकल्येन स्वाम्यसाकल्याद् स्वामीश्वरः सकलः सम्पूर्णो भवति, तथा स्वस्य वैकल्येन स्वाम्यवैकल्याद् स्वामीश्वरो विकलोऽसम्पूर्णो भवति। बाह्यधर्मा ये वैकल्यादयः स्वाम्यप्रणालिकया सञ्चारिताः शरीरे तानात्मन्यध्यस्यतीत्यर्थः। – भामती

Also, cf. बाह्याः स्वदेहापेक्षया पुत्रादयः, तद्धर्मा वैकल्यादयः। स्वस्वाम्यनिमित्तमात्मनि स्वदेहे तानारोपयतीत्यर्थः। – न्यायनिर्णय

[11] Cf. पुत्रदारादिष्वात्माभिमानो गौणः। – भामती (समन्वयाधिकरण)

Also, cf. तद्यथा बालके प्रातिवेश्यमात्रसम्बन्धिना केनचिद्वस्त्रालङ्कारादिना पूजिते निरुपचरितमात्मानमेव पूजितं मन्यते पिता। पूजयिताऽपि पितरमेवापूपुजमिति मन्यते। यतो न बालकस्य पूजितत्वाभिमानः, अव्यक्तत्वात्, तथैव राजानमुपहन्तुकामोऽनन्तरो विजिगीषुस्तद्राष्ट्रे ग्राममात्रमप्युपहत्य तमेवोपघ्नन्तमात्मानं मन्यते, सोऽप्युपहतोऽस्मीति सन्तप्यते। – पञ्चपादिका

4. In the same way, one superimposes on the Self the attributes of the body as 'I am fat', 'I am thin', 'I am fair', 'I stand', 'I go' and 'I jump': The Self here connotes the conglomerate of the inner Self, antaḥkaraṇa and senses. Just as one superimposes on the Self the external attributes of the child (health, ill-health, etc.) so also one superimposes on the Self the attributes, like leanness, fatness and so on of one's own body. The suggestion is: If through the notion of ownership (svāmya) one could superimpose the attributes of even an external entity like the child, what need be said about the attributes of one's own body, which is more intimate than the child's body?[12]

5. Likewise one superimposes on the Self the attributes of the organs as 'I am dumb', 'I am one-eyed', 'I am impotent', 'I am deaf' (and) 'I am blind': Here the term 'Self' denotes the conglomerate of the inner Self and antaḥkaraṇa (internal organ). The organs are more intimate than the physical body and hence their attributes are readily superimposed on the Self. Among the attributes cited, dumbness and impotence are the attributes of the organs of action (karmendriyas) and the rest, like deafness, blindness and so on are those of the organs of cognition (jñānendriyas).

6. Similarly one superimposes on the Self the attributes of the internal organ such as desire, resolve, doubt, determination, etc.: Here the term 'Self' stands for the inner Self conditioned by nescience (avidyopahitacaitanya). Because antaḥkaraṇa (inner equipment or internal organ) is proximate, its attributes like desire, hatred and so on are much more readily superimposed on the Self.

The concept of mind as delineated in Advaita-vedānta goes against the Nyāya conception of the mind. The attributes (desire, resolve, etc.) which

[12] Cf. यदा च परोपाध्यपेक्षे देहधर्मे स्वाम्ये इयं गतिः, तदा कैव कथा अनौपाधिकेषु देहधर्मेषु कृशत्वादिषु इत्याशयवानाह—तथा देहधर्मान् इति। – भामती

Also, cf. तदेवं प्रसिद्धव्यतिरेकस्यात्मनि मुख्य एवाध्यासो दृष्टः, किमु वक्तव्यं—कृशस्थूलाद्यभिमानस्य मुख्यत्वमिति कथयितुमाह—अहमेव विकलः सकलो वेति बाह्यधर्मानात्मन्यध्यस्यतीति। – पञ्चपादिका

Also, cf. प्रसिद्धातिरेकयोरपि पुत्रादिसाकल्यवैकल्ययोरनुभवेनैव मुख्याध्याससिद्धावप्रसिद्धातिरेकाणां कृशत्वादीनां तथा स्यादिति किं वक्तव्यमित्याशयेनाह—पुत्रेति। – न्यायनिर्णय

are ascribed to the mind in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* are postulated to inhere in the Self by the Naiyāyikas through the instrumentality of the mind. By ascribing such qualities to the mind, the Śruti absolves the Self of any modification that might occur because of the inherence of these qualities in it. The Ācārya's description of desire, resolve and the rest as attributes of the mind (antaḥkaraṇa) is based on the Upaniṣad declaring these qualities as the mind itself.[13]

7. In this way, one superimposes the internal organ etc. (the locus of 'I'-notion) on the 'Witness of all the activities of the internal organ' (namely, the inner Self):[14] This sentence throws light on the mutual superimposition of the substrata (dharmi-adhyāsa) which alone enables the above-mentioned mutual superimposition of the attributes (dharma-adhyāsa).[15]

The term 'ahaṁpratyayī' denotes all that in which there is the notion of 'I-ness'. Hence it includes in its gamut the antaḥkaraṇa, senses, body as well as the external entities on which one has the sense of ownership (child, wife, etc.).[16]

8. and conversely by implication one superimposes that inner Self, the Witness of all, on the internal organ etc.: The organs and the body are inert; it is the superimposition of the inner Self that makes them appear to be infused with consciousness.

The 'superimposition of the Self' on the antaḥkaraṇa (antaḥkaraṇe ātmādhyāsaḥ) differs from the 'superimposition of the antaḥkaraṇa on the Self' (ātmani antaḥkaraṇādhyāsaḥ). In the former case it is not the Self which is superimposed on the antaḥkaraṇa but rather it is the inner Self's 'contact' with the antaḥkaraṇa that is superimposed on the antaḥkaraṇa.

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[13] कामः सङ्कल्पो विचिकित्सा श्रद्धाऽश्रद्धा धृतिरधृतिर्ह्रीर्धीरित्येतत्सर्वं मन एव। – बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद् (१.५.३)

[14] 'aśeṣasvapracārasākṣiṇi': aśeṣa – all; sva – antaḥkaraṇa (internal organ); pracāra – vṛttayaḥ (modifications); sākṣin – Witness. This compound word thus means 'on the inner Self which witnesses all the activities of the internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa)'.

[15] Cf. तदनेन प्रपञ्चेन धर्माध्यासमुक्त्वा तस्य मूलं धर्म्यध्यासमाह—एवमहंप्रत्ययिनम्। – भामती

[16] Cf. अहंप्रत्ययो वृत्तिर्यस्मिन्नन्तःकरणादौ सोऽयमहंप्रत्ययी। – भामती

Also, cf. 'अहंप्रत्ययिनि' इति वक्तव्ये 'अन्तःकरणादिषु' इति वदन् भगवान् भाष्यकारः प्रत्येकमपि तेषामध्यासाधिष्ठानत्वमिति सूचयति। अत एव अन्तःकरणादिसङ्घाताधिष्ठानत्वमनपेक्ष्यैव 'देहश्चेतनः' इति केवले देहे चैतन्यप्रतीतिः। – वार्तिक

Also, cf. एवमहंप्रत्ययिनमिति धर्मिग्रहणम्। प्रत्ययाः – कामादयोऽस्येति प्रत्ययी, अहं चासौ प्रत्ययी चेत्यहंप्रत्ययी। – पञ्चपादिका

The superimposition of contact (saṁsarga) is termed 'saṁsarga-adhyāsa'. If we were to posit that it is the inner Self alone (and not Its contact) that is superimposed on the antaḥkaraṇa, the inner Self would be rendered illusory. For all that is superimposed (adhyasta) is illusory in nature as the cases of superimposed silver and snake. It is to avoid this undesirable contingency that the 'contact' (saṁsarga) of the inner Self with (antaḥkaraṇa) has been postulated as being superimposed (adhyasta) and not the pure inner Self.[17]

On the other hand, the latter case of 'the superimposition of antaḥkaraṇa on the inner Self' is in terms of both its nature (svarūpa-adhyāsa) and its contact (saṁsarga-adhyāsa). Superimposition of the nature (svarūpa) of one entity on the other is termed 'svarūpa-adhyāsa'. Such a superimposed entity alone (like silver, snake, etc.) becomes an object of illusory perception (bhrama-jñāna). By positing 'the superimposition of antaḥkaraṇa on the inner Self' in terms of not only contact (saṁsargataḥ) but also in terms of its nature (svarūpataḥ), the Advaitins clearly establish the illusory nature of the superimposed antaḥkaraṇa.

[17] Cf. अहमित्यध्यासे चिदात्मनः भानं वाच्यम् अन्यथा जगदान्ध्यापत्तेः। न चानध्यस्तस्याध्यासे भानमस्ति। तस्माद् रजतादौ इदम् इव आत्मनः संसर्गाध्यास एष्टव्यः। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. तत्र अज्ञाने केवलात्मनः संसर्गः, मनसि अज्ञानोपहितस्य, देहादौ मन-उपहितस्य इति विशेषः। एवमात्मनि बुद्ध्याद्यध्यासात् कर्तृत्वादिलाभः। बुद्ध्यादौ च आत्माध्यासात् चैतन्यलाभ इति भावः। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. तद्विपर्ययेण—अन्तःकरणविपर्ययेण, जडस्यान्तःकरणस्य चैतन्यमेव विपर्ययः, इति तेनाध्यासोऽहङ्कारे चैतन्यसंसर्गाध्यास एवेति पर्यवस्यति। अत्र संसर्गाध्यास एव, नतु चैतन्यमेवाध्यस्यत इति तद्विपर्ययमिति द्वितीयान्तपदाप्रयोगेण तद्विपर्ययेणेति तु तृतीयान्तपदप्रयोगेण च ज्ञाप्यते। – प्रदीप

Also, cf. तद्विपर्ययस्तेषामन्तःकरणादीनां विपर्ययश्चेतनत्वं। तदात्मनेति यावत्। न च तेषामधिष्ठानत्वमेव, तद्विशेषादृष्ट्या व्यवहारविरहात्। अतो द्वयोर्विशेषदृष्टेरन्योन्याध्यासधीः, अध्यासे विशेषदृष्टेरध्यस्यमानताकृतत्वात्। न च द्वयोर्विशेषदृष्टौ नाधिष्ठानत्वं, स्वनिष्ठत्वेन तदभानात्। न चोभयोरध्यासे बाध्यतया शून्यता, द्विधाऽध्यस्तानात्मनः सर्वथा बाधेऽपि संसृष्टरूपेणैवाध्यस्तात्मनस्तन्मात्रबाधेऽपि स्वरूपशेषादिति भावः। – न्यायनिर्णय

15

[अध्यासविचारनिगमनभाष्यम्]

एवमयम्[1] अनादिरनन्तो नैसर्गिकः[2] अध्यासो मिथ्याप्रत्ययरूपः[3] [१]कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्व-प्रवर्तकः सर्वलोकप्रत्यक्षः[4]। अस्यानर्थहेतोः[5] प्रहाणाय[6] आत्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये[7] सर्वे[8] वेदान्ता आरभ्यन्ते[9]।

15 A

[ADHYĀSAVICĀRANIGAMANABHĀṢYAM]

evamayam anādirananto naisargikaḥ adhyāso mithyāpratyayarūpaḥ kartṛtva-bhoktṛtvapravartakaḥ sarvalokapratyakṣaḥ. asyānarthahetoḥ prahāṇāya ātmaikatvavidyāpratipattaye sarve vedāntā ārabhyante.

15 B

एवम् *evam* – in this manner; अयम् *ayam* – this (the above-mentioned); अनादिः *anādiḥ* – having no beginning; अनन्तः *anantaḥ* – (and) no end; नैसर्गिकः *naisargikaḥ* – natural; अध्यासः *adhyāsaḥ* – superimposition; मिथ्याप्रत्ययरूपः *mithyāpratyayarūpaḥ* – of the nature of illusory cognition; कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वप्रवर्तकः *kartṛtvabhoktṛtvapravartakaḥ* – which brings about doership and enjoyership

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[१] CSS *Pañcapādikā* -प्रवर्तनः

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[1] अयम् – धर्म्यध्यासधर्माध्यासोभयरूपोऽध्यासः। – प्रदीप

[2] अनाद्यनन्तत्वे हेतुरुक्तः—नैसर्गिक इति। – भामती

[3] मिथ्याधीहेतुत्वेन तादात्म्यमाह—मिथ्येति। कारणाध्यासो हि कार्याध्यासस्य हेतुरित्यध्यासस्य मिथ्याप्रत्ययत्वमित्यर्थः। लक्षणतस्तथा रूप्यते, न प्रतीयत इति रूपग्रहणम्। अथवा मिथ्याप्रत्ययानां रूपमनिर्वाच्यत्वं यस्य स तथेत्यनिर्वाच्यत्वं वोच्यते। यद्वा मिथ्याभूताऽखण्डजडशक्तिस्तन्मात्रत्वेनाध्यासप्रत्ययो रूप्यते। न हि कारणादृते कार्यस्य रूपमस्ति। – न्यायनिर्णय
मिथ्याप्रत्ययरूप इति रूपग्रहणं लक्षणतस्तथा रूप्यते, न प्रतीतित इति दर्शयितुम्। अथवा मिथ्याप्रत्ययानां रूपमनिर्वचनीयं लक्षणतः, तथोक्तोऽनिर्वचनीय इत्यर्थः। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

[4] प्रत्यक्षपदमुक्तप्रमाणोपलक्षणम्। – न्यायनिर्णय

[5] कर्तृत्वादिरनर्थः, तस्य हेतुरुक्तोऽध्यासः, तस्य प्रकर्षेण हानं सोपादानस्य निवृत्तिः, तदर्थमिति यावत्। – न्यायनिर्णय

[6] प्रहाणाय – बाधाय। – प्रदीप

[7] आत्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये आत्ममात्रविषयकनिर्विकल्पकसाक्षात्कारसिद्धय इत्यर्थः। – प्रदीप
आत्मनस्त्वमर्थस्य तदर्थेन ब्रह्मणा यदेकत्वं वाक्यार्थः, तद्विषया विद्या साक्षात्कारो बुद्धिवृत्तिः तस्याः प्रतिपत्तिरप्रतिबद्धतया प्राप्तिः तदर्थमिति यावत्। – न्यायनिर्णय

[8] द्विविधवाक्यसङ्ग्रहार्थः सर्वशब्दः। – न्यायनिर्णय

[9] आरम्भो विचारः। – न्यायनिर्णय

(in the Self); सर्वलोकप्रत्यक्षः *sarvalokapratyakṣaḥ* – is experienced by one and all; अस्य *asya* – (of) this; अनर्थहेतोः *anarthahetoḥ* – source of evils; प्रहाणाय *prahāṇāya* – for eradicating; आत्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये *ātmaikatvavidyāpratipattaye* – for gaining Realisation of the oneness of the Self; सर्वे वेदान्ताः *sarve vedāntāḥ* – all Upaniṣads (Vedānta); आरभ्यन्ते *ārabhyante* – are commenced (revealed)

15 C

[DISCUSSION ON SUPERIMPOSITION CONCLUDES]

In this manner[1] this beginningless[2] and endless[3] natural superimposition, which is of the nature of illusory cognition,[4] which brings about doership and enjoyership (in the Self),[5] is experienced by one and all.[6] It is for the eradication of this source of evils – to attain the Realisation of the oneness of the Self that all the Upaniṣads (Vedānta) are commenced (revealed).[7]

15 D

1. In this manner: Having established the theory of mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self (itaretarādhyāsa) by adducing arguments, proofs and illustrations, the Ācārya now concludes his essay on adhyāsa.

2. beginningless: Adhyāsa is beginningless.[10] Both adhyāsa (superimposition) and the individual (jīva) flow eternally as a series of cause and effect (pravāhanitya). Hence there is no 'defect of reciprocal dependence' (anyo'nyāśrayadoṣa).[11]

3. endless: Adhyāsa is not to be construed as being absolutely indestructible. If it had meant so, the inquiry into the nature of Brahman would have been rendered fruitless. Hence the term 'ananta' (endless) means that it is not destructible in the absence of the Knowledge of the Self.[12]

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[10] The following six are considered to be beginningless in Advaita-vedānta: (1) Jīva, (2) Īśvara, (3) Brahman, (4) Jīveśvara-bheda (the difference between jīva and Īśvara), (5) Avidyā/adhyāsa and (6) Avidyācaitanya-sambandha (the relation between avidyā and Caitanya).

[11] Cf. जीवात्मा इतरेतराध्यासोपादानः, तदुपादानश्चाध्यास इत्यनादित्वाद्बीजाङ्कुरवन्नेतरेतराश्रयत्वमित्युक्तं भवति। – भामती
Also, cf. अनाद्यविद्यात्मकत्वादविद्यावदनादिः, तत्रापि च प्रवाहत एवानादिर्यतो नैसर्गिकः। – प्रदीप
Also, cf. पूर्वबुद्ध्याद्यध्यासाद् संस्काराद्यध्यासः, ततस्तादृगुत्तरबुद्ध्याद्यध्यास इति प्रवाहात्मना, प्रवाह्युपादानजाड्यात्मना वाऽनादित्वम्। – न्यायनिर्णय

[12] Cf. तत्त्वज्ञानमन्तरेणाशक्यसमुच्छेदः। – भामती

4. of the nature of illusory cognition: The fundamental nature of illusory cognition (mithyāpratyaya) is its illusoriness (mithyātva), which in Advaita-vedānta is described as indeterminablity (anirvacanīyatva). Indeterminablity of illusory cognition lies in being neither existent (sat) nor non-existent (asat) – *'sadasadbhyāmanirvacanīyam'*.[13]

5. which brings about doership and enjoyership (in the Self): Notions of doership and enjoyership are caused in the inner Self by adhyāsa. These are in turn responsible for the cycle of vāsanā, cintā and kriyā, which fuels the evil cycle of transmigration (saṁsāra).[14]

By stating that doership (kartṛtva) and enjoyership (bhoktṛtva) are products of ignorance, the Ācārya refutes indirectly the thesis of Self being essentially a doer and enjoyer (kartṛtvabhoktṛtva-śaktimān) as posited by the Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṁsakas and others.

6. is experienced by one and all: In Section 2, inference (anumāna) is used to establish the existence of adhyāsa. The Ācārya therein invokes the natural usages such as 'I am this' and 'this is mine' to imply adhyāsa as their causative factor. In the present section he says that adhyāsa is experienced perceptually by one and all and therefore perception (pratyakṣa) is used in this section to prove adhyāsa. Thus both pramāṇas (means of knowledge) – pratyakṣa and anumāna – have been used to establish the existence of adhyāsa.[15]

7. It is for the eradication of this source of evils – to attain the Realisation of the oneness of the Self that all the Upaniṣads (Vedānta) are commenced (revealed): Adhyāsa, the source of all evils can be eradicated by its direct opponent alone – the Knowledge of the oneness of the Self. Ignorance is overcome by knowledge just as darkness is destroyed by light alone.

Also, cf. तत्त्वधियं विना सर्वात्मना नाशहानेरानन्त्यम्। – न्यायनिर्णय

Also, cf. अनादिः प्रवाहरूपेण। अनन्त इति विद्याऽनुदये। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

[13] Cf. मिथ्याप्रत्ययरूपः मिथ्याप्रत्ययानां रूपमनिर्वचनीयत्वं, तद्यस्य स तथोक्तः, अनिर्वचनीय इत्यर्थः। – भामती

Also, cf. मिथ्या माया तया प्रतीयते इति प्रत्ययः—कार्यप्रपञ्चः तत्प्रतीतिश्चेत्येवंस्वरूप इत्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

[14] Cf. कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वप्रवर्तनः इत्यनर्थहेतुत्वं दर्शयति हेयतासिद्धये। – पञ्चपादिका

[15] Cf. प्रमाणं निगमयति—सर्वेति। साक्षिप्रत्यक्षमेव अध्यासधर्मिग्राहकं मानम् अनुमानादिकं तु सम्भावनार्थमिति अभिप्रेत्य प्रत्यक्षोपसंहारः कृतः। – रत्नप्रभा

The expression *"ātmaikatvavidyāpratipattaye sarve vedāntā ārabhyante"*[16] affirms that the Upaniṣads are the sole means of gaining the aforesaid Knowledge. Also it implies that the Upaniṣads are not intended to be used as Mantra for Vaidika-karma or for mere japa.[17]

The present sentence indicates:

(1) viṣaya of Vedānta as the Realisation of the Self as being one with Brahman (ātmaikatvavidyā-pratipatti) and

(2) prayojana (or phala) of Vedānta as destruction of avidyā and its effects (sarva-anartha-hetuprahāṇa).[18]

The 'oneness of the Self' (ātmaikatva) is the 'total dissociation from the entire phenomena' (vigalitasamasta-prapañcatva) and remaining as the blissful Brahman.[19] The Upaniṣads affirm that there can be no delusion and misery to the one who has realised this oneness of the Self.[20]

[16] Cf. आरभ्यन्ते, विचार्यन्ते। अस्मिन् शास्त्रे इति शेषः। – वार्तिक

Also, cf. वेदान्ताः आरभ्यन्ते इत्यनेन वेदान्तसम्बन्धिविचारशास्त्रमेव लक्ष्यते। – प्रदीप

[17] Cf. प्रतिपत्तिः प्राप्तिः तस्यै, न तु जपमात्राय, नापि कर्मसु प्रवृत्तये। – भामती

[18] Cf. एवमध्यासं वर्णयित्वा तत्साध्ये विषयप्रयोजने दर्शयति—अस्येति। कर्त्तृत्वाद्यनर्थहेतोरध्यासस्य समूलस्य आत्यन्तिकनाशो मोक्षः स केनेत्यत—आह—आत्मेति। ब्रह्मात्मैक्यसाक्षात्कारस्य प्रतिपत्तिः श्रवणादिभिरप्रतिबन्धेन लाभः तस्या इत्यर्थः। विद्यायां कारणमाह—सर्वे इति। आरभ्यन्ते—अधीत्य विचार्यन्ते इत्यर्थः। विचारितवेदान्तानां ब्रह्मात्मैक्यं विषयः, मोक्षः फलमित्युक्तं भवति। अर्थात् तद्विचारात्मकशास्त्रस्याऽपि ते एव विषयप्रयोजने इति ज्ञेयम्। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. एवं तावत्सूत्रेणार्थादुपात्तयोर्विषयप्रयोजनयोः सिद्धये जीवस्याब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वमध्यासात्मकमुपदर्श्य, अस्यानर्थहेतोः प्रहाणायेति प्रयोजनं निर्दिशति। हेतोः प्रहाण्या हि हेतुमतः प्रहाणिरात्यन्तिकी यतः। – पञ्चपादिका

Also, cf. एवं युष्मदस्मदित्यादिना भाष्येण प्रथमसूत्रेणार्थादुपात्तविषयप्रयोजनसिद्धहेतुमध्यासमुपपाद्येदानीमनेन सूत्रेण विषयप्रयोजनयोरुपादाने निमित्तमाह—वेदान्ता इति। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

Also, cf. एवं कर्तृत्वादिबन्धस्याध्यस्तत्वं प्रसाध्य तत्प्रसाधनफलभूतां विषयप्रयोजनयोस्सिद्धिमाह—अस्यानर्थहेतोः प्रहाणायेति। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

[19] Cf. आत्मैकत्वं विगलितनिखिलप्रपञ्चत्वम्, आनन्दरूपस्य सतः, तत्प्रतिपत्तिं निर्विचिकित्सां भावयन्तो वेदान्ताः समूलघातमध्यासमुपघ्नन्ति। – भामती

[20] तत्र को मोहः कः शोकः एकत्वमनुपश्यतः। – ईशावास्योपनिषद् (७)

16

[शारीरकमीमांसाभाष्यारम्भप्रतिज्ञा]

यथा चायमर्थः सर्वेषां वेदान्तानां तथा वयमस्यां शारीरकमीमांसायां प्रदर्शयिष्यामः ॥

16 A

[ŚĀRĪRAKAMĪMĀṂSĀBHĀṢYĀRAMBHAPRATIJÑĀ]

yathā cāyamarthaḥ sarveṣāṁ vedāntānāṁ tathā vayamasyāṁ śārīrakamīmāṁsāyāṁ pradarśayiṣyāmaḥ.

16 B

यथा च *yathā ca* – and how; अयम् अर्थः *ayam arthaḥ* – this purport; सर्वेषां वेदान्तानाम् *sarveṣāṁ vedāntānām* – of all the Upaniṣads (Vedānta); तथा *tathā* – that; वयम् *vayam* – we; अस्यां शारीरकमीमांसायाम् *asyāṁ śārīrakamīmāṁsāyām* – in this *Śarīraka-mīmāṁsā*; प्रदर्शयिष्यामः *pradarśayiṣyāmaḥ* – we shall show

16 C

[COMMENCEMENT OF THE ŚĀRĪRAKABHĀṢYA ANNOUNCED]

And how this is the purport of all the Upaniṣads (Vedānta),[1] that we shall explain in the (ensuing) *Śārīraka-mīmāṁsā*.[2]

16 D

1. And how this is the purport of all the Upaniṣads (Vedānta): The expression 'all the Upaniṣads (Vedānta)' suggests that all the Upaniṣads are to be treated as 'one homogeneous unit' (ekavākyatayā) and that their purport is to be understood accordingly in a harmonious way (samanvaya). The Bhāṣyakāra establishes this in the Samanvayādhyāya[1] (the Chapter on Harmony) of the *Brahma-sūtra*. One should not understand the different passages of the Upaniṣads in a mutually unrelated manner as if they are independent units. In that case one is sure to get lost often in their superficial contradictions. The

[1] The four adhyāyas (chapters) of *Brahma-sūtra* are as follows: (1) Samanvaya-adhyāya (2) Avirodha-adhyāya (3) Sādhana-adhyāya and (4) Phala-adhyāya.

contradictions expressed in the passages are only apparent since they have been occasioned by the different angles from which the same truth has been expounded. These contradictions have been reconciled by the Sūtrakāra and the Bhāṣyakāra in the second chapter Avirodhādhyāya (Chapter on Reconciliation).

◈

In the Upaniṣads we come across many passages that prescribe various contemplations (upāsanās) such as prāṇopāsanā, oṁkāropāsanā, vaiśvānara-ātmopāsanā and so on. Each of these upāsanās is also pointed out as having specific fruits. Yet none of these upāsanās are capable of bestowing the Knowledge of the Self – the explicit 'fruit' (phala) of the Upaniṣads. Indeed, contemplation on the rope has never been known to have destroyed the ignorance about the rope! Rather it is the direct knowledge (jñāna) of the rope alone that can remove the ignorance about the rope.[2] The Upaniṣads being replete with descriptions of various upāsanās, how does the Bhāṣyakāra declare that all the Upaniṣads have the single fruit of the Knowledge of the Self?[3]

The reply to this question is: The Upaniṣads declare that the Self is to be known through śravaṇa (listening), manana (reflection) and nididhyāsana (meditation).[4] All these require mental concentration (cittaikāgratā) which is augmented by the various upāsanās. Hence the importance of upāsanās and therefore their explicit mention even in the Upaniṣad portions of the Vedas. Since the upāsanās also help in the attainment of Self-knowledge through generating mental concentration, the Bhāṣyakāra asserts that all the Upaniṣads (Vedānta) have the single purpose of Knowledge of the Self as their goal.[5] These ideas are explained in detail in the third chapter Sādhanādhyāya (Chapter on the Means for Attaining Liberation).

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[2] Cf. न हि रज्जूपासनेन रज्वज्ञाननिवृत्तिरनुभवसिद्धा रज्जुसाक्षात्कारेणेव। – प्रदीप

[3] Cf. प्राणाद्युपासना अपि वेदान्तेषु बहुलमुपलभ्यन्ते। तत्कथं सर्वेषां वेदान्तानामात्मैकत्वप्रतिपादनमर्थ इत्यत आह—यथा चायमर्थः इत्यादि। – भामती

Also, cf. ननु वेदान्तेषु प्राणाद्युपास्तीनां भानात् आत्मैक्यमेव तेषाम् अर्थ इति कथमित्यत आह—यथा चेति। – रत्नप्रभा

[4] आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः। – बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद् (२.४.५, ४.५.६)

[5] Cf. उपास्तीनां चित्तैकाग्र्यद्वारा आत्मैक्यज्ञानार्थत्वात् तद्वाक्यानामपि महातात्पर्यमैक्ये इति वक्ष्यते। – रत्नप्रभा

Also there is no contradiction between the Upaniṣadic passages that posit Brahman as the Creator and those which deny the same. Creatorship is not a real characteristic of Brahman, as the world is mithyā (illusory) in nature because of its 'dṛṣṭanaṣṭa-svabhāva' (which disappears as it appears). Hence the passages that delineate Brahman as a Creator are merely meant as adhyāropa (deliberate superimposition) and those passages which describe Brahman as being free from qualities like creatorship are from the angle of apavāda (negation).[6] Therefore there is no mutual contradiction whatsoever.[7]

Thus the Bhāṣyakāra is perfectly justified in asserting that all the Upaniṣads are to be treated as one homogenous whole and that the purport (tātparya or viṣaya) of all the Upaniṣads is the attainment of the Realisation of oneness of the Self.

2. Śārīraka-mīmāṁsā: The *Brahma-sūtra* has been termed *'Śārīraka-mīmāṁsā'* by the Ācārya. The word 'śārīrakamīmāṁsā' literally means 'inquiry (mīmāṁsā) into the one who dwells in the contemptible physical body (śārīraka or jīva)'. In short the compound 'śārīraka-mīmāṁsā' means 'an inquiry into the real nature of jīva'. The jīva is the denotation of 'tvam-pada' and Īśvara is the denotation of 'tat-pada'. An inquiry into their real nature shows their identity as evidenced by Mahāvākyas like *"tat tvam asi."*[8]

Adhikārin, viṣaya, prayojana and sambandha are the members of 'the group of four related preliminary considerations' (anubandha-catuṣṭaya)

[6] Cf. अध्यारोपापवादाभ्यां निष्प्रपञ्चं प्रपञ्च्यते। शिष्याणां बोधसिद्ध्यर्थं तत्त्वज्ञैः प्रकल्पितः क्रमः॥

[7] Cf. ननु—वेदान्तानामात्मैकत्वप्रतिपत्तिःप्रयोजनमिति कथमुच्यते। प्रपञ्चसृष्ट्यादीनां, तदनुगुणतया ब्रह्मणि सर्वज्ञत्वादिगुणवृन्दस्य च तत्र तत्र प्रतिपादनदर्शनाद्—इत्याशङ्क्य, अध्यारोपप्रक्रियया अपवादशेषभूतानां तद्वाक्यानां प्रत्यगभिन्नब्रह्मण्येव तात्पर्यमिति वक्ष्यमाणैर्न्यायैः स्पष्टं भविष्यतीत्याह—यथा चायमर्थ इति। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

[8] Cf. शरीरमेव शरीरकं, तत्र निवासी शारीरको जीवात्मा। तस्य त्वंपदाभिधेयस्य तत्पदाभिधेयपरमात्मरूपतया या मीमांसा सा तथोक्ता। – भामती

Also, cf. शरीरमेव शरीरकं, कुत्सितत्वात्, तन्निवासी शारीरको जीवस्तस्य ब्रह्मत्वविचारो मीमांसा तस्यामित्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. शरीरमेव शरीरकं जुगुप्सितत्वात्, तस्मिन् भवः शारीरको जीवात्मा। तद्याथात्म्यमधिकृत्य वेदान्तानां मीमांसा विचारः शारीरकमीमांसा, मीमांसाशब्दस्य विचारे रूढत्वाद् इदमनेन मीमांसितम्, इदमनेन विचारितमित्यविशेषेण लोके प्रयोगदर्शनात्। तत्प्रतिरूपकत्वादियमपि चतुर्लक्षणी शारीरकमीमांसेत्यभिधीयते। – वार्तिक

Also, cf. कुत्सितं शरीरं शरीरकं शरीरके भवः, शारीरकः, आत्मा, तन्मीमांसा शारीरकमीमांसा। आत्मैव तु ब्रह्म। तथा च ब्रह्ममीमांसा आत्ममीमांसेति चानर्थान्तरम्। वेदान्ता अपि शारीरकमेव जीवात्मानं ब्रह्माभिन्नं प्रतिपादयन्तीति न कोऽपि विरोधः। अत्र कुत्सार्थकस्य कप्रत्ययस्य शरीरपदे प्रयोगाद् सर्वं शरीरजातं कुत्सितं नात्मना शुद्धेन सम्बन्धमर्हति, इति वस्तुगत्याऽशरीरमात्मानं शारीरकपदं गमयति, इति चिदचिच्छरीरकब्रह्ममीमांसैवेयमिति वादस्य नावसरलेशोऽपीति सूच्यते। – प्रदीप

Also, cf. शारीरमेव शरीरकं कुत्सितत्वात्, तन्निवासी शारीरको जीवः, तस्य ब्रह्मतावेदिका विचारात्मिका मीमांसा, तस्यामिति यावत्। – न्यायनिर्णय

that are expected to be specified at the commencement of every treatise of philosophical inquiry. The 'adhikārin' is elucidated by the Ācārya as 'the individual endowed with sādhana-catuṣṭaya'[9] while analysing the word 'atha' (ānantarya – immediately after) in the first Sūtra – *"athāto brahmajijñāsā"*. The viṣaya being ātmaikatva (oneness of the Self with Brahman) and the prayojana being the destruction of ajñāna and its effect–saṁsāra (anarthahetuprahāṇa) have been already indicated in Section 15.

The present sentence indicates the sambandha (relation between the expounder and expounded – pratipādya-pratipādaka-sambandha) of the subject matter of ātmaikatva (viṣaya or pratipādya) as being revealed by the *Śārīraka-mīmāṁsā*, that is the *Brahma-sūtra* (pratipādaka).

[9] नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः, इहामुत्रार्थभोगविरागः, शमदमादिसाधनसम्पद्, मुमुक्षुत्वं च। – ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्य (१.१.१)

Adhyāsa-bhāṣya: A Recapitulation

Purpose of *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya*

Ācārya Śaṅkara's preamble to the *Brahma-sūtra* and its commentary is well-known as *'Adhyāsa-bhāṣya'* or the 'commentary on superimposition'. Contrary to the expectation that an introduction to *Brahma-sūtra* would focus on Brahman, the Ācārya chooses to delineate the nature of adhyāsa (superimposition). Why does he do so?

The *Brahma-sūtra* begins with the aphorism on inquiry – *"athāto brahmajijñāsā* – now, therefore, begins the inquiry into Brahman." Indeed all inquiries presuppose two grounds:

(1) existence of doubt (i.e. the absence of clarity about the object of inquiry) in the inquirer and

(2) conviction that the inquiry would lead to a fruitful result.

The *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya* seeks to establish the existence of these two grounds of all inquiries without which the *Brahma-sūtra* itself would be rendered a meaningless deliberation. Herein the Ācārya shows that the 'I'-experience is erroneous by demonstrating that it is based on the mutual superimposition (itaretara-adhyāsa) of the Self and the not-Self. Hence the doubt about the essential nature of 'I'-experience and the need for clarity about the same. Also, this adhyāsa is shown by the Ācārya as being the cause of saṁsāra and its consequent evils (sarva-anartha-hetu). Since the Knowledge of the identity of the inner Self with Brahman (ātmaikatvavidyāpratipatti) alone can put an end to saṁsāra, the inquiry into Ātman–Brahman (brahma-jijñāsā) is very purposeful and fruitful. Thus the *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya* establishes the twin prerequisites of inquiry – doubt and usefulness.

Further, the Upaniṣads declare Brahman as one and indivisible through statements such as *(Chā.U.6.2.1) "ekamevādvitīyam."* If the Reality was one alone, how then do we account for the perceived plurality? Advaitins postulate adhyāsa–ignorance (also termed 'māyā') to explain the phenomenon of plurality. The Ācārya's *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya* renders doubtful the status of plurality in the world *vis-a-vis* the Upaniṣadic non-dualism of the Reality.

Establishing Adhyāsa

In order to explain the nature of adhyāsa and to situate it in its proper perspective, the Ācārya at the very beginning questions the existence of mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self through the words of the opponent (Pūrvapakṣin). He compares the opposed nature of the Self and not-Self with the dissimilar and contradictory nature of light and darkness. Light cannot be mistaken for darkness and *vice versa*. So, too, the Self and the not-Self cannot be mistaken for each other. In spite of their mutually opposed nature, the experience of mutual superimposition between the Self and the not-Self is a matter of universal experience as evidenced by the common experiences – 'I am this' (aham idam) and 'this is mine' (mama idam). Thus using direct experience (pratyakṣa) the Ācārya brings to attention the undeniable presence of adhyāsa.

Defining and Corroborating Adhyāsa

After making a strong case for the existence of adhyāsa, the Ācārya proceeds to the next logical step of defining adhyāsa: "*smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ* – superimposition is a cognition on a different locus, having a nature similar to that of recollection, and cognising what has been experienced earlier." Paraphrasing this definition of adhyāsa, the Ācārya presents three variants which cover the khyāti-vādas (theories of illusion): (1) Ātma-khyāti of Vijñāna-vāda, (2) Akhyāti of Prabhākara-mīmāṁsā and (3) Anyathā-khyāti or Viparīta-khyāti of Nyāya. The Ācārya avers that the common characteristic found in all these khyāti-vādas happens to be the very core part of his definition – "*anyasya anyadharmāvabhāsatā*," that is "the nature of one thing having the attribute of another." Thus the Advaitin's doctrine of anirvacanīyatā is 'sarvatantrasiddhānta' (a tenet postulated and established in one Darśana but acceptable to all). The Ācārya corroborates adhyāsa by bringing to our attention two well-known instances of error: (1) The shell appears as if silver and (2) the single moon appears as if having a double. These two illustrations are respectively classical examples of the two types of superimposition – dharmi-adhyāsa (nirupādhika-adhyāsa) and dharma-

adhyāsa (sopādhika-adhyāsa). Dharmi-adhyāsa accounts for the experience of 'aham-idam – I am the body, mind, etc.' while dharma-adhyāsa accounts for the experiences 'mama idam – I am stout, deaf, etc.'

Defending Adhyāsa

At this juncture the Ācārya raises a poignant question: The event of mutual superimposition occurs between observable entities alone. But in the case of mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self, even though the not-Self is an object of knowledge, yet the Self does not fall under the category of observable or experienceable entities. How then could superimposition instantiate itself to be a valid phenomenon? The answer given to this philosophical quagmire is this: Though the pure Self does not become an object of cognition, yet in the proximity of avidyā or its effects (mind etc.), the Self does assume observability and seems to become the content of 'I'-notion (asmatpratyayaviṣaya). Moreover, it is immediately given in everybody's experience (aparokṣa). Even assuming the imperceptibility of the Self, the Ācārya invokes the illustration of space in order to drive home the point that imperceptible entities also become the locus of superimposition just as perceptible ones do. The laymen superimpose attributes such as surfacehood, impurities on the space inspite of it not being cognised by the senses. Hence the superimposition of not-Self on the Self is not contrary to logic.

Importance of Adhyāsa in Advaita-vedānta

After proving the incidence of mutual superimposition of the Self and not-Self, the Ācārya shows that the doctrine of adhyāsa is a tenet accepted in general by all schools of Indian philosophy. He says that the learned (Patañjali, Gautama, etc.) hold this very same adhyāsa as avidyā (nescience) – *"tametam evaṁlakṣaṇam adhyāsaṁ paṇḍitāḥ avidyā iti manyante."* Avidyā is destroyed by the knowledge (vidyā) of the true nature of the locus (adhiṣṭhāna). He further avers that the locus of superimposition remains absolutely unassociated and unaffected by the superimposed entity (adhyasta). Therefore, the act of superimposition ascribes plurality to the non-dual Reality, Brahman, without affecting It in the least bit and the

notions such as kartṛtva (doership) and bhoktṛtva (enjoyership) do not taint the Self at all. This in essence becomes the pivotal point of the philosophy of Advaita-vedānta.

Adhyāsa – the Basis of Epistemological Behaviour

The Ācārya then goes on to show that adhyāsa runs as an under-current through pramāṇaprameya-vyavahāra (epistemological behaviour) – be it secular or Vedic. He raises a query on behalf of the opponent: Why is it that perception and other means of valid knowledge and also the Scriptures pertain to the ignorant? By way of answering the query, the Ācārya gives the rationale that all the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) including the Vedas relate to the knower (pramāta) whose status is consequent upon the superimposition of internal organ, senses and body on the Self. Without the mutual superimposition of the Self and not-Self, neither epistemological behaviour nor Scriptural activity is possible. Hence it follows that perception and other means of knowledge (as well as the Vedas) pertain to the individual who is under the spell of adhyāsa. The Ācārya endorses this state of affairs by drawing effectively a parallel between the well trained and cultivated human beings and animals so far as the worldly epistemological behaviour is concerned.

The Vedas are of non-human origin and hence are free from all human deficiencies and error. Such being the case, one would naturally suppose that it is implausible to bring the acts enjoined by them within the jurisdiction of nescience. For instance, the injunction for Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice is based on the distinction between the body and the Self, which is vidyā. Thus, the eligibility conferred by all Vedic injunctions on the performers presupposes vidyā. In such a situation how can all human transactions be said to be rooted in nescience (avidyā)? Is there the defect of inconstancy (vyabhicāra-doṣa) in the Advaitin's argument?

The Ācārya answers this query: Even though Vedic injunctions presuppose the distinction between the body and the Self, yet they still superimpose notions such as kartṛtva (doership), bhoktṛtva (enjoyership)

and saṁsāritva (transmigratory nature) on the inner Self and are hence still within the purview of ignorance. The applicability of Vedic injunctions, thus, has an invariable concomitance with superimposition and, therefore, there is no defect of inconstancy.

Vedānta – the Remedy for Adhyāsa

After thus demonstrating that adhyāsa lies at the root of all human transactions (secular as well as Vedic) the Ācārya reiterates the definition of superimposition as *"atasmiṁstadbuddhiḥ* – cognition of one thing in what is not that thing," and goes on to bring to our attention the exact objects of mutual superimposition. He provides five instances of superimposition – the first four being dharma-adhyāsas and the last one being dharmi-adhyāsa.

(1) Superimposition of the attributes of external objects (like son, wife, etc.) on the Self.
(2) Superimposition of the attributes of the body (fatness, thinness, etc.) on the Self.
(3) Superimposition of the attributes of the senses (dumbness, deafness, etc.) on the Self.
(4) Superimposition of the attributes of the internal organ (desire, resolve, etc.) on the Self and, finally
(5) Superimposition of the body, senses, internal organ and so on on the Self and vice versa.

All these illustrations effectively drive home the point that mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self lies at the heart of all human sufferings (sarva-anartha-hetu). He concludes by declaring that it is to end this natural beginningless superimposition that the Upaniṣads (Vedānta) have been commenced (revealed).

In this way the Ācārya gives a meaningful and enlightening introduction for undertaking the deliberation on Brahman initiated by the *Brahma-sūtra*.

॥ इति अध्यासभाष्यं समाप्तम् ॥

iti adhyāsabhāṣyaṁ samāptam

Thus Concludes the Commentary on Superimposition.

॥ जिज्ञासाधिकरणम् ॥

Jijñāsādhikaraṇam

Topical Section:
Desire to Know

Section 1

[जिज्ञासासूत्रम्]

अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा। (१.१.१)

Section 1 A

[JIJÑĀSĀSŪTRAM]

athāto brahmajijñāsā. (1.1.1)

Section 1 B

compound word

अथ *atha* – then; अतः *ataḥ* – therefore; ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा *brahmajijñāsā* – the desire to know Brahman

Section 1 C

[APHORISM ON THE DESIRE TO KNOW]

Then, therefore, the desire to know Brahman. (1.1.1)

Section 1 D

The *Brahma-sūtra* has been composed by the venerable sage Bādarāyaṇa who is identified with Veda-vyāsa in the Vedāntic tradition. The *Brahma-sūtra* is also termed *Vedānta-darśana, Śārīraka-mīmāṁsā, Brahma-mīmāṁsā, Uttara-mīmāṁsā* and so on. The text consists of four chapters or adhyāyas and each of these has four pādas or quarters which in turn are further sub-divided into adhikaraṇas or topical sections. The first chapter aims to establish that all the Upaniṣadic enunciations unequivocally teach the oneness of the Self (brahmātmaikya). Hence, this chapter is rightly given the appellation 'Samanvaya-adhyāya', or 'Chapter on Harmony'.

The first adhikaraṇa is the Jijñāsā-adhikaraṇa. An adhikaraṇa is a thematic exposition with five limbs. The following verse aptly describes what an adhikaraṇa is: *"viṣayaḥ saṁśayaścaiva pūrvapakṣastathottaram, saṅgatiśceti pañcāṅgaṁ śāstre'dhikaraṇaṁ smṛtam."*

doubt clearing

interconnectedness

(1) Viṣaya or Subject: The Upaniṣadic enunciation to be taken up for deliberation.
(2) Saṁśaya or Doubt: This arises out of the Upaniṣadic enunciations which admit of conflicting or contradictory interpretations.
(3) Pūrvapakṣa or Prima Facie View: This refers to the opponent's position and the arguments in its support.
(4) Siddhānta or the Established View: This refers to the conclusive view arrived at after incisive deliberation.
(5) Saṅgati or Connectedness: This pertains to the relevance of topics under deliberation in the entire scheme of the text. It also dwells upon the connectedness with the preceding and following topics.

An adhikaraṇa could be analysed under one or several aphorisms. The present adhikaraṇa, the Jijñāsā-adhikaraṇa is covered in a single Sūtra – *"athāto brahmajijñāsā."*

2

[अवतरणिकाभाष्यम्]

वेदान्तमीमांसाशास्त्रस्य व्याचिख्यासितस्य इदम् आदिमं सूत्रम्[1]।

2 A

[AVATARAṆIKĀBHĀṢYAM]

Sought to be expounded because purva-mimamsa hasn't covered it.

vedāntamīmāṁsāśāstrasya vyācikhyāsitasya idam ādimaṁ sūtram.

Desires to be expounded: Why Because hasn't been inquired into before, hasn't been addressed so far. Why? Because of Purva-mimamsa.

2 B

Upanisads enquiry (complete enquiry into Upanisads)

वेदान्तमीमांसाशास्त्रस्य *vedāntamīmāṁsāśāstrasya* – pertaining to the deliberation on the Vedānta-treatise; व्याचिख्यासितस्य *vyācikhyāsitasya* – proposed to be elucidated; इदम् *idam* – this; आदिमं सूत्रम् *ādimaṁ sūtram* – is the first aphorism

that which is sought to be expounded

2 C

[THE PREFATORY COMMENTARY]

This is the first aphorism,[1] pertaining to the deliberation on the Vedānta-treatise, which is proposed to be elucidated.[2]

2 D

1. This is the first aphorism: In the last section of the *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya* it has been stated that the purport of the Upaniṣads is to teach the Knowledge of the oneness of Self (ātmaikatvavidyā). This Knowledge alone is capable of destroying the mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self and leads the aspirant to Liberation.

Logical propriety demands that a philosophical treatise should at the very outset specify: (1) viṣaya or the subject matter of the treatise, (2) prayojana or the benefit that accrues from its study, (3) sambandha or the relation between the subject matter of the text (viṣaya) and the benefit (prayojana)[2] and (4) adhikārī or the qualified aspirant who alone can reap

[1] वेदान्तविषयकपूजितविचारात्मकशास्त्रस्य व्याख्यातुमिष्टस्य सूत्रसन्दर्भस्य इदं प्रथमसूत्रमित्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

[2] The term 'sambandha' in the context of anubandha-catuṣṭaya, according to those well-versed in the Vedāntic tradition, could refer to these varied relations. For example – between

the full benefit by the perusal of the treatise. These four aspects – viṣaya, prayojana, sambandha, and adhikārī – are collectively known in the Indian philosophical tradition as the 'anubandha-catuṣṭaya' or the 'four preambulatory factors'.

The Pūrvapakṣin (opponent) raises an objection that the very first aphorism of the *Brahma-sūtra* is defective inasmuch as it does not specify the anubandha-catuṣṭaya. Rather it simply states the desire to know Brahman (brahma-jijñāsā). Hence, the Pūrvapakṣin declares that the author of the *Brahma-sūtra* does not intend in anyway to teach the oneness of the Self (viṣaya), as the Sīddhāntin (proponent) avers.

The Pūrvapakṣin further states that the author does not explicitly state the prayojana, that is the benefit of Liberation through the destruction of the mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self, as being effected by the perusal of the treatise. Therefore, the Pūrvapakṣin asserts that the Ācārya's detailed discussion on superimposition, the *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya,* does not serve as a suitable introduction to the first aphorism and to the treatise and hence remains utterly unwarranted and unjustified.

In the *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya* we have seen that the Pūrvapakṣin had declared that the mutual superimposition of the Self and not-Self is an impossible proposition. But he was effectively silenced by the Bhāṣyakāra who established that this mutual superimposition is actually an undeniable fact of life. We see that the opponent has now changed his strategy when he raises the objection that the aphorism does not touch upon the anubandha-catuṣṭaya. Hence it needs to be shown that the first aphorism does contain suggestions about the said four preambulatory factors.

It is true that the viṣaya (subject) and prayojana (fruit) of the Upaniṣads are also those of the *Brahma-sūtra* since the *Brahma-sūtra* thoroughly inquires

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the grantha (text) and its viṣaya, the sambandha is that of the pratipādaka or bodhaka (expounder) and the pratipādya or bodhya (to be expounded); between the adhikārin (qualified aspirant) and the vicāra (inquiry) it is that of kartṛ (performer) and kartavya (to be performed); between the viṣaya (subject matter of the treatise) and the prayojana (benefit) it is that of hetu (cause) and phala (effect); between the adhikārin (qualified aspirant) and the phala (result of Liberation) that of prāpaka (attainer) and prāpya (to be attained).

into the Upaniṣadic enunciations alone. Yet it still remains to be demonstrated whether the first aphorism of the *Brahma-sūtra* contains ample suggestions about the said anubandha-catuṣṭaya or the preambulatory factors.

The object of brahma-jijñāsā or the 'desire to know Brahman' is evidently the Knowledge of Brahman. But such a Knowledge is not intended to be a mere intellectual understanding (parokṣa-jñāna) of Brahman at which an individual who studies the *Brahma-sūtra* could arrive. It is rather the direct Realisation of Brahman (Brahmāvagati or Aparokṣa-jñāna). This, therefore, constitutes the object of brahma-jijñāsā, of which the aphorism speaks. Thus the viṣaya or the subject matter of the treatise *Brahma-sūtra,* as being the Realisation of the Self, is certainly suggested by the expression 'brahma-jijñāsā'.

When such a direct Realisation of Brahman happens, that very Knowledge annihilates the ignorance (avidyā) about the Self and the sorrowful transmigratory existence (avidyāmaya-saṁsāraduḥkhaṁ sakalam) caused by ignorance. This is verily the prayojana (purpose or fruit) of the *Brahma-sūtra.* Thus the expression brahma-jijñāsā (desire to know Brahman) occurring in the very first Sūtra suggests not only the viṣaya (subject matter) but also the prayojana (result) of the treatise.[3]

Further, the expression 'brahma-jijñāsā' also suggests the causal relation[4] that exists between the viṣaya (Knowledge of Brahman) and the result (destruction of ignorance and its effect saṁsāra). Thus, the third of the four preambulatory factors, that is the sambandha or relation between the viṣaya and the prayojana is also suggested by the expression 'brahma-jijñāsā' occurring in the first aphorism.

The Ācārya will establish in the sequel that the word 'atha' (meaning 'then') in the aphorism, is expressive of the sādhana-catuṣṭaya or the

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[3] Cf. जिज्ञासया च सन्देहप्रयोजने सूचयति। तत्र साक्षादिच्छाव्याप्यत्वाद्ब्रह्मज्ञानं कण्ठोक्तं प्रयोजनम्। न च कर्मज्ञानात् पराचीनमनुष्ठानमिव ब्रह्मज्ञानात्पराचीनं किञ्चिदस्ति, येनैतदवान्तरप्रयोजनं भवेत्। किन्तु ब्रह्ममीमांसाख्यतर्कैतिकर्तव्यतानुज्ञात-विषयैर्वेदान्तैराहितं निर्विचिकित्सं ब्रह्मज्ञानमेव समस्तदुःखोपशमरूपमानन्दैकरसं परमं प्रयोजनम्।...जिज्ञासा तु संशयस्य कार्यमिति स्वकारणं संशयं सूचयति। संशयश्च मीमांसारम्भं प्रयोजयति। तथा च शास्त्रे प्रेक्षावत्प्रवृत्तिहेतुसंशयप्रयोजनसूचनाद् युक्तमस्य सूत्रस्य शास्त्रादित्वम्, इत्याह भगवान्भाष्यकारः—वेदान्तमीमांसाशास्त्रस्य व्याचिख्यासितस्य अस्माभिः, इदमादिमं सूत्रम्। – भामती
Also, cf. शास्त्रस्य विषयः प्रयोजनं चार्थात् प्रथमसूत्रेण सूत्रिते इति प्रतिपादयति। – पञ्चपादिका

[4] It is well-known that the jñāna or the right cognition of a thing exterminates the ajñāna or the nescience about that thing along with its results – jñānam ajñānanāśanam.

fourfold means, which constitute the adhikāra or eligibility for undertaking the study of the *Brahma-sūtra*. Thus the anubandha-catuṣṭaya or the four preambulatory factors are all indicated in the very first aphorism itself.

The causal relationship between the subject (Knowledge of the Self) and the result (destruction of saṁsāra) suggested in the first aphorism would be intelligible only if saṁsāra is illusory.[5] Hence the analysis of the mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self, being the cause of saṁsāra, as explained by the Ācārya in the *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya*, stands vindicated as truly meaningful and entirely appropriate. We thus observe the Ācārya's depth of intelligence to take upon himself the onerous responsibility of adding the preamble in the form of the *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya* to the entire *Brahma-sūtra*.

An objection as to how a single Sūtra (aphorism) could yield such myriad thoughts is not sustainable since it is the very nature of a Sūtra to have the potency of providing manifold meanings either directly or suggestively. This, indeed, is the glory of the Sūtra literature.[6] Further, the present Sūtra is the first in the treatise. It is, therefore, only natural that it has been accorded the function of connoting the whole of anubandha-catuṣṭaya. Having all this in his mind, the Ācārya articulates, 'this is the first aphorism'.[7]

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[5] Knowledge has the capability to end ignorance and its resultant false projections or misapprehensions. For example, in the rope–snake example, the knowledge of the rope destroys the ignorance of the rope and the resultant superimposed snake. Note that knowledge can never exterminate a true snake. It is this fact that leads to the postulation (arthāpatti) referred to above.

[6] Cf. सूत्रस्य बह्वर्थत्वं भूषणम्। – तत्त्वदीपन

Also, cf. सूत्रं च बह्वर्थसूचनाद् भवति। यथाहुः—'लघूनि सूचितार्थानि स्वल्पाक्षरपदानि च। सर्वतः सारभूतानि सूत्राण्याहुर्मनीषिणः॥' इति। – भामती

Also, cf. सूत्रमिति च बह्वर्थसूचनसामर्थ्यं दर्शयति। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

[7] Cf. तदेवं मुमुक्षुत्वानन्तरं ब्रह्मज्ञानकर्तव्यतोपदेशमुखेन वेदान्तानां विषयप्रयोजननिर्देशेऽप्यार्थं सूत्रस्य व्यापारं दर्शयित्वा तदपेक्षितमप्यर्थाद् सूत्रितमविद्यात्मकबन्धमुपवर्ण्य प्रतिज्ञातार्थसिद्धये हेत्वाकाङ्क्षायामस्मिन्नेव तं प्रदर्शयिष्याम इति व्याख्येयत्वमुपक्षिप्य व्याख्यातुकामः प्रथमं तावत्प्रयोजनविषययोरुपादाने निमित्तमाह—वेदान्तमीमांसाशास्त्रस्य व्याचिख्यासितस्येदमादिमं सूत्रम्—अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासेति। अयमस्यार्थः—शास्त्रस्यादिरयम्। आदौ च प्रवृत्त्यङ्गतया प्रयोजनं विषयश्च दर्शनीयः। सूत्रं चैतद्, अतो यः कश्चिदर्थः शब्दसामर्थ्येनार्थबलाद्वा उत्प्रेक्षितः स सर्वस्तदर्थ एवेति भवत्ययमर्थकलापस्तन्महिमाधिगतः। एवं सूत्रस्यादित्वेन कारणेन सूत्रतया च विषयप्रयोजनं तत्सिद्धिकरं चाविद्याख्यं बन्धं तत्सामर्थ्यावगतमापाद्य तत्र सूत्रसामर्थ्यं दर्शयितुं प्रतिपदं व्याख्यामारभते। – पञ्चपादिका

Also, cf. आदिमं सूत्रं इत्यनेन विषयादिप्रतिपादनद्वारा कृत्स्नशास्त्रोपोद्घातसङ्गतिर्दर्शिता। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

Also, cf. आदिमत्वादनेन श्रोतृप्रवृत्तये विषयादि सूच्यते। सूत्रत्वाच्चास्यानेकार्थसूचकत्वम्। उक्तं हि—'लघूनि सूचितार्थानि स्वल्पाक्षरपदानि च। सर्वतः सारभूतानि सूत्राण्याहुर्मनीषिणः॥' 'अल्पाक्षरमसन्दिग्धं सारवद्विश्वतोमुखम्। अस्तोभमनवद्यं च सूत्रं सूत्रविदो विदुः॥' इति। तथा च विशिष्टविषयादिमदिदं शास्त्रमारभ्यमिति भावः। – न्यायनिर्णय

2. pertaining to the deliberation on the Vedānta-treatise, which is proposed to be elucidated: The Bhāṣyakāra describes the present aphorism specifically as the intial Sūtra of the *Vedānta-śāstra* (*Brahma-sūtra*). This description is particularly meant to strike at the basis of the thesis which views that both the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā (karma-kāṇḍa) and the Vedānta-mīmāṁsā (jñāna-kāṇḍa i.e. Uttara-mīmāṁsā) make a single Śāstra, the Uttara-mīmāṁsā being just a continuation or an extension of the former.

The investigation into the Upaniṣadic enunciations is termed 'mīmāṁsā' to signify its sacredness and also to express the respect it commands[8] as it serves as a means to attain the ultimate goal (parama-puruṣārtha) of Liberation.[9] This implies that this deliberation would be free from any irrelevant digression. Because such a sublime inquiry into the Upaniṣads is being taught (śiṣyate) to the students by the *Brahma-sūtra*, the Ācārya rightfully designates it as a 'Śāstra' (refer to the expression 'vedāntamīmāṁsāśāstra').[10]

The expression 'vedāntamīmāṁsāśāstrasya' is qualified by the past participle of the desiderative form 'vyācikhyāsa' which literally means 'to desire to elucidate'. The term 'vyācikhyāsitasya' thus indicates the irresistible urge of the Ācārya to explicate the *Brahma-sūtra* with a view to inculcating conviction in the seekers to embark upon the path to Liberation.[11]

It is of advantage here to have a quick look at how Śabara-svāmin, the illustrious commentator of the *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra* of Jaimini, explains the strikingly similar aphorism, *"athāto dharmajijñāsā,"* the very first Sūtra of *Mīmāṁsā-śāstra*, in order to appreciate in contrast the Ācārya's language and technique of explication. Śabara-svāmin construes the aphorism as meaning

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[8] Mīmāṁsā is derived from the root 'mān', which means to worship (pūjāyām). The desiderative suffix 'san' is added to it to convey the sense of 'jijñāsā' (desire to know) by the *Vārtika "mānerjijñāsāyām."*

[9] Cf. पूजितविचारवचनो मीमांसाशब्दः। परमपुरुषार्थहेतुभूतसूक्ष्मतमार्थनिर्णयफलतया च विचारस्य पूजितता। – भामती
Also, cf. मीमांसाशब्दस्य परमपुरुषार्थहेतुसूक्ष्मार्थनिर्णयार्थविचारवाचित्वात्। – न्यायनिर्णय

[10] Cf. तस्या मीमांसायाः शास्त्रं, सा ह्यनेन शिष्यते शिष्येभ्यो यथावत् प्रतिपाद्यत इति। – भामती
Also, cf. तस्याः शास्त्रं सूत्रसन्दर्भः, शास्यते शिष्येभ्योऽनेन प्रतिपाद्यते तत्त्वमिति व्युत्पत्तेः। – न्यायनिर्णय

[11] On the term 'vyācikhyāsitasya', Govindānanda, the author of *Ratnaprabhā* says this: *"yadi vidhireva vedārthaḥ syāt, tadā sarvajño bādarāyaṇo brahmajijñāsāṁ na brūyād, brahmaṇi mānābhāvāt. ato brahmaṇo jijñāsyatvoktyā kenāpi tantreṇa anavagatabrahmaparavedāntavicāra ārambhaṇīya iti sūtrakṛd darśayati. tacca 'vyācikhyāsitasya' iti padena bhāṣyakāro babhāṣe."*

thus: "Then afterwards, therefore, an inquiry into the dharma (must be undertaken)."

It is to be noted that the word 'jijñāsā' of the aphorism is taken in the sense of 'mīmāṁsā' (sacred inquiry). The expression 'kartavyā' that is 'must be undertaken' is supplied (adhyāhṛta) to complete the sense of the sentence. The Mīmāṁsakas define 'dharma' occurring in the compound word 'dharma-jijñāsā' as the purport taught by the Scripture as a means to attain a desired end.[12] It is this dharma that is being comprehensively inquired into in the entire Mīmāṁsā-darśana. An inquiry into the purport of the Scripture cannot be undertaken, until and unless one has learnt the Scripture thoroughly. Hence, it is logical to conclude that the term 'atha' meaning 'then' of the *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra* means 'after having studied the Vedic text pertaining to the tradition one belongs to and having properly imbibed the sense contained therein'.[13] This Scriptural study is ordained by the Vedic injunction (*Tai.Ā.*2.19) *"svādhyāyo'dhyetavyaḥ* – One's own branch of the Veda must be studied." It is an accepted fact that the Scripture ordains such an act alone which is capable of begetting a definite prescribed result. But, no such specific result or fruit is indicated for the ordained learning of the Veda. Therefore, it must be accepted that the Vedic learning is meant to yield its fruit in the form of the correct knowledge of dharma, the purport of the Veda. Nonetheless, an unambiguous knowledge of dharma can be gained only by means of a thorough inquiry into the same since even learned men entertain conflicting notions about dharma.[14] Consequently, the term 'ataḥ' (therefore) indicates 'svādhyāyādhyayanasya arthavattvāvaśyakatvād ataḥ – because the Scriptural learning must have a definite purpose, therefore'. In view of all this, the dharma-jijñāsā aphorism conveys this stipulated sense: After learning one's own branch of the Scripture, because such a learning must be with a specific purpose of knowing its purport, that is dharma, therefore an inquiry into dharma is to be undertaken.[15]

[12] वेदबोधितेष्टसाधनताको धर्मः।

[13] स्वाध्यायाध्ययनानन्तरम्।

[14] धर्मं प्रति हि विप्रतिपन्ना बहुविदः। केचिदन्यं धर्ममाहुः केचिदन्यम्। – शबरभाष्य

[15] स्वाध्यायाध्ययनानन्तरम् अध्ययनस्यार्थवत्त्वावश्यकत्वाद् अतः धर्मविचारः कर्तव्यः इति सूत्रवाक्यतात्पर्यार्थः।

Now with this background, we are better equipped to understand how Śaṅkarācārya elucidates word by word the initial aphorism of the *Brahma-sūtra* – *"athāto brahmajijñāsā."*

3

[अथशब्दार्थसिद्धान्तभाष्यम्]

[1]तत्र अथशब्द आनन्तर्यार्थः परिगृह्यते[1]।

3 A

[ATHAŚABDĀRTHASIDDHĀNTABHĀṢYAM]

tatra athaśabda ānantaryārthaḥ parigṛhyate.

3 B

thereafter

तत्र *tatra* – there ; अथशब्दः *athaśabdaḥ* – the word 'atha'; आनन्तर्यार्थः *ānantaryārthaḥ* – having the sense of immediate succession; परिगृह्यते *parigṛhyate* – is accepted

3 C

[COMMENTARY GIVING THE CONCLUSIVE WORD MEANING OF THE WORD 'ATHA']

There,[1] the word 'atha' is accepted in the sense of immediate succession.[2]

3 D

1. There: That is, among the words of the aphorism.[2]

2. the word 'atha' is accepted in the sense of immediate succession: We observe that the Bhāṣya first presents the conclusive view of the Siddhāntin first on the meaning of the word 'atha' and then proceeds to reject the views of others in the sequel.

The term 'Bhāṣya' refers to that commentarial literature which explains systematically the meaning of every term of the aphorism with words consonant with the tenor of the aphorism and then proceeds to elucidate these very explanatory words further. The following verse defines the term 'Bhāṣya': *sūtrārtho varṇyate yatra padaiḥ sūtrānusāribhiḥ, svapadāni ca varṇyante*

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[1] पाठभेदः—अत्र।

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[1] तेषु सूत्रपदेषु मध्ये योऽयं अथशब्दः स आनन्तर्यार्थ इति योजना। – भामती
सूत्रघटकाथशब्द आनन्तर्याथकः स्वीक्रियत इत्यर्थः। – प्रदीप

[2] तेषु सूत्रपदेषु मध्ये । – भामती

bhāṣyaṁ bhāṣyavido viduḥ.[3] True to this definition of the Bhāṣya we shall observe how Bhāṣyakāra Śaṅkarācārya takes up for elucidation the first word 'atha' of the Sūtra and then goes on to throw further light on his own explanation.

[3] Another reading of this last quarter is: *"tadbhāṣyaṁ kavayo viduḥ."*

4

[अर्थान्तरनिराकरणभाष्यम्]

नाधिकारार्थः,[1] ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाया अनधिकार्यत्वात्। [१]मङ्गलस्य च वाक्यार्थे समन्वयाभावात्। अर्थान्तरप्रयुक्त एव ह्यथशब्दः श्रुत्या मङ्गलप्रयोजनो भवति। पूर्वप्रकृतापेक्षायाश्च फलत आनन्तर्याव्यतिरेकात्।

4 A

[ARTHĀNTARANIRĀKARAṆABHĀṢYAM]

nādhikārārthaḥ, brahmajijñāsāyā anadhikāryatvāt. maṅgalasya ca vākyārthe samanvayābhāvāt. arthāntaraprayukta eva hyathaśabdaḥ śrutyā maṅgalaprayojano bhavati. pūrvaprakṛtāpekṣāyāśca phalata ānantaryāvyatirekāt.

4 B

artha: some scriptures begin with this word.

न *na* – not; अधिकारार्थः *adhikārārthaḥ* – having the sense of commencement; ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाः *brahmajijñāsāyāḥ* – of the desire to know Brahman; अनधिकार्यत्वात् *anadhikāryatvāt* – because of it being incapable of being commenced; मङ्गलस्य *maṅgalasya* – of auspiciousness; च *ca* – again; वाक्यार्थे *vākyārthe* – with the sense of the sentence; समन्वयाभावात् *samanvayābhāvāt* – no syntactic connection; अर्थान्तरप्रयुक्तः *arthāntaraprayuktaḥ* – employed in some other sense; एव *eva* – only; हि *hi* – indeed; अथशब्दः *athaśabdaḥ* – the word 'atha'; श्रुत्या *śrutyā* – by hearing; मङ्गलप्रयोजनः *maṅgalaprayojanaḥ* – producer of auspiciousness; भवति *bhavati* – becomes; पूर्वप्रकृतापेक्षायाः *pūrvaprakṛtāpekṣāyāḥ* – with regard to reference to what has already been said; च *ca* – also; फलतः *phalataḥ* – in effect; आनन्तर्याव्यतिरेकात् *ānantaryāvyatirekāt* – since it does not differ from immediate succession

4 C

[COMMENTARY REFUTING OTHER MEANINGS]

It is not taken in the sense of commencement,[1] since the desire to know

[१] 'मङ्गलस्य च' इति भामतीपाठः।
CSS 'मङ्गलस्यापि' इति पञ्चपादिकाप्रस्थानाभिमतः पाठः

[1] परिगृह्यते इति शेषः।

Brahman cannot be commenced.[2] Nor can the word meaning be taken as auspiciousness since auspiciousness has no syntactic connection with the sense of the sentence.[3] Indeed, the word 'atha' only when employed in some other sense begets auspiciousness merely by hearing it.[4] And 'reference to what has already been said' does not, in effect, differ from 'immediate succession' in the final analysis.[5]

4 D

1. It is not taken in the sense of commencement: Sanskrit lexicons recognise the indeclinable particle 'atha' in the following senses: auspiciousness, immediate succession, commencement, questioning, entirety or option.[2] Having taken the word 'atha' in the sense of immediate succession (ānantarya), the Ācārya substantiates the untenability of other lexical senses that could be construed in the present context.

It is worth noting here that many Śāstric primers begin with the word 'atha' in the sense of commencement (adhikāra). The great grammarian Patañjali starts the *Mahābhāṣya* with the prefatory statement: *"atha śabdānuśāsanam."* He explains further this enunciation to mean, "The science of grammar-instruction is being commenced." Similarly, the first aphorism of the *Pātañjala-yogasūtra* is *"atha yogānuśāsanam"* and the *Vyāsa-bhāṣya* thereon construes 'atha' in the sense of 'commencement' and consequently explains the aphorism, "The science of Yoga-instruction is being commenced."[3] Thus we observe that the Sūtra literature, in general, begins with the term 'atha' and usually in the sense of commencement (adhikāra).

Since the Ācārya has interpreted the word 'atha' in the Sūtra *"athāto brahmajijñāsā"* to mean 'ānantarya' or 'immediate succession' he takes upon himself the task of demonstrating the unsuitability of other meanings for the present context.

2. since the desire to know Brahman cannot be commenced: The derivative meaning, conveyed by the members of the compound word (avayavārtha)

[2] मङ्गलानन्तरारम्भप्रश्नकात्स्न्र्येषु अथो अथ। – अमरकोश (३.३.२४७)

[3] अथेत्ययं शब्दः अधिकारार्थः प्रयुज्यते। शब्दानुशासनं नाम शास्त्रम् अधिकृतं वेदितव्यम्। – महाभाष्य
अथेत्ययमधिकारार्थः। योगशासनं शास्त्रम् अधिकृतं वेदितव्यम्। – व्यासभाष्य

'brahma-jijñāsā' is: brahma jñātum icchā – the desire to know Brahman. The word 'atha' essentially conveys the sense of being a syntactically compatible qualifier with the primary word-sense denoted by another term colocated with itself (i.e. atha).[4] The use of the term 'atha' right at the outset of the *Mahābhāṣya* and the *Yoga-sūtra* illustrates this very sense of 'ārambhaṇīyam' or 'worth commencing' since these texts aim to offer instructions on grammar and yoga respectively. Thus, in the context of the above-mentioned texts, the word 'atha' does mean 'commencement' (adhikāra) and appropriately qualifies the primary meaning conveyed by the noun 'anuśāsana' or instruction.

But in the context of the first *Brahma-sūtra* – *"athāto brahmajijñāsā"* – the primary meaning of the colocated compound word 'brahma-jijñāsā' (desire to know Brahman) is beyond the scope of the act of commencing. Desire wells up by itself and keeps itself beyond the scope of being commanded.[5] Also if the desire to know Brahman were to be commenced, then from the second Sūtra onwards we would notice this desire alone having been commenced. But this is not the case.[6] Rather, we observe these topics being discussed – definition of Brahman, sources of the Knowledge of Brahman, harmonious nature of these sources and so on. This scenario also substantiates beyond doubt that the word 'atha' cannot perform the function of denoting 'adhikāra' (commencement). Since 'commencement' cannot thus be colocated with the substantative 'the desire to know', we can realise that the Sūtrakāra does not use 'atha' in the sense of 'commencement' (adhikāra-artha).

The *Pūrvamīmāṁsā-darśana* commences with the aphorism *"athāto dharmajijñāsā."* Śabara-svāmin, the venerable author of *Mīmāṁsā-bhāṣya*, interprets the word 'jijñāsā' (desire to know) occurring in that aphorism

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[4] अथशब्दस्य हि तावदयं स्वभावः यत् स स्वसमानाधिकृतपदान्तराभिहितप्रधानपदार्थान्वययोग्यं विशेषणमभिधत्ते। – वार्तिक

[5] Cf. ननु अधिकारार्थोऽप्यथशब्दो दृश्यते, यथा अथैष ज्योतिः इति वेदे, यथा वा लोके अथ शब्दानुशासनम् इति, अथ योगानुशासनम् इति च, तत्किमत्राधिकारार्थो न गृह्यत इत्यत आह—नाधिकारार्थः। कुतः, ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाया अनधिकार्यत्वात्। ...न च तस्या अधिकार्यत्वं अप्रस्तूयमानत्वाद् येन तत्समभिव्याहृतोऽथशब्दोऽधिकारार्थः स्यात्। – भामती

Also, cf. अथशब्दस्य आरम्भार्थत्वेन ब्रह्मज्ञानेच्छा आरभ्यते इति सूत्रार्थः स्यात्, स च असङ्गतः, तस्या अनारभ्यत्वात्। – रत्नप्रभा

[6] Cf. विचारसाध्यज्ञानविषयेच्छा तु जिज्ञासा नोपरितनेषु सूत्रेषु प्रस्तूयते, इति नाधिकारार्थोऽथशब्द इति भावः। – प्रदीप

in its collective sense (saṅghātārtha) that is, 'mīmāṁsā' (deliberation or investigation or inquiry).[7] Following Śabara-svāmin, why should we not take brahma-jijñāsā as a synonym of 'brahma-mīmāṁsā', that is 'inquiry into Brahman'? If this is accepted, then the word 'atha' of the aphorism could very well denote 'commencement', and the same could very well qualify to be the primary sense of brahma-jijñāsā, that is, brahma-mīmāṁsā or the inquiry into Brahman.

Also on the perusal of the commentary on the Sūtra *"athāto brahmajijñāsā"* we find the following statements of Śaṅkarācārya testifying to this interpretation of the term 'atha' as 'commencement':

(1) *"tasmādyathoktasādhanasampattyanantaraṁ brahmajijñāsā kartavyā."*

(2) *"tasmād brahma jijñāsitavyam."*

(3) *"vedāntamīmāṁsā...prastūyate."*

From these statements of the commentary it appears that Śaṅkarācārya too has taken 'jijñāsā' and 'atha' of the present aphorism in the sense of inquiry and commencement respectively. Thus there seems to be a serious contradiction in the Bhāṣya itself.

Modern English translators of the *Brahma-sūtra* by and large and the *Śāṅkara-bhāṣya* thereon on the first Sūtra have translated 'brahma-jijñāsā' as 'inquiry into Brahman', or 'deliberation on Brahman', or 'discussion about Brahman' and so on. But such rendering goes counter to the Bhāṣya and to its spirit. Basing ourselves on the traditional commentaries on the *Śāṅkara-bhāṣya* let us now investigate into what the Bhāṣyakāra actually means by the term 'brahma-jijñāsā':

(1) We notice that the expression 'brahma-jijñāsā' figures as the chief element in the aphorism *"athāto brahmajijñāsā."* This compound word 'brahma-jijñāsā' consists of three avayavas or components: (1) the noun 'Brahman', (2) the verbal root 'jñā' (to know) and (3) the suffix 'san' (to desire). Thus the expression 'brahma-jijñāsā' signifies 'brahma jñātum icchā – the desire to know Brahman'. It is amply clear that among these three components of the

[7] Vide *"dharmaṁ jijñāsitumicchet"* and *"vedavākyāni vicārayitavyāni"* of the *Śabara-bhāṣya* on the Sūtra *"athāto dharmajijñāsā."*

derivate 'brahma-jijñāsā', it is only 'desire' – expressed by the suffix 'san' – that is the principal or chief component, while Brahman and its knowledge (jñāna) are secondary in nature.

It is to be noted that without a subject matter and a significant result in mind no discriminating person would ever develop a desire to know (jijñāsā). It is these two factors – the subject matter Brahman and the desirable result of Its Knowledge – that the author, through the secondary components 'Brahman' and the verbal root 'jñā' occurring in the expression 'brahma-jijñāsā', indicates for the purpose of engaging the attention of the discerning seeker (prekṣāvat-pravṛttyaṅgatayā). This being the case, it is not prudent to ignore the primary sense of brahma-jijñāsā as desire (icchā) conveyed by its grammatical components in consonance with the context. Consequently, the indeclinable particle 'atha' cannot be construed in the sense of adhikāra or commencement.

Why then do the modern translators arbitrarily translate the expression brahma-jijñāsā as inquiry or deliberation on Brahman by invoking the faculty of indication (lakṣyārtha) with reference to the composite meaning (saṅghātārtha)?[8]

(2) The term 'jijñāsā', derived from 'jñā' (to know) followed by the suffix 'san' conveying the sense of desire, means 'desire to know'. The term 'mīmāṁsā' is derived from the root 'mān' (to worship) followed by the suffix 'san' that imparts to it the specific meaning of 'inquiry'. Indeed, it is jijñāsā that begets mīmāṁsā and hence it is evident that jijñāsā and mīmāṁsā have the specific relationship of cause and effect (hetuphala-bhāva). As the modern translators seem to suggest, if the meanings of jijñāsā and mīmāṁsā were identical then the above relation between them would be impossible.

Mīmāṁsā or inquiry could, therefore, only be the lakṣyārtha, that is an indirect or secondary sense of the word 'jijñāsā'.[9] However, when the term

[8] When the meanings of the components of the composite word are taken collectively then it is termed 'saṅghātārtha'.

[9] This is similar to the analogy *'annaṁ vai prāṇinaḥ prāṇāḥ* – food is verily the life of living beings'. It is a well-known fact that food (anna) sustains prāṇa and hence its cause. Nevertheless anna is declared to be prāṇa because prāṇa is sustained by anna alone. In exactly the same way

jijñāsā's direct primary derivative meaning (mukhyārtha or avayavārtha) not only suits the context but is also very much necessary here, is it not illogical to ignore it in preference to its secondary sense simply on the ground that Śabara-svāmin has done so while commenting on the first Sūtra of the *Pūrva-mīmāṁsā*?[10]

(3) While commenting on the *Mīmāṁsā-darśana's* first aphorism *"athāto dharmajijñāsā,"* Śabara-svāmin would have had his own reasons for understanding 'jijñāsā' (desire to know) in the secondary sense of 'mīmāṁsā' (inquiry). However, it is to be noted that even while doing so Śabara-svāmin has taken 'atha' of the aphorism in the sense of 'immediate succession' (ānantaryārtha) alone – Śaṅkarācārya too has done so – and not in the sense of 'commencement' (adhikārārtha). This is so because the dharma-jijñāsā aphorism can only then presuppose the learning of the Vedas as the prerequisite (vedādhyayanānantaram) for the inquiry into dharma and stipulate the study of the Vedas as the necessary qualification (adhikāra) for the seeker who undertakes such an inquiry. In just the same way, brahma-jijñāsā (desire to know Brahman) also presupposes certain qualifications for the aspirant who seeks to know Brahman. And the Ācārya does enumerate these qualifications in the sequel.

In view of all this, it does not stand to reason to construe 'atha' of the aphorism *"athāto brahmajijñāsā"* in the sense of adhikāra or commencement, and then to colocate 'atha' with jijñāsā or inquiry following Śabara-svāmin, so that adhikāra could serve as a syntactically compatible qualifying term of the substantive jijñāsā in the sense of inquiry.

Further, if we were to follow the Mīmāṁsāka way and take jijñāsā in the sense of mīmāṁsā (inquiry), then, like the Mīmāṁsāka, we too will be forced to supply (adhyāhāra) the word 'kartavyā' (should be undertaken)

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here jijñāsā is spoken of as mīmāṁsā by dint of the causal relation between them. (*"annasādhye prāṇe annavyavahāraḥ, evameva prakṛte jijñāsāsādhyamīmāṁsāyāṁ jijñāsāvyavahāraḥ."*)

[10] Cf. न च जिज्ञासा मीमांसा येन योगानुशासनवदधिक्रियेत, नान्तत्वं निपात्य 'माङ् माने' इत्यस्माद्वा 'मान पूजायाम्' इत्यस्माद्वा धातोः 'मान्बध—' इत्यादिना अनिच्छार्थे सनि व्युत्पादितस्य मीमांसापदस्य पूजितविचारवचनत्वाद्, ज्ञानेच्छावाचकत्वाज्जिज्ञासापदस्य। प्रवर्तिका हि मीमांसायां जिज्ञासा स्यात्। न च प्रवर्त्यप्रवर्तकयोरैक्यम्, एकत्वे तद्भावानुपपत्तेः। न च स्वार्थपरत्वस्योपपत्तौ सत्यां अन्यार्थपरत्वकल्पना युक्ता, अतिप्रसङ्गात्। तस्मात्सुष्ठूक्तम् 'जिज्ञासाया अनधिकार्यत्वाद्' इति। – भामती

for without the word 'kartavyā' the meaning of the aphorism would remain incomplete. But there is really no valid requirement for taking jijñāsā in the sense of mīmāṁsā and then burdening oneself with the additional exercise of supplying an altogether new word 'kartavyā'.

On the other hand, if the word 'jijñāsā' were to be taken in the usual sense of 'desire to know' – as its components certainly denote – then there would simply be no such additional labour of supplying an additional word 'kartavyā' because according to the grammarians' dictum the verb 'asti' or 'bhavati' (meaning 'is') is invariably implied whenever a substantive is used unaccompanied by a finite verb.[11] By invoking this well-known grammarians' dictum here we are saved the consequent arduous task of interpreting jijñāsā as mīmāṁsā and the unnecessary exercise of supplying the additional word 'kartavyā'.

(4) It is quite clear that while interpreting jijñāsā in the sense of mīmāṁsā (inquiry), even Śabara-svāmin has not altogether abandoned the meanings of the components of the word 'jijñāsā'. The word 'jijñāsā' does not merely denote a desire for a plain idea that arises from a simple teaching but rather denotes a desire for a knowledge which is born as a result of a profound inquiry (mīmāṁsā).[12] Thus Śabara-svāmin, too, has adhered to the derivative meaning of jijñāsā even while construing it as mīmāṁsā.[13] That jijñāsā denotes a specific desire for the kind of knowledge that could ensue only as a result of systematic inquiry explains why after the present Sūtra on jijñāsā, the Sūtrakāra embarks upon a meticulous and profound inquiry (mīmāṁsā) from the very next Sūtra onwards.

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[11] अस्तिर्भवन्तीपरः प्रथमपुरुषोऽप्रयुज्यमानोऽप्यस्तीति गम्यते। – महाभाष्य (२.३.१)

[12] Cf. विचारपूर्वकसाध्यज्ञानविषयेच्छा जिज्ञासाशब्दात् प्रतीयते, न उपदेशमात्रसाध्यज्ञानविषयेच्छा। – पञ्चपादिका

[13] It is perhaps due to the special juxtaposition (samabhivyāhāraviśeṣabalāt) of the stem 'jñā' and the suffix 'san' that the word 'jijñāsā' could signify 'the desire for knowledge which is born as a result of inquiry (mīmāṁsā)'. Now, if the meaning of the second component, that is, the suffix 'san', which is icchā (desire) were to be dropped, then it may not be possible at all to derive from jijñāsā the meaning mīmāṁsā. Perhaps this could have been one of the reasons why the Ācārya prefers not to go by the path shown by the revered predecessor Śabara-svāmin but directly takes the primary or derivative meaning of jijñāsā as 'desire to know' and not as 'inquiry'.

The Upaniṣads, too, stand evidence to such parallels as is seen in the case of the Upaniṣadic seekers, like Bhṛgu–Vāruṇi (*Tai.U.*3.1), Śvetaketu, Āruṇeya (*Chā.U.*6.1.3), Indra (*Chā.U.*8.10.2), Nārada (*Chā.U.*7.1.1) approaching their teachers for the Knowledge of Brahman. In these Upaniṣads, we observe that instead of teaching them straightaway the ultimate knowledge of the identity between the Self and Brahman, the Seers first took them through a systematic sacred inquiry (mīmāṁsā) into Brahman and then alone revealed for them the knowledge of the identity.

(5) The opponent has cited three statements from the later section of Bhāṣya on this Sūtra to endorse his view that the Ācārya himself takes jijñāsā in the sense of inquiry (mīmāṁsā) and hence there is a palpable contradiction between the Bhāṣya's earlier and later sections. We shall now see how the opponent has completely missed the points contained in those statements.

The first of the statements he has referred to is: "*tasmādyathoktasādhana-sampattyanantaraṁ brahmajijñāsā kartavyā* – Therefore, in the immediate succession to the acquisition of the above-mentioned means, there should be the desire to know Brahman." We should note that the Ācārya does not supply (adhyāhāra) the word 'kartavyā' in this sentence to complete the sense of the Sūtra. Rather, he uses it to merely indicate that when all the four means to brahma-jijñāsā, that is the result, are present, then they should necessarily on their own produce brahma-jijñāsā and that there is nothing to stop them from bringing it about.[14]

This Bhāṣya sentence may also be understood from a slightly different angle. The Bhāṣya mentions the word 'kartavyā' not with the intention to indicate that the word 'jijñāsā' in the Sūtra means mīmāṁsā (inquiry) but rather adds the word 'kartavyā' merely to articulate what the expression brahma-jijñāsā (desire to know Brahman) itself seeks to emphasise: Since what is desired is the Knowledge of Brahman and because this Knowledge cannot but be gained through inquiry alone, therefore, the aspirant must undertake a thorough inquiry (mīmāṁsā).[15] That the inquiry into Brahman

[14] Cf. यतः परिपूर्णहेतुरवश्यं कार्यमारभते, अतः कर्तव्या इत्यावश्यकतामाह। – पञ्चपादिका

[15] Cf. अत्र कर्तव्यपदाध्याहारः विचारसाध्यज्ञानेच्छया इष्यमाणस्य ज्ञानस्य विचारसाध्यत्वाद् विचारस्य कर्तव्यत्वं विचारस्याप्याक्षिपति इति सूचनार्थः, न तु ब्रह्मजिज्ञासापदार्थ एव विचार इत्यभिप्रायः। – प्रदीप

ought to be undertaken is corroborated by the fact that the inquiry into Brahman starts immediately from the second Sūtra onwards.

The second Bhāṣya sentence – *"tasmād brahma jijñāsitavyam"* – has been cited by the opponent without situating it in the right context of its occurrence. The context is this: *"jñānena hi pramāṇenāvagantumiṣṭaṁ brahma. brahmāvagatirhi puruṣārthaḥ, niḥśeṣasaṁsārabījāvidyādyanarthanibarhaṇāt. tasmād brahma jijñāsitavyam* – Indeed, it is by knowledge, the valid means to know, that Brahman is desired to be realised. The Realisation of Brahman is verily the human goal because it annihilates the evils of nescience etc., that are the seeds of the entire transmigration. Therefore, Brahman should be desired to be known."

And this is what this Bhāṣya section intends to convey – the aspirant who desires to attain total identity with Brahman, ought to seek that very means by which that end can be attained. That definite means is the Knowledge of Brahman and it arises not just from the Vedāntic texts but rather from the inquiry into their purport, Brahman. Thus, by making primary the desire for the Knowledge regarding Brahman, the Sūtrakāra seeks to engage the aspirant in a thoroughgoing deliberation into Brahman (brahma-mīmāṁsā).[16] When we thus situate the Bhāṣya statement quoted by the opponent *"tasmād brahma jijñāsitavyam"* in the right context, it does not in any way prompt the interpretation of jijñāsā (desire) occurring in the Sūtra as mīmāṁsā (inquiry).

Coming to the third passage of the Bhāṣya quoted by the opponent – *"vedāntavākyamīmāṁsā...prastūyate"* – we notice that the opponent has cited only a part of the statement. The complete sentence reads as – *"tasmād brahmajijñāsopanyāsamukhena vedāntavākyamīmāṁsā tadavirodhitarkopakaraṇā niḥśreyasaprayojanā prastūyate."* This can be translated as: "Consequently, an inquiry into the Upaniṣadic enunciations is commenced by the Sūtrakāra, by the way of introducing the presentation with the 'desire to know Brahman', which inquiry is accompanied by logical argumentation not hostile to it and which has Liberation as its aim." This declaration is the final conclusion of

[16] Cf. तस्मादानन्दघनब्रह्मात्मतामिच्छता तदुपायो ज्ञानमेषितव्यं तच्च न केवलेभ्यः वेदान्तेभ्यः अपि तु ब्रह्ममीमांसोपकरणेभ्यः इति इच्छामुखेन ब्रह्ममीमांसायां प्रवर्त्यते। – भामती

the Bhāṣya on the first aphorism and it also serves as a link connecting the present Sūtra with the next one.

When we peruse this complete statement of the Ācārya in depth, it becomes crystal clear that the objection of the opponent that the Bhāṣya self-contradicts itself is utterly untenable. We observe that the Ācārya is not inclined to drop the desire element contained in the word 'jijñāsā' (derived from the root 'jñā' followed by the suffix 'san' denoting desire). Even while commenting on the passage (*Tai.U.*3.1) *"tad vijijñāsasva, tad brahmeti,"*[17] which is the basis of the present aphorism, the Ācārya does not appear to lose sight of the desire element in the term 'jijñāsā' as is evident from his pertinent comments on the above-mentioned passage: *"viśeṣeṇa jñātum icchasva* – you should desire to know Brahman well." This perfect Knowledge of Brahman indeed is effected by inquiry. Thus this explanatory paraphrase on 'vijijñāsasva' does make the Ācārya's point on jijñāsā in the present Sūtra abundantly clear. The great commentaries like the *Pañcapādikā, Bhāmatī* and so on also interpret the derivative jijñāsā as containing the desire element in it and this corroborates the Ācārya's construal of the word 'jijñāsā' as 'desire to know' and not as 'inquiry'.

Inspite of all this, the modern translators of the Sūtra and the Bhāṣya thereon erroneously render jijñāsā as 'inquiry', 'deliberation', 'discussion' and so on.[18]

3. Nor can the word meaning be taken as auspiciousness since auspiciousness has no syntactic connection with the sense of the sentence: We have noticed that the Sanskrit lexicons assign 'maṅgala' (auspiciousness) to the word 'atha' as one of its several connotations. If the connotation of 'atha' as maṅgala were to be accepted, the Sūtra would then read as *"maṅgalam, ato*

[17] The student Bhṛgu–Vāruṇi of the Upaniṣad has the desire for the Knowledge of Brahman and consequently he has approached his father Varuṇa for attaining this Knowledge. The teacher Varuṇa here guides and channelises the student's desire and enthusiasm into right inquiry.

[18] The non-Advaitic critics of the medieval times misunderstood some of the passages in the Bhāṣya, *Bhāmatī, Pañcapādikā* and *Vivaraṇa* and hence they attributed inconsistencies to these authorities. For details see the commentaries like the *Brahmavidyābharaṇa, Pradīpa* and so on.

brahmajijñāsā – auspiciousness, therefore the desire to know Brahman." But the word 'maṅgalam' has no syntactic relation with the sentence meaning because only meanings of words (padārtha) – be they vācyārtha (direct meaning) or lakṣyārtha (implied meaning) – can be syntactically related to the sentence meaning. But the sense of 'maṅgalam' is neither denoted nor implied by 'atha' but rather arises merely from its acoustic impression.[19] This will become clearer in the sequel.

If one were to argue that the Sūtrakāra is offering maṅgalācaraṇa (invocation) by the word 'atha' at the beginning of the treatise, here again the argument is not valid. For even when the word 'atha' indicates another sense, it can suggest auspiciousness by its mere auditory perception.

Padmapāda, the author of *Pañcapādikā* and Prakāśātman, the author of *Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa* and well-known as Vivaraṇakāra, discuss this issue differently. What these authors have said can be broadly presented as follows: The word 'atha' meaning auspiciousness works fairly well so far as the colocating syntactic connection (sāmānādhikaraṇyena anvayaḥ) is concerned. But the sense obtained in this manner boils down to eulogy of brahma-jijñāsā which goes against the injunctive sense of performing maṅgalam in the beginning as the Pūrvapakṣin points out.

In this situation the Siddhāntin makes a suggestion that the word 'atha' when heard does convey the requisite sense of maṅgalam, which renders redundant the effort to assign the meaning of auspiciousness to the indeclinable particle 'atha'.[20]

4. Indeed, the word 'atha' only when employed in some other sense begets auspiciousness merely by hearing it: To better appreciate the significance of this statement of Ācārya Śaṅkara it is necessary to refer to the Pūrvapakṣin's view which emanates from this Smṛti verse: *"oṁkāraścāthaśabdaśca dvāvetau*

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[19] Cf. अथ मङ्गलार्थोऽथशब्दः कस्मान्न भवति। तथा च मङ्गलहेतुत्वात् प्रत्यहं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्येति सूत्रार्थः सम्पद्यत इत्यत आह—मङ्गलस्य च वाक्यार्थे समन्वयाभावात्। पदार्थ एव हि वाक्यार्थे समन्वीयते, स च वाच्यो लक्ष्यो वा। न चेह मङ्गलमथशब्दस्य वाच्यं वा लक्ष्यं वा, किन्तु मृदङ्गशङ्खध्वनिवदथशब्दश्रवणमात्रकार्यम्। न च कार्यज्ञाप्ययोर्वाक्यार्थे समन्वयः शब्दव्यवहारे दृष्ट इत्यर्थः। – भामती
Also, cf. पदार्थो हि वाक्यार्थे समन्वेति। मङ्गलं च नाथपदार्थः, किन्तु प्रयोजनमिति भावः। – प्रकटार्थविवरण

[20] Cf. नापि सामानाधिकरण्येनान्वयः—'ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा मङ्गलम्' इति, प्रशंसापरतयाऽर्थवादत्वप्रसङ्गात्। ननु कर्तव्यमेव मङ्गलाचरणमिति, तत्राह—श्रुतिमात्रोपयोगादिति। – पञ्चपादिकाविवरण

brahmaṇaḥ purā, kaṇṭhaṁ bhittvā viniryātau tasmānmāṅgalikāvubhau – The two words 'Om' and 'atha' burst forth in times of yore (at the beginning of creation) from the throat of the Creator. Hence both these words are auspicious by nature." On the authority of this verse the Pūrvapakṣin asserts that the word 'atha' occurring as the first word in the first Sūtra *"athāto brahmajijñāsā"* of the *Brahma-sūtra* does indeed represent the Sūtrakāra's maṅgalācaraṇa (invocation). This rejoinder of the Pūrvapakṣin came when it was made clear to him that the word 'atha' connoting auspiciousness does not enter into syntactic relation with the sentence meaning of the Sūtra *"athāto brahmajijñāsā."*

As such the contingency of not performing maṅgalācaraṇa (invocation) at the start of the treatise becomes likely to be incurred when the Siddhāntin explicates 'atha' in the sense of 'ānantarya'. In this contingent situation, when there is the necessity of maṅgalācaraṇa, the Siddhāntin views that it is the very nature of the word 'atha' to convey the sense of auspiciousness by its acoustic impression similar to the case of the notes of the flute (veṇu) and lyre (vīṇā) when played or the sound of the conch when heard.

The word 'atha' only when used in a sense other than that of auspiciousness in a sentence is purported to express maṅgala (auspiciousness). To quote a traditional example to explain: Though a pot full of water is being carried by a daughter to quench her father's thirst, it also expresses a sense of auspiciousness for the onlooker.[21]

[21] Cf. तत्किमिदानीं मङ्गलार्थोऽथशब्दः तेषु तेषु न प्रयोक्तव्यः। तथा च 'ओंकारश्चाथशब्दश्च द्वावेतौ ब्रह्मणः पुरा। कण्ठं भित्त्वा विनिर्यातौ तस्मान्माङ्गलिकावुभौ॥' इति स्मृतिव्याकोप इत्यत आह—अर्थान्तरप्रयुक्त एव ह्यथशब्दः श्रुत्या मङ्गलप्रयोजनो भवति। अर्थान्तरेष्वानन्तर्यादिषु प्रयुक्तः अथशब्दः श्रुत्या श्रवणमात्रेण वेणुवीणाध्वनिवन्मङ्गलं कुर्वन् मङ्गलप्रयोजनो भवति अन्यार्थमानीयमानोदकुम्भदर्शनवत्। तेन न स्मृतिव्याकोपः। तेन च इह आनन्तर्यार्थस्य सतः श्रवणमात्रेण मङ्गलार्थतेत्यर्थः। – भामती
Also, cf. ननु सूत्रकृता शास्त्रादौ मङ्गलं कार्यमिति अथशब्दः प्रयुक्त इति चेत्, सत्यं, न तस्य अर्थः मङ्गलं किन्तु तच्छ्रवणम् उच्चारणं च मङ्गलकृत्यं करोति। तदर्थस्तु आनन्तर्यमेव इत्याह—अर्थान्तरेति। अर्थान्तरम्—आनन्तर्यम्। श्रुत्या—श्रवणेन, शङ्खवीणादिनादश्रवणवद् ओङ्काराथशब्दयोः श्रवणं मङ्गलफलकम्। – रत्नप्रभा
Also, cf. न च ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा मङ्गलमिति सामानाधिकरण्यं, प्रशंसात्वेन सूत्रस्यार्थवादत्वापत्तेः, तन्माङ्गल्यस्य च प्रसिद्धत्वात्। न च तदनूद्य तत्कर्तव्यतापरं सूत्रम्। तस्या मङ्गलत्वे कर्तव्यत्वस्यार्थिकत्वात्। अतो न मङ्गलार्थः। ननु विघ्नोपशान्तये शिष्टाचाररक्षायै च शास्त्रारम्भे मङ्गलमाचरणीयम्, 'ओंकारश्चाथशब्दश्च' इत्यादिस्मृतेर्मङ्गलार्थश्चाथशब्दः, तत्राह—अर्थान्तरेति। आनन्तर्यमर्थान्तरम्। तस्मिन्नेव प्रयुक्तोऽथशब्दः श्रवणमात्रेण वीणाध्वनिवन्मङ्गलहेतुस्तत्फलो भवति, अन्यार्थं नीयमानोदकुम्भोपलम्भवत्। उक्तस्मृतिस्तु मङ्गलफलत्वविषयेत्यर्थः। – न्यायनिर्णय
Also, cf. ननु—मङ्गलार्थता तर्ह्यस्तु। न च तस्यानन्वयः। 'ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा मङ्गलं' इति स्तुतिपरत्वोपपत्तेः—इत्याशङ्क्य, शास्त्रारम्भे तदुपयोगितया अधिकारिबोधनसम्भवे न व्यर्थप्रायस्तुतिपरत्वं कल्पनीयमित्याह—मङ्गलस्य चेति। ननु—शास्त्रादौ मङ्गलमाचरितव्यं,

5. And 'reference to what has already been said' does not, in effect, differ from 'immediate succession' in the final analysis: The expression 'pūrvaprakṛtāpekṣā' (reference to what has already been said) is not commonly met with elsewhere.[22]

This compound expression, with its three constituent words – pūrva, prakṛta and apekṣā – indicates an expectation of or dependence upon what has been already stated or begun thus establishing a prior context. Thus, this expression does not in any way indicate any specific sense of 'atha' but describes the behaviour of the word 'atha' in conveying the existence of a pre-existing context.[23] Thus depending on what has been stated earlier in the context, the word 'atha' introduces the subject matter of the sentence of which it is a part.[24] We see that Śabara-svāmin, the author of the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā-bhāṣya*, taking note of this very behaviour of the word 'atha' explaining the aphorism (*Pū.Mī.Sū.*4.1.1) *"athātaḥ kratvarthapuruṣārthajijñāsā."* This aphorism may be translated as: "Then, therefore the inquiry into the subsidiaries subserving the sacrificial purpose and those subserving the sacrificer's personal purpose." Herein, Śabara-svāmin observes: By referring to the theme that is being discussed from the beginning of the preceding third chapter, namely

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ततो मङ्गलार्थत्वे न व्यर्थता—इत्याशङ्क्य, सत्यं मङ्गलमाचरितव्यम्। तदर्थं न मङ्गलप्रतिपादनमपेक्षितम्। न हि मङ्गलप्रतिपादनमात्रेण मङ्गलाचारस्सिद्धो भवति। अपि तु तदनुष्ठानेन। तच्च अथशब्दोच्चारणं तदनुसन्धानं वा। तथा च स्मृतिः 'ओंकारश्चाथशब्दश्च द्वावेतौ ब्रह्मणः पुरा। कण्ठं भित्वा विनिर्यातौ तस्मान्माङ्गलिकावुभौ।' इति अत्र हि माङ्गलिकाविति (तदस्य) 'प्रयोजनम्' (पा.सू.५.१.१०९) इत्यधिकारविहितठञ्प्रत्ययान्तम्। ततश्च तदनुसन्धानस्य तदुच्चारणस्य वा मङ्गलत्वे, विषयतया तत्राथशब्दस्य कारकत्वाद् मङ्गलप्रयोजनकत्वमुपपद्यते। तच्च आनन्तर्याद्यर्थान्तरपरत्वेऽपि सिध्यतीत्याह—अर्थान्तरप्रयुक्त एव ह्यथशब्द इति। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

[22] The *Parimala* commentary draws our attention to another occurrence of it in the *Ślokavārtika* (2.2.22) in the course of a discussion on the purport of the Vedic injunction *"athaiṣa jyotiḥ, athaiṣa viśvajyotiḥ, athaiṣa sarvajyotiḥ – etena sahasradakṣiṇena yajeta."* Here, by way of reinforcing the Pūrvapakṣa view found in the *Śābara-bhāṣya*, the Vārtikakāra Kumārila-bhaṭṭa points out that with reference to what has been already stated in the context (pūrvaprakṛtāpekṣatvāt) the words 'atha' and 'eṣaḥ' found in the above Vedic injunction must denote something specific. Here, the contextual Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice has been referred to by 'atha' and goes on to prescribe some new subsidiary rituals thereof such as Jyoti, Viśvajyoti and Sarvajyoti.

[23] In a way this behaviour of 'atha' resembles that of the pronouns like 'tad' (that) and 'etad' (this). That is why Kumārila-bhaṭṭa clubs together the words 'atha' and 'eṣaḥ' as having a similar behaviour. Vide *"tadādipadānām avyavahitapūrvavākyamukhyaviśeṣya-parāmarśitvamiti niyamaḥ."* Also, vide *"atheti pūrvaprakṛtāṁ dharmajijñāsāmapekṣyānantaraṁ brahmajijñāsāprārambhārthaḥ."* (*Pañcapādikā*)

[24] अथशब्दस्य पूर्वप्रकृतापेक्षया स्वार्थबोधकत्वं, स्वकीयवाक्यार्थोन्नायकत्वञ्च।

the application of the different subsidiaries of sacrifices (śeṣaviniyoga-lakṣaṇa), the word 'atha' presently introduces the topic of the subsidiaries subserving the sacrificial purpose (kratvartha) and those subserving the personal purpose (puruṣārtha) which are to be inquired into. In the words of Śabara-svāmin: *"...tṛtīyādhyāye...śeṣaviniyogalakṣaṇamuktam, ihedānīṁ kratvarthapuruṣārthau jijñāsyete...atheti pūrvaprakṛtaṁ śeṣalakṣaṇamapekṣate."* The wording of the last portion of this passage (that is, *atheti pūrvaprakṛtaṁ śeṣalakṣaṇam apekṣate*) is significant inasmuch as it has led to such usages that have engendered the coining of the expression 'pūrvaprakṛtāpekṣā'. We have many instances, both in the Vedic and classical Sanskrit literature to illustrate this behaviour of 'atha' as referring to the prior context.[25]

In the context of the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā-sūtra* (4.1.1) quoted above pūrvaprakṛtāpekṣā has relevance as explained in the foregoing paragraph. But in the context of the Jijñāsā-sūtra there is no visible relevance of pūrvaprakṛtāpekṣā because the present Jijñāsā-sūtra itself is the first Sūtra of the treatise and therefore there is nothing that has been stated earlier depending upon which the word 'atha' could refer to a persisting prior context. So, how does one account for the statement of the Ācārya that 'contextual reference to what has already been said' (pūrvaprakṛtāpekṣā) does not, in effect (phalataḥ), differ from ānantarya (immediate succession) in the final analysis?

The Ācārya's statement itself which contains the two terms – 'pūrvaprakṛtāpekṣā' and 'phalataḥ' – presents the necessary clues for unravelling what the Ācārya wants to convey. 'Pūrvaprakṛtāpekṣā', as a mere term, has already been explained. We shall presently embark upon understanding 'pūrvaprakṛtāpekṣā' in conjuction with the word 'phalataḥ' in order to get at the full purport of the Ācārya's statement.

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[25] Cf. (1) *"atha hainaṁ punarṛṣayaḥ, uttaravedyāmeva satriyamacinvata...yo'gniṁ nāciketaṁ cinute..."* (2) *"atha hainaṁ vāyurṛddhikāmaḥ, yathānyuptamevopadadhe...yo'gniṁ nāciketaṁ cinute..."* (3) *"atha hainaṁ gobalo vārṣṇaḥ paśukāmaḥ, pāṅktameva cikye...yo'gniṁ nāciketaṁ cinute..."* (all in *Tai.Brā.*3.11.9). Here the context is that of the Nāciketacayana and these statements introduced different ritualistic techniques in that very sacrifice. In the classical Sanskrit too we have instances like (1) *"atha prajānāmadhipaḥ prabhāte..."* (*Raghuvaṁśa*, 2.1), (2) *"atha sā punareva vihvalā..."* (*Kumārasambhava*, 4.4) and so on. Mallinātha's commentaries on these verses make the above-mentioned significance of 'atha' in the sense of pūrvaprakṛtāpekṣā abundantly clear.

The tenor and the content of the Bhāṣya statement, when examined closely, suggest that the Ācārya is referring to the view of some earlier commentator of the *Brahma-sūtra*, belonging to a different school of Vedānta, who viewed both the *Pūrva-mīmāṁsā* and the *Uttara-mīmāṁsā* as one single system of thought, that is 'Ekaśāstratva-vāda', and who therefore accepted the pūrvaprakṛtāpekṣā sense of 'atha' in the present Jijñāsā-sūtra, just as Śabara-svāmin recognised and accepted it in the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā-sūtra* (4.1.1).

In the course of arguments and counterarguments under the Samanvaya-sūtra (*tattu samanvayāt*) we observe the Ācārya quoting for refutation extensively[26] this theory of an earlier philosopher and commentator of the *Brahma-sūtra*, identified as the Vṛttikāra, who probably is Upavarṣa, the author of the *Vṛtti* or gloss on the *Brahma-sūtra*. This *Vṛtti* unfortunately has been lost totally. Yet, a good many views of this Vṛttikāra are preserved in the quotations that abound in the Bhāṣyas of the Ācārya and their early commentaries.

The Vṛttikāra's theory is that both the *Pūrva-mīmāṁsā* and the *Uttara-mīmāṁsā* constitute a single system of philosophy. The karma-kāṇḍa dwells upon the nature of karma and prescribes injunctions for the performance of the same to attain varied fruits like heaven. In a similar way, the Upaniṣads enlighten us on the nature of Brahman and prescribe through injunctions Its contemplation (upāsanā-vidhi) leading the seeker to Liberation.[27] Thus both the karma-kāṇḍa and the Vedānta teach us severally about karma and Brahman through their respective injunctions alone. Hence these two should be viewed basically as one discipline (ekaśāstra) and not different from one another. Consequently, the karma-mīmāṁsā (*Jaimini-sūtra*) and brahma-mīmāṁsā (*Brahma-sūtra*), undertaking in-depth inquiries into these two parts of the Veda should also be viewed fundamentally as one alone. In other words the brahma-mīmāṁsā is a mere continuation or an extension of the karma-mīmāṁsā. Therefore, the Jijñāsā-sūtra has to introduce brahma-jijñāsā, as a natural continuation of the karma-mīmāṁsā.

[26] The lengthy passage commencing with *"atra apare pratyavatiṣṭhante"* (Samanvayādhikaraṇa, Section 8) and ending with *"tasmāt pratipattividhiviṣayatayaiva śāstrapramāṇakaṁ brahma abhyupagantavyam."* (Samanvayādhikaraṇa, Section 12)

[27] Vide *"pratipattividhiviṣayatayaiva śāstreṇa brahma samarpyate."* (Bhāṣya on Samanvaya-sūtra – 1.1.4)

In the ensuing Samanvayādhikaraṇa, the Ācārya discusses in detail and refutes in toto the above theory of the Vṛttikāra by exposing its manifold untenability and absurdity. Towards the end of the refutation of the 'single-school theory' (Ekaśāstratva-vāda), we find that the Ācārya in order to disarm the opponent draws support from the very same *Pūrvamīmāṁsā-sūtra* (4.1.1) quoted above, that is – *"athātaḥ kratvarthapuruṣārthayorjijñāsā"* – wherein the word 'atha' is accepted to have the pūrvaprakṛtāpekṣā sense thus connecting the fourth chapter of the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā-sūtra* with the third. The Vṛttikāra seems to be of the view that just as the sense of pūrvaprakṛtāpekṣā of the word 'atha' in the above Mīmāṁsā aphorism unites the fourth chapter with the third, so too 'atha' with the denotation of pūrvaprakṛtāpekṣā in the present Jijñāsā-sūtra unites the Śārīraka-mīmāṁsā (*Brahma-sūtra*) with karma-mīmāṁsā (*Jaimini-sūtra*). Therefore, it is quite plausible that in the present context of determining the sense of 'atha' in the Jijñāsā-sūtra, the Ācārya naturally refers to the way in which the Vṛttikāra had interpreted the word.[28]

The Ācārya opines that even if 'atha' is taken in the sense of pūrvaprakṛtāpekṣā – as the Ekaśāstratva-vādin is keen to construe – the sense of ānantarya subsumes the sense of pūrvaprakṛtāpekṣā of 'atha' and therefore pūrvaprakṛtāpekṣā does not in 'effect' (phalataḥ) differ from that of ānantarya (immediate succession). Pūrvaprakṛtāpekṣā is, therefore, merely a subset of ānantarya and, therefore, ānantarya is inclusive of pūrvaprakṛtāpekṣā too.[29] Thus the Bhāṣyakāra while arriving at the intended meaning of 'atha' seems to be tentatively agreeing to the ekaśāstratva-vādin's view, even though in the sequel, that is in the Samanvayādhikaraṇa, he will analyse this theory in all its detail and then refute it altogether.

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[28] Compare *"pūrvaprakṛtāpekṣāyāśca ānantaryāvyatirekāt"* of the *Śaṅkara-bhāṣya* with Śabara-svāmin's statement (1.1.1) *"loke'yamathaśabdaḥ vṛttādanantarasya prakriyārtho dṛṣṭaḥ* – In common parlance, the word 'atha' is observed to convey the commencement of a certain event that takes place immediately after what has happened earlier." Vide *"atheti pūrvaprakṛtāṁ karmajijñāsāmapekṣyānantaraṁ brahmajijñāsāyā api prārambhārthaḥ."* (*Pañcapādikā*)

[29] It is because of this reason that the Sanskrit lexicons do not enumerate pūrvaprakṛtāpekṣā among the denotations of 'atha' like commencement, auspiciousness and so on.

Pūrvaprakṛtāpekṣā would be the denotation of 'atha' only when there is a persisting context and an alternative view or something pertaining to the same context is going to be indicated. But no such persisting context is there; neither is there an alternate view to be presented. Such being the case, in the final analysis, ānantarya (immediate succession) is alone the meaning of word 'atha' in the Jijñāsā-sūtra – *"athāto brahmajijñāsā."*[30]

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[30] Cf. न वयमानन्तर्यार्थतां व्यसनितया रोचयामहे। किन्तु ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाहेतुभूतपूर्वप्रकृतसिद्धये। सा च पूर्वप्रकृतार्थापेक्षत्वेऽप्यथशब्दस्य सिध्यतीति व्यर्थं आनन्तर्यार्थत्वावधारणाग्रहोऽस्माकमिति। तदिदमुक्तं 'फलतः' इति। परमार्थतस्तु कल्पान्तरोपन्यासे पूर्वप्रकृतापेक्षा, न चेह कल्पान्तरोपन्यास इति पारिशेष्यादानन्तर्यार्थ एवेति युक्तम्। – भामती

Also, cf. ननु प्रपञ्चो मिथ्येति प्रकृते सति अथैतन्मतं प्रपञ्चः सत्य इत्यत्र पूर्वप्रकृतार्थाद् उत्तरार्थस्य अर्थान्तरत्वार्थोऽथशब्दो दृष्टः तथा अत्र किं न स्याद् इत्यत आह पूर्वेति। फलतः फलस्येत्यर्थः। ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाः पूर्वमर्थविशेषः प्रकृतो नास्ति यस्मात्तस्या अर्थान्तरत्वमथशब्देन उच्येत। यतः कुतश्चिदर्थान्तरत्वं सूत्रकृता न वक्तव्यं फलाभावाद्। यदि फलस्य जिज्ञासापदोक्तकर्त्तव्यविचारस्य हेतुत्वेन यत्पूर्वं प्रकृतं तदपेक्षा अस्ति इति अपेक्षाबलात् प्रकृतहेतुमाक्षिप्य ततोऽर्थान्तरत्वम् उच्यते तदा अर्थान्तरत्वमानन्तर्ये अन्तर्भवति हेतुफलभावज्ञानाय आनन्तर्यस्य अवश्यं वाच्यत्वात्। तस्माद् इदमर्थान्तरमित्युक्ते तस्य हेतुत्वाप्रतीतेः। तस्माद् इदमनन्तरमित्युक्ते भवत्येव हेतुत्वप्रतीतिः। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. यत्किञ्चित् प्रकृतमपेक्ष्य भाविन्यां जिज्ञासायामथप्रयोगेऽनुवादादृष्टार्थत्वयोरन्यतरत्वम्। अवश्यं हि पुमान् किञ्चित् कृत्वा किञ्चित् करोति। फलत्वेनावस्थितजिज्ञासाहेतुत्वेन प्रकृतापेक्षया भाविन्यामस्यामथशब्दे प्रकृतापेक्षावशाद्यदस्यार्थान्तरं तदानन्तर्यान्नातिरिच्यते, हेतुफलयोरव्यभिचारेणानन्तर्यस्यैव मुख्यत्वात्, तथा चार्थान्तरं न पृथग्वाच्यम्। अतो हेतुभूतार्थस्याधिकारि-विशेषणत्वेन फलपर्यन्तेच्छाविचारादिप्रवृत्तौ प्रतिपत्त्यपेक्षत्वात्, प्रवृत्त्यङ्गशास्त्रीयाधिकारिविशेषणसाधनचतुष्टयपुष्कल-हेत्वानन्तर्यार्थोऽथशब्द इति भावः। – न्यायनिर्णय

Also, cf. हेतुफलभावेनाऽऽनन्तर्ये प्रतिपादिते पूर्वप्रकृतत्वमपि तत्रान्तर्भवति। पूर्वप्रकृताभिधाने तु नानन्तर्यं तत्रान्तर्भवति, अहेतु-फलयोरानन्तर्यव्यभिचारस्यापि सम्भवात्। अतोऽनन्यलभ्यत्वादानन्तर्यमेवाथशब्दार्थ इत्यर्थः। – प्रकटार्थविवरण

5

[आनन्तर्यप्रतियोगिविचारभाष्यम्]

सति चानन्तर्यार्थत्वे, यथा धर्मजिज्ञासा पूर्ववृत्तं वेदाध्ययनं नियमेनापेक्षते, एवं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासापि यत् पूर्ववृत्तं नियमेनापेक्षते, तद्वक्तव्यम्। [1]स्वाध्यायानन्तर्यं[1] तु समानम्।

5 A

[ĀNANTARYAPRATIYOGIVICĀRABHĀṢYAM]

action: Vedica-karma what is complete

sati cānantaryārthatve, yathā dharmajijñāsā pūrvavṛttaṁ vedādhyayanaṁ niyamenāpekṣate, evaṁ brahmajijñāsāpi yat pūrvavṛttaṁ niyamenāpekṣate, tadvaktavyam. svādhyāyānantaryaṁ tu samānam.

5 B

सति च आनन्तर्यार्थत्वे *sati ca ānantaryārthatve* – the meaning being immediate succession; यथा *yathā* – just as; धर्मजिज्ञासा *dharmajijñāsā* – the desire to know dharma; पूर्ववृत्तम् *pūrvavṛttam* – the antecedent; वेदाध्ययनम् *vedādhyayanam* – study of the Veda; नियमेन *niyamena* – necessarily; अपेक्षते *apekṣate* – demands; एवम् *evam* – in the same manner; ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा *brahmajijñāsā* – the desire to know Brahman; अपि *api* – also; यत् *yat* – what; पूर्ववृत्तम् *pūrvavṛttam* – antecedent; नियमेन *niyamena* – necessarily; अपेक्षते *apekṣate* – demands; तत् *tat* – that; वक्तव्यम् *vaktavyam* – ought to be stated; स्वाध्यायानन्तर्यम् *svādhyāyānantaryam* – immediate succession to the study of one's own branch of the Veda; तु *tu* – however; समानम् *samānam* – is common

5 C

[DISCUSSION ON THE PRIOR CORRELATE OF IMMEDIATE SUCCESSION]

The meaning being immediate succession,[1] it ought to be stated as to what antecedent the desire to know Brahman necessarily demands just as the desire to know dharma necessarily demands the study of one's own branch of the Veda as its antecedent.[2] Immediate succession to the study of one's own section of the Veda is however common.[3]

[1] AA (fn.), VV स्वाध्यायाध्ययनानन्तर्यं तु समानम्

[1] स्वाध्यायपदं तदध्ययनपरम्। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

5 D

1. The meaning being immediate succession: After a thorough analysis it has been determined that ānantarya (immediate succession) is the only plausible meaning of 'atha' in the present context. Other meanings of 'atha', such as adhikāra (commencement), maṅgala (auspiciousness) and pūrvaprakṛtāpekṣā (reference to what has already been stated) in the context have all been discarded. The lexicons also ascribe to 'atha' other denotations such as praśna (objection or question) and kārtsnya (entirety). However, these meanings are irrelevant in the present context[2] because neither of these two meanings can possibly indicate the necessary prerequisites for brahma-jijñāsā (the desire to know Brahman). Therefore, by the process of elimination, it is being concluded that 'atha' in the present context means 'immediate succession' alone.

2. it ought to be stated as to what antecedent the desire to know Brahman necessarily demands just as the desire to know dharma necessarily demands the study of one's own branch of the Veda as its antecedent: It has been concluded that the word 'atha' carries the sense of immediate succession alone in the present context. But merely determining the meaning of 'atha' serves no meaningful purpose whatsoever since any event is preceded by another invariably regardless of our making a statement about it. Therefore, a statement pertaining to immediate succession would assume significance provided we specify the exact prior correlate of that immediate succession (ānantarya-pratiyogin). In other words, we have to specify the exact antecedent in the immediate succession to which, as a natural consequence, arises brahma-jijñāsā (the desire to know Brahman).[3]

To cite an example, the first aphorism of the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā-sūtra* reads *"athāto dharmajijñāsā."* In that context Śabara-svāmin, the Mīmāṁsā-bhāṣyakāra,

[2] That is to say, a declaration, like 'kṛtsnā brahmajijñāsā' (the entire desire to know Brahman) is irrelevant here. And nothing has been stated previously that could be objected to (praśna) here.

[3] Cf. न तावद्यस्य कस्यचिदव्यानन्तर्यमिति वक्तव्यं, तस्याभिधानमन्तरेणापि प्राप्तत्वात्। अवश्यं हि पुरुषः किञ्चित्कृत्वा किञ्चित्करोति। न चानन्तर्यमात्रस्य दृष्टमदृष्टं वा प्रयोजनं पश्यामः। तस्मात्तस्यात्रानन्तर्यं वक्तव्यं यद्विना ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा न भवति, यस्मिन् सति तु भवन्ती भवत्येव। – भामती

Also, cf. येन विना नियमेनानन्तरस्य न प्रक्रिया, स तादृशो हेतुः पूर्वनिर्वृत्तो वक्तव्यः, यस्यानन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा प्रक्रियते। – पञ्चपादिका

fixes immediate succession as the meaning of 'atha' and then goes on to clearly specify its exact antecedent (pratiyogin) as svādhyāyādhyayana (the study of one's own branch of the Veda). Thus, he concludes that the inquiry into dharma begins immediately after the completion of the study of one's own branch of the Veda. Likewise, in the context of the Brahmajijñāsā-sūtra, it behoves us to state specifically the exact antecedent in the immediate succession to which the desire to know Brahman arises as a natural consequence. And it goes without saying that the immediate antecedent when ascertained will be the invariable cause for the rise of brahma-jijñāsā (the desire to know Brahman).[4]

3. Immediate succession to the study of one's own section of the Veda is however common: Obviously the Ācārya makes this observation to indicate his disapproval of a certain suggestion made by some earlier commentator of the *Brahma-sūtra*. We have already seen that while commenting on the dharma-jijñāsā aphorism, *"athāto dharmajijñāsā,"* Śabara-svāmin has determined that the prior study of one's own branch of the Veda is the necessary preceding prerequisite of dharma-jijñāsā (the inquiry into dharma). The Pūrvapakṣin argues that the very same study of one's branch of the Veda could be very well considered as the prerequisite for brahma-jijñāsā (the desire to know Brahman). This is so, he opines, because Brahman too, like dharma, is known from the Veda alone. Moreover, as in the *Dharmamīmāṁsā-sūtra*, so too each and every topical section (adhikaraṇa) of the *Brahma-sūtra*, besides the Tarkapāda,[5] makes the Vedic sentences alone the pivotal point of discussion thereby expecting a complete prior knowledge of the Veda on the part of the student.

The Bhāṣyakāra expresses his disapproval of the Pūrvapakṣin's hypothesis by asserting that the prior Vedic study is but common (*"tu samānam"*).[6] The point at issue is this: The suggestion of the Pūrvapakṣin that the study of

[4] Cf. पूर्ववृत्तं पूर्वभावि असाधारणकारणं, पुष्कलकारणम् इति यावत्। – रत्नप्रभा

[5] Tarkapāda is the second quarter of the second chapter of the *Brahma-sūtra* in which all non-Advaitic systems of philosophy have been discussed and refuted.

[6] Cf. समानम्—ब्रह्मविचारे साधारणकारणं, न पुष्कलकारणम् इत्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. समानम् – साधारणो हेतुर्धर्मब्रह्मजिज्ञासयोः। अतश्च—अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासेति पुनरथशब्देन तन्मात्रापेक्षणं व्यर्थं स्यात्। अथवा—समानं नात्यन्तमपेक्षितं, न स्वयमेव सामर्थ्यं जनयितुं प्रयोक्तुं च शक्तम्। अतः समानो हेतुः, नावश्यं निष्पादक इत्यर्थः। – पञ्चपादिका

one's section of the Veda as the prerequisite for brahma-jijñāsā renders this prior Vedic study as the sole common prerequisite of both the dharma-jijñāsā and the brahma-jijñāsā. Such a stance will lead to the following unwelcome scenario: When a student completes his Vedic study, he would be confronted simultaneously with two jijñāsās – the dharma-jijñāsā and the brahma-jijñāsā. Since he has already completed his Vedic study, the only accepted prerequisite for dharma-jijñāsā, he could immediately undertake the inquiry into dharma. There would be nothing specific or unique which could generate a desire in him to know Brahman. In this manner all those who have completed their Vedic studies, would undertake dharma-jijñāsā alone and the brahma-jijñāsā would be left unsought for and the inquiry into Brahman is thus rendered unviable.[7]

So to make 'atha' purportful it must be accepted that besides the above common prerequisite (sādhāraṇa-kāraṇa or sāmānya-kāraṇa) in the form of the prior study of the Veda, some other specific factor needs to be postulated as an adequate prerequisite (viśeṣa-kāraṇa or puṣkala-sāmagrī) to generate brahma-jijñāsā (desire for the Knowledge of Brahman). Otherwise the present aphorism meant to introduce the Brahmamīmāṁsā-darśana, would be rendered redundant. Therefore, the word 'atha' has to signify the exclusive prerequisite that necessarily precedes brahma-jijñāsā. Keeping this in view, the Ācārya remarks "the immediate succession to the study of one's own Veda is, however, a common requisite alone."[8]

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[7] Alternatively, if every student who has completed the Vedic study were to take up brahma-jijñāsā, there would be no adhikārins to pursue dharma-jijñāsā. This too would be an unwelcome position.

[8] Cf. ननु धर्मजिज्ञासासूत्रे पूर्ववृत्तस्योक्तत्वान्नात्र वक्तव्यं शिष्यते, तत्राह—स्वाध्यायेति। विध्यधीनसाङ्गाध्ययनलब्धस्वाध्यायादानन्तर्यं धर्मब्रह्मजिज्ञासयोः साधारणम्। अतो नात्र पृथक्कथनीयम्। यद्वा समानं नात्यन्तमनपेक्षितं, नापि स्वयमेव प्रयोजकम्। अतस्तन्न शास्त्रारम्भे पुष्कलकारणमित्यर्थः। – न्यायनिर्णय

Also, cf. स्वाध्यायानन्तर्यमप्यतो नाथशब्दार्थ इति शेषः। स्वाध्यायशब्दः तदध्ययनपर्यन्तः। तुशब्दो हेत्वर्थः। तथा च वेदाध्ययनानन्तर्यं नाथशब्दार्थः, तु – यस्मात्, समानं – साधारणं, कर्मब्रह्ममीमांसयोरिति शेषः। असाधारणहेत्वानन्तर्यमेव ह्यथशब्दमुख्यार्थः। वेदाध्ययनन्तु धर्ममीमांसयाऽप्यपेक्ष्यते, ब्रह्ममीमांसयाऽपि। अतस्तदानन्तर्यं नाथशब्दार्थः। – प्रदीप

Also, cf. समानम् – समानो हेतुर्धर्मब्रह्मजिज्ञासयोः। अतो न पृथगिह वक्तव्यम्। अथवा समानम् – नात्यन्तमनपेक्षितं, नापि स्वयमेव प्रयोजकम्, अतः समानम् – न पुष्कलकारणमित्यर्थः। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

Also, cf. ननु तर्हि यथाऽधीतवेदो धर्मविचारेऽधिकियते, तथा ब्रह्मविचारेऽपि स एवाधिक्रियत इति तदानन्तर्यार्थोऽथशब्दो भवत्वित्याशङ्क्याह—स्वाध्यायेति। स्वाध्यायानन्तर्यं तु समानं साधारणं धर्मब्रह्मजिज्ञासयोः। – प्रकटार्थविवरण

Having said this, the Ācārya now undertakes in the succeeding sections the task of identifying those exclusive factors in the immediate succession to which brahma-jijñāsā arises as a natural consequence and in the absence of which there arises no brahma-jijñāsā.

Also, cf. ननु—आनन्तर्यार्थत्वपक्षेऽपि वेदाध्ययनमेव तत्प्रतियोगिभूतमस्तु। 'स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः' (तै.आ.२.१९) इति विधिना हि स्वाध्यायस्य यद्यत् प्रयोजनं तत्सर्वमधीतेनैव सम्पादनीयमिति नियमिततया, वेदान्तवाक्यानुसन्धानजन्यस्य तत्तात्पर्यनिर्णयद्वारा तदर्थावबोधफलकस्य च वेदान्तविचारस्य वेदान्तविषयकदृढसंस्कारापेक्षतया स्वाध्यायप्रयोज्यस्य अध्ययननियमापेक्षत्वाद्, धर्मविचारवद् ब्रह्मविचारेऽपि अध्ययनानन्तर्यस्यावश्यकत्वाद्—इत्याशङ्क्य, तथापि तद् न पुष्कलकारणं, विचारद्वयसाधारणत्वाद्, अतो विशेषकारणमन्यदपि वक्तव्यमित्याशयवानाह—स्वाध्यायेति। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

6

[तत्र पूर्वपक्षभाष्यम्]

ननु इह[1] कर्मावबोधानन्तर्यं [t]विशेषः[2]।

6 A

[TATRA PŪRVAPAKṢABHĀṢYAM]

nanu iha karmāvabodhānantaryaṁ viśeṣaḥ.

6 B

ननु *nanu* – is not; इह *iha* – here; कर्मावबोधानन्तर्यम् *karmāvabodhānantaryam* – the immediate succession to the knowledge of Vedic rituals; विशेषः *viśeṣaḥ* – the distinctive feature

6 C

[THE PRIMA FACIE VIEW]

Is not here (in this context), immediate succession to the knowledge of Vedic rituals the distinctive feature?

6 D

According to the Pūrvapakṣin comprehensive knowledge of Vedic rituals is the necessary prerequisite for brahma-jijñāsā. This comprehensive knowledge of Vedic rituals also includes in its ambit its causative factor, which is dharma-jijñāsā or deliberation into Vedic rites and the Vedic injunctions pertaining to them.[3]

To appreciate the significance of this statement of the opponent, which is here stated pithily by the Ācārya, we need to know the philosophical

[t] AA (fn.) विशेष इति चेत्

[1] इह – ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाम्। – रत्नप्रभा
इह – ब्रह्ममीमांसायाम्। – प्रदीप
[2] विशेषो असाधारणकारणम्। – रत्नप्रभा
विशेषः धर्मजिज्ञासातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाः। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका
[3] Cf. कर्मावबोधानन्तर्योक्त्या तत्कारणीभूतकर्मविचारानन्तर्यमपि अर्थादुक्तं भवति। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

background from which stems this statement. In the last section, the Siddhāntin insisted that besides the common requisite in the form of prior Vedic study, a distinct and adequate prerequisite for brahma-jijñāsā must be specified. This sentence of the Bhāṣya presents the prima facie view of the Pūrvapakṣin regarding the prerequisite.

The *Vārtika* (gloss) on the Bhāṣya identifies this Pūrvapakṣin as a certain Ekadeśin, that is a teacher belonging to a different school of Vedānta.[4] *Pañcapādikā*, the commentary on the Bhāṣya by Padmapādācārya, traces the source of the present prima facie view to an unspecified *Vṛtti* (vṛttyantara) and also adds that this is also the contention of some other glossators who belong to some other schools of philosophy (*anyaiḥ*).[5] The *Bhāmatī* commentary too includes some more early Vedāntins in the list of the opponents who upheld the present prima facie view. Thus we observe that the Bhāṣyakāra has taken for analysis the view of some earlier Vedānta-ācāryas as well as Mīmāṁsakas by presenting it as the prima facie view.

The *raison d'etre* of the prima facie view is as follows: It has been established that the prior correlate of the immediate succession (ānantarya-pratiyogin), should be an adequate and exclusive cause capable of generating brahma-jijñāsā. The Pūrvapakṣin opines that such a cause can be none other than the comprehensive knowledge of Vedic rituals (karma).

How can the Pūrvapakṣin make such an assertion when the knowledge of the Vedic rites cannot beget the Knowledge of Brahman? Indeed, we do not see any invariable concomitance (vyāpti) – such as that which exists between smoke and fire – existing between the knowledge of Vedic rites and that of Brahman.[6]

However, the Pūrvapakṣin avers that by engaging oneself sincerely in

[4] Cf. कर्मावबोधानन्तर्यं चाचार्यैकदेशिनः। – वार्तिक

[5] Vide *"tathā ca vṛttyantare varṇitam...anyairapi svavṛttau varṇitam."* (*Pañcapādikā*) The word 'anyaiḥ' seems to suggest that the authors of these other glosses were not Vedāntins, but are obviously the Mīmāṁsakas.

[6] Cf. न हि धूमाग्न्योरिव धर्मब्रह्मणोर्व्याप्तिरस्ति यया धर्मज्ञानाद् ब्रह्मज्ञानं भवेत्। – रत्नप्रभा

the performance of the Vedic rites one attains the necessary mental purity (cittaśuddhi) and equipoise (cittaikāgratā) which are required for attaining the Knowledge of Brahman. Thus, according to the Pūrvapakṣin, karma itself becomes the means for attaining Liberation, albeit in a gradual manner.

He buttresses his argument with the Śruti declaration (*Bṛ.U.*4.4.22): *"tametaṁ vedānuvacanena brāhmaṇā vividiṣanti yajñena dānena tapasānāśakena* – The brāhmaṇas desire to know Brahman by the study of the Vedas, by sacrifice, by charity and by desireless penance." According to the Pūrvapakṣin, this teaching of the Upaniṣad clearly enunciates the relation between the performance of the Vedic rites, upāsanās, etc. and the Knowledge of Brahman to be that of upakāryopakāraka-bhāva, that is the relation between the benefactor (upakāraka) and the beneficiary (upakārya).

At this juncture the Siddhāntin raises a pertinent question: The Upaniṣad teaches the oneness of the jīva (the individual self) and Brahman (supreme Self) through such statements like *"tat tvam asi* – That thou art" and is it not that one comprehends the teaching of oneness by merely listening to these Upaniṣadic declarations? Where then does the necessity for Vedic sacrifices and upāsanās arise? Indeed, we do not depend on Vedic sacrifices to comprehend the purport of a statement like "ghaṭo'sti – This is a pot." Nor is there any necessity for the observance of the daily sandhyā-upāsanā (vide *"aharahaḥ sandhyām upāsīta"*) to comprehend the meanings of such sentences like "ghaṭo'sti." Would it then be logical to make an exception and declare that the Upaniṣadic sentences like *"tat tvam asi," "ahaṁ brahmāsmi"* alone need the assistance of Vedic rituals, upāsanās and so on for enabling one to comprehend their import?[7]

The Pūrvapakṣin then comes up with another defense in justification of his stance. He pleads that the identity of the jīva, the limited self, with the infinite Reality, Brahman, as taught in the Upaniṣads is too sublime and too subtle to realise for those whose minds are impure and are caught up in the

[7] Cf. अस्यार्थः—'विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन' इति तृतीयाश्रुत्या यज्ञादीनामङ्गत्वेन ब्रह्मज्ञाने विनियोगाद्, ज्ञानस्यैव कर्मतया इच्छां प्रति प्राधान्यात्, प्रधानसम्बन्धाच्चाप्रधानानां पदार्थान्तराणाम्। तत्रापि च न वाक्यार्थज्ञानोत्पत्तावङ्गभावो यज्ञादीनां, वाक्यार्थज्ञानस्य वाक्यादेवोत्पत्तेः। न च वाक्यं सहकारितया कर्माण्यपेक्षत इति युक्तम्, अकृतकर्मणामपि विदितपदपदार्थसम्बन्धानां समधिगतशाब्दन्यायतत्त्वानां गुणप्रधानभूतपूर्वापरपदार्थाकाङ्क्षासन्निधियोग्यतानुसन्धानवतामप्रत्यूहं वाक्यार्थप्रत्ययोत्पत्तेः। – भामती

snare of worldly likes and dislikes, on account of the beginningless nescience (anādyavidyā) and its impressions (saṁskāra).

For emphasising the role of karma and upāsanā in the context of Self-knowledge the Pūrvapakṣin delineates the spiritual pursuit: A sincere aspirant commences his spiritual practice (sādhanā) by first comprehending the oneness of the Self with Brahman from his Preceptor by listening to the Upaniṣadic declarations like *"tat tvam asi"* (śravaṇa). He then, through reasoning (manana) that is supported by the Śruti, comes to have an intellectual clarity about this knowledge of identity. Of course, in these two stages, the aspirant's comprehension does not depend on his observance of Vedic rites and upāsanās. But then their importance lies in the third stage of nididhyāsana (meditation).[8] An aspirant who has gone through the first two stages of śravaṇa and manana comes to the third stage of deep contemplation or single-pointed meditation (bhāvanā or nididhyāsana) on the oneness of the Self, about which he has already heard (śravaṇa) and become convinced by reasoning (manana). It is this meditation alone that is capable of bestowing on him the fruit of direct Realisation. This nididhyāsana or intense meditation ought to be practised incessantly for long with total devotion and without any distraction.[9] Such a practice of the contemplation is so arduous that it is not possible for those whose minds are impure and distracted. Thus, in the context of nididhyāsana, one can clearly see the relevance and necessity for Vedic rituals and upāsanās. A devoted observance of sacrifice, charity and so on, that are mentioned in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad's* declaration (4.4.22), if they have been performed earlier, helps in the fruition of such a contemplation by destroying the impurities that block the aspirant's onward march towards Liberation by brightening and energising his dull and weak intellect and by enhancing and intensifying his devotion. In this manner, supported and buttressed by his earlier performed karma, the aspirant now

[8] Following the Upaniṣadic teaching (*Bṛ.U.*2.4.5) *"ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ* – The Self should be realised and for that purpose it should be listened to (śravaṇa), it should be deliberated upon (manana) and it should be intensely incessantly meditated upon (nididhyāsana)."

[9] Cf. स तु दीर्घकालनैरन्तर्यसत्कारासेवितो दृढभूमिः। – योगसूत्र (१.१४)

remains engrossed in the contemplation of Brahman steadfastly and puts an end to the beginningless nescience and attains Liberation.[10]

That the Vedic sacrifices and the upāsanās assist the emergence of contemplation and thereby serve the cause of Liberation has been duly acknowledged even by the Sūtrakāra himself in the *Brahma-sūtra* (3.4.26) when he states: *"sarvāpekṣā ca yajñādiśruteḥ, aśvavat* – In accordance with Śruti injunctions about the Vedic rites, all sacrificial acts are necessary as in the case of a horse in matters of its necessity."[11]

Thus the relation of the benefactor and the beneficiary (upakāryopakāraka-bhāva) is well-established between the performance of the Vedic rites and deep contemplative Knowledge of Brahman. Therefore, for gaining that Knowledge one ought to observe the Vedic rites. But one cannot observe them until and unless one has a thorough comprehension of the different forms of Vedic karmas (rites) and their subtle nuances. It is this knowledge of Vedic karma that is taught in the karma-mīmāṁsā (Pūrva-mīmāṁsā). In this way the relation of the benefactor and the beneficiary (upakāryopakāraka-bhāva) gets established between the karma-mīmāṁsā and brahma-mīmāṁsā also.

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[10] The argument that both the observance of Vedic rites and intense meditation can jointly beget Realisation of the oneness of the Self is not tenable for when one is incessantly engrossed in a single pointed meditation, he cannot be expected to observe these Vedic rites and upāsanās. In the sequel, we will be studying many more reasons given by the Ācārya to counter the above argument (jñānakarmasamuccaya-vāda).

Cf. ननु 'तत्त्वमसि' इति वाक्यात् त्वंपदार्थस्य कर्तृभोक्तृरूपस्य जीवात्मनो नित्यशुद्धबुद्धोदासीनस्वभावेन तत्पदार्थेन परमात्मनैक्यमशक्यं द्रागित्येव प्रतिपत्तुं आपाततोऽशुद्धसत्त्वैः, योग्यताविरहविनिश्चयात्। यज्ञदानतपोऽनाशकतनू-कृतान्तर्मलास्तु विशुद्धसत्त्वाः श्रद्दधाना योग्यतावगमपुरःसरं तादात्म्यमवगमिष्यन्तीति चेत्, तत्किमिदानीं प्रमाणकारणं योग्यतावधारणमप्रमाणात्कर्मणो वक्तुमध्यवसितोऽसि, प्रत्यक्षाद्यतिरिक्तं वा कर्मापि प्रमाणम्। वेदान्ताविरुद्धतन्मूलन्यायबलेन तु योग्यतावधारणे कृतं कर्मभिः। तस्मात् 'तत्त्वमसि' इत्यादेः श्रुतमयेन ज्ञानेन जीवात्मनः परमात्मभावं गृहीत्वा, तन्मूलया चोपपत्त्या व्यवस्थाप्य, तदुपासनायां भावनापराभिधानायां दीर्घकालनैरन्तर्यवत्यां ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारफलायां यज्ञादीनामुपयोगः। यथाहुः—'स तु दीर्घकालनैरन्तर्यसत्कारासेवितो दृढभूमिः' इति। ब्रह्मचर्यतपःश्रद्धायज्ञादयश्च सत्काराः। अत एव श्रुतिः—'तमेव धीरो विज्ञाय प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत ब्राह्मणः' इति विज्ञाय तर्कोपकरणेन शब्देन प्रज्ञां भावनां कुर्वीतेत्यर्थः। अत्र च यज्ञादीनां श्रेयःपरिपन्थि-कल्मषनिबर्हणद्वारेणोपयोग इति केचित्। पुरुषसंस्कारद्वारेणेत्यन्ये। यज्ञादिसंस्कृतो हि पुरुषः आदरनैरन्तर्यदीर्घकालैरासेवमानो ब्रह्मभावनामनाद्यविद्यावासनां समूलकाषं कषति, ततोऽस्य प्रत्यगात्मा सुप्रसन्नः केवलो विशदीभवति। – भामती

[11] The Knowledge of Brahman, to come into existence, depends upon the performance of Vedic rites and those duties (that are enjoined for the different āśramas or orders of life). However, the performance of these Vedic rites and the duties have no bearing upon the fruit of Knowledge, that is Liberation. The horse is fit to be yoked to a chariot even though it is of no use for a plough!

This being the case, the word 'atha' in the aphorism *"athāto brahmajijñāsā"* should be taken to signify immediate succession to the correct understanding of Vaidika-karma expounded in the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā-sūtra*. This is how the early commentators of the *Brahma-sūtra* interpreted the word 'atha'.[12]

The *Pañcapādikā* refers to one of the commentators of the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā-sūtra* who had gone to the extent of affirming that the words 'atha' and 'ataḥ' occurring in the first aphorism *"athāto dharmajijñāsā"* themselves indicate that there is a relation of the benefactor and the beneficiary (upakāryopakāraka-bhāva) that exists between the karma-mīmāṁsā and the brahma-mīmāṁsā.[13] The word 'dharma' in the aphorism is taken to be inclusive of the Knowledge of Brahman for this Knowledge too, according to this commentator, falls within the ambit of the Vedic injunctions.[14] The word 'atha' is construed to mean 'immediate succession' and it implies that in the immediate succession to the inquiry of dharma, brahma-jijñāsā ensues, when the term 'dharma' is taken in the inclusive sense of the Knowledge of Brahman too. The word 'ataḥ' (i.e. 'therefore') of the aphorism reaffirms the causal nature of the prior correlate of the immediate succession, which is the knowledge of Vedic rituals, thus establishing this very knowledge of Vedic rituals as the necessary cause or prerequisite (hetu) for brahma-jijñāsā. In this fashion, the commentator declares that Jaimini, the author of the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā-sūtra*, had actually anticipated the *Vedānta-darśana* as the natural consequence of the Pūrvamīmāṁsā-darśana in his very first aphorism – *"athāto dharmajijñāsā."*[15]

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[12] Cf. अत एव पारमर्षं सूत्रं 'सर्वापेक्षा च यज्ञादिश्रुतेरश्वद्' इति। यज्ञतपोदानादि सर्वं, तदपेक्षा ब्रह्मभावनेत्यर्थः। तस्माद् यदि श्रुत्यादयः प्रमाणं यदि वा पारमर्षं सूत्रं सर्वथा यज्ञादिकर्मसमुच्चिता ब्रह्मोपासना विशेषणत्रयवती अनाद्यविद्यातद्वासनासमुच्छेदक्रमेण ब्रह्मसाक्षात्काराय मोक्षापरनाम्ने कल्पत इति तदर्थं कर्माण्यनुष्ठेयानि। न चैतानि दृष्टादृष्टसामवायिकारादुपकारहेतुभूतौपदेशिकाति-देशिकक्रमपर्यन्ताङ्गग्रामसहितपरस्परविभिन्नकर्मस्वरूपतदधिकारिभेदपरिज्ञानं विना शक्यान्यनुष्ठातुम्। न च धर्ममीमांसापरिशीलनं विना तत्परिज्ञानम्। तस्मात्साधूक्तं 'कर्मावबोधानन्तर्यं विशेषः' इति। कर्मावबोधेन हि कर्मानुष्ठानसाहित्यं भवति ब्रह्मोपासनाया इत्यर्थः। – भामती

Also, cf. ननु संयोगपृथक्त्वन्यायेन 'यज्ञेन दानेन' (बृ.उ.४.४.२२) इत्यादिश्रुत्या 'यज्ञादिकर्माणि ज्ञानाय विधीयन्ते' इति सर्वापेक्षाधिकरणे (ब्र.सू.३.४.२६) वक्ष्यते। तथा च पूर्वतन्त्रेण तदवबोधः पुष्कलकारणमिति शङ्कते—नन्विति। – रत्नप्रभा

[13] Cf. अन्यैरपि स्ववृत्तौ वर्णितम्—तत्राथातःशब्दौ प्रथम एवाध्याये प्रथमसूत्रे वर्णितौ। अथेति पूर्वप्रकृतां धर्मजिज्ञासामपेक्ष्यानन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाप्रारम्भार्थः। अत इति पूर्वनिर्दिष्टस्यैवार्थस्य हेतुतामाचष्टे ब्रह्मजिज्ञासां प्रतीति। – पञ्चपादिका

[14] Cf. ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य चोदनालक्षणत्वेन धर्मस्वरूपत्वात्। – पञ्चपादिका

[15] Vide *"atheti pūrvaprakṛtāṁ dharmajijñāsāmapekṣya anantaraṁ brahmajijñāsāyā prārambhārthaḥ. ata iti pūrvaṁ nirdiṣṭasya arthasya hetutāmācaṣṭe brahmajijñāsāṁ prati."* (*Pañcapādikā*)

Since the Mīmāṁsā-darśana is thus the benefactor (upakāraka), it should naturally precede the Vedānta-darśana, the beneficiary (upakārya).[16]

We have so far discussed the Scriptural basis for the prima facie view. The logical basis of the Pūrvapakṣin's argument will be taken up for examination in the following section wherein the Siddhāntin analyses and refutes the view of the Pūrvapakṣin.

We observe that all these premises of the earlier Vṛttikāras, that have been elaborated so far, are presented in an encapsulated form by the Ācārya: *"nanu iha karmāvabodhānantaryaṁ viśeṣaḥ."* In the succeeding sections, the Ācārya will refute these erroneous propositions and establish his standpoint.[17]

The early Vṛttikāras not only presented the above theory of the relation between karma-mīmāṁsā and brahma-mīmāṁsā as that of upakāryopakārakabhāva-sambandha (the relation of the benefactor and the beneficiary) but also aimed to establish thereby the thesis that both these

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These earlier commentators interpreted 'dharma' of the aphorism (*Pū.Mī.Sū.*1.1.1) *"athāto dharmajijñāsā"* in the sense of 'what has been enjoined by the Vedic injunctions', which, in substance means both karma and the Knowledge of Brahman. Taking into account this interpretation of the word 'dharma' in this aphorism, they offered two elucidations of the aphorism as follows: (1) [atha] Immediately after completing the study of one's own section of the Veda (vedādhyayanānantaram); [**dharma-jijñāsā**] an inquiry into what has been enjoined by the Vedas (vihitadharmavicāraḥ); ought to be undertaken (kartavyā iti śeṣaḥ); [**ataḥ**] because such a study of one's own section of the Veda is beneficial to the inquiry into what has been enjoined by the Veda (vedādhyayanasya vihitasya arthavattvāvaśyakatvāt). (2) The aphorism is to be repeated (āvarttiḥ karttavyā) for the second elucidation; [**atha**] after gaining knowledge about the Vedic rites through inquiry (dharmavicāraprāpta-karmāvabodhānantaram); [**dharma-jijñāsā**] an inquiry for attaining the enjoined Knowledge of Brahman; ought to be undertaken (kartavyā iti śeṣaḥ); [**ataḥ**] because the knowledge of Vedic rites, the specific cause for the Knowledge of Brahman, has been gained (karmāvabodhasya viśeṣakāraṇasya siddhatvāt).

[16] Probably this point is taken by the Vṛttikāras as one of the factors for explaining why the karma-mīmāṁsā is termed the 'Pūrva-mīmāṁsā' (Earlier Inquiry) and the brahma-mīmāṁsā the 'Uttara-mīmāṁsā' (Later Inquiry).

[17] Some of the commentators on the *Brahma-sūtra*, like Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, who were posterior to Ācārya Śaṅkara, are inclined to treat this prima facie view (Pūrvapakṣa) itself as their Siddhānta (final accepted view). Their arguments against the Bhāṣyakāra's views may be looked up in their works. Elaborate counterarguments against, and refutations of the viewpoints of these post-Śaṅkara commentators are found in the works of the Advaita Ācāryas of the subsequent ages, like Prakāśātman's *Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa*, Appayya-dīkṣita's *Parimala* and *Pūrvottara-mīmāṁsāvāda-nakṣatramālā* and Advaitānanda's *Brahmavidyābharaṇa*.

mīmāṁsās actually constitute one composite Darśana, which is termed 'Ekaśāstratva-vāda' (unitary system of philosophy). Further, they also tried to develop the theory that the Upaniṣads are subservient to the karma-kāṇḍa and thus did not accord an independent status for the Upaniṣads.[18]

It goes to the credit of the Ācārya that he subjected these erroneous assumptions of these earlier commentators to a thorough examination, refuted them in toto and then salvaged the Aupaniṣada-darśana from the clutches of the proponents of the karma-kāṇḍa and established the Vedānta-darśana as an absolutely independent and glorious system of philosophy.

Padmapādācārya, the earliest known commentator on the *Brahmasūtra-śaṅkarabhāṣya*, in his *Pañcapādikā*, has devoted a full section (Varṇaka 2) for analysing and refuting the Vṛttikāra's thesis that Jaimini, the author of the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā-sūtra*, had anticipated right in the first aphorism the entire Vedānta-darśana. Advaita writers of the later period continued to carry cudgels against the unacceptable postulation of these audacious erring thinkers.

[18] Cf. ननु धर्मजिज्ञासायां वेदाध्ययनादेवानन्तर्यम्। यथाहुः—'तादृशीं तु धर्मजिज्ञासामधिकृत्याथशब्दं प्रयुक्तवानाचार्यः, या वेदाध्ययनमन्तरेण न सम्भवति' इति। ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायां तु कर्मावबोधादानन्तर्यमथशब्दार्थः। युक्तं हि विचारयोरन्योन्यमुपकार्योपकारकत्वाद्, उपकार्यब्रह्मावबोधस्योपकारककर्मावबोधादानन्तर्यम्। अतो धर्मजिज्ञासातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाया हेतुभेदोऽस्तीति शङ्कते—नन्विति। – न्यायनिर्णय
Also, cf. धर्मब्रह्मजिज्ञासयोरन्योन्योपकारकभावेनैकफलशेषत्वादुपकारकत्वाच्च धर्मावबोधानन्तर्यं ब्रह्मावबोधस्योच्यत इति चोदयति—नन्विहेति। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

[निराकरणभाष्यम्]

न, [1]धर्मजिज्ञासायाः प्रागपि अधीतवेदान्तस्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपपत्तेः। यथा च [2]हृदयाद्यवदानानाम् आनन्तर्यनियमः, क्रमस्य विवक्षितत्वाद्, न तथा इह क्रमो विवक्षितः। [3]शेषशेषित्वे[1] अधिकृताधिकारे[2] वा प्रमाणाभावाद्, धर्मब्रह्मजिज्ञासयोः।

फलजिज्ञास्यभेदाच्च[3]। अभ्युदयफलं धर्मज्ञानं तच्चानुष्ठानापेक्षम्। निःश्रेयसफलं तु[4] [4]ब्रह्मज्ञानं न चानुष्ठानान्तरापेक्षम्। भव्यश्च[5] धर्मो जिज्ञास्यो न ज्ञानकाले अस्ति, पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रत्वात्[6]। इह[7] तु भूतं ब्रह्म जिज्ञास्यं [5]नित्यवृत्तत्वाद् न पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रम्।

चोदनाप्रवृत्तिभेदाच्च[8]। या हि चोदना धर्मस्य लक्षणं सा स्वविषये नियुञ्जानैव[9] पुरुषमवबोधयति[10]। ब्रह्मचोदना तु पुरुषमबोधयत्येव केवलम्, अवबोधस्य [6]चोदना-जन्यत्वाद् न पुरुषः अवबोधे नियुज्यते। यथा [7]अक्षार्थसन्निकर्षेण अर्थावबोधे, तद्वत्।

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[1] CSS (fn.) कर्मावबोधात् प्रागपि इति भामतीप्रस्थानपाठः।

[2] हृदयाद्यवदानानन्तर्य-

[3] शेषशेषित्वे प्रमाणाभावात्। अधिकृताधिकारे वा धर्मब्रह्मजिज्ञासयोः इति भामत्यभिमतः पाठः। अत्र प्रमाणाभावाद् इत्यस्योत्तरवाक्ये धर्मब्रह्मजिज्ञासयोः इत्यस्य पूर्ववाक्ये चानुषङ्गः।

[4] AA, ASS, NSP ब्रह्मविज्ञानम्; ब्रह्मज्ञानं च नानुष्ठानन्तरापेक्षम् इति भामत्यभिमतः पाठः

[5] The standard editions of the Bhāṣya have *'nityatvāt'* or *'nityavṛttatvāt'* or *'nityanirvṛttatvāt'*, and it balances *'puruṣavyāpāratantratvāt'* of the previous sentence. The *Pañcapādikā* seems to read the text as *"nityanirvṛttaṁ na puruṣavyāpāratantram."* Cf. The Bhāṣya sentence *"iha tu bhūtaṁ nityanirvṛttaṁ brahma jijñāsyam"* in the context of recapitulating and elaborating the present point under the Samanvaya-sūtra (1.1.4).

[6] पाठभेदः—चोदनाऽजन्यत्वात्

[7] AA (fn.) सन्निकर्षेण अक्षार्थावबोधः तद्वत्

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[1] शेषाश्च शेषिणश्च शेषशेषिणः, तेषां भावः शेषशेषित्वम्। कर्मब्रह्मविचारयोर्हि न शेषत्वं, न वा शेषित्वं, शेषशेषिभाव इति भावात्। – प्रदीप

[2] अधिकृते प्राकरणिकेऽधिकारः प्रकरणद्वारकः सम्बन्धः। – प्रदीप

[3] नोक्तरीत्या क्रमापेक्षेति शेषः। – न्यायनिर्णय

[4] अभ्युदयफलव्यावृत्तये तुशब्दः। – न्यायनिर्णय

[5] भव्यः – भावी। – प्रदीप

[6] पुरुषकृतिसाध्यत्वादित्यर्थः। – प्रदीप

[7] इह एतच्छास्त्रे। – प्रदीप

[8] वेदवाची चोदनाशब्दः। – प्रकटार्थविवरण

[9] नियुञ्जानैव प्रवर्तयन्त्येव। – प्रदीप

[10] बोधयति – ज्ञापयति। – प्रदीप

7 A

[NIRĀKARAṆABHĀṢYAM]

na, dharmajijñāsāyāḥ prāgapi adhītavedāntasya brahmajijñāsopapatteḥ. yathā ca hṛdayādyavadānānām ānantaryaniyamaḥ, kramasya vivakṣitatvād, na tathā iha kramo vivakṣitaḥ. śeṣaśeṣitve adhikṛtādhikāre vā pramāṇābhāvād, dharmabrahmajijñāsayoḥ.

phalajijñāsyabhedācca. abhyudayaphalaṁ dharmajñānaṁ taccānuṣṭhānāpekṣam. niḥśreyasaphalaṁ tu brahmajñānaṁ na cānuṣṭhānāntarāpekṣam. bhavyaśca dharmo jijñāsyo na jñānakāle asti, puruṣavyāpāratantratvāt. iha tu bhūtaṁ brahma jijñāsyaṁ nityavṛttatvād na puruṣavyāpāratantram.

tantram: dependent

codanāpravṛttibhedācca. yā hi codanā dharmasya lakṣaṇaṁ sā svaviṣaye niyuñjānaiva puruṣamavabodhayati. brahmacodanā tu puruṣamabodhayatyeva kevalam, avabodhasya codanājanyatvād na puruṣaḥ avabodhe niyujyate. yathā akṣārthasannikarṣeṇa arthāvabodhe, tadvat.

7 B

न *na* – no; धर्मजिज्ञासायाः *dharmajijñāsāyāḥ* – the desire to know dharma; प्राग् अपि *prāg api* – even prior to; अधीतवेदान्तस्य *adhītavedāntasya* – for one who has studied Vedānta; ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपपत्तेः *brahmajijñāsopapatteḥ* – because the desire to know Brahman could arise; यथा *yathā* – just as; च *ca* – and; हृदयाद्यवदानानाम् *hṛdayādyavadānānām* – of apportioning the heart and so on; आनन्तर्यनियमः *ānantaryaniyamaḥ* – there is the rule on the order of succession; क्रमस्य विवक्षितत्वात् *kramasya vivakṣitatvāt* – because an order of succession is intended to be specified; न *na* – not; तथा *tathā* – in that manner; इह *iha* – here; क्रमः *kramaḥ* – a sequence; विवक्षितः *vivakṣitaḥ* – is intended to be specified; शेषशेषित्वे *śeṣaśeṣitve* – on the relation of the principal and the subsidiary; अधिकृताधिकारे *adhikṛtādhikāre* – on the relation of the eligibility of the already eligible; वा *vā* – or; प्रमाणाभावात् *pramāṇābhāvāt* – there is no Scriptural sanction; धर्मब्रह्मजिज्ञासयोः *dharmabrahmajijñāsayoḥ* – between the desire to know dharma and the desire to know Brahman

फलजिज्ञास्यभेदात् च *phalajijñāsyabhedāt ca* – also because there is difference between the result and the object of the desire to know; अभ्युदयफलम् *abhyudayaphalam* – brings about prosperity; धर्मज्ञानम् *dharmajñānam* – the knowledge of dharma; तत् *tat* – that; च *ca* – and; अनुष्ठानापेक्षम् *anuṣṭhānāpekṣam* – depends on the performance; निःश्रेयसफलम् *niḥśreyasaphalam* – leads to Liberation; तु *tu* – on the other hand; ब्रह्मज्ञानम् *brahmajñānam* – the Knowledge of Brahman; न च अनुष्ठानान्तरापेक्षम् *na ca anuṣṭhānāntarāpekṣam* – and does not depend on any other observance; भव्यः *bhavyaḥ* – that which is yet to come into existence; च *ca* – further; धर्मः *dharmaḥ* – dharma; जिज्ञास्यः *jijñāsyaḥ* – the object of desire; ज्ञानकाले *jñānakāle* – at the time of its knowledge; न अस्ति *na asti* – does not exist; पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रत्वात् *puruṣavyāpāratantratvāt* – because it depends on the activity of a person; इह *iha* – in the present context; तु *tu* – but; भूतम् *bhūtam* – existent; ब्रह्म *brahma* – Brahman; जिज्ञास्यम् *jijñāsyam* – the object of the desire to know; नित्यवृत्तत्वात् *nityavṛttatvāt* – since it always exists; न पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रम् *na puruṣavyāpāratantram* – does not depend on the activity of a person

चोदनाप्रवृत्तिभेदात् च *codanāpravṛttibhedāt ca* – and since there is also difference in the operation of the texts; या *yā* – which; हि *hi* – indeed; चोदना *codanā* – the text; धर्मस्य *dharmasya* – of dharma; लक्षणम् *lakṣaṇam* – expounds the nature; सा *sā* – the same; स्वविषये *svaviṣaye* – in its own domain; नियुञ्जाना एव *niyuñjānā eva* – necessarily urging him to perform; पुरुषम् *puruṣam* – the person; अवबोधयति *avabodhayati* – instructs; ब्रह्मचोदना *brahmacodanā* – the text pertaining to Brahman; तु *tu* – on the other hand; पुरुषम् *puruṣam* – the person; अवबोधयति एव केवलम् *avabodhayati eva kevalam* – indeed merely teaches; अवबोधस्य चोदनाजन्यत्वात् *avabodhasya codanājanyatvāt* – because knowledge is brought about by the text; पुरुषः *puruṣaḥ* – the person; न नियुज्यते *na niyujyate* – is not enjoined to perform; अवबोधे *avabodhe* – in the domain of knowledge; यथा *yathā* – just as; अक्षार्थसन्निकर्षेण *akṣārthasannikarṣeṇa* – by the contact of the visual organ with the object; अर्थावबोधे *arthāvabodhe* – in the case of the knowledge of the object; तद्वत् *tadvat* – so too

7 C

[THE COMMENTARY ON REFUTATIONS[1]]

No, for the desire to know Brahman could arise in a person, who has studied Vedānta, even prior to the desire to know dharma.[2] And, there exists a rule governing the order of succession in the case of apportioning the heart and so on, since a sequence is intended to be specified there. However, no such order of succession is intended to be specified here.[3] Also, there is no Scriptural sanction on the relation of the principal and the subsidiary[4] or on the relation of the eligibility of the already eligible between the desire to know dharma and the desire to know Brahman.[5]

Also, because there is difference between the result and the object of the desire to know.[6] The result of the knowledge of dharma is prosperity and its acquisition depends on the performance. On the other hand, the Knowledge of Brahman leads to Liberation and it is not dependent on any observance whatsoever.[7] Further, dharma, the object of the desire, does not exist at the time of its knowledge because its incidence depends on the activity of the person. But, in the present context of brahma-jijñāsā, the already existent Brahman, which is the object of the desire to know, does not depend upon the activity of the person because it is an eternally accomplished entity.[8]

Besides, there is also difference in the operation of the texts. To explain: The text which expounds the nature of dharma instructs man in its domain necessarily urging him to perform. On the other hand, the text pertaining to Brahman merely teaches the person and does not enjoin upon him in the domain of knowledge because knowledge is brought about by the text. To illustrate: A person need not be commanded to see the object when the visual organ is already in contact with it.[9]

7 D

1. The Commentary on Refutations: We saw in the last section that some commentators of the *Brahma-sūtra* and Mīmāṁsā thinkers of the pre-Śaṅkara

age had built up a thesis that the Knowledge of Brahman, the subject matter of the Vedānta-darśana, is facilitated by the knowledge of karma, that is the dharma taught in the Mīmāṁsā-darśana. Hence, the Pūrvapakṣin ruled that the word 'atha' of the aphorism *"athāto brahmajijñāsā"* is to be taken to mean 'in the immediate succession to the knowledge of karma'.

The Ācārya disapproves the above theory as an illogical prima facie view. In this section we will see how effectively he refutes it by using their own terminology and technique. Moreover, being adept in logicial niceties, the Ācārya presses into service some of the standard principles of logic to establish his viewpoint. Therefore, it will be of advantage if we become familiar with the relevant principles of Mīmāṁsā and logic pertaining to this context.

It is evident that the prima facie view rests on two major assumptions: (1) A cause and effect relation, that is the relation of the benefactor and the beneficiary (upakāryopakārakabhāva-sambandha), exists between the knowledge of karma and that of Brahman. The same is indicated by the Upaniṣadic enunciation (*Bṛ.U.*4.4.22), *"tametaṁ vedānuvacanena brāhmaṇā vividiṣanti yajñena dānena tapasānāśakena* – The brāhmaṇas desire to know Brahman by the study of the Vedas, by sacrifice, by charity and by desireless penance" and by the *Brahma-sūtra* (3.4.26), *"sarvāpekṣā ca yajñādiśruteḥ, aśvavat* – In accordance with Śruti injunctions about the Vedic rites, all sacrificial acts are necessary as in the case of a horse in matters of its necessity."[11] (2) On account of this upakāryopakārakabhāva-sambandha, brahma-jijñāsā ensues immediately after the knowledge of karma that is taught in the Mīmāṁsā-darśana thus becoming the unique cause of brahma-jijñāsā. Therefore, it is only logical to assume that the word 'atha' of the aphorism means 'in the immediate succession to the knowledge of karma'.

The Ācārya refutes this thesis of the Pūrvapakṣin (opponent) in toto on the following grounds.

2. No, for the desire to know Brahman could arise in a person, who has studied Vedānta, even prior to the desire to know dharma: The Ācārya had concluded his earlier argument saying that svādhyāya (the study of one's

[11] Refer to Section 6 D.

own branch of the Veda), though a prerequisite, is common to both dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā.[12] Hence, the unique cause (viśeṣa-kāraṇa) needs to be identified in the immediate succession to which the desire to know Brahman arises.

The Pūrvapakṣin explained that when the svādhyāya is completed, it leads to its natural consequence dharma-jijñāsā (the desire to know dharma), which is expounded in the Pūrvamīmāṁsā-darśana. Thereupon, dharma-jijñāsā leads to the correct knowledge of karma (karmāvabodha). This knowledge of karma, thus obtained through the study of the Pūrvamīmāṁsā-darśana, is to be construed as the unique cause (viśeṣa-kāraṇa) of the rise of brahma-jijñāsā (the desire for the knowledge of Brahman). Thus, it is only karmāvabodha (the knowledge of the nature of karma) that is the prior correlate of the 'immediate succession' denoted by the term 'atha' (then) occurring in the aphorism *"athāto brahmajijñāsā."*

The present sentence of the Bhāṣya is intended to refute entirely the above contention of the opponent.

But, why should the Bhāṣyakāra declare that there exists the possibility of the rise of brahma-jijñāsā (the desire for knowing Brahman) even prior to dharma-jijñāsā (desire to know dharma)? Should he not instead argue that even prior to karmāvabodha (knowledge of Vedic rituals) brahma-jijñāsā could arise, for only such a statement could contend directly the viewpoint of the opponent: *"nanu iha karmāvabodhānantaryaṁ viśeṣaḥ."*[13] In other words should not the Bhāṣya declare: *"karmāvabodhāt prāgapi adhītavedāntasya brahmajijñāsopapatteḥ."*

Such a statement undoubtedly stands in direct opposition to the Pūrvapakṣin's point of view. However, the Ācārya intends to be more incisive in his criticism of the opponent. The idea is: If svādhyāya or the study of one's own branch of the Vedas was the unique cause for the rise of dharma-jijñāsā (desire for knowledge of dharma) and its result, that is karmāvabodha (knowledge of Vaidika-karma), then alone would the

[12] Since the svādhyāya is to be undertaken when one is eight years or so.

[13] Translated as: "Is not here, in this context, immediate succession to the knowledge of Vedic rituals the distinctive feature?" (Refer to Section 6 C.)

proposition of the opponent hold water. But contrary to svādhyāya alone being the cause for karmāvabodha, the hankering for the different results prescribed to be brought about by the various karmas can undeniably be taken as a necessary cause for karmāvabodha.

It is also plausible that there could be students who during the course of the study of their section of the Vedas (svādhyāya) are more inclined to the study of the Upaniṣads (Vedānta)[14] and are convinced of the hollowness and transiency of all material accomplishments (abhyudaya) promised by the Vedic rites and enthused by the significant and eternal result of the Realisation of Brahman, that is the absolute emancipation from all the miseries of the nescience-constituted saṁsāra as vouchsafed in the Upaniṣads.[15] In the case of these dispassionate students of the Veda, it is the brahma-jijñāsā (desire for the Knowledge of Brahman) that arises and not dharma-jijñāsā which leads to karmāvabodha (or the mastery of the Vedic rituals). In fact, the Upaniṣads themselves declare that all are confronted by two desires: one for Liberation (śreyas) and another for the worldly prosperity (preyas) and that the discriminating wise man chooses the former while the dull-witted falls for the latter.[16] Thus, the opponent's thesis of karmāvabodha as the prerequisite for brahma-jijñāsā fails to have the support of both the Scripture (Śruti) and experience (anubhūti).[17]

We also observe that the Ācārya has refuted the proposition of the Pūrvapakṣin by pointing out its logical anomaly. To explain: The Logicians accept the weaver's shuttle, loom and so on as the cause of cloth because

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[14] It is this idea that is obviously intended by the compound word 'adhīta-vedāntasya' of the Bhāṣya.

[15] This point the Bhāṣyakāra himself elaborates later in the context of explaining the significance of the word 'ataḥ' of the present aphorism.

[16] श्रेयश्च प्रेयश्च मनुष्यमेतस्तौ सम्परीत्य विविनक्ति धीरः। श्रेयो हि धीरोऽभि प्रेयसो वृणीते प्रेयो मन्दो योगक्षेमाद् वृणीते॥ – कठोपनिषद् (१.२.२)

[17] In view of the above discussion, one need not essay to interpret dharma-jijñāsā (lit. the desire to know dharma) of the Bhāṣya text in the secondary sense of 'karmāvabodha' (knowledge of karma) which is rather the result of dharma-jijñāsā. Vide *"dharmajijñāsāpadena tatphalaṁ karmāvabodho lakṣyate."* (*Vārtika*) Besides, it is significant to observe that the *Bhāmatī* reads in the present Bhāṣya sentence itself *"karmāvabodhāt prāgapi"* in lieu of the generally accepted reading *"dharmajijñāsāyāḥ prāgapi."* Obviously, both these efforts are aimed at making the Bhāṣyakāra's refutation of the prima facie view tenable.

the former invariably precede the latter.[18] But karmāvabodha (knowledge of karma) and its cause dharma-jijñāsā (desire to know dharma) do not invariably precede the rise of brahma-jijñāsā (desire for the Knowledge of Brahman). We have seen that there is a distinct possibility that a student of the Vedānta can have a longing for the Knowledge of Brahman even before the desire to know dharma. Therefore, the proposition of cause and effect relationship (kāryakāraṇa-sambandha) effected by the relation of the benefactor and the beneficiary (upakāryopakāraka-sambandha) espoused by the opponent between dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā suffers from the serious defect, which the Logicians term 'vyatireka-vyabhicāra', which means that the absence of one of the relata is not invariably accompanied by the absence of the other relatum.[19] The said causal relation between dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā can be maintained, only if it were possible to establish their respective instances of absence to have an invariable concomitance[20] with each other, that is wherever there is no dharma-jijñāsā and no karmāvabodha, in all such instances there is also the absence of brahma-jijñāsā. But, such is not the case. Therefore, when we consider the logical aspect (yukti) of the Pūrvapakṣin's proposition, there too we are bound to reject it in toto.

In order to point out the above vyatireka-vyabhicāra or the logical flaw of inconstancy of the negatives, the Ācārya could have very well said *"dharmajijñāsāyā asattve'pi* – even when there is no dharma-jijñāsā." However, the Ācārya has rightly preferred the expression *"prāgapi dharmajijñāsāyāḥ* – even prior to dharma-jijñāsā" because it directly counters the opponent's assertion *"iha karmāvabodhānantaryaṁ viśeṣaḥ* – only after karmāvabodha (knowledge of Vedic rituals), the desire for the Knowledge of Brahman arises."

While critically examining the viewpoint of the opponent that brahma-jijñāsā dawns after the knowledge of Vedic rituals, the Ācārya must have considered statements of the Scripture (*Bṛ.U.*4.4.22) such as *"tametaṁ*

[18] कार्यनियतपूर्ववृत्तित्त्वं कारणत्वम्।

[19] कारणाभावेऽपि कार्यसत्त्वं (कार्याभावाभावः) व्यतिरेकव्यभिचारः।

[20] यत्र यत्र कारणाभावः तत्र तत्र कार्याभावः इति कार्यकारणयोः व्यतिरेकसहचारः।

vedānuvacanena brāhmaṇā vividiṣanti yajñena dānena tapasānāśakena – The brāhmaṇas desire to know Brahman by the study of the Vedas, by sacrifice, by charity and by desireless penance" which touch upon the significance of means such as sacrifice, charity and desireless penance by observing which seekers aspire for the Knowledge of Brahman.

In this context, pertaining to the means for the Realisation of Brahman, we have to examine another very significant Upaniṣadic declaration (*Bṛ.U.*2.4.5): "*ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ* – The Self should be seen, should be heard, should be inquired into, should be meditated upon."[21] This Upaniṣadic declaration enlightens us on the threefold direct means of śravaṇa (listening), manana (reflection) and nididhyāsana (meditation) to the Realisation of the Self leading to Liberation. Hence, this declaration carries greater importance than the previous sentence (*Bṛ.U.*4.4.22) that merely touches upon the ancillary means. We observe from this Upaniṣadic statement dealing with the direct means to Realisation, that the Upaniṣads do not ascribe so much significance to the performance of sacrifice, charity and desireless penance as they do to the direct evolutionary means of śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana to the Realisation of the Self.

That the Vedic rituals, charity, penances and so on are merely the ancillary means becomes evident as we proceed to analyse the tenor of the Upaniṣadic statement (*Bṛ.U.*4.4.22), "*tametaṁ vedānuvacanena brāhmaṇā vividiṣanti yajñena dānena tapasānāśakena.*" We observe that this Upaniṣadic statement merely says that the seekers by performing sacrifice, charity and dispassionate penance become desirous of Self-knowledge (vividiṣanti), that is as a result of these observances one develops a desire for such Knowledge.[22] Thus, this Upaniṣadic sentence does not directly connect karma (Vedic rituals, charity and so on) as a direct means or as a unique cause for the Knowledge of the Self. Rather, it renders karma as an ancillary means to the Knowledge of the Self by making it a causal factor for just the generation of the desire to know the Self by effecting the purification of the mind.

[21] We had seen how the opponent interpreted this enunciation to his advantage in Section 6 D.

[22] The desiderative 'vividiṣanti' in the sentence is significant and it means 'they desire to know'.

To explain: By performing karma, like sacrifice, charity, desireless penances and so on, an individual annihilates his sins, then becomes capable of seeing things in the right perspective (nityānityavastu-viveka), thereafter develops dispassion for worldly pleasures (vairāgya), then goes on to acquire tranquility, self-control and other such mental qualities (śamadamādisādhana-sampat) and as a consequence of all these, there arises in him an intense longing for Liberation (mumukṣutva). It is these above-mentioned fourfold qualities which give rise to brahma-jijñāsā (the desire to know Brahman). Thereupon, such an individual seeks refuge in the Guru (gurūpasadana), then learns from him the Upaniṣadic truth of the oneness of the Self (śravaṇa) and thereafter progresses to the subsequent stages of reflection (manana) and intense meditation (nididhyāsana) and thus comes to have the direct Knowledge of the Self. Thus karma helps Jñāna (Knowledge of the Self) in a distant manner (ārādupakāraka) by purifying the mind and then generating the desire to know the Self unlike śravaṇa (listening), manana (reflection) and nididhyāsana (meditation) which directly aid the generation of Self-knowledge. This is the collective purport of the Upaniṣadic sentences (*Bṛ.U.*4.4.22 & 2.4.5 respectively), *"tametaṁ vedānuvacanena brāhmaṇā vividiṣanti yajñena dānena tapasānāśakena* – The brāhmaṇas desire to know Brahman by the study of the Vedas, by sacrifice, by charity and by desireless penance" and *"ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ* – The Self should be seen, should be heard, should be inquired into, should be meditated upon" – the former providing the ancillary means and the latter the direct means to the Realisation of the Self. The very same Upaniṣadic idea about karma helping in a distant manner in the rise of the Knowledge of Brahman is also reflected in the aphorism *Brahma-sūtra* (3.4.26), *"sarvāpekṣā ca yajñādiśruteḥ, aśvavat* – In accordance with Śruti injunctions about the Vedic rites, all sacrificial acts are necessary as in the case of a horse in matters of its necessity" quoted by the opponent under a wrong notion that it vouchsafes his theory of karmāvabodha being the unique cause of brahma-jijñāsā.

In view of what we have discussed in the foregoing, how can the knowledge

of karma be taken as the unique cause (viśeṣa-kāraṇa) of brahma-jijñāsā? And, how can the word 'atha' occurring in the aphorism *"athāto brahmajijñāsā"* convey the sense of 'in the immediate succession to the knowledge of karma'? It cannot.[23] We do come across in the Scriptural literature individuals who without entering into the stages of gṛhastha (household life) and vānaprastha (hermit life) have taken to sannyāsa (monastic life) after having renounced all karmas such as sacrifice, charity and so on and then through the direct means of śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana have come to realise the supreme Brahman. The Purāṇas inform us about Sages like Śuka who were born Brahmajñānins, and who did not even undergo the upanayana (sacred thread ceremony) that initiates one into the brahmacarya-āśrama (student life). Therefore, the knowledge or performance of karma can, by no means, be the direct cause for the rise of brahma-jijñāsā (desire to know Brahman).[24]

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[23] Cf. तत्किमिदानीमनुपयोग एव सर्वथेह कर्मणाम्। तथा च विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन इत्याद्याः श्रुतयो विरुध्येरन्। न, आरादुपकारकत्वात्कर्मणां यज्ञादीनाम्। तथा हि—तमेतमात्मानं वेदानुवचनेन नित्यस्वाध्यायेन, ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति, वेदितुमिच्छन्ति, न तु विदन्ति।...तथा हि—नित्यकर्मणामनुष्ठानाद्धर्मोत्पादः, ततः पाप्मा निवर्तते, स हि अनित्याशुचिदुःखरूपे संसारे नित्यशुचिसुखख्यातिलक्षणेन विपर्यासेन चित्तसत्त्वं मलिनयति, अतः पापनिवृत्तौ प्रत्यक्षोपपत्तिद्वारापावरणे सति प्रत्यक्षोपपत्तिभ्यां संसारस्य अनित्याशुचिदुःस्वरूपत्वमप्रत्यूहमवबुध्यते, ततोऽस्य अस्मिन्ननभिरतिसंज्ञं वैराग्यमुपजायते, ततस्तज्जिहासोपावर्तते, ततो ह्यानोपायं पर्येषते, पर्येषमाणश्चात्मतत्त्वज्ञानमस्योपाय इत्युपश्रुत्य तज्जिज्ञासते, ततः श्रवणादिक्रमेण तज्ज्ञानातीत्यारादुपकारकत्वं तत्त्वज्ञानोत्पादं प्रति चित्तसत्त्वशुद्धा कर्मणां युक्तम्। इममेवार्थमनुवदति भगवद्गीता—आरुरुक्षोर्मुनेर्योगं कर्म कारणमुच्यते। योगारूढस्य तस्यैव शमः कारणमुच्यते॥ इति। एवं च अननुष्ठितकर्मापि प्राग्भवीयकर्मवशाद् यो विशुद्धसत्त्वः संसारासारतादर्शनेन निष्पन्नवैराग्यः, कृतं तस्य कर्मानुष्ठानेन वैराग्योत्पादोपयोगिना, प्राग्भवीयकर्मानुष्ठानादेव तत्सिद्धेः। इममेव च पुरुषधौरेयभेदमधिकृत्य प्रववृते श्रुतिः—यदि वेतरथा ब्रह्मचर्यादेव प्रव्रजेद् इति। तदिदमुक्तं, कर्मावबोधात्, प्रागप्यधीतवेदान्तस्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपपत्तेरिति। अत एव न ब्रह्मचारिण ऋणानि सन्ति येन तदपाकरणार्थं कर्मानुतिष्ठेत्। एतदनुरोधाच्च जायमानो वै ब्राह्मणस्त्रिभिर्ऋणवा जायते इति गृहस्थः सम्पद्यमान इति व्याख्येयम्। अन्यथा यदि वेतरथा ब्रह्मचर्यादेव इति श्रुतिर्विरुध्येत। गृहस्थस्यापि च ऋणापाकरणं सत्त्वशुद्ध्यर्थमेव। जरामर्यवादो भस्मान्ततावादोऽन्त्येष्टयश्च कर्मजडानविदुषः प्रति, न त्वात्मतत्त्वविदः पण्डितान्। तस्मात्तस्यानन्तर्यमथशब्दार्थः यद्विना ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा न भवति यस्मिंस्तु सति भवन्ती भवत्येव। न चेत्थं कर्मावबोधः। तस्मान्न कर्मावबोधानन्तर्यमत्राथशब्दार्थ इति सर्वमवदातम्। – भामती

[24] Cf. अयं भावः—तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्तीति वाक्येन यज्ञादीनामात्मसाक्षात्कारसाधनत्वमवगतम्। प्रमाण-परतन्त्रश्चात्मसाक्षात्कारः, इति कर्मणां तत्साधननिदिध्यासनापरपर्यायब्रह्मभावनादीर्घकालनैरन्तर्यादिसम्पादकतयोपयोगो वक्तव्यः। सर्वथा तु यज्ञादीनामात्मसाक्षात्कारप्रयोजकत्वात् कर्मविचारानन्तरं ब्रह्मविचार इति युक्तमेव, नित्यकर्मणामेव भावनाङ्गत्वं, संयोगपृथक्त्वन्यायेन नित्यकर्मसाधारण्येनेति त्वन्यदेतत्। ब्रह्मभावना हि ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारं न कर्मसहकारेण जनयति। न हि निदिध्यासनकाले कर्मानुष्ठानसम्भवः। उपासनाऽपि श्रवणमननाधीना न स्वरूपोत्पत्त्यर्थमपि कर्मापेक्षते। यज्ञेन दानेनेति वाक्यन्तु विविदिषोत्पत्तिप्रयोजकचित्तशुद्धावेव कर्मणामुपयोगं गमयति। ततश्च जन्मान्तरीयकर्मवशेन स्वत एव विशुद्धसत्त्वाः संसारासारतादर्शनेन निष्पन्नवैराग्याश्च विनैव कर्मानुष्ठानं ब्रह्मचर्यादेव सन्न्यस्य विविदिषाद्वारा ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारं सम्पादयितुमर्हन्ति, इति न ब्रह्मविचारः कर्मविचारपूर्वकालिक एवेति नियमः। अत एव स्वयंप्रतिभातवेदानां देवानां ब्रह्मविद्याधिकारः कर्मानधिकारिणामपि स्वत एव विशुद्धसत्त्वानां देवताधिकरणसाधित उपपद्यते। तथा च कर्मविचारानन्तर्यं नाथशब्दार्थः, इत्यभिप्रायेणोक्तामाशङ्कां समाधत्ते—न, धर्मजिज्ञासायाः प्राग्प्यधीतवेदान्तस्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपपत्तेरिति। अत्रापिशब्दस्य काकाक्षिन्यायेन धर्मजिज्ञासायाः प्रागित्यनेनाधीतवेदान्तस्येत्यनेन च सम्बन्धः। तथा च केचन ब्रह्मचर्यादेव सन्न्यस्ताः, कर्मावबोधात्प्राक्, केचन चानधीतवेदान्ता अपि वेदार्थकर्मविचारात्प्राग् ब्रह्मविचारं सप्रयोजनं कुर्वन्तो दृश्यन्ते। अत्रानधीतवेदान्तानामपि देवानां ब्रह्मविचाराधिकारज्ञापनेन

At this juncture, there could arise a doubt: These seekers, mentioned in the Scriptural sources, must have performed Vedic rituals, charity, desireless penances and so on in their former incarnations (janmāntareṣu) and the merit produced by these observances alone must have generated the brahma-jijñāsā and the consequent Realisation in the present life. Can the sense of 'atha', therefore, not take into account the observance of the Vedic rituals in the earlier incarnation as the prior correlate of immediate succession?

This argument is rather self-defeating for the following reason: Before embarking upon the spiritual pursuit a seeker must satisfy himself that he possesses the requisite qualifications. But, the karmas of one's past lives and their resultant merits cannot fall within the ambit of the sense of the word 'atha' for they are beyond one's direct comprehension. Indeed, only those qualifications that are directly perceived can legitimately be the eligibility intended by the word 'atha' in the aphorism.[25]

All these ideas discussed here are very well encapsulated in the seemingly simple sentence of the Bhāṣya under study. Thus neither dharma-jijñāsā (the desire to know dharma), nor karmāvabodha (the knowledge of Vaidika-karma) taught in the Mīmāṁsā-darśana, nor the observance of karma in this or the previous life is the viśeṣa-kāraṇa (unique cause) of brahma-jijñāsā (desire to know Brahman) and hence none of them can be considered as the prior correlate of the 'immediate succession' (ānantarya-pratiyogī) denoted by the term 'atha' of the aphorism *"athāto brahmajijñāsā."*[26]

3. And, there exists a rule governing the order of succession in the case of apportioning the heart and so on, since a sequence is intended to be specified

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नाध्ययनविधिमूलको ब्रह्मविचारः, किन्तु उपनिषदमावर्तयेद् इति विधिमूलक एव ब्रह्मविचार इत्यपि केचन मन्यन्ते। न हि कर्मणां ब्रह्मज्ञानापेक्षा, इति हि अग्नीन्धनाद्यनपेक्षा इत्यादिभिरवगम्यते, इति सर्वापेक्षा च यज्ञादिश्रुतेरिति सूत्रं परम्परया कर्मोपयोगमेव विवक्षतीति न कोऽपि दोषः। यावता च विनाऽपि कर्मविचारं कुत्रचन ब्रह्मविचारसम्भवः, तावता नियतपूर्ववृत्तो न कर्मावबोधः, इति नाथशब्देन तदानन्तर्यं विवक्ष्यत इति निष्कर्षः। – प्रदीप

Also, cf. न तावद्धर्मविचारे पूर्ववृत्ते सत्येव ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायां प्रवर्तते। जन्मान्तरे परमेश्वराराधनबुद्ध्याऽनुष्ठितकर्मभिः शुद्धसत्त्वस्य विरक्तस्य वृद्धव्यवहारत एव विदितपदपदार्थसङ्गतेः वेदान्ताध्ययनेन चापातावगतश्रोतव्यविधिकस्य अन्तरेणैव धर्मविचारं ब्रह्मविचारे प्रवृत्त्युपपत्तेः। नापि धर्मविचारे सति प्रवर्तत एव, कृतधर्मविचारस्य वेदान्तानां कार्यशेषताग्रहगृहीतस्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायां पराङ्मुखत्वात्। अतो न धर्मविचारानन्तर्यार्थोऽथशब्द इत्यर्थः। – प्रकटार्थविवरण

[25] Cf. यद्यपि शुद्धिविवेकादिद्वारा कर्माणि हेतवः, तथापि तेषां नाधिकारिविशेषणत्वम्, अज्ञातानां तेषां जन्मान्तरकृतानामपि फलहेतुत्वात्। अधिकारिविशेषणं ज्ञायमानं प्रवृत्तिपुष्कलकारणम् आनन्तर्यावधित्वेन वक्तव्यम्। – रत्नप्रभा

[26] Cf. अतः कर्माणि, तदवबोधः, तन्न्यायविचारो वा न अवधिरिति न ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाया धर्मजिज्ञासानन्तर्यमिति। – रत्नप्रभा

there. However, no such order of succession is intended to be specified here: The opponent contends: There may not be the cause and effect relationship between dharma-jijñāsā (desire to know dharma) and brahma-jijñāsā (desire to know Brahman). Still, the latter should be accepted to rise only in the immediate succession to the former.[27] The point sought to be conveyed by the Pūrvapakṣin is this: If a person has two or more acts to perform, he executes them one by one in a specific sequence alone. He does so, not because there is among these acts always a relation of cause and effect, but because he cannot perform all of them simultaneously.

The Pūrvapakṣins who raise this objection are the Mīmāṁsakas and they cite examples from the Vedic sacrificial practices to endorse their stand. An instance of a sequence is met with in the performance of the Vedic animal sacrifice named 'Paśubandha'. During the process of this sacrifice, certain prescribed eleven limbs or parts (aṅgas) – such as the heart, the tongue, the sides and so on – are first cut from the sacrificial goat. Then, the cooked limbs are kept on the spread darbha grass. Thereupon, the priest places them one after another on the sacrificial wooden ladles (termed 'juhu' and 'upabhṛt') for offering them as oblations into the sacrificial fire. This process of taking a portion of the oblation and placing the same on the ladles for offering is termed 'avadāna', which can roughly be rendered as 'apportioning'. In this Paśubandha sacrifice there are eleven such avadānas for offering.[28] Of these eleven, the first three are apportioned always in a specific sequence, that is the heart is apportioned first, then the tongue, and then the sides.[29] Here, it should be noted that the avadāna of the portion of the heart is not the cause of the next avadāna of the portion of the tongue, and this too does not become the cause for the avadāna of the sides that follows. Yet, they are to be apportioned in this prescribed specific sequence alone because of the Vedic injunction that stipulates so. Likewise, the Pūrvapakṣin here argues

[27] Cf. ननु धर्मब्रह्मजिज्ञासयोः कार्यकारणत्वाभावेऽपि आनन्तर्योक्तिद्वारा क्रमज्ञानार्थोऽथशब्दः। – रत्नप्रभा

[28] That is, eleven portions of the eleven limbs are prepared in this manner – *"ekādaśāvadānānyavadyati."*

[29] The sequence of the other eight avadānas is left to the priest's choice (aicchika-krama) but with a stipulation that he must not miss any of the remaining apportioned limbs.

that, brahma-jijñāsā should come in the immediate succession to dharma-jijñāsā, even though there is no cause and effect relation between them.

The Ācārya rejects this thesis of the opponent by pointing out that the citation of the avadānas in the Paśubandha sacrifice lacks relevance and tenability in the present context. To explain: In the case of the sacrificial avadānas their sequence is clearly stipulated by a rule in the Śruti (Scripture): "The priest should first apportion the heart, then the tongue, and then apportion the sides."[30] Further, the explanatory passage (arthavāda) pertaining to this rule explains why such a specific sequence is followed. Therefore, we are bound to follow the prescribed sequence of these avadānas in consonance with the Scriptural authority. On the other hand, there is no Scriptural injunction whatsoever in the context of dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā prescribing the sequence that brahma-jijñāsā should only follow dharma-jijñāsā. And, it is not only untenable but ludicrous too to argue that the word 'atha' of the present aphorism is itself the rule laying down such a sequence between dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā because the denotation of the term 'atha' is yet to be determined!

The Pūrvapakṣin raises a seemingly pertinent objection: The contention of the Ācārya that there is no Scriptural prescription that brahma-jijñāsā should be preceded by dharma-jijñāsā ignores the well-known Śruti (Scriptural injunctions) and Smṛti (traditional codes). The *Jābāla-upaniṣad* (4) indeed enjoins the sequence when it stipulates: *"brahmacaryaṁ samāpya gṛhī bhaved gṛhādvanībhūtvā pravrajet* – After completing the student's life (brahmacarya) one should become a householder (gṛhastha), thereafter take up the hermit's life (vanī), and then alone one should renounce." In this Scriptural injunction, the word 'gṛhi' (householder) is a synecdoche for the observance of karma and 'pravrajet' (one should renounce) for that of brahma-jijñāsā. There is also a traditional code (*Manusmṛti*, 6.36) stipulating the same: *"adhītya vidhivad vedān putrāṁścotpādya dharmataḥ, iṣṭvā ca śaktito yajñairmano mokṣe niveśayet* – Having studied the Vedas according to rule, having begotten sons in the manner laid down by the traditional codes, and after performing

[30] हृदयस्याग्रेवद्यत्यथ जिह्वाया अथ वक्षसः। – तैत्तिरीयसंहिता (६.३.१०)

Vedic sacrifices to the best of one's ability one should then devote oneself to the pursuit of Liberation." This is further endorsed (*Manusmṛti*, 6.37) by the following censure: *"anadhītya dvijo vedānanutpādya tathātmajān, aniṣṭvā caiva yajñaiśca mokṣamicchan vrajatyadhaḥ* – The brāhamaṇa who, without having studied the Veda, and also without begetting children and without performing sacrifices, desires Liberation is condemned to fall." In this way, fortifying his arguments with these citations from the Śruti and the Smṛti, the Pūrvapakṣin rejects as baseless and invalid the rebuttal of the Ācārya that there is no Scriptural injunction whatsoever stipulating that dharma-jijñāsā should precede brahma-jijñāsā.

This objection of the Pūrvapakṣin to the Ācārya's stand is because of his non-comprehension of the purport of the Ācārya's statement who has kept in view the import of the entire Scriptural corpus before voicing his rebuttal. The reasoning of the Ācārya is to this effect: Unlike the specific uncontradicted rule governing the sequence of the avadānas of the heart, the tongue and the sides in the Paśubandha sacrifice, there is no such uncontradicted rule governing the sequence of dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā that the Pūrvapakṣin is desirous of establishing. In fact, the *Jābāla-upaniṣad* (4.1) itself contains a declaration in the sequel, right after the very sentence that has been cited by the Pūrvapakṣin, that contradicts his citation. It reads: *"yadi vetarathā, brahmacaryādeva pravrajet, gṛhādvā, vanādvā* – If it is possible to do otherwise, let one renounce even from brahmacarya-āśrama (student life), or from that of gṛhastha-āśrama (householder) or from that of vānaprastha-āśrama (hermit)."[31]

The contradiction in the case of these two sets of rules is only apparent. To explain: It is the complete vairāgya (dispassion) alone that constitutes the essential prerequisite for renunciation and brahma-jijñāsā and not such factors relating to the states of householder, hermit and so on. That is the reason why the *Jābāla-upaniṣad* goes on to further stipulate: *"yadahareva virajet tadahareva pravrajet* – The moment one becomes dispassionate let him

[31] Also refer the Smṛti statement: *"āsādayati śuddhātmā mokṣaṁ vai prathamāśrame* – The one who is pure at heart attains Liberation even while in the first brahmacarya-āśrama."

renounce that very day." Therefore, it is crystal clear that the Śruti and the Smṛti statements cited by the Pūrvapakṣin to establish his point are only concerned with individuals who have not developed the requisite dispassion and purity of mind that actually urge upon them to renounce and commit themselves to Self-knowledge. The other set of Scriptural injunctions cited by the Siddhāntin to offset the objection raised by the Pūrvapakṣin pertain to the individuals who are dispassionate and enjoy the purity of the heart and are thus qualified to renounce and be eligible for brahma-jijñāsā.[32]

Hence, the Ācārya is perfectly justified when he states that like the uncontradicted rule governing the sequence of the avadānas of the heart, the tongue and the sides in the context of Paśubandha sacrifice, there is no such rule governing the sequence of dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā in order to stipulate dharma-jijñāsā as a prior correlate to brahma-jijñāsā.[33]

In the context of the above significant discussion, the statement of the Ācārya, "the desire to know Brahman could arise in a person, who has studied Vedānta, even prior to the desire to know dharma"[34] becomes much clearer. He has conscientiously avoided stating in a simple way, "The desire to know Brahman rises prior to dharma-jijñāsā" and has carefully worded the sentence as, "The desire to know Brahman *could* arise even prior to dharma-jijñāsā." By hinting at the possibility, what the Ācārya intends to convey is that the rise of brahma-jijñāsā earlier to the dharma-jijñāsā is possible only in the case of those who by virtue of their pure minds are totally dispassionate –

[32] Cf. हृदयस्याग्रेऽवद्यति अथ जिह्वाया अथ वक्षसः इत्यथाग्रशब्दाभ्यां क्रमस्य विवक्षितत्वात्। न तथेह क्रमो विवक्षितः, श्रुत्या तयैवानन्तरमनियमस्य दर्शितत्वाद्, यदि वेतरथा ब्रह्मचर्यादेव प्रव्रजेद्गृहाद्वा वनाद्वा इति। एतावता हि वैराग्यमुपलक्षयति। अत एव यदहरेव विरजेत्तदहरेव प्रव्रजेद् इति श्रुतिः। निन्दावचनं च अविशुद्धसत्त्वपुरुषाभिप्रायम्। अविशुद्धसत्त्वो हि मोक्षमिच्छन्नालस्यात् तदुपायेऽप्रवर्तमानो गृहस्थधर्ममपि नित्यनैमित्तिकमनाचरन्प्रतिक्षणमुपचीयमानपाप्मा अधोगतिं गच्छतीत्यर्थः। – भामती

Also, cf. एतदुक्तं भवति यदि जन्मान्तरकृतकर्मभिः शुद्धं चित्तं, तदा ब्रह्मचर्यादेव सन्न्यस्य ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यम्। यदि न शुद्धमिति रागेण ज्ञायते, तदा गृही भवेत्, तत्राप्यशुद्धौ वनी भवेत्, तत्राप्यशुद्धौ तथैव कालमाकलयेत्, वने शुद्धौ प्रव्रजेदिति। – रत्नप्रभा

[33] Cf. ननु तर्ह्यानन्तर्याभिधानमुखेन क्रमप्रतिपत्त्यर्थो भवत्वित्याशङ्क्याह—यथेति। हृदयस्याग्रेऽवद्यत्यथ जिह्वाया अथ वक्षसः इत्यथाग्रेशब्दाभ्यां क्रमस्य विवक्षितत्वादित्यर्थः। न तथेति। एककर्तृकाणां युगपदनुष्ठानासम्भवे क्रमो भवति, एककर्तृत्वं त्वङ्गाङ्गिनोरङ्गानां च बहूनामेकाङ्गिसम्बन्धिनामधिकारान्तरप्रयुक्तयुपजीविनां च भवति। न चात्रान्यतमसत्त्वे श्रुत्यादिप्रमाणमस्तीत्यर्थः। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

[34] Refer to Section 7 D, n.2.

which dispassion is indeed a rare commodity! As far as others are concerned, they have to diligently perform their prescribed duties to gain the necessary purity of mind and the resultant dispassion which awaken brahma-jijñāsā.

We have already seen that this carefully worded statement of the Ācārya, which establishes the possibility of brahma-jijñāsā occurring prior to dharma-jijñāsā, logically demolishes the reasoning of the cause and effect relation (kāryakāraṇa-sambandha) and the benefactor and the beneficiary relation (upakāryopakāraka-sambandha) which the opponent presents as existing between the dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā. This logical argument itself could dismiss the present argument of the Pūrvapakṣin too.[35] Yet, the Ācārya prefers to deal with this Pūrvapakṣin's argument in a different manner because, while the previous Pūrvapakṣin based his argument on logical grounds, the present Pūrvapakṣin has based his analysis on an analogy he has drawn from the Vedic sacrificial practice and the Vedic injunction pertaining to it as well as on the basis of a declaration found in the *Jābāla-upaniṣad*. Hence, the Ācārya rebuts this Pūrvapakṣin too, not merely on the basis of logic – for logic is ineffective if it goes counter to Scriptural declaration – but takes direct recourse to Śruti and offers his cogent criticism of the Pūrvapakṣin's viewpoint.

4. Also, there is no Scriptural sanction on the relation of the principal and the subsidiary...between the desire to know dharma and the desire to know Brahman: The Pūrvapakṣin makes another effort to substantiate his earlier standpoint that brahma-jijñāsā (desire to know Brahman) is necessarily preceded by dharma-jijñāsā (desire for the knowledge of Vaidika-karma) and karmāvabodha (knowledge of Vaidika-karma) by linking brahma-jijñāsā on the one hand and dharma-jijñāsā and karmāvabodha on the other as the principal and the subsidiary (śeṣa-śeṣi-bhāva).

This relationship of the principal (śeṣī) and the subsidiary (śeṣa) can be exemplified through the well-known Vedic sacrifices, the Darśapūrṇamāsa-iṣṭi and its subsidiaries.[36] This sacrifice consists of six independent rites. Of

[35] Refer to Section 7 D, n.3.

[36] The Darśapūrṇamāsa-iṣṭi consists of two sacrifices which are performed on the new moon

them, the first set of three rites – Āgneya, Aindraṁ-dadhi and Aindraṁ-payaḥ – are observed on the new moon day. Hence, they are collectively known as 'Darśa'. The second set of three – Āgneya, Upāṁśu and Agnīṣomīya – are performed on the full moon day. Hence, these three are collectively termed 'Pūrṇamāsa'. Consequently, the entire sacrificial rite gets the appellation 'Darśapūrṇamāsa-iṣṭi'.

Each one of the above six sacrifices is an independent principal (śeṣī) by itself. Yet, these independent principal rites are enjoined for achieving one common purpose, namely the heaven.[37] In this way, these six principal rites (śeṣī) are mutually related through their common goal of heaven. It is only natural that since these rites cannot be performed simultaneously by a single individual, there has to be necessarily a sequence in their observance. And the sequence of these yāgas is decided by the order in which their respective mantras (chants) invoking the deities and the offering of the oblations appear in their relevant Vedic section (mantrapāṭhakrama).[38]

The Pūrṇamāsa-yāga and Darśa-yāga which consists of three rites each have five subsidiary (śeṣa) rites, collectively known as 'Pañcaprayājāḥ' (five Fore-sacrifices). The Pañcaprayājas thus become the śeṣa (subsidiary) to the śeṣī (principal) which constitute the rites of the Darśa and the Pūrṇamāsa – that is Āgneya, Aindraṁ-dadhi, Aindraṁ-payaḥ, and Āgneya, Upāṁśu, Agnīṣomīya. Each of the Pañcaprayājas though recognised as equal to one another are subsidiaries (śeṣa) to the six main yāgas (śeṣī) of the Pūrṇamāsa

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and full moon day. 'Darśa' is called so as on that day the moon stays with the sun and consequently it is not visible in the sky: *"ekatrasthitacandrārkadarśanāt darśa iti ucyate."* The term 'darśa' also stands for 'amāvāsyā' because the sun and the moon live together on that day (*amāśabdaḥ sahārthe, yasmin kāle sūryācandramasoḥ sahavāsaḥ sa kālaḥ amāvasyā*). 'Pūrṇamāsa' is called so because the moon is full on this day. It would be of advantage to note that the word 'māsa' denotes the moon. As such, the compound word 'pūrṇamāsa' is analysed as: *"pūrṇo māso yasmin kāle sa pūrṇamāsaḥ* – The time (day) when the moon has attained its full form."

[37] दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां स्वर्गकामो यजेत।

[38] Each sacrificial offering of oblation is preceded by the citing of a Mantra or chant technically termed 'purānuvākyā' (introductory chant to be recited for invoking a deity to receive the offering) and 'yājyā' (the chant to be recited at the moment of offering the oblation) – *purānuvākyāmanūcya yājyayā juhoti.* These two are jointly known as 'yājyā-purānuvākye'. These chants are found arranged in a certain sequence in the relevant portion of the Veda known as 'yājyā-purānuvākyā-kāṇḍa' (portion containing chants pertaining to invocation and oblation).

and the Darśa. This is because the Pañcaprayājas have a single common purpose of benefiting (upakāra) the main sacrifices (śeṣī), that is the Āgneya, Aindraṁ-dadhi and so on, which are the upakārya (beneficiary), and they all collectively produce the single final result of heaven. Since it is impossible for a single individual to simultaneously perform the Pañcaprayājas, the brāhmaṇa portion of the Veda that deals with injunctions enjoins these Pañcaprayājas in the following order: *"samidho yajati, tanūnapataṁ yajati, iḍo yajati, barhir yajati, svāhākāraṁ yajati."*

Keeping this concept of śeṣaśeṣi-bhāva and the necessary order of succession in mind, the Pūrvapakṣin presents his case in the following way: The dharma-jijñāsā and the brahma-jijñāsā are together purported to have a single goal of Liberation.[39] Here, dharma-jijñāsā is meant to be the benefactor (upakāraka) and the subsidiary (śeṣa) for the beneficiary (upakārya) brahma-jijñāsā and hence the principal (śeṣī), that is the direct means for Liberation. This being the case, they are to be observed by a single individual, and the sequence of their performance – as in the case of the Pañcaprayājas is to be determined, naturally, by the order in which they occur in the Veda. The earlier part of the Veda is the karma-kāṇḍa that deals with dharma-jijñāsā while the later portion is the Vedānta (Upaniṣads) which expounds brahma-jijñāsā. Therefore, the latter brahma-jijñāsā is to come in the immediate succession to the former dharma-jijñāsā. In this manner, the Pūrvapakṣin asserts that the sequential occurrence of dharma-jijñāsā being followed by brahma-jijñāsā should alone be the true purport of the word 'atha' occurring in the aphorism *"athāto brahmajijñāsā."*

The Ācārya refutes the above thesis. He points out that there is no Scriptural authority that lays down that brahma-jijñāsā and dharma-jijñāsā are related as the principal (śeṣī) and the subsidiary (śeṣa) resulting in the single goal of Liberation, just as the Pañcaprayājas are related to the six principal yāgas of the Darśa and the Pūrṇamāsa in śeṣaśeṣi-bhāva resulting in the single goal of heaven. The fact is this: A relation of the principal and the subsidiary (śeṣaśeṣi-bhāva) between any two or more observances is possible only if

[39] Cf. एकमोक्षफलत्वेन एककर्तृकत्वं स्यादेव। – रत्नप्रभा

they are related like the Pañcaprayājas (śeṣa) to the six principal rites of the Darśapūrṇamāsa-yāga (śeṣī) by contributing to the attainment of a single goal (ekaphala), by being ordained on and performed by a single individual (eka-adhikāri-kartṛka), enjoined by a single Scriptural injunction (eka-prayojana-vacana-gṛhīta), and by being related to a single specific period of time (eka-kāla-sambandha). But, in no way can brahma-jijñāsā and the dharma-jijñāsā enter into such a relation of the principal and the subsidiary (śeṣaśeṣi-bhāva) since none of these above-stipulated conditions can exist between them. That the texts pertaining to the dharma-jijñāsā are found in the earlier part of the Veda and those concerned with brahma-jijñāsā are usually found in the later part is not reason enough to pre-suppose the śeṣaśeṣi-bhāva and construe the consequent sequence between dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā. In this respect they are like the texts pertaining to the multifarious yāgas – Saurya, Vāyavya, Prājāpatya, Vaiṣṇava and so on – which are all absolutely independent of one another and which are to performed separately for their varied results by different individuals, choosing their own convenient periods of time and not adhering to any specific sequence in which injunctions concerning them occur in the Veda.

Keeping all these relevant points in mind the Ācārya affirms: There is no Scriptural sanction on the relation of the principal and the subsidiary between dharma-jijñāsā (desire to know dharma) and brahma-jijñāsā (desire to know Brahman).[40]

5. Also, there is no Scriptural sanction...on the relation of the eligibility of the already eligible between the desire to know dharma and the desire to know Brahman:[41] The Pūrvamīmāṁsā-darśana delineates a principle

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[40] Cf. शेषाणां समिदादीनां शेषिणां चाग्नेयादीनाम् एकफलवदुपकारोपनिबद्धानाम् एकफलावच्छिन्नानाम् एकप्रयोग-वचनोपगृहीतानाम् एकाधिकारिकर्तृकाणाम् एकपौर्णमास्यमावास्याकालसम्बद्धानां युगपदनुष्ठानाशक्तेः, सामर्थ्यात्क्रमप्राप्तौ तद्विशेषापेक्षायां पाठादयस्तद्भेदनियमाय प्रभवन्ति। यत्र तु न शेषशेषिभावः नाप्येकाधिकारावच्छेदः यथा सौर्यार्यमण्यप्राजापत्यादीनां, तत्र क्रमभेदापेक्षाभावान्न पाठादिः क्रमविशेषनियमे प्रमाणम्, अवर्जनीयतया तस्य तत्रावगतत्वात्। न चेह धर्मब्रह्मजिज्ञासयोः शेषशेषिभावे श्रुत्यादीनामन्यतमं प्रमाणमस्तीति। – भामती

Also, cf. नापि समुदितरूपेणैकफलसाधनत्वरूपं शेषित्वमिति न क्रमाकाङ्क्षेति भावः। – प्रदीप

[41] Here the intended anvaya (syntactical relationship) between the words of the sentence as shown in the commentaries like the *Bhāmatī* is: *"dharmabrahmajijñāsayoḥ śeṣaśeṣitve pramāṇābhāvād, dharmabrahmajijñāsayoḥ adhikṛtādhikāre vā pramāṇābhāvāt."*

having a bearing on the nature of the sequence. The required eligibility (adhikāra) for performing a certain act lies only with the individual who is already eligible (adhikṛta) for undertaking a related Vedic rite. This is termed 'adhikṛtādhikāra', that is the 'eligibility of the one already eligible'.

In order to explain this relationship of the eligibility (adhikāri) of the one who is already eligible (adhikṛta) – adhikṛtādhikāra – let us take up the injunctive Scriptural sentence, *"darśapūrṇamāsābhyām īṣṭvā somena yajeta* – Having performed the Darśapūrṇamāsa sacrifice, one should perform the Soma-yāga." Here the person who has already performed (adhikṛta) the Darśapūrṇamāsa-yāga alone becomes eligible, that is has the adhikāra to perform the Soma-yāga.

To elucidate the concept of 'adhikṛta-adhikāra', most commentators invoke another example from the context of Vedic rituals. During the course of the Darśapūrṇamāsa-yāga that is performed to gain heaven, one of the rituals observed is the Ap-praṇayana (fetching and sprinkling water rite). The Vedic injunction ordains that the water (ap) is to be fetched (praṇayana) using a sacrificial wooden vessel termed 'camasa'. The injunction further stipulates that if one is however desirous of an additional benefit of cattle in this present life, apart from that of heaven after death, he is enjoined to use the godohana-pātra (milk-pail) during the course of the Ap-praṇayana ritual for the purpose of fetching and sprinkling water in lieu of the camasa vessel.[42] From this it is obvious that only the performer of the Darśapūrṇamāsa-yāga has the right (adhikāra) to use the godohana-pātra (milk-pail) for the Ap-praṇayana ritual and not the one who is not the performer of the Darśapūrṇamāsa-yāga.[43] The godohana-pātra (milk-pail) thus serves a dual function of not only being 'kratvartha', that is it serves the purpose of the rite by being a necessary part of the Darśapūrṇamāsa-yāga but also for 'puruṣārtha', that is it serves the purpose of the performer too by begetting for him the additional benefit of cattle.[44]

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[42] The injunction pertaining to this is: *"camasena āpaḥ praṇayed godohanena paśukāmasya."*

[43] Cf. स्वर्गकामस्य हि दर्शपूर्णमासाधिकृतस्य पशुकामस्य सतः दर्शपूर्णमासकर्त्वर्थाप्रणयनाश्रिते गोदोहने अधिकारः। – भामती

[44] Cf. तस्मात् कर्त्वर्थाप्रणयनाश्रितत्वाद् गोदोहनस्य तत्कर्मेण पुरुषार्थमपि गोदोहनं कर्मवद् इति सिद्धम्। – भामती

The Pūrvapakṣin is of the view that the same principle of sequence that arises because of adhikṛta-adhikāra-bhāva – as elucidated in the example of the Darśapūrṇamāsa-yāga and Soma-yāga as well as in the example of the Darśapūrṇamāsa-yāga and Ap-praṇayana ritual using the godohana-pātra[45] – is definitely applicable in the present case of dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā too.

To explain: The Vedic injunction (*Tai.Ā.*2.19) *"svādhyāyo'dhyetavyaḥ"* enjoins that one should learn one's own branch of the Veda along with its full purport. It is dharma-jijñāsā that is the necessary means for karmāvabodha (knowledge of the Vedic rites), which is the purport of the Veda. This dharma-jijñāsā in the illustration is similar to the Ap-praṇayana ritual that is an essential aspect in the performance of the Darśapūrṇamāsa-yāga. Brahma-jijñāsā is also meant for acquiring the knowledge of the purport of the Veda, albeit that of the Upaniṣadic section, and is meant for the optional additional benefit of Liberation for the person who is already engaged in the enjoined act of karmāvabodha (knowledge of the Vedic rites) rising from dharma-jijñāsā.

To further delineate: Just as the use of godohana-pātra for the Ap-praṇayana ritual during the course of the performance of the Darśapūrṇamāsa-yāga is enjoined for the additional benefit of cattle so too the individual can optionally take recourse to brahma-jijñāsā for the additional result of Liberation even while remaining engaged in dharma-jijñāsā for gaining karmāvabodha (knowledge of Vedic rites) and not otherwise. Thus, dharma-jijñāsā is associated with two benefits: (1) by itself it leads to karmāvabodha (knowledge of the Vedic rituals) and (2) by depending on the brahma-jijñāsā during the course of dharma-jijñāsā, it begets for the person the additional benefit of Liberation too.[46]

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[45] This second illustration of the Ap-praṇayana ritual with the godohana-pātra (milk-pail) assumes significance, for the Ācārya himself has invoked this example to elucidate the concept of adhikṛta-adhikāra while commenting on one of the later Sūtras.
Cf. तेष्वपि अधिकृताधिकारात् प्रकृतापूर्वसन्निकर्षेणैव फलकल्पना युक्ता गोदोहनादिनियमवत्। – ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्य (४.१.६)

[46] For ease of understanding, we may compare and contrast the dṛṣṭānta with the dārṣṭāntika:

In this way, the Pūrvapakṣin delineates that adhikṛtādhikāra decides the sequence of dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā: the dharma-jijñāsā being first, and the brahma-jijñāsā later. Thus the individual who had attained karmāvabodha by dharma-jijñāsā (i.e. the adhikārin or one who is already eligible) alone becomes capable (i.e. has the adhikāra or the eligibility) for attaining Liberation through brahma-jijñāsā and not the one who is bereft of dharma-jijñāsā (desire for knowing Vedic rituals) and its resultant karmāvabodha (knowledge of Vedic rituals).

The Ācārya dismisses the contentious thesis of the Pūrvapakṣin concerning the sequence that brahma-jijñāsā is to be preceded by dharma-jijñāsā in consonance with the principle of adhikṛtādhikāra, by pointing out that there is no Scriptural evidence for the application of adhikṛtādhikāra in the context of dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā. To explain: In the case of the Ap-praṇayana ritual with the godohana-pātra (milk-pail) there is a specific injunction[47] that becomes the basis for the sequence by enjoining the fetching of water with the godohana-pātra (milk-pail) thus investing it with the double benefit of contributing to the performance of the Darśapūrṇamāsa-yāga (kratvartha) and the obtainment of cattle (puruṣārtha). Hence, it is a befitting case for the application of the principle of sequence through the relation of adhikṛtādhikāra (the eligibility of the one already eligible). But there is no such authority[48] for applying the principle of adhikṛtādhikāra in the case of

S.No	Aspects	Dṛṣṭānta	Dārṣṭāntika
1	Performance	Darśapūrnamāsa-yāga	Svādhyāya
2	Subsidiary act	Ap-praṇayana ritual with camasa-pātra	Dharma-jijñāsā
3	Result	Svargaprāpti	Karmāvabodha
4	Optional subsidiary act	Ap-praṇayana ritual with godohana-pātra	Dharma-jijñāsā with brahma-jijñāsā
5	Optional additional result	Paśu-prāpti	Mokṣa-prāpti

[47] Vide *"camasenāpaḥ praṇayet, godohanena paśukāmasya* – One should fetch water with the camasa-pātra for the water sprinkling ritual, but if the performer has the desire for cattle he is enjoined to fetch water for the ritual with the milk-pail."

[48] That is some specific injunction like *"dharmajijñāsayā vedārtham vijānīyāt brahmajijñāsayā mokṣakāmasya* – One should have the knowledge of the purport of the Veda through dharma-jijñāsā but if one is desirous of Liberation, then one is enjoined to have the desire to know Brahman."

dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā. Contrarily, we have observed that there is the possibility of brahma-jijñāsā arising even prior to dharma-jijñāsā in the case of those who have studied the Vedānta.[49] This demolishes the thesis relating to the sequence between dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā – the former being first and the latter being the next – built by the opponent based on the adhikṛtādhikāra-bhāva. Consequently, brahma-jijñāsā does not arise by virtue of dharma-jijñāsā but has its own independent cause.[50]

Undoubtedly, many subtle principles of the Pūrvamīmāṁsā-darśana have been applied and discussed in the Vedānta-darśana. However, this feature does not become the basis for the sequential order between dharma-jijñāsā (desire to know dharma) and brahma-jijñāsā (the desire to know Brahman). Besides, a great many principles of logic too have found place in the Vedānta-darśana while discussing its salient tenets. For example, we observe that the present section commenced with an important logical principle of cause and effect relation (kāryakāraṇa-bhāva). Standing on the firm ground of this logical dictum, the Ācārya has succeeded in refuting all the points put forward by the opponents who presume that they have the firm backing of the principles of Pūrva-mīmāṁsā. Also, the perusal of the structure of the *Brahma-sūtras* evinces that almost all the aphorisms are syllogistic propositions (anumāna-prayoga) specially expounded in the Nyāya-darśana. Despite the fact that the Vedāntic inquiry teems with discussions based on the science of logic, one cannot draw a conclusion that brahma-jijñāsā should necessarily follow nyāya-jijñāsā.

Also, the Pūrvapakṣins in this section, who are the pre-Śaṅkara exponents of the *Brahma-sūtra,* have invoked numerous Mīmāṁsa principles to establish that brahma-jijñāsā could arise only in the immediate succession to dharma-jijñāsā which according to them is the legitimate prerequisite for the former. The Ācārya has successfully argued against each of their viewpoints without

[49] Refer to Section 7 D, n.2.

[50] The fourfold means (sādhana-catuṣṭaya) which will be elaborated in the sequel.

finding fault with any one of their Mīmāṁsā dicta notwithstanding the fact that he has convincingly established that dharma-jijñāsā is not a prerequisite of brahma-jijñāsā at all.

All these only go to prove the importance the Ācārya gives to the principles of Nyāya (logic) and Mīmāṁsā, for both of them play an important role in the Vedāntic pursuit. This will become clear from the following analysis. The desire to know Brahman (brahma-jijñāsā) wells up in an individual as a result of the sādhana-catuṣṭaya (fourfold means), like the discrimination between the Eternal and the ephemeral (nityānityavastu-viveka), strong dispassion for the worldly pleasures (vairāgya) and so on. Thereupon, being galvanised by the desire for acquiring the Knowledge of Brahman, such an individual approaches a compassionate Guru and hears and learns from him the sublime Upaniṣadic truth of the oneness of the Self. This is the first stage of 'śravaṇa' (listening) in the aspirant's spiritual pursuit. Thereafter, the aspirant ponders over and analyses what he has heard from the Master so that he can comprehend the Reality taught by him bereft of doubts. This stage is termed 'manana' (logical deliberation). At this stage he is confronted with mental blocks of the nature of doubts and misgivings as well as the challenging points of objections. These seem to shake his unflinching conviction in the authenticity of what the Master has taught him for the subject is indeed too subtle to grasp. However, because of his irresistible desire to know Brahman, he again seeks guidance from the master and requests for greater clarity. The Guru advises the disciple to avoid all wrong and misleading logic and follow that discriminatory rationale that is consonant with the Upaniṣadic teaching (śrutyanusāriṇī yukti)[51] which alone can help him tide over the various mental blocks of the nature of nagging doubts and awful misgivings.

It is at this stage of manana, which is riddled with doubts and confusions, that the disciple needs the help of the well-tested principles of the Mīmāṁsā-darśana which has an advanced hermeneutical science that throws ample light on the methodology of interpreting the Vedic sentences. The Mīmāṁsā-śāstra helps the aspirant clear his doubts regarding the ultimate purport

[51] दुस्तर्कात् सुविरम्यतां श्रुतिमतस्तर्कोऽनुसन्धीयताम्। – साधनपञ्चकम्

(tātparya) of the Upaniṣadic utterances and enables him to counter the pseudo-logic (yuktyābhāsā) that is taken recourse to by other schools of philosophy. Besides the principles of the Mīmāṁsā-śāstra, the aspirant addresses himself to the logical principles expounded in the Nyāya-śāstra in order to dispel the cobweb of doubts and misgivings so that his conviction of the nature of the ultimate Truth becomes steadfast.[52] These well-tested principles of Mīmāṁsā and Nyāya abundantly figure in the *Brahma-sūtra*. Since the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā principles and the logical tools of the Nyāya-śāstra are thus certainly helpful for the aspirant in the manana stage, the Ācārya neither looks down upon them nor rejects them nor does he make any effort to minimize their importance or authenticity. All that he does in the present section is to demonstrate that the Mīmāṁsā and Nyāya principles cited by the opponents are not relevant to the present context of understanding the prior correlate of immediate succession with regard to brahma-jijñāsā.

In this context, it is worth noticing that the Ācārya has taken the compound word 'brahma-jijñāsā' occurring in the aphorism *"athāto brahmajijñāsā"* in its direct derivative sense, that is 'the desire to know Brahman'. We have observed in our earlier discussions that there is no adequate logical ground for interpreting that word 'brahma-jijñāsā' in an indirect and secondary sense as 'brahma-mīmāṁsā', that is 'the inquiry into Brahman'.[53] The pre-Śaṅkara Vṛttikāras had a strong predilection towards the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā doctrines and were under the overpowering influence of the *Mīmāṁsā-bhāṣya* of the illustrious Śabara-svāmin who has explained the compound word

[52] To illustrate the logical principles used in the stage of manana in the present section: *"āgamamātragamye dharmabrahmaṇī paurvāparyakramābhāvavatī śāstrapramāṇābhāvāt* – Knowable only by the Scriptural authority, dharma and Brahman do not have the sequence of precedence and consequence because there is no Scriptural evidence for it." Regarding the absence of sequence between dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā, this is the logical principle at use: *"asatyāṁ dharmajijñāsāyāṁ brahmajijñāsāyā abhāvaḥ. tanna. tasmād brahmajijñāsāṁ prati dharmajijñāsāyāḥ pūrvavṛttitvamapi neti siddham* – In the absence of the desire to know dharma, there exists no desire to know Brahman. Such is not the case. Therefore, dharma-jijñāsā is not slated prior to brahma-jijñāsā."

[53] Refer to Section 4 D, n.1.

'dharma-jijñāsā' of the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā-sūtra* (1.1.1) *"athāto dharmajijñāsā"* in the secondary sense of 'dharma-mīmāṁsā', that is 'inquiry into dharma or Vedic rites'. Treading the same path, the Vṛttikāras have also interpreted 'brahma-jijñāsā' in the secondary sense alone as 'brahma-mīmāṁsā', that is 'inquiry into Brahman'.

Having thus taken the expression 'brahma-jijñāsā' as a synonym of 'brahma-mīmāṁsā' (inquiry into Brahman), the Vṛttikāras are under the logical compulsion to declare that brahma-mīmāṁsā should come only next to the dharma-mīmāṁsā because brahma-mīmāṁsā is benefited by the many principles that have been analysed in-depth in the Mīmāṁsā-śāstra. This stand taken by the Vṛttikāras might have been one of the fundamental factors that contributed to the rise of the Ekaśāstratva-vāda, the theory of a single school of philosophy consisting of both the karma-mīmāṁsā and the brahma-mīmāṁsā.

6. Also, because there is difference between the result and the object of the desire to know:[54] This Bhāṣya statement also refutes the argument raised by the Pūrvapakṣin in favour of the sequential order between dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā. Sequential order between varied acts is necessitated either because of a single prescribed result (phalaikya) or because of a single intended knowable (jijñāsyaikya). As to how these two factors become the determinant factors for sequential order (krama) will become amply clear from the following analysis of the various analogies of the Vedic rites cited by the opponent.

The six main rites constituting the Darśapūrṇamāsa-iṣṭi[55] are enjoined individually by different injunctions. Hence, all the six are principal rites alone and therefore they are neither mutually related as the principal and the subsidiary (śeṣaśeṣibhāva-sambandha) nor do they have any room for the application of the principle of the eligibility of the one already eligible (adhikṛtādhikāra). Yet, all of these rites have the single goal of heaven (phalaikya) and thus they are to be necessarily performed by a single

[54] *phalajijñāsyabhedācca dharmabrahmajijñāsayoḥ* is the intended anvaya here.

[55] That is the three Darśa rites and the three Pūrṇamāsa rites. Refer to Section 7 D, n.5.

individual (ekādhikārin). Because all these rites cannot be performed simultaneously by a single individual, their performance should necessarily conform to an order of sequence (krama). How is the sequence between these six principal rites of the Darśapūrṇamāsa-yāga determined? We do not see any explicit Vedic injunction like the one we see in the Paśubandha-yāga.[56] Yet, there has to be some basis by which we can arrive at the sequential order. In the absence of an explicit Vedic statement enjoining the order of sequence, or in the absence the śeṣaśeṣi-bhāva, or the adhikṛtādhikāra – all of which could also become the determinants in deciding the order of sequence – the sequential order is decided based on the order in which the mantras pertaining to the six rites of the Darśapūrṇamāsa-yāga occur in the related Vedic section.

Thus, it is the presence of a single fruit (phalaikya) for the varied rites that become the primary determinant for necessitating the sequential order of the rites regardless of the different means like a direct Vedic injunction, or śeṣaśeṣibhāva-sambandha, or the adhikṛtādhikāra-sambandha, or the order of the presentation of the rituals in the related Vedic section – albeit all of which in turn become the determining factors for deciding the exact order of the performance of the different Vedic rites.

All the varied analogies of Vedic rites cited so far by the opponents in the sections expounded so far – Āhutis in the Paśubandha sacrifice, the six principal rites of the Darśapūrṇamāsa-yāga, the five Prayājas and the rites of the Darśapūrṇamāsa-yāga, the camasa-pātra being replaced by the godohana-pātra in the Ap-praṇayana ritual of the Darśapūrṇamāsa-yāga – all of them are in no way compatible analogies that could enable us to establish the sequence between dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā because there is a fundamental difference that exists between dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā and the instances of Vedic rites cited by the opponents. This will become abundantly clear from the following analysis.

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[56] *"hṛdayasyāgre'vadyati atha jihvāyā atha vakṣasaḥ* – One should cut the heart first, then the tongue, then the sides." This injunction specifies the order of the sequence by virtue of the words 'agre' (first) and 'atha' (then). (*Taittirīya-saṁhitā*, 6.3.10)

In the Paśubandha sacrifice,[57] the avadāna (apportioning) of the heart, the tongue and the sides are all intended for a single purpose consisting in the āhuti (oblation), and thus is to be performed by a single individual. Hence, there has to be a sequence in their performance. In the absence of the relation of the principal and the subsidiary (śeṣaśeṣi-bhāva) or the relation of the eligibility of the one already eligible (adhikṛtādhikāra) – all of which could become determinants for the sequential order – we have observed that the sequence comes to be determined by a specific injunction that prescribes it.[58] But dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā have totally different results (phalabheda) and hence they cannot be undertaken by a single individual. So, the question of a sequence between them does not arise at all.

The six independent Darśa and Pūrṇamāsa rites of the Darśapūrṇamāsa-yāga[59] are not connected by the relation of the principal and the subsidiary (śeṣaśeṣi-bhāva) or by the relation of the eligibility of the already eligible (adhikṛtādhikāra). Yet, they are enjoined by a single injunction[60] to confer a single common reward of heaven (phalaikya). Thus enjoined for a single purpose, they are to be observed in a specific sequence by a single adhikārin. In the absence of any other determinant of the sequence like a specific injunction giving the sequential order as in the case of the Paśubandha sacrifice or the relation of śeṣaśeṣī or adhikṛtādhikāra, their sequence has to be determined by the order in which the mantras of their oblations occur in the related Scriptural text. If dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā were enjoined for a single reward or if they were ordained by a single injunction or if there existed the relation of śeṣaśeṣī and adhikṛtādhikāra then, dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā too might have to be observed in a specific sequence alone by a single adhikārin. But, dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā have altogether different results and they are also not comprehended by a single injunction. Hence, in the absence of any determinants of the sequence (i.e. single fruit

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[57] For Paśubandha-yāga, refer to Section 7 D, n.3.

[58] हृदयस्याग्रेवद्यत्यथ जिह्वाया अथ वक्षसः। – तैत्तिरीयसंहिता (६.३.१०)

[59] For Darśapūrṇamāsa-yāga and the śeṣa-śeṣi-bhāva, refer to Section 7 D, n.4.

[60] दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां स्वर्गकामो यजेत।

and the consequent single adhikārin and so on) no fixed sequence whatsoever can be postulated between dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā.

The Ap-praṇayana ritual with the sacrificial camasa-pātra during the course of the Darśapūrṇamāsa-yāga is enjoined for the purpose of the sacrifice proper (kratvartha) while the godohana-pātra (milk-pail) is subsequently enjoined as a substitute for the camasa-pātra for the sacrificer's personal benefit (puruṣārtha), that is the cattle.[61] Yet, the godohana-pātra (milk-pail) itself could beget both these benefits – kratvartha and puruṣārtha – provided it is used by the eligible sacrificer (adhikṛta-adhikārin) in the already enjoined Ap-praṇayana ritual. Thus, for the individual who is performing the Darśapūrṇamāsa-yāga, the principle of adhikṛtādhikāra (eligibility of the one already eligible) becomes the determinant of the sequence within the ambit of the Darśapūrṇamāsa-yāga between the limbs of the said Yāga and the Ap-praṇayana ritual with the godohana-pātra. But in the case of dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā, it is not stated, nay not even hinted at, in the entire Vedic corpus that brahma-jijñāsā (desire for the Knowledge of Brahman) begets the personal benefit of Liberation (niḥśreyasa) and also yields prosperity (abhyudaya) by becoming a part of the already prescribed dharma-jijñāsā (desire for the knowledge of Vedic rituals) imparted in the Mīmāṁsā-darśana. Therefore, there is no question of a sequential order between dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā on the basis of the eligibility of the one already eligible.

The foregoing analysis of different illustrations of the Vedic rites sheds light on how the sequence becomes a necessity only in those cases in which two or more acts ordained by single injunction are mutually connected by a single goal and hence are to be undertaken by a single individual.

Besides the prescribed single fruit (phalaikya) for the varied rites necessitating a sequence, the sequential order can also arise when there is a single intended knowable (jijñāsyaikya). To illustrate: The four chapters of the *Brahma-sūtra* deal with four different topics – samanvaya (i.e. the harmony of the Vedāntic doctrines), avirodha (i.e. non-contradiction of the

[61] Refer to Section 7 D, n.5.

Vedānta doctrines with the Smṛti and logic), sādhana (means for Brahma-vidyā) and phala (result of Brahma-vidyā).[62] These four topical themes are to be studied by a single individual in a prescribed sequence since all of them cannot be studied simultaneously. Among these chapters there is no śeṣaśeṣibhāva-sambandha or adhikṛtādhikāra-sambandha determining the sequence. In this context, the determinant of the order of sequence is a clear and comprehensive understanding of the subject of inquiry. In such cases, the topical themes are to be carefully arranged in a viable and logical sequence, then studied and thoroughly analysed one by one, in the prescribed order, by a person who is interested in gaining an absolute mastery over the subject. Thus we observe that the topical themes of the four chapters of the *Brahma-sūtra* are discoursed by the Preceptors in a specific order of sequence and disciples too master the four chapters in that very stipulated order alone since all of them are connected by a single topical theme that is desired to be thoroughly understood (jijñāsyaikya), that is the Realisation of Brahman.[63]

However, so far as dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā are concerned they are not so connected by a single intended knowable (jijñāsyaikya), that is a common single subject desired to be known. On the one hand, the subject of the dharma-jijñāsā of the *Pūrva-mīmāṁsā* is karma, the knowledge of which leads to bondage and does not vouchsafe emancipation. On the other hand, the subject of the brahma-jijñāsā of the *Śārīraka-mīmāṁsā* is the oneness of the Self, the Knowledge of which confers Liberation. Thus the topical themes of these two – dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā – are not only diametrically opposed but are also mutually incompatible and exclusive, like the darkness and light (tamaḥ-prakāśavat). Therefore, it is not necessary at all that dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā should be undertaken by a single person in a fixed order of sequence.

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[62] In this respect these four chapters resemble the six principal rites of the Darśapūrṇamāsa-iṣṭi.

[63] Cf. शेषशेषित्वाधिकृताधिकाराभावेऽपि क्रमो विवक्ष्येत यद्येकफलावच्छेदो भवेदु, यथाग्नेयादीनां षण्णामेकस्वर्गफलावच्छिन्नानां, यदि वा जिज्ञास्यब्रह्मणः अंशो धर्मः स्यादु, यथा चतुर्लक्षणीव्युत्पाद्यं ब्रह्म केनचित्केनचिदंशेनैकेन लक्षणेन व्युत्पाद्यते, तत्र चतुर्णां लक्षणानां जिज्ञास्याभेदेन परस्परसम्बन्धे सति क्रमो विवक्षितः, तथेहाप्येकजिज्ञास्यतया धर्मब्रह्मजिज्ञासयोः क्रमो विवक्ष्येत, न चैतदुभयमप्यस्तीत्याह—फलजिज्ञास्यभेदाच्च। – भामती

A significant argument still remains to be addressed: The term 'dharma' the first member of the compound word 'dharma-jijñāsā' occurring in the first aphorism of the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā-sūtra*, *"athāto dharmajijñāsā,"* is interpreted to signify 'vedārtha' (the purport of the Veda) in general. It has been accepted by one and all that both karma and Brahman are the purports of the Veda, which, to all intents and purposes, has been subscribed to by the Siddhāntin himself when he states that dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā are to be undertaken after the study of one's own section of the Veda.[64] Therefore, the desire to know the purport of the Veda – that is dharma-jijñāsā – encompasses both the desire to know karma and Brahman. Thus the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā-sūtra* (1.1.1), *"athāto dharmajijñāsā,"* itself envisages the Vedānta-darśana also. Consequent upon this, both these dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā become all the more connected by a single common result (phalaikya) consisting in knowing the purport of the Veda which is itself the single intended subject which is desired to be known (jijñāsyaikya). Therefore, it becomes all the more obligatory that dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā are to be undertaken by a single person in the order of sequence already alluded to. Hence, it is only proper that the word 'atha' of the aphorism signifies that necessary sequence of brahma-jijñāsā to be preceded by dharma-jijñāsā.

The above interpretation of the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā-sūtra* (1.1.1), *"athāto dharmajijñāsā,"* which has become the basis for the Pūrvapakṣin to build up the thesis of Ekaśāstratva-vāda as described above, is logically untenable and factually erroneous. For, in the very next aphorism (*Pū.Mī.Sū.*1.1.2), Jaimini, the author, himself specifically defines dharma as *"codanālakṣaṇo'rtho dharmaḥ* – Dharma is that which is ordained by an injunction to attain a desired result." Therefore, it is certain that the word 'dharma' in the first aphorism, *"athāto dharmajijñāsā,"* is not intended to signify the 'vedārtha' or 'the general purport of the Veda' as the opponent construes but rather denotes what Śabara-svāmin, the illustrious Mīmāṁsā-bhāṣyakāra interprets, that is the sacred Vedic rites like Jyotiṣṭoma, Darśapūrṇamāsa and so on which

[64] *"svādhyāyānantaryaṁ tu samānam* – Immediate succession to the study of one's own section of the Veda is however common." Refer to Section 5 D, n.3.

are enjoined for specific desired results like heaven by the Vedic injunctions that have employed the conjugated forms of the verbs like 'yaj' (to perform sacrifice), 'hu' (to offer oblation) and so on.[65] Under the Samanvaya-sūtra (*B.S.*1.1.4), the Ācārya himself is going to establish that Brahman is not an entity that can become an object of an injunction pertaining to contemplation (pratipattividhi), much less an object of an injunction ordaining a sacrificial act. For the reasons mentioned above it is impossible to accept the view that the expression 'dharma-jijñāsā' (the desire to know dharma) should also encompass brahma-jijñāsā (the desire to know Brahman).[66]

In an earlier section[67] we have conclusively delineated that Jaimini, the author of the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā-sūtra*, could not have used in his first aphorism *"athāto dharmajijñāsā"* the word 'dharma' in the sense of 'purport of the Veda' in general so as to invest the compound word 'dharma-jijñāsā' of that aphorism with the additional signification of including brahma-jijñāsā (desire to know Brahman) also.[68] It can reasonably be asserted that Bādarāyaṇa, the

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[65] Cf. यजतिशब्दवाच्यमेव धर्मं समामनन्ति...कोर्थः। यो निःश्रेयसाय, ज्योतिष्टोमादिः। – शबरभाष्य (१.१.२)

[66] Vide *"satyaṁ vedārthatvena dharmabrahmaṇorasti sāmyaṁ, tathā'pi pravartakavākyārthatva-siddhārthavākyārthatvābhyāṁ vailakṣaṇyamaparihāraṇīyameva* – Both karma and Brahman are one as the purport of the Veda, but this does not imply that their investigations are to be undertaken in a sequence. They both are divergent because dharma-jijñāsā dwells upon injunctions about the acts to be brought into existence while brahma-jijñāsā delineates that which is eternally existent." (*Pradīpa*)

Further, even considering that both the karma and Brahman are the purport of the Veda, this fact does not warrant the hypothesis that their respective deliberations are to be conducted in a particular sequence. For example, the different sacrifices to be offered to different deities like Sūrya, Vāyu, and so on (i.e. Sauryeṣṭi, Vāyavyeṣṭi, etc.), though are purports of the Veda, yet, the sacrificers (śiṣṭāḥ yājñikāḥ) are not in any way obliged to undertake their deliberation or perform these rites in any specific sequence.

[67] Refer to Section 4 D, n.5.

[68] Vide *"codanālakṣaṇasya dharmatve'bhidhīyamāne dharmasya vā codanālakṣaṇatve, vedārthastvetāvān iti na nirṇītaṁ bhavati, codanādharmaśabdayorvedatadarthābhidhāyitvābhāvāt, yathā yaccākṣuṣaṁ tadrūpamityukte na sarvasya pratyakṣasya rūpamartham ityuktaṁ bhavati, tadvaditi bhāvaḥ* – Whether dharma is defined in terms of codanā (injunction) or codanā is defined in terms of dharma – this does not lead to the implication that the purport of the Veda gets exhausted by such a definition because the terms codanā and dharma do not convey the full sense of the purport of the Veda. To illustrate, if it is said that the form is an object of visual perception, this does not mean that form exhausts all the instances of perception – auditory, olfactory, gustatory and so on." (*Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa*)

Brahmasūtrakāra, too does not at all consider the word 'dharma-jijñāsā' to be inclusive of the brahma-jijñāsā (desire to know Brahman). Had it been so, the first aphorism of the *Brahma-sūtra* on the desire to know Brahman would become irrelevant and redundant because the compound word 'dharma-jijñāsā' in the first aphorism of the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā-sūtra* (1.1.1) *"athāto dharmajijñāsā"* would have included this sense within its expansive scope. Further, Bādarāyaṇa would not have commenced an independent inquiry (pṛthak-śāstra) on the Vedānta-darśana. In the event of commencing an additional inquiry, Bādarāyaṇa would have constructed the first aphorism of the *Brahma-sūtra* in such a fashion as to make the Śārīraka-mīmāṁsā a continuation of the dharma-mīmāṁsā.[69]

Thus, by no stretch of imagination can one accord dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā a single common result (phalaikya) and a single common intended knowable (jijñāsyaikya). In view of all these facts, dharma-jijñāsā cannot in any way become the prior correlate of immediate succession envisaged by the word 'atha' in the first aphorism of the *Brahma-sūtra* – *"athāto brahmajijñāsā."*

7. The result of the knowledge of dharma is prosperity[70] and its acquisition depends on the performance. On the other hand, the Knowledge of Brahman leads to Liberation and it is not dependent on any observance whatsoever: What has been indicated in the previous sentence by the compound word 'phalajijñāsyabhedāt' comprising three members – phala, jijñāsya and bheda – is being elaborated systematically in the ensuing remaining section.

Presently, the Ācārya critically analyses the various characteristics that distinguish the results of dharma-jijñāsā from brahma-jijñāsā. It has been already clarified that only if two or more acts have a single result, then alone do they need to be undertaken in a specific sequence by an individual who is desirous of that result. But, if the results of these acts are divergent then

[69] The Ācārya himself makes this point abundantly clear in his commentary of the Samanvaya-sūtra (1.1.4) by proposing a different construction for the first *Brahma-sūtra* aphorism as *"athātaḥ pariśiṣṭadharmajijñāsā."*

[70] The word 'abhyudaya' is usually rendered as 'prosperity'. *Ratnaprabhā* explicates the word: *"viṣayābhimukhyenodeti ityabhyudayaḥ viṣayādhīnaṁ sukhaṁ svargādikam."*

there arises no necessity of a specific sequence for executing those acts since they could be performed by distinct individuals seeking different results. Keeping this in view, the Ācārya examines whether dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā carry a single fruit, as the opponent is prone to imagine, in the event of which they would have to be necessarily undertaken only in a specific sequence by an individual.

The knowledge of dharma constitutes the object of dharma-jijñāsā. And abhyudaya (prosperity) is the fruit or result of this knowledge.[71] However, abhyudaya (prosperity) is actually the result, neither of dharma, nor of the knowledge of dharma (karmāvabodha) that is enjoined in rites like Jyotiṣṭoma, Darśapūrṇamāsa and so on, but it is rather the fruit of 'anuṣṭhāna', that is the actual performance of these enjoined rites, as understood from the study of Mīmāṁsā-darśana.[72]

But, when we analyse the result of brahma-jijñāsā (desire to know Brahman) we arrive at a diametrically opposite conclusion. The content of brahma-jijñāsā (desire to know Brahman) is the Knowledge of the true nature of Brahman, which is oneness of the Self that has been obtained by an aspirant from the Mahāvākyas (Scriptural declarations) such as *"tat tvam asi* – That thou art." This Knowledge of the oneness of the Self does not depend on an act of observance (anuṣṭhāna) or for that matter on anything other than itself for bringing about its result of Liberation (niḥśreyasa).[73] What brings about Liberation is only a sustained awareness of that very knowledge of the oneness of the Self, which the aspirant has acquired from the Mahāvākyas.[74] This sustained awareness of the oneness of the Self is

[71] Cf. विषयाभिमुख्येन उदेतीत्यभ्युदयो विषयाधीनं सुखं स्वर्गादिकं, तच्च धर्मज्ञानहेतोर्मीमांसायाः फलमित्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

[72] Such parallels are not uncommon in day-to-day life. A person afflicted with a malady visits a doctor. The doctor examines the patient, and prescribes necessary medicines for the cure. This prescription gives the patient the knowledge about the necessary medicines meant for him. However, neither the prescription, nor its knowledge, nor the medicines themselves offer him any succour. But, it is the act of actually taking the prescribed medicine that cures his malady. In just the same way, it is neither the Vedic injunction, nor the rite prescribed by it, nor one's knowledge of the rite that grants the result of abhyudaya (prosperity) but it is rather the actual and proper performance of the Vedic rite.

[73] Cf. नित्यं निरपेक्षं श्रेयो निःश्रेयसम्—मोक्षः। – रत्नप्रभा

[74] Cf. ब्रह्मज्ञानं च नानुष्ठानान्तरापेक्षम्। शाब्दज्ञानाभ्यासान्नानुष्ठानान्तरमपेक्षते, नित्यनैमित्तिककर्मानुष्ठानसहभावस्य अपास्तत्वात्—इति भावः। – भामती

not of the form of contemplation (mānasī kriyā, i.e. upāsanā)[75] much less on a par with a physical activity like the performance of the Vedic rites. The knowledge, which is thus consciously sustained by an aspirant, does not fail to be the content of brahma-jijñāsā. On the other hand, the physical activity of performing the Vedic rites is not at all the content of dharma-jijñāsā.

Thus, it is established beyond an iota of doubt that the results of the dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā are by nature diametrically opposite to each other because they are brought about differently. Consequently, a fixed order of sequence between dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā is neither needed nor plausible. This also proves the validity of the proposition made right at the beginning of this section that the desire to know Brahman may arise even prior to the desire to know dharma.[76] Therefore, the word 'atha' (then) in the aphorism cannot be taken to mean 'in the immediate succession to the knowledge of Vedic rites'.

8. Further, dharma, the object of the desire, does not exist at the time of its knowledge because its incidence depends on the activity of the person. But, in the present context of brahma-jijñāsā, the already existent Brahman, which is the object of the desire to know, does not depend upon the activity of the person because it is an eternally accomplished entity: After having decisively established that there is no possibility of an order of sequence between dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā, since their results are divergent, the Ācārya proceeds to elucidate how their intended knowables (jijñāsya) are also divergent thus establishing again that there cannot be any sequence between dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā.

Dharma or karma, the intended knowable (jijñāsya) of dharma-jijñāsā, is not existent at the time when one comes to know about it from the Vedic injunction of the Pūrvamīmāṁsā-śāstra. So also, dharma, the Vedic rite, is absent even when one ascertains it by investigating (karmāvabodha) the intricate procedures involved in its performance.[77] This is so because by

[75] This point, the Ācārya will establish in detail in the Samanvayādhikaraṇa (1.1.4).

[76] Refer to Section 7 D, n.2.

[77] Vide *"svavidhijanyajñānakāle, svamīmāṁsāmātrasādhyasya svānuṣṭhānajñānasya kāle ca nāsti*

nature dharma (i.e. the Vedic rite or karma) is yet to come into existence (bhavya) and its very emergence depends upon the performance of the rite by the individual.[78] In fact, even after its emergence, karma needs the performer's activity to be in continued existence. As a result, karma exists only during the period of the performer's activity[79] and it ceases to exist the moment the performer's effort comes to an end.[80] This complete dependence of karma on the effort of the individual is delineated by the pithy expression: *"puruṣavyāpāratantram* – wholly dependent on the effort of the person."[81] This complete dependence of karma on the individual's vyāpāra (effort) distinguishes it from the eternally existing Brahman, the intended knowable (jijñāsya) of brahma-jijñāsā.

Again, this feature of karma being utterly dependent for its birth as well as for its continuation on the person's vyāpāra (effort or activity) differentiates it from all the objects of the world like pot, cloth and so on since these depend for their emergence alone on the vyāpāra (activity) of their creators like the potter, weaver and so on but continue to exist even after the cessation of their respective creators' activities. It is evident from the above analysis that dharma (i.e. karma or Vedic rites) has a totally dependent and brief existence.

On the other hand, Brahman, the intended knowable (jijñāsya) of the desire to know Brahman (brahma-jijñāsā), exists even prior to one's Knowledge of it from the Scriptures and the Preceptor since it exists eternally, not being

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karma – The Vedic rite does not exist at the time of its knowledge that is brought about by the injunctive sentence enjoining the Vedic rule and also it does not exist at the time of the knowledge of how it ought to be performed produced by a comprehensive investigation of the rite." This fact is also suggested by Śabara-svāmin when he declares (*Pū.Mī.Bhā.*1.1.2): *"codanā hi bhūtaṁ, bhavantaṁ, bhaviṣyantaṁ ca...arthaṁ śaknotyavabodhayitum* – The injunction has the capacity to instruct on things that are past, on those that are at present, and again also on those which are yet to come about."

[78] Cf. भविता भव्यः, कर्तरि कृत्यः। भविता च भावकव्यापारनिर्वर्त्यतया तत्तत्र इति ततः प्राग्ज्ञानकाले नास्तीत्यर्थः। – भामती
Also, cf. *"ācāraprabhavo dharmaḥ* – Dharma springs from the performance of an act." (*Mahābhārata*, Anuśāsanaparva, 231.156)

[79] स्वानुष्ठानकालमात्रसत्ताकं कर्म।

[80] स्वानुष्ठानक्रियानाशक्षणनाश्यं कर्म।

[81] Cf. पुरुषव्यापारः प्रयत्नः तन्त्रं हेतुर्यस्य तत्त्वाद् इत्यर्थः। कृतिसाध्यत्वात् कृतिजनकज्ञानकाले धर्मस्य असत्त्वं, न तुच्छत्वाद् इत्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

sublated in all the three periods of time – *"trikālābādhyaṁ brahma."*[82] That is why Brahman is declared as 'Absolute Existence'. Thus, an impassable chasm exists between karma and Brahman even though they both constitute the purport of the Veda.

In this way, since the intended knowables (jijñāsya) of dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā, that is the Vedic rites and Brahman respectively, are totally different in nature, there cannot be a single intended knowable (jijñāsya) for dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā. In the absence of a single jijñāsya, dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā cannot be considered to have a sequence between them with regard to their inquiry. Hence the inquiry into dharma (Vedic rites), that is karmāvabodha, cannot be the prior correlate of the immediate succession indicated by the word 'atha' in the aphorism *"athāto brahmajijñāsā."*

9. Besides, there is also difference in the operation of the texts. To explain: The text which expounds the nature of dharma instructs man in its domain necessarily urging him to perform. On the other hand, the text pertaining to Brahman merely teaches the person and does not enjoin upon him in the domain of knowledge because knowledge is brought about by the text. To illustrate: A person need not be commanded to see the object when the visual organ is already in contact with it: After explaining the difference between dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā in terms of their phala (result) and jijñāsya (intended knowable), the Ācārya presently explains as to how they both are different even in the *modus operandi* of their respective texts. Unlike the codanā (basic text) pertaining to dharma or Vedic rites, the codanā (basic text)[83] pertaining to Brahman merely teaches the person the

[82] Vide *"sve mahimni pratiṣṭhitaḥ* – It remains established in its own greatness." (*Chā.U.*7.24.1)

[83] The term 'codanā', pertaining to the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā-darśana*, has been technically defined by Kumārila-bhaṭṭa, its renowned glossator, in his well-known work *Ślokavārtika* as *"kimādyapekṣitaiḥ pūrṇaḥ samarthaḥ pratyayo vidhau, tena pravartakaṁ vākyaṁ śāstre'smiṁścodanocyate* – 'Codanā' signifies an injunctive sentence which induces in an individual an urge to perform a Vedic rite explaining the object, the means and the manner of its performance." This definition comes to mean that 'Codanā' is the complete injunctive sentence that contains the verbal form comprising the injunctive suffix. Examples of codanā are *"jyotiṣṭhomena svargakāmo yajeta"* and *"darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṁ svargakāmo yajeta."* In

knowledge of a given entity. This will become evident from the following analysis.

The Pūrvapakṣin states that both karma and Brahman, being expounded in the Vedic texts, are essentially Vedic subjects and therefore karma and Brahman are one as the purport of the Veda – that is 'dharma'. Hence, dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā, having karma and Brahman respectively as their subject matter, are to be regarded as being connected by a single intended knowable (jijñāsyaikya), that is dharma. They must therefore have an order of sequence between them, and it is this sequential order between dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā that is indicated by the word 'atha'.

To refute this, the Ācārya has already explained how karma and Brahman are basically different on account of their respective distinguishing features of phala (result) and jijñāsya (intended knowable). In the Bhāṣya statements under consideration, the Ācārya sheds further light on their mutual differences. He establishes that even though karma and Brahman are taught by the Veda alone, the *modus operandi* of the Vedic texts that teach the knowledge of karma is utterly different from those that impart the Knowledge of Brahman.

The following are some examples of Vedic texts that enjoin rites: "*darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṁ svargakāmo yajeta* – He who is desirous of heaven shall perform the Darśapūrṇamāsā rite," "*svārājyakāmo vājapeyena yajeta* – He who longs for sovereignty should perform the Vājapeya sacrifice," "*uparāge snāyāt* – One should bathe at the time of eclipse." All these are in the form of injunctions. These karma-codanās, that is the basic texts enjoining the Vedic rites, operate in two distinct modes simultaneously: (1) they teach the

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the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā-śāstra*, Śabara-svāmin, the commentator, defines 'codanā' as "*codaneti kriyāyāḥ pravartakaṁ vacanam āhuḥ* – The learned declare that 'codanā' is the Vedic injunctive statement that urges an individual to perform an act." But, in this Bhāṣya passage, the word 'codanā' is not interpreted in the sense of 'injunction' alone, in the manner of the traditional Mīmāṁsakas, but also in the sense of 'upadeśa' (teaching) in general, that is a Vedic sentence that imparts the knowledge of a given thing. Hence, the term 'codanā' here stands for 'the fundamental texts' or 'basic texts' that form the primary sources of knowledge. The word that denotes a particular entity, that is an injunction, is used to imply the class, that is the Vedic text. Vide "*codaneti vaidikaṁ śabdamāha, viśeṣeṇa sāmānyasya lakṣaṇāt.*" (*Bhāmatī*) Also, vide "*ajñātajñāpakaṁ vākyamatra codanā.*" (*Ratnaprabhā*)

person the knowledge about karma, that is the rite and (2) they also urge the individual to perform the act (vyāpāra) by creating in him an inclination or urge (mānasī pravṛtti) to undertake the enjoined Vedic rite. These two simultaneous acts of imparting the knowledge of a Vedic rite and urging the individual to perform the Vedic rite constitute the two inseparable facets of the *modus operandi* of an injunctive sentence.

It is the very nature of an injunction pertaining to karma (karma-codanā) to be invested with this kind of bi-functional *modus operandi*. To explain: A 'codanā', that is an injunctive sentence, refers to the 'pravartanā' or 'preraṇā' (intention to prompt) of the ordainer (preraka) of the injunction (codanā). This is evident because on receiving the codanā, the injunctive command from the ordainer, the individual becomes aware of the pravartanā, the ordainer's (preraka) intention to prompt the act. Unless this pravartanā (act of prompting) of the ordainer – either of a person or of a Vedic injunctive sentence – generates in the individual the mānasī pravṛtti (inclination to act) having the actual performance of the Vedic rite (yajña-vyāpāra) as its object, the codanā (injunction) cannot urge the individual to perform the Vedic rite. This codanā-generated mānasī pravṛtti alone brings about the actual performance of the rite and confers upon the individual a result (phala) such as the heaven. It is to be noted that the prompted person's (prerya) inclination or mānasī pravṛtti does not carry any significance by itself if it does not lead to the performance of the Vedic rite which alone can confer on the individual his desired result. Thus, for its very existence, the codanā-generated mental inclination (mānasī pravṛtti) of the prompted person is in need of an object in the form of an operational function (vyāpāra) like cooking food (pāka-vyāpāra), bringing cow (gavānayana-vyāpāra), performing a rite (yāgānuṣṭhāna-vyāpāra) and so on.[84] Hence, in the final analysis, the codanā's operational function pertaining to the dharma (Vedic rite) depends on the activity (vyāpāra) of a person for its emergence and existence. In this way, in its very nature, the codanā (injunction) while teaching a Vedic rite

[84] This bi-functional *modus operandi* is common in all the injunctions, be they empirical or Scriptural.

has also to urge a person (mānasī pravṛtti) to an activity with regard to that Vedic rite (yāga-vyāpāra). It is thus evident that codanā is bi-functional in its *modus operandi* in that it generates knowledge as well as urges the individual to perform the action.

On the other hand, the Upaniṣadic Mahāvākyas (declarations) operate in a different manner in that they merely impart the Knowledge of oneness of the Self without urging the individual to act or even without urging upon him to know. To explain: The Upaniṣadic Mahāvākyas such as: "*tat tvam asi* – That thou art," "*ahaṁ brahmāsmi* – I am Brahman," "*idaṁ sarvaṁ yadayamātmā* – All this is Self," *ayam ātmā brahma* – This self is Brahman" and so on, unlike the Vedic sentences that teach dharma and urge the individual to act, are merely in the form of a statement of fact that the Self is the all-pervasive infinite supreme Brahman. They do not enjoin upon the individual to act through any mānasī pravṛtti (urge to act) whatsoever. The aim of these Upaniṣadic declarations is just to reveal to the individual the Knowledge of the Reality – neither more, nor less – and with that their purpose comes to a definite end. When an individual conversant with the language – its grammar, syntax and so on – hears these sentences from the Master, the Knowledge about the Reality, that is the oneness of Self that these Upaniṣadic declarations teach, ensues from them automatically. Not only do these sentences not prompt the individual to any activity, they do not even enjoin upon the individual the Knowledge that they teach in the form of "know the oneness of the Self." On hearing these Upaniṣadic declarations, the Knowledge about the oneness of Self rises of its own accord for the qualified aspirant.[85]

The above analysis makes it amply clear that there exist vital and undeniable differences between the *modus operandi* of the codanās (basic texts) of the karma-kāṇḍa and the Upaniṣads in the way by which they impart the knowledge of karma and the Knowledge of Brahman respectively.[86]

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[85] Just as on hearing the sentence 'There is a cow', the knowledge about the existence of a cow in a particular place rises on its own. This is a statement of a fact and not an injunction and does not also ordain an individual to know the cow.

[86] Cf. प्रवृत्तिसापेक्षफलसाधनज्ञानजनकानि कर्मवाक्यानि, ब्रह्मवाक्यानि तु प्रवृत्तिनिरपेक्षफलसाधनज्ञानजनकानि, इति न कर्मब्रह्मणोर्वेदार्थत्वमात्रेणैकत्वमित्यर्थः। – प्रदीप

This is so, notwithstanding the fact that these two sets of sentences belong to one common source, the Veda. For this reason too, karma and Brahman that are the intended knowables (jijñāsya) of the karma-kāṇḍa and jñāna-kāṇḍa respectively cannot be deemed to be identical or similar subjects (jijñāsyaikya) even though they have been taught by the same Veda.

Thus, the Ācārya has established that dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā differ in their result (phala), differ in their intended knowable (jijñāsya) and also differ with regard to the texts (codanā) that pertain to them. Thus, dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā being utterly distinct from each other, it cannot be held that dharma-jijñāsā leads to brahma-jijñāsā. It is therefore irrational and absurd to opine that karmāvabodha (knowledge of Vedic rites) is the prior correlate of the immediate succession (ānantarya) denoted by the word 'atha' in the aphorism *"athāto brahmajijñāsā."*

The opponent unrelentingly substantiates his position by putting forward another argument: It is wrong to assert that the operational modes of the Vedic sentences teaching the knowledge of Vedic rituals (dharma or karma) and the Knowledge of Brahman are different. For instance, the Darśapūrṇamāsa-yāga has many well-defined subsidiaries (aṅga), each enjoined by their respective texts (aṅgavidhi). A person desirous of performing this Darśapūrṇamāsa-yāga, must have, prior to its performance, a comprehensive view of the rite. This view cannot be gained by merely studying the texts dealing with the subsidiary rites of the yāga. For a comprehensive view of the whole Darśapūrṇamāsa-yāga, one has to rather understand all the injunctions pertaining to the subsidiary rites in the context of its main injunction (mukhyavidhi), *"darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṁ svargakāmo yajeta* – One who is desirous of heaven, should perform the Darśapūrṇamāsa-yāga." That is, an individual can have a thorough understanding of the entire Darśapūrṇamāsa-yāga only by comprehending the syntactic structure (samanvaya) of the main injunctive sentence (mukhyavidhi) in proximity with all the texts pertaining to the subsidiaries (aṅgavidhi).

Keeping in view the same syntactical methodology of interpretation, the Pūrvapakṣin says that one should not address oneself to merely

the analysis of the Upaniṣadic sentences like *"tat tvam asi* – That thou art," *"ayam ātmā brahma* – This Self is Brahman" and so on, for all these are subsidiary texts (aṅgavidhi) and they have to be necessarily studied in conjunction with the purport of the main injunctive text (mukhyavidhi) keeping in view the proper syntactical relation among them (vākyaikavākyatayā). This main injunctive text (*Chā.U.*8.7.1) is: *"ya ātmā...so'nveṣṭavyaḥ sa vijijñāsitavyaḥ* – The Self...should be inquired into and should be desired to be known," which is evidently in the form of an injunction indicated by the presence of the potential primary (kṛt) suffix (tavya). And hence it must be accepted that the Upaniṣadic texts even while teaching the Knowledge of Brahman urge him also to their object (niyuñjānaiva svaviṣaye), that is the Knowledge of Brahman. This is similar to the injunctive sentences (vidhi-vākya) of the karma-kāṇḍa that give the knowledge as well as urge the individual to the performance of a Vedic rite. In this manner, the Pūrvapakṣin concludes his argument by asserting that there is no difference in the *modus operandi* between the two sets of Vedic texts pertaining to dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā.

The Ācārya in his own inimitable style presents his rejoinder precisely and cogently. He explicates: The Upaniṣadic declarations that constitute the fundamental texts (pramāṇa) are the means for acquiring the Knowledge of Brahman and they do not in any way urge him on to any activity, just as the injunctions on the Vedic rituals do.[87] This assertion the Ācārya makes is entirely based on logical principles and the nature of the instrument of a valid cognition (pramāṇa).

To explain: (1) In the case of perceptual knowledge (pratyakṣajñāna), the contact of the sense with the object (akṣārthasannikarṣa) becomes the instrument of the valid perceptual cognition that it generates. (2) Inferential cognition (anumiti) is brought about by its instrument which consists of the cognition of the residence of the probans (hetu) as qualified by the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) of the probans (hetu) with the probandum (sādhya)

[87] Cf. ननु 'आत्मा ज्ञातव्यः' इत्येतद्विधिपरैर्वेदान्तैः तदेकवाक्यतयावबोधे प्रवर्तयद्भिरेव पुरुषो ब्रह्मावबोध्यत इति समानत्वं धर्मचोदनाभिर्ब्रह्मचोदनानामित्यत आह—न पुरुषोऽवबोधे नियुज्यते। – भामती

existing in a given locus (pakṣa).[88] (3) The verbal cognition (śābdabodha) is generated by the instrument which consists of a collection of words having mutual expectancy.[89] In this manner, different valid cognitions (pramiti) are produced by their respective instruments (karaṇa) and it is of importance to observe that in none of these instances of cognition does the instrument of cognition by itself prompt the person, that is the knower, to an activity at the moment it gives rise to the cognition.[90] This same principle must naturally also apply to the cognition that is generated when one listens to the Master and hears the Upaniṣadic statements like *"tat tvam asi* – That thou art" and *"ayam ātmā brahma* – This self is Brahman," implying that on hearing these statements Knowledge about the oneness of Self (ātmaikatvavidyā) alone ensues and therefore while imparting this Knowledge these statements do not prompt the person to any activity whatsoever.[91]

However, the case is quite different with regard to the injunctive sentences (vidhi-vākya) that enjoin a person to action such as *"darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṁ svargakāmo yajeta* – One who is desirous of heaven should perform the Darśapūrṇamāsa-yāga," *"gām ānaya* – Bring the cow" and so on, even though they too are instruments of cognition (pramāṇa). In these injunctive sentences (vidhi-vākya), the prompting agent, that is the injunction (vidhi) itself, constitutes the central or vital part of these sentences. This is indeed so because these injunctive sentences (vidhi-vākya) cannot urge upon the individual until and unless they indicate their object consisting of the activity to which the person is prompted.

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[88] This 'parāmarśa' (*"vyāptiviśiṣṭapakṣadharmatājñānam"*), that is the instrument for inferential knowledge, is also conveyed by the expression *"pakṣe liṅgaparāmarśaḥ."* For further details on the process of acquiring inferential knowledge, one is advised to refer to *Tarkasaṅgraha* of Annambhaṭṭa, the basic primer on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system.

[89] That is *"sākāṅkṣapadakadambavadvākyajñānam."*

[90] Many times, the cognitions of perception, inference and verbal testimony seem to prompt their knowers to the activities of acquiring or avoiding the objects cognised through their respective instruments (pramāṇa). But a close examination would show that these activities of acquisition (upādāna) and avoidance (hāna) are generated by the likes and dislikes of the persons concerned alone and not by their knowledge *per se*. Therefore, it is to be noted that these activities of acquisition and avoidance by themselves fall beyond the scope of the instruments of cognition.

[91] Cf. स्वजन्यज्ञाने स्वयं प्रमाणं न प्रवर्तकमित्यत्र दृष्टान्तमाह—यथेति। – रत्नप्रभा

No doubt the Upaniṣadic declarations such as *"ya ātmā...so'nveṣṭavyaḥ sa vijijñāsitavyaḥ* – The Self...should be inquired into and should be desired to be known" and *"ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ* – The Self should be seen, should be heard, should be inquired into, should be meditated upon" seem like injunctive sentences (vidhicchāyāni vākyāni) that contain an injunction or command indicated by the potential primary kṛt-suffix (tavya). However, we must carefully note that though the object or purpose of an injunction (vidhi-vākya) is always an activity alone that depends invariably on the person (puruṣatantra), the object and purpose of the Upaniṣadic declarations quoted is merely Knowledge, which by nature therefore does not depend on the person, but rather depends on its object alone (vastutantra) consisting in the awareness of the oneness of the Self (ātmaikatva-pratipatti). And, this awareness is not an activity at all; rather, this awareness puts an end to activity in its entirety![92]

Here, we are confronted with a significant query: Why can't we propose that injunctions pertaining to Self-knowledge, such as those quoted above, prompt the person to the Knowledge of the oneness of Self (ātmaikatva-pratipatti)? This cannot be so because in subscribing to such a view, we land in the following unsurmountable difficulties: (1) If a cognition were a prompted one, then one cannot be sure whether the cognised oneness of Self is a reality, for the prompted cognition can be even without any reference to the nature of the thing, that is the object cognised. (2) In all instances of injunctive statements (vidhi-vākya), which by nature prompt a person to their object, that is an activity, the onus falls squarely upon the individual who has cognised the object of activity of the injunctive statement (vidhi) that later generates the activity, the object of the injunctive statement. But, the established and accepted basic doctrine (siddhānta) of the Advaita system is that the Brahmasākṣātkāra, the direct awareness of the oneness of the Self with Brahman, is of the very nature of Self itself and thus eternal and therefore it cannot be created or generated at all like an activity.

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[92] Vide *"kṣīyante cāsya karmāṇi tasmin dṛṣṭe parāvare* – All activities come to an end the very moment the supreme Self constituted of the higher and the lower is realised." (*Mu.U.*2.2.8)

Because of the aforesaid causes, it stands to reason that Knowledge alone, free from any element of prompting to an activity, ensues from hearing the Upaniṣadic sentences like *"tat tvam asi* – That thou art," *"ayam ātmā brahma* – This self is Brahman" and so on.[93] This can further be elucidated by invoking the instance of knowledge that arises when the object and the adequate causal perceptual apparatus are in place because this knowledge does not depend on the will of the person and arises effortlessly of its own accord as illustrated by the Ācārya when he states that when the eyes are in contact with a visual object, say a pot, the knowledge of the pot just effortlessly ensues.[94]

Even the Upaniṣadic sentences like *"ya ātmā...so 'nveṣṭavyaḥ sa vijijñāsitavyaḥ* – The Self...should be inquired into and should be desired to be known" and *"ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ* – The Self should be seen, should be heard, should be inquired into, should be meditated upon" – even though they seem like injunctive statements – are no exceptions to this general principle discussed above.

The great commentaries on the *Śaṅkara-bhāṣya* of the *Brahma-sūtra*, like the *Pañcapādikā* and the *Bhāmatī*, have dissolved the compound word 'codanājanyatvāt' of the Bhāṣya sentence as 'codanā–janyatvāt' and interpret the term 'codanā' of the compound word in the sense of 'the basic Scriptural text' (upadeśa). Following these commentaries, we too have translated the sentence as, "The text pertaining to Brahman merely teaches the person and does not enjoin upon him in the domain of knowledge *because knowledge (avabodha) is brought about (janya) by the text (codanā).*" The above discussion is also based on this rendering.

However, there are a few commentaries, like *Pradīpa* and *Ratnaprabhā*, that dissolve the compound word as 'codanā–ajanyatvāt' and take 'codanā'

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[93] Cf. तथा च प्रवर्तकमानमेयो धर्मः, उदासीनमानमेयं ब्रह्म, इति जिज्ञास्यभेदाद्, न तन्मीमांसयोः क्रमार्थो अथशब्द इति भावः। – रत्नप्रभा

[94] Cf. अवबोधो हि यथावस्तु यथाप्रमाणं चोदेति, न पुरुषस्येच्छामप्यनुवर्तते, तत्र कुतः प्रेर्येत, यथाऽक्षार्थयोः सन्निकर्षे सति तेन सन्निकर्षेणाक्षावगम्यार्थज्ञाने पुरुषो न नियुज्यते, तद्वद्, अनिच्छतोऽपि स्वयमुत्पत्तेः, ब्रह्मणि तु नित्यसिद्धत्वान्न प्रेरणा सम्भवति। ब्रह्मचोदनेति चोदनाशब्दो भाष्ये प्रमाणविवक्षया प्रयुक्तः, न प्रेरणाविवक्षया, तदाह—या हि चोदना धर्मस्य लक्षणं, सा स्वविषये नियुञ्जानैव पुरुषमवबोधयति, ब्रह्मचोदना पुनः पुरुषमवबोधयत्येव केवलम्, अवबोधस्य चोदनाऽजन्यत्वान्न पुरुषोऽवबोधे नियुज्यते, यथाऽक्षार्थसन्निकर्षेणार्थावबोधे, तद्वत्। – पञ्चपादिका

Also, cf. अनिच्छतोऽप्रयतमानस्यापि दुर्गन्धादिज्ञानदर्शनादित्यर्थः। – पञ्चपादिकाविवरण

as a synonym of vidhi (injunction) or preraṇā (prompting). Accordingly, the entire sentence would now mean, "The text pertaining to Brahman merely teaches the person and does not enjoin upon him in the domain of knowledge because knowledge (avabodha) *is not brought about (ajanya) by an injunctive statement (codanā).*"[95]

The idea envisaged in this second interpretation is as follows: The injunctive statement has for its object an activity that entirely depends for its execution on the individual (puruṣatantra) who is commanded or prompted by the injunctive statement (codanā). For instance, an activity like bringing a cow is dependent on the will and choice of a person (puruṣatantra) since the activity of bringing the cow may be effected, or may not be effected, or effected in a different way (*"kartum akartum anyathā vā kartum"*). In other words, he may bring the animal by himself, or he may cause it to be brought by someone else, or he may not even bring it at all. The injunctive statements have the kind of object which consists in an activity that is presently non-existent and which for its emergence depends on the person who has been directly enjoined. On the other hand, knowledge (pramiti) of an already accomplished entity (pariniṣṭhita-vastu) does not have an object of that sort which an injunctive statement has. To explain: Knowledge is born as a result of an instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa) and that instrument, like the eyes, ought to have for its content a thing which actually exists (pariniṣṭhita-vastu). Also, the nature of knowledge of an existing object is not something that depends on the person's effort and will, unlike that of an activity ordained by an injunctive sentence (vidhi or codanā). In other words, knowledge is not something that may be effected, or not effected, or effected in some other way – *"kartum akartum anyathā vā kartum"* – by the person's will, but depends solely on the existence of its object, that is it is 'vastutantra'. Since knowledge of an existing object cannot be an object of any injunction – either Scriptural or empirical – the Knowledge of the Self revealed by such statements like *"tat tvam asi"* cannot be an object of an injunction. This entails the following corollary: All statements pertaining to Self-knowledge like those that declare

[95] Cf. अवबोधस्य, ज्ञानस्य, चोदनाजन्यत्वात् प्रेरणाविषयत्वात्, प्रेरणानिरूपितविषयत्वासम्भवात्। – प्रदीप

the nature of the Self such as *"tat tvam asi* – That thou art" and *"ayam ātmā brahma* – This Self is Brahman" or those like *"ya ātmā...so'nveṣṭavyaḥ sa vijijñāsitavyaḥ* – The Self...should be inquired into and should be desired to be known" and *"ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ* – The Self should be seen, should be heard, should be inquired into, should be meditated upon" which resemble injunctive statements because of the presence of the tavya-suffix are not truly injunctive statements (vidhi or codanā) at all.[96]

From the above elaborate analysis of the Bhāṣyakāra's refutation of the Pūrvapakṣin's thesis of the necessity of brahma-jijñāsā to be preceded by dharma-jijñāsā, it becomes abundantly clear that karmāvabodha (knowledge of Vedic rites) cannot in any way be the prior correlate of immediate succession (ānantarya) denoted by the term 'atha' of the first Sūtra – *"athāto brahmajijñāsā."*

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[96] Cf. ननु—"आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः" इति ब्रह्मज्ञानमपि चोदनाजन्यमेव प्रतीयते, इति कथं ब्रह्मचोदनाऽपि न नियुञ्जानैव बोधयतीति, अत आह—अवबोधस्येति। ज्ञानस्येत्यर्थः चोदनाऽजन्यत्वात् प्रेरणाऽविषयत्वात्। पुरुषतन्त्रेष्वेव चोदनाया प्रवृत्तिः, ज्ञानन्तु वस्तुतन्त्रमेव, न पुरुषतन्त्रम्, इति न तत्र विधिरिति भावः। व्यक्तीभविष्यति चेदं भाष्य एव समन्वयसूत्रे—ननु ज्ञानं नाम मानसी क्रिया, नेत्यादिग्रन्थसन्दर्भे। – प्रदीप

8

[प्रकृतोपसंहारभाष्यम्]

तस्मात् किमपि[1] वक्तव्यं यदनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा उपदिश्यते[2] इति।

8 A

[PRAKṚTOPASAṀHĀRABHĀṢYAM]

tasmāt kimapi vaktavyaṁ yadanantaraṁ brahmajijñāsā upadiśyate iti.

8 B

तस्मात् *tasmāt* – therefore; किम् अपि *kim api* – something; वक्तव्यम् *vaktavyam* – must be stated; यदनन्तरम् *yadanantaram* – in immediate succession to which; ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा *brahmajijñāsā* – the desire to know Brahman; उपदिश्यते *upadiśyate* – is being taught; इति *iti* – thus

8 C

[COMMENTARY CONCLUDING THE PRESENT TOPIC]

Therefore something must be stated in immediate succession to which the desire to know Brahman is taught.

8 D

The Pūrvapakṣin has steadfastly upheld his view that it is the inquiry into dharma (dharma-jijñāsā) that constitutes the prior correlate of the immediate succession (ānantarya) to the desire to know Brahman (brahma-jijñāsā). Thus, according to him, the word 'atha' in the Sūtra *"athāto brahmajijñāsā"* which denotes 'thereafter' comes to mean that the desire to know Brahman (brahma-jijñāsā) should necessarily be preceded by the inquiry into dharma, the Vedic rites.

This has been analysed by the Bhāṣyakāra from different angles and rejected completely in the last section. The grounds for rejection were as

[1] किमपि – पुष्कलकारणमिति शेषः। – प्रदीप

[2] उपदिश्यते सूत्रकृता इति शेषः। – रत्नप्रभा

follows: (1) Dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā are not interlinked by a cause and effect relationship so that we can establish such a sequence between them. (2) There is no Scriptural authority stipulating, either directly or by implication, such a sequence between the two. (3) These two inquiries are not interlinked either by a single purpose or by a single subject – a feature that alone may justify the sequence as suggested by the opponent.

When the Pūrvapakṣin's view is thus dismissed, the issue of identifying the prior correlate of the immediate succession (ānantarya), the meaning of the word 'atha' (thereafter) still remains to be deciphered. Hence, the Siddhāntin has to specify presently the adequate unique cause (puṣkala-kāraṇa or asādhāraṇa-kāraṇa),[3] which alone could constitute the prior correlate of immediate succession to brahma-jijñāsā.[4]

[3] Cf. यस्मिन्नसति ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा न भवति सति तु भवन्ती भवत्येवेत्यर्थः। – भामती

[4] Cf. एवमथशब्दस्य अर्थान्तरासम्भवादु आनन्तर्यवाचित्वे सति तदवधित्वेन पुष्कलकारणं वक्तव्यमित्याह—तस्मादिति। – रत्नप्रभा
Also cf. तदेवं जिज्ञास्यैक्यनिबन्धनाऽपि न क्रमापेक्षा तन्त्रद्वयस्य, येन तदपेक्षोऽथशब्दो व्याख्यायेत, अत उपसंहरति—तस्मात् किमपि वक्तव्यं यदनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपदिश्यत इति। – पञ्चपादिका
Also, cf. आनन्तर्यवाचिनोऽथशब्दस्याक्रमार्थत्वे पुष्कलहेतुज्ञानार्थत्वमेवेत्युपसंहरति—तस्मादिति। – न्यायनिर्णय

9

[सिद्धान्तभाष्यम्]

उच्यते – नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः, [1]इहामुत्रार्थभोगविरागः, शमदमादिसाधनसम्पद्, मुमुक्षुत्वं च। तेषु हि सत्सु, प्रागपि धर्मजिज्ञासाया ऊर्ध्वं च, शक्यते ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितुं ज्ञातुं च, न विपर्यये। तस्माद् अथशब्देन यथोक्तसाधनसम्पत्त्यानन्तर्यमुपदिश्यते।

9 A

[SIDDHĀNTABHĀṢYAM]

ucyate – nityānityavastuvivekaḥ, ihāmutrārthabhogavirāgaḥ, śamadamādisādhana-sampad, mumukṣutvaṁ ca. teṣu hi satsu, prāgapi dharmajijñāsāyā ūrdhvaṁ ca, śakyate brahma jijñāsituṁ jñātuṁ ca, na viparyaye. tasmād athaśabdena yathokta-sādhanasampattyānantaryamupadiśyate.

indeed when these are there

it is indeed possible to enter into inquiry into brahman

9 B

उच्यते *ucyate* – it is stated; नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः *nityānityavastuvivekaḥ* – discrimination between the eternal and the ephemeral; इहामुत्रार्थभोगविरागः *ihāmutrārthabhogavirāgaḥ* – dispassion towards the enjoyment of the objects here and hereafter; शमदमादिसाधनसम्पत् *śamadamādisādhanasampat* – the wealth of the means such as control of the mind and control of the senses; मुमुक्षुत्वम् *mumukṣutvam* – longing for Liberation; च *ca* – and; तेषु हि सत्सु *teṣu hi satsu* – indeed when these exist; प्राग् अपि *prāg api* – even prior to; धर्मजिज्ञासायाः *dharmajijñāsāyāḥ* – the desire to know dharma; ऊर्ध्वं च *ūrdhvaṁ ca* – or after; शक्यते *śakyate* – can be; ब्रह्म *brahma* – Brahman; जिज्ञासितुम् *jijñāsitum* – to desire to know; ज्ञातुम् *jñātum* – to know; च *ca* – and; न विपर्यये *na viparyaye* – not conversely; तस्मात् *tasmāt* – therefore; अथशब्देन *athaśabdena* – by the word 'atha'; यथोक्तसाधनसम्पत्त्यानन्तर्यम् *yathoktasādhanasampattyānantaryam* – immediate succession to the wealth of the aforesaid means; उपदिश्यते *upadiśyate* – is being taught

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[1] ASS इहामुत्रार्थफलभोगविरागः। Also CSS (fn.) वार्तिकसम्मतपाठः—इहामुत्रार्थफलभोगविरागः।

9 C

[CONCLUDING COMMENTARY]

The prior correlate is stated:[1] The discrimination between the eternal and the ephemeral,[2] the dispassion towards the enjoyment of the objects here and hereafter,[3] the wealth of the means such as control of the mind and control of the senses[4] and the longing for Liberation.[5] Having acquired the fourfold means, the desire to know Brahman and also to know can arise even prior to the desire to know dharma or after it, but not conversely.[6] Therefore, by the word 'atha' is taught the immediate succession to the wealth of the aforesaid means.[7]

9 D

1. The prior correlate is stated: The four 'sādhanas' (i.e. 'means') listed in this section of the Bhāṣya are the prior correlates of the immediate succession (ānantarya) to brahma-jijñāsā (desire to know Brahman) and are collectively given the appellation 'sādhana-catuṣṭaya', usually translated as the 'fourfold means'. Since they effect brahma-jijñāsā, they become the prerequisites for brahma-jijñāsā and are hence accorded the status of being the prior correlates of the immediate succession (ānantarya) denoted by term 'atha' in the aphorism *"athāto brahmajijñāsā."*

While refuting the Pūrvapakṣin's view, it was time and again logically established that the sādhanas (means) which the Pūrvapakṣin proposed as prior correlates cannot in any way constitute the prerequisites of brahma-jijñāsā. Moreover, their being the prerequisites for brahma-jijñāsā was also shown to be unsubstantiated by any Scriptural authority. Having been disarmed by the Siddhāntin's incisive analysis, the Pūrvapakṣin concedes that the word 'atha', denoting 'thereafter', does not mean subsequent to either (1) the Vedic study (svādhyāyādhyayana), or (2) an inquiry into dharma or karma (dharma-jijñāsā), or (3) the knowledge of karma (karmāvabodha) or (4) the observance of karma (karmānuṣṭhāna).

Now, it behoves the Siddhāntin to establish that the prior correlate of the immediate succession to brahma-jijñāsā is, indeed, the aforesaid sādhana-

catuṣṭaya by providing the logical basis that these four means are unique, adequate and effective (puṣkala-kāraṇa) to bring about brahma-jijñāsā.[1] The Siddhāntin has also to establish that there are evident pertinent Upaniṣadic declarations for designating these four means as the prerequisites of brahma-jijñāsā. We observe that the Ācārya takes up and establishes the first point in the ensuing section. In the present section we shall trace the necessary Scriptural authorities, that is the Upaniṣadic declarations, having a bearing on these four means, the sādhana-catuṣṭaya, and appreciate the logical basis of how the sādhana-catuṣṭaya causes the welling up of brahma-jijñāsā in the seeker.

2. The discrimination between the eternal and the ephemeral: As to why this is designated as the first prerequisite will become evident from the ensuing discussion. The term 'viveka' (discrimination) certainly cannot signify the authentic direct Realisation (Brahmāvagati) of the difference between the eternal Self from the ephemeral phenomena constituted by the non-self (anātman), that is the physical body, senses, mind and so on. For the term 'discrimination' (viveka) if it were to be construed to mean the final experience of Brahman (Brahmāvagati) then the very brahma-jijñāsā (desire to know Brahman) will be rendered redundant! If, however, the viveka (discrimination) in question were an erroneous one (viparyāsa) or if it were to be riddled with doubts (saṁśaya), then it cannot generate its result consisting of detachment (vairāgya) towards worldly pleasures. Therefore, the term 'viveka' (discrimination), in the present context, stands neither for the direct Experience of the Self nor for a discrimination rendered futile by error or doubt but rather for a firm intellectual understanding (adhyavasāya) or a logical insight (darśana) into the difference between the eternal and the ephemeral.[2]

The clear understanding of the difference between the nature of the Eternal and the ephemeral will dawn upon a sincere student of the

[1] Cf. प्रकृतमुपसंहरति—तस्मात्किमपि वक्तव्यम् इति। यस्मिन्नसति ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा न भवति सति तु भवन्ती भवत्येवेत्यर्थः। – भामती

[2] Cf. आत्मातिरिक्तं सर्वं कार्यत्वाद् घटवदनित्यं, आत्मैव नित्योऽकृतकभावत्वादिति निश्चयो नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः। – न्यायनिर्णय Also, cf. तत्र नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेको नाम आत्मव्यतिरिक्तं सर्वं कार्यत्वादनित्यं, नित्य आत्मैव कृतकत्वाभावादित्याद्यवधारणम्। प्रकटार्थविवरण

Upaniṣads. He comprehends intellectually that the world of objects consisting of the physical body, mind, senses and so on is the content of the 'yuṣmat-pratyaya', the 'thou'-notion, and is transient (anitya) and hence is unreal (anṛta); as against this, the subject, that is the content of the 'asmat-pratyaya', the 'I'-notion, is eternal (nitya) and hence is real (satya). And all worldly transactions (loka-vyavahāra), without any exception whatsoever, endlessly go on without any perceivable beginning or end (anādi and ananta) only as a result of the inexplicable (anirvacanīya) coupling of the contents of asmat-pratyaya (subject) and yuṣmat-pratyaya (object) through the mutual superimposition (*"satyānṛte mithunīkṛtya"*) of the eternal and the transient (nitya and anitya) – the real and the unreal[3] – even though these two are by nature diametrically opposed to each other like light and darkness.[4]

The above-mentioned insight of the form of discrimination (viveka) begets dispassion (vairāgya) towards the worldly objects and their enjoyment as well as the burning desire and love to know and realise the Reality, the eternal Self. The former is termed 'vairāgya' (dispassion) and the latter alone is 'brahma-jijñāsā'. Thus, it stands to reason that viveka (discrimination) at its emergence gives rise to both vairāgya and brahma-jijñāsā simultaneously.[5] Also, stronger the viveka, deeper will be the vairāgya and efficacious too the brahma-jijñāsā.

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[3] नित्यः प्रत्यगात्मा, अनित्याः देहेन्द्रियविषयादयः। एतद्विषयश्चेद्विवेको निश्चयः, कृतमस्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासया, ज्ञातत्वाद्ब्रह्मणः। अथ विवेको ज्ञानमात्रं, न निश्चयः, तथा सति एष विपर्यासादन्यः संशयः स्यात्, तथा च न वैराग्यं भावयेद्, अभावयन्कथं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाहेतुः। तस्मादेवं व्याख्येयम्। नित्यानित्यवोर्वसतीति नित्यानित्यवस्तु तद्धर्मः, नित्यानित्ययोर्धर्मिणोस्तद्धर्माणां च विवेको नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः। एतदुक्तं भवति—मा भूद् इदं ऋतं नित्यम्, इदं तदनृतमनित्यमिति धर्मिविशेषयोर्विवेकः, धर्ममात्रयोः नित्यानित्ययोस्तद्धर्मयोश्च विवेकं निश्चिनोत्येव। नित्यत्वं सत्यत्वं तद्यस्यास्ति तन्नित्यं सत्यं, तथा चास्थागोचरः। अनित्यत्वमसत्यत्वं तद्यस्यास्ति तदनित्यमनृतं, तथा चानास्थागोचरः। तदेतेष्वनुभूयमानेषु युष्मदस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरेषु विषयविषयिषु यदृतं नित्यं सुखं व्यवस्थास्यते तदास्थागोचरो भविष्यति, यत्त्वनित्यमनृतं भविष्यति तापत्रयपरीतं तत्त्यक्ष्यत इति सोऽयं नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः प्राग्भवीयादैहिकाद्वा कर्मणो विशुद्धसत्त्वस्य भवत्यनुभवोपपत्तिभ्याम्। – भामती

[4] Vide *"tamaḥprakāśavadviruddhasvabhāvayoḥ."* (*Adhyāsa-bhāṣya*) In this context, it is of advantage to note that the Ācārya has kept this viveka, that is the intellectual discrimination between the Real and the unreal, the Eternal and the transient, as the very embarking point to the study of the *Brahma-sūtra*, by presenting the same in great detail in his *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya*, his preamble to the *Brahma-sūtra*.

[5] This dual role of the viveka in giving rise to vairāgya and brahma-jijñāsā is observed in the cases of the Upaniṣadic seekers like Nārada, Indra, Naciketas and so on. All of them are depicted in the Upaniṣads as rejecting the transient (vairāgya) and fervently seeking the knowledge of eternal Self (brahma-jijñāsā).

The Vedāntic seeker endowed with such a strong viveka has an irresistible urge to tread the path. The credit, therefore, for such an unimpeded pursuit of Self-realisation goes to the acquisition of the discrimination between the mundane objects pertaining to the 'thou'-notion and the eternal Self belonging to the 'I'-notion. Moreover, a seeker endowed with viveka, is able to discern that all the worldly objects of enjoyment – inspite of their enormous variety – belong to a single class alone: they are all created by human efforts (kṛtijanya) and are therefore destined to perish and are thus transient (anitya) and unreal (anṛta). He extends this universal law of invariable concomitance (vyāpti)[6] to the pleasures of the other higher worlds too by comprehending that the pleasures of the higher realm like the heaven, since they are products of Vedic rites, which are also a human endeavour, must also be transient like those enjoyed in this world. Thus, he comes to possess a complete logical and intellectual discrimination of what is Eternal and what is transient.

Viveka (discrimination) is well-illustrated by the Upaniṣadic statement (*Chā.U.*8.1.6), *"tadyatheha karmacito lokaḥ kṣīyate, evamevāmutra puṇyacito lokaḥ kṣīyate* – Just as in this world, the pleasures, obtained by human endeavours perish, so also do the pleasures of the hereafter (heaven), gained by the sacrificial rites, perish." This statement of the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad* occurs in the context where the inquiry into Brahman is prescribed: (*Chā.U.*8.1.1) *"tadanveṣṭavyaṁ, tadvāva vijijñāsitavyam* – That (Brahman) should be sought and that alone should be desired to be inquired into." Therefore, it stands to reason that the Upaniṣads prescribe viveka (discrimination) as a subsidiary (aṅga) and as a means (sādhana) for brahma-jijñāsā, the desire to know Brahman.

We have already discussed that the first prerequisite, viveka, generates the second, that is vairāgya (dispassion) and in conjunction with it also gives rise to the desire for the Knowledge of Brahman (brahma-jijñāsā). On the other hand, if Vedic study (svādhyāya), or the desire to know dharma (dharma-jijñāsā), or the knowledge of karma (karmāvabodha), or the observance

[6] yat kṛtakaṁ tad anityam iti vyāptiḥ.

of karma (karmānuṣṭāna) were to be the sole prerequisite – instead of the discrimination, as the opponent would like to maintain – then these factors would be continuously urging all the Vedic students to the performance of the sacrifices alone and nothing would be left to stop them from that path of karma and generate in them brahma-jijñāsā (desire for the Knowledge of Brahman). Consequently, the Vedānta-darśana would be rendered bereft of any suitable student (adhikārin) desiring to know Brahman and thus the entire Vedānta-darśana (the Upaniṣadic section) would become an exercise in futility. Therefore, it is certain that Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the *Brahma-sūtra* himself, must have intended to teach the inquiry into Brahman through his *Śārīraka-mīmāṁsā*, that is the *Brahma-sūtra*, in the immediate succession to the sādhana-catuṣṭaya like discrimination (viveka), dispassion (vairāgya) and so on and not in the immediate succession to the inquiry into dharma (dharma-jijñāsā) or the knowledge of karma (karmāvabodha) and so on.

Let us now address ourselves to another aspect of viveka. Earlier, it has been pointed out that viveka is purported to generate dispassion towards the enjoyment of the ephemeral objects (vairāgya) and also to effect the desire to know Brahman (brahma-jijñāsā). However, it does not cease after generating vairāgya and brahma-jijñāsā. It continues to nourish and sustain the seeker throughout his journey on the arduous path to the Realisation of Brahman (Brahmāvagati) – a journey, through the three specific stages of first listening (śravaṇa) from the teacher the Upaniṣadic doctrine of the oneness of the Self, and then his thorough logical analysis (manana) of that Truth that he has listened to, and finally in his continuous unceasing meditation (nididhyāsana) on that Truth which he has logically imbibed. Thus, ever remaining with the seeker, viveka (discrimination) goes on augmenting the other three prerequisites of vairāgya, śamādiṣaṭka-sampat and mumukṣutva as well as the desire for the Knowledge of Brahman (brahma-jijñāsā) and also the Vedāntic practices of śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana. It is viveka that goes on to blossom into the strong and concrete knowledge of the Real, the eternal Brahman, as being distinct from all the rest, that is

the world of names and forms, the transient (jagat).[7] Finally this blossom itself becomes the fruit, that is the Realisation of the oneness of the Self with Brahman (Brahmātmāvagati)[8] – the very goal of the inquiry into the purport of the Upaniṣads (Vedānta)[9] – which itself is the ultimate human end, that is, Liberation (Mokṣa).[10] Thus, the spiritual pursuit of the aspirant (jijñāsu) commences with viveka, the intellectual recognition of the difference between the Eternal and the transient, that is the Self and the not-Self and it culminates in 'Brahmāvagati', the actual authentic Experience of the same. This is the briefest possible account of the aspirant's successful spiritual pursuit, and this is also in a way the shortest summary of the Vedānta-darśana too.

3. the dispassion towards the enjoyment of the objects here and hereafter: This is the second prerequisite for brahma-jijñāsā (desire to know Brahman). The word 'virāga' of the Bhāṣya text and also its secondary derivative, the word 'vairāgya', is the antonym of 'rāga', which means 'desire' or 'attachment'. 'Vairāgya' therefore denotes 'aversion' or 'revulsion',[11] and is thus a positive mental disposition which does not merely signify only 'the absence of desire' (rāgābhāva). However, in Scriptural literature, we observe that the term 'vairāgya' is often translated as 'detachment' or 'dispassion'.[12]

We have observed how a seeker, as a result of his viveka (discrimination between the eternal from the transient), develops dispassion towards the transient pleasures of this world and those of the higher realms too. This

[7] ब्रह्म सत्यं जगन्मिथ्या। – ब्रह्मज्ञानावलिमाला

[8] जीवो ब्रह्मैव नापरः। – ब्रह्मज्ञानावलिमाला

[9] वेदान्तवाक्यविचाराध्यवसाननिर्वृत्ता हि ब्रह्मावगतिः। – ब्रह्मसूत्रशङ्करभाष्य (१.१.२)

[10] ब्रह्मावगतिर्हि पुरुषार्थः। – ब्रह्मसूत्रशङ्करभाष्य (१.१.१)

[11] तद्वैराग्यं या जुगुप्सा। – विवेकचूडामणि (२१)

Cf. ततोऽस्येदृशान्नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकलक्षणात्प्रसङ्ख्यानाद् इहामुत्रार्थभोगविरागः भवति। अर्थ्यते प्रार्थ्यत इत्यर्थः, फलमिति यावत्। तस्मिन्विरागो नामानाभोगात्मिकोपेक्षाबुद्धिः। – भामती

Also, cf. वर्तमानदेहस्थितिहेत्वनिषिद्धान्नाद्यतिरिक्तार्थेच्छाविरुद्धा दृढा चेतोवृत्तिरिहामुत्रार्थभोगविरागः। – न्यायनिर्णय

Also, cf. इहामुत्रार्थभोगविरागो नाम वर्तमानशरीरस्थितिहेतुभूताप्रतिषिद्धान्नपानव्यतिरिक्तविषयप्रवृत्तिकारणेच्छाविरुद्धो निश्चलश्चेतोवृत्तिविशेषः। – प्रकटार्थविवरण

[12] 'Detachment', that is 'absence of attachment' may be the same as what is conveyed by 'asakti' (or 'anāsakti') or 'saṅgābhāva'. Hence, the *Bhagavad-gītā* (13.9–10) mentions 'asakti' or 'detachment' separately from 'vairāgya' or 'aversion'. (*"asaktiranabhiṣvaṅgaḥ putradāragṛhādiṣu, nityaṁ ca samacittatvamiṣṭāniṣṭopapattiṣu. mayi cānanyayogena bhaktiravyabhicāriṇī, viviktadeśasevitvam aratirjanasaṁsadi."*)

cause and effect relation (kāryakāraṇa-sambandha) between viveka and vairāgya is indicated by the *Muṇḍaka-upaniṣad* passage (1.2.12) when it states, *"parīkṣya lokān karmacitān brāhmaṇo nirvedamāyāt* – Having examined all the worlds (of enjoyment) that could be gained by human endeavours, the seeker of the Knowledge of Brahman should acquire dispassion." The Upaniṣad goes further to delineate how under the impact of vairāgya the seeker becomes endowed with śama (mind control) and dama (sense control) and approaches a Guru for the Knowledge of Brahman.[13] Thus, the Upaniṣad not only recognises the cause–effect relationship between viveka (discrimination) and vairāgya (detachment) but also between vairāgya (detachment) and the acquisition of śamādiṣaṭka-sampat (control of the mind, control of the senses, etc.). In the same Upaniṣad (*Mu.U.*3.1.9), it is also asserted that one realises this subtle Self by a purified mind alone.[14] In the same context, the *Muṇḍaka-upaniṣad* also brings out the importance of vairāgya (the second prerequisite) and śama and so on (the third prerequisite) in enabling the seeker to realise the Self.[15]

After producing śamādiṣaṭka-sampat, the third prerequisite for brahma-jijñāsā, vairāgya continues to exist, augmenting the third and the fourth prerequisites of śamādiṣaṭka-sampat and mumukṣutva respectively and intensifies the seeker's longing for the direct experience of Brahman. In fact, the stronger the vairāgya, the quicker is the Realisation of Brahman.

4. the wealth of the means such as control of the mind and control of the senses: This is the third prerequisite for the desire of the Knowledge of Brahman (brahma-jijñāsā) and is a set of six mental dispositions that are collectively designated as 'śamādiṣaṭka-sampat', which literally means 'the sixfold means, beginning with the control of the mind'.

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[13] Cf. परीक्ष्य लोकान् कर्मचितान् ब्राह्मणो निर्वेदमायान्नास्त्यकृतः कृतेन। तद्विज्ञानार्थं स गुरुमेवाभिगच्छेत् समित्पाणिः श्रोत्रियं ब्रह्मनिष्ठम्॥ तस्मै स विद्वानुपसन्नाय सम्यक् प्रशान्तचित्ताय शमान्विताय। येनाक्षरं पुरुषं वेद सत्यं प्रोवाच तां तत्त्वतो ब्रह्मविद्याम्॥ – मुण्डकोपनिषद् (१.२.१२-१३)

[14] Cf. एषोऽणुरात्मा चेतसा वेदितव्यो यस्मिन् प्राणः पञ्चधा संविवेश। प्राणैश्चित्तं सर्वमोतं प्रजानां यस्मिन् विशुद्धे विभवत्येष आत्मा॥ – मुण्डकोपनिषद् (३.१.९)

[15] Cf. सम्प्राप्यैनमृषयो ज्ञानतृप्ताः कृतात्मानो वीतरागाः प्रशान्ताः। ते सर्वगं सर्वतः प्राप्य धीरा युक्तात्मानः सर्वमेवाविशन्ति॥ – मुण्डकोपनिषद् (३.२.५)

The six members of this group are as follows:[16]

(1) Śama: This is control of the mind from the longing for the external world of objects.[17]

(2) Dama: This is the control of the senses from the pleasures of the external world.[18]

(3) Uparati:[19] This literally means 'turning away' or 'withdrawal', that is being free from all the likes and dislikes (rāgadveṣa) as well as renouncing worldly activities and taking to asceticism (sannyāsa).[20]

(4) Titikṣā:[21] This is forbearance, or the capacity to endure the pairs of opposites such as joy and sorrow, heat and cold, prosperity and adversity, honour and dishonour and so on.[22]

(5) Samādhāna: This is concentration of the mind in the spiritual pursuit by remaining firm with a single pointed focus and being free from the fluctuations of the mind and the senses.[23]

The earlier four disciplines of śama, dama, uparati and titikṣā are of the nature of withdrawing the organs of knowledge (jñānendriya) and action (karmendriya) from their activities like seeing, touching and so on and also from those psychoses of the internal organ such as the mind over which the individual has control. On the other hand, samādhāna is in the form

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[16] We endeavour here to understand these terms in the light of what the Ācārya states in his Prakaraṇagrantha's like *Tattvabodha* and *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, where the topic of sādhana-catuṣṭaya is discussed in detail.

[17] Cf. विरज्य विषयव्रातादोषदृष्ट्या मुहुर्मुहुः। स्वलक्ष्ये नियतावस्था मनसः शम उच्यते॥ – विवेकचूडामणि (२२)
Also, cf. शमः कः। मनोनिग्रहः। – तत्त्वबोध

[18] Cf. विषयेभ्यः परावर्त्य स्थापनं स्वस्वगोलके। उभयेषामिन्द्रियाणां स दमः परिकीर्तितः।– विवेकचूडामणि (२३)
Also, cf. दमः कः। चक्षुरादिबाह्येन्द्रियनिग्रहः। – तत्त्वबोध

[19] उपरतः, सर्वेषणाविनिर्मुक्तः, सन्न्यासी। – बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्य (४.४.२३)

[20] Cf. बाह्यानालम्बनं वृत्तेरेषोपरतिरुत्तमा। – विवेकचूडामणि (२३)
Also, cf. उपरमः कः। स्वधर्मानुष्ठानमेव। – तत्त्वबोध
Also, cf. निवर्तितानामेतेषां तद् व्यति तद् व्यतिरिक्तविषयेभ्य उपरमणमुपरतिरथवा विहितानां कर्मणां विधिना परित्यागः। – वेदान्तसार (२१)

[21] तितिक्षुः, द्वन्द्वसहिष्णुः। – बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्य (४.४.२३)

[22] Cf. सहनं सर्वदुःखानामप्रतीकारपूर्वकम्। चिन्ताविलापरहितं सा तितिक्षा निगद्यते॥ – विवेकचूडामणि (२४)
Also, cf. तितिक्षा का। शीतोष्णसुखदुःखादिसहिष्णुत्वम्। – तत्त्वबोध

[23] समाहितः, इन्द्रियान्तःकरणचलनरूपाद् (वृत्तिविशेषाद्) व्यावृत्त्य ऐक्याग्यरूपेण समाहितः। – बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्य
Also, cf. सर्वदा स्थापनं बुद्धेः शुद्धे ब्रह्मणि सर्वदा। तत्समाधानमित्युक्तं न तु चित्तस्य लालनम्॥ – विवेकचूडामणि (२६)
Also, cf. समाधानं किम्। चित्तैकाग्रता। – तत्त्वबोध

of withdrawing even from those involuntary activities of the senses over which an individual usually has no control like hearing, smelling and so on and from those psychoses like sleep, idleness, fanciful thinking. Indeed, even these involuntary activities of the senses and the mind have the power to obstruct his true comprehension of the Reality.[24]

(6) Śraddhā: This term is usually translated as 'faith' and is complete trust in the authenticity of the teachings of the Scripture and that of the Preceptor.[25]

The group of the six means discussed above,[26] which is helpful for the sādhaka in experiencing the oneness of Self, occurs in the Kāṇva recension of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* (4.4.23): *"śānto dānta uparatastitikṣuḥ samāhito bhūtvā ātmanyevātmānaṁ paśyati sarvamātmānaṁ paśyati"* – One who is endowed with control of the mind, control of the senses, is withdrawn, has forbearance, is concentrated (samāhitaḥ), sees the Self in himself and sees

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[24] Cf. यत्र कर्तुः स्वातन्त्र्यं, तेषां कर्मणां वृत्तीनां च निवृत्तिः शमादिपदैः उक्ता, यत्र तु सम्यग्धीविरोधिनि निद्रालस्यादौ पुंसो न स्वातन्त्र्यं, तन्निवृत्तिः समाधानम्। – आनन्दगिरिकृतबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यटीका (४.४.२३)

[25] शास्त्रस्य गुरुवाक्यस्य सत्यबुद्ध्यवधारणम्। सा श्रद्धा कथिता सद्भिर्यया वस्तूपलभ्यते॥ – विवेकचूडामणि (२५)

Also, cf. श्रद्धा कीदृशी। गुरुवेदान्तवाक्यादिषु विश्वासः श्रद्धा। – तत्त्वबोध

[26] Cf. लौकिकव्यापाराद् मनस उपरमः शमः, बाह्यकरणानाम् उपरमो दमः, ज्ञानार्थं विहितनित्यादिकर्मसन्न्यास उपरतिः, शीतोष्णादिद्वन्द्वसहनं तितिक्षा, निद्रालस्यप्रमादत्यागेन मनःस्थितिः समाधानं, सर्वत्र आस्तिकता श्रद्धा। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. रागादिकषायमदिरामत्तं हि मनः तेषु तेषु विषयेषूच्चावचमिन्द्रियाणि प्रवर्तयदु विविधाश्च प्रवृत्तीः पुण्यापुण्यफला भावयत् पुरुषमतिघोरे विविधदुःखज्वालाजटाले संसारहुतभुजि जुहोति। प्रसङ्ख्यानाभ्यासलब्धवैराग्यपरिपाकभग्नरागादिकषायमदिरामदं तु मनः पुरुषेणावजीयते वशीक्रियते। सोऽयमस्य वैराग्यहेतुको मनोविजयः शम इति वशीकारसञ्ज्ञ इति चाख्यायते। विजितं च मनस्तत्त्वविषयविनियोगयोग्यतां नीयते, सेयमस्य योग्यता दमः, यथा दान्तोऽयं वृषभयुवा हलशकटादिवहनयोग्यः कृत इति गम्यते। आदिग्रहणेन च विषयतितिक्षातदुपरमतत्त्वश्रद्धाः सङ्गृह्यन्ते। अत एव श्रुतिः—तस्माच्छान्तो दान्त उपरतस्तितिक्षुः श्रद्धावित्तो भूत्वात्मन्येवात्मानं पश्येदु, सर्वमात्मनि पश्यति इति। तदेतस्य शमदमादिरूपस्य साधनस्य सम्पत, प्रकर्षः, शमदमादिसाधन-सम्पत्। – भामती

Also, cf. शमः – वैराग्यहेतुको वशीकारसंज्ञो मनोविजयः, तत एवान्तरिन्द्रियनिग्रह इति नामान्तरम्। दमो नाम – मनसो विजितस्य तत्त्वग्रहणविनियोगयोग्यता, बाह्यकरणानुसारेण विषयेष्वप्रवृत्तिः। स हि बाह्यकरणोपरमाविनाभूतः, इति बाह्येन्द्रियोपरमो दम इति व्यपदिश्यते। उपरतिः – सन्न्यासः। शीतोष्णादिसहनं तितिक्षा। निद्राऽऽलस्यप्रमादत्यागेन मनःस्थिरता समाधानम्। गुरुवेदान्तवाक्येषु विश्वासः श्रद्धा। एतत्षट्कसम्पत्तिः शमदमादिसाधनसम्पत्। – प्रदीप

Also, cf. लौकिकसर्वबुद्धिव्यापाराणां स्वाधिकारानुपयुक्तानामफलत्वज्ञानपूर्वकस्त्यागः शमः। तथारूपबाह्यकरणव्यापारत्यागो दमः। सत्त्वशुद्धौ नित्यानामपि विधित एव त्याग उपरतिः। शीतोष्णादिद्वन्द्वानां स्वाधिकारापेक्षितजीवनविच्छेदकातिरिक्तानां सहिष्णुता तितिक्षा। सर्वास्तिकता श्रद्धा। विधित्सितश्रवणादिविरोधिनिद्रादिनिरोधेन चेतसोऽवस्थानं समाधानम्। एतेषां सम्पत्तिः शमदमादिसम्पत्। – न्यायनिर्णय

Also, cf. शमो नाम अन्तःकरणव्यापाराणां प्रतिषिद्धानामप्रतिषिद्धानामपि लौकिकानां स्वाधिकारनिष्पत्त्यनुपयोगिनां निष्फलत्वावधारणपूर्वकः परित्यागः। दमो नाम बहिष्करणव्यापाराणामुक्तलक्षणानां परित्यागः। उपरतिरिति कृतप्रयोजनकृष्णविषाणस्येव सत्त्वशुद्धिसिद्धौ नित्यानामपि विधित एव परित्यागः। तितिक्षुत्वं नाम शीतोष्णादिद्वन्द्वनां स्वाधिकार-निर्वृत्त्यपेक्षितजीवनविच्छेदहेतुव्यतिरिक्तानां सहिष्णुता। समाधानं नाम विधित्सितश्रवणादिप्रतिकूलनिद्रालस्यादिविरोधेन चेतसोऽवस्थानम्। एतैः सम्पन्नत्वं शमदमादिसाधनसम्पत्। – प्रकटार्थविवरण

all as the Self." In this Upaniṣadic declaration, we find the mention of śama, dama, uparati, titikṣā and samādhāna (indicated by the word 'samāhitaḥ'). The mention of 'śraddhā' (faith) is found in the Mādhyandina recension of the same Upaniṣad wherein the expression 'samāhito bhūtvā' of the Kāṇva recension is replaced with 'śraddhāvitto bhūtvā': *"śānto dānta uparatastitikṣuḥ śraddhāvitto bhūtvā ātmanyevātmānaṁ paśyati sarvamātmānaṁ paśyati* – One who is endowed with control of the mind and the senses, is withdrawn, has forbearance, is possessed of faith (śraddhāvittaḥ) sees the Self in himself and sees all as the Self." In the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad* (6.12.3), in the context of teaching the oneness of the Self, we find the teacher, exhorting the student to repose faith in the teaching when he urges: *"śraddhattsva somya...tat satyam, sa ātmā, tat tvam asi* – O Pleasing one! Have faith...that is the Reality, that is the Self, That thou art." All these Upaniṣadic declarations clearly indicate that the group of these six means – the śamādiṣaṭka-sampat – is essential for the seeker to realise the oneness of Self.[27]

It is certain that the Realisation of the oneness of the Self (ātmaikatva-vidyā) will not arise so long as one has not worked hard for it. To toil that hard, it is essential to have a forceful and keen desire for the Knowledge of Brahman (brahma-jijñāsā). But, this intense yearning will not develop until and unless one has a burning desire for Liberation, that is the fourth prerequisite in the sādhana-catuṣṭaya, termed 'mumukṣutva'; and, this mumukṣutva will not be generated in an individual unless a person has the third prerequisite consisting of śamādiṣaṭka-sampat, that is the diligent cultivation of such virtues as calmness of mind (śama), sense-control (dama), asceticism (uparati), forbearance (titikṣā), concentration (samādhāna) and an absolute faith in the Scripture and the Preceptor (śraddhā). Thus, by effecting a longing for Liberation (mumukṣutva), the group of these six mental dispositions become the causative factor for the desire to know Brahman (brahma-jijñāsā). It is because of this reason that the *Muṇḍaka-upaniṣad*

[27] The mention of the importance of such qualities as śama also finds mention in the following *Kaṭhopaniṣad* verse (1.2.24): *"nāvirato duścaritānnāśānto nāsamāhitaḥ, nāśāntamānaso vāpi prajñānenainamāpnuyāt."*

relates that a Guru teaches the knowledge of the Self to that disciple alone who is endowed with śama and other means, and who also has the intense longing for Liberation and has approached the Guru to gain Brahma-vidyā.[28] Thus, it is based on the Upaniṣadic declarations that the Bhāṣyakāra delineates the cause–effect relationship between the śamādiṣaṭka-sampat and brahma-jijñāsā.

5. the longing for Liberation: 'Mumukṣutva'[29] translated as the 'burning desire for Liberation' is the fourth prerequisite for brahma-jijñāsā. This intense yearning is in the form of the strong thought: "I ought to get rid of the miseries of the cycle of birth and death. I ought to be free, I ought to be free!"[30] We have discussed earlier[31] that it is the actual direct Realisation of Brahman alone (Brahmāvagati, Brahmānubhava or Aparokṣānubhūti) – and not merely an intellectual understanding of the Reality (parokṣa-jñāna) – that constitutes the content or the object of the desire signified by the term 'brahma-jijñāsā' in the Sūtra *"athāto brahmajijñāsā."*[32] Only if this desire is intense (utkaṭecchā), could it galvanise the person to tread the highly subtle and arduous path[33] of śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana, culminating in the aforementioned Realisation of Brahman (Brahmāvagati). This intense brahma-jijñāsā can be generated not by a weak (manda) or moderate (madhyama) desire for Liberation (mumukṣutva), but by a burning longing (tīvratamā mumukṣā) alone. This intense longing for Liberation is illustrated in the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad* (7.1.3) when Nārada, the ardent disciple, approaches Sanatkumāra, the noble teacher, to learn Brahma-vidyā and beseeches his Guru in the following manner: *"śrutaṁ hyeva me bhagavaddṛśebhyaḥ 'tarati śokamātmavit'*

[28] Cf. तस्मै स विद्वानुपसन्नाय सम्यक् प्रशान्तचित्ताय शमान्विताय। येनाक्षरं पुरुषं वेद सत्यं प्रोवाच तां तत्त्वतो ब्रह्मविद्याम्॥ – मुण्डकोपनिषद् (१.२.१३)

[29] The term 'mumukṣutva' is derived from the verbal root 'muc!' which means to 'give up'. When the desiderative suffix 'san' is added, we get the form 'mumukṣa' which means 'to desire to renounce'. The primary suffix 'u' is added to it to arrive at the derivative 'mumukṣu' – one who has the burning desire to free oneself from saṁsāra.

[30] Cf. संसारदुःखान्मुक्तः स्यां, स्यामहं मुक्तः।

Also, cf. आत्मनोऽज्ञानतत्कार्यसम्बन्धो बन्धः। तद्विच्छेदो मोक्षः। तदिच्छावत्त्वं मुमुक्षुत्वम्। – न्यायनिर्णय

[31] Refer to Section 2 D, n.1.

[32] अवगतिपर्यन्तं ज्ञानं सन्वाच्याया इच्छायाः कर्म। – ब्रह्मसूत्रशाङ्करभाष्य

[33] Cf. क्षुरस्य धारा निशिता दुरत्यया दुर्गं पथस्तत्कवयो वदन्ति। – कठोपनिषद् (१.३.१४)

iti so'haṁ bhagavaḥ śocāmi, taṁ mā bhagavān śokasya pāraṁ tārayatu – Venerable Sir, from Godlike persons like you, I have learnt that he who realises the Self crosses over sorrow. I am afflicted with sorrow; I earnestly implore that your venerable Self may kindly enable me to go beyond the shore of sorrow."

This moving entreaty from such a disciple as Nārada clearly evinces his intense brahma-jijñāsā kindled by his burning yearning for Liberation (tīvratamā mumukṣā). Such a strong longing for Liberation is possible only in a person who is firmly rooted in the śamādiṣaṭka-sampat consisting of the virtues śama, dama, uparati, titikṣā, śraddhā and samādhāna delineated above. Thus, it is substantiated by Scriptural evidence that mumukṣutva (a longing for Liberation) is also an essential prerequisite for brahma-jijñāsā (desire to know Brahman) and is itself brought into existence by the third prerequisite consisting of śamādiṣaṭka-sampat.

It has been established that the prerequisite of brahma-jijñāsā (desire to know Brahman) is actually four and it is collectively termed 'sādhana-catuṣṭaya' (set of four means). Among these four, the third one is not a single factor but is a group of six inner dispositions such as śama (mind control), dama (sense control) and so on for which the Bhāṣyakāra has collectively given the appellation 'śamādiṣaṭka-sampat'. What is the reasoning for arranging the group of these six means (śamādiṣaṭka-sampat) within a group of four means (sādhana-catuṣṭaya)? After all, all of them form the means or prerequisites of brahma-jijñāsā. Cannot all these means – nine in total – be arranged in a single group and termed as 'sādhana-navaka' (the ninefold means)? In fact, while speaking about the third prerequisite, the Bhāṣyakāra mentions only the first two (i.e. śama and dama) and includes the other four under the term 'ādi' (meaning 'and so on'). He could have as well included all the other seven prerequisites also likewise by the same term 'ādi'. Why should he arrange these prerequisite sādhanas for brahma-jijñāsā in this odd fashion?

It is not without reason that the Bhāṣyakāra has presented these means in this sequential order and in this manner. We can observe, in the Upaniṣadic

declarations that have been cited specifying the sādhanas, that the Upaniṣads usually indicate them in this order alone. That is to say, they club śama, dama and the rest together, and mention the other sādhanas (means) individually. The Ācārya's genius consists in grouping together all these prerequisites occurring at different places in the Upaniṣads and in presenting them in a logical order that highlights the cause–effect relationship prevailing among them. We have already discussed how the first prerequisite of viveka begets the second sādhana of vairāgya and how vairāgya in turn produces their third member śamādiṣaṭka-sampat and how śamādiṣaṭka-sampat gives rise to mumukṣutva, the fourth of the sādhana-catuṣṭaya. This vital cause–effect relationship among these prerequisites could be missed if all of them were combined under a single head as 'sādhana-navaka' the way śama, dama and so on are grouped together as 'śamādiṣaṭka-sampat'.[34]

The Pūrvapakṣin raises a pertinent point. The third chapter of the *Brahma-sūtra* is 'Sādhana-adhyāya' (Chapter on the Means) which expounds the primary (antaraṅga) and auxiliary (bahiraṅga) means for the Knowledge of Brahman and the consequent Liberation.[35] These means are intended to help the seeker attain his goal, that is the fruit (phala) consisting in the Knowledge of Brahman. This is the subject matter of the fourth chapter titled 'Phala-adhyāya' (Chapter on the Fruit). The exposition of the topics on sādhana (means) in the third chapter suggests what the Mīmāṁsā tradition terms

[34] Like the linear cause–effect relationship that exists amongst viveka, vairāgya, śamādiṣaṭka-sampat and mumukṣutva, there exists no such linear causal relation among the six mental dispositions comprising the group of śamādiṣaṭka-sampat. Each one amongst them is capable of begetting the other. The sequence here is not based on the linear causal relation but in the order in which they have been enumerated in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* (4.4.23).

[35] The term 'antaraṅga', literally means the 'inner' or 'internal' limb. Antaraṅga-sādhana refers to the primary means of śravaṇa (listening), manana (reflection) and nididhyāsana (incessant meditation) that are proximate to the goal of Self-realisation. The term 'bahiraṅga', literally means 'the outer' or 'external' limb and refers to such means as the dedicated performance of one's duty (karma) and the various contemplations (upāsanās) which generate cittaśuddhi (purity of mind) and cittaikāgratā (concentration of the mind) respectively. It is cittaśuddhi and cittaikāgratā that produce sādhana-catuṣṭaya. Karma, upāsanā and sādhana-catuṣṭaya thus collectively become the bahiraṅga-sādhana.

'pāṭhakrama', signifying a sequence of actions that is decided based on the order in which they are presented in the text. Based on the pāṭhakrama, it is clear that according to the author of the *Brahma-sūtra*, a seeker is first of all expected to comprehend the correct purport of the Upaniṣadic utterances, and only later acquire the sādhanas (means) for reaching the goal. Therefore, it lacks logical propriety to assume that in the first aphorism of the treatise itself, the author has used the word 'atha' (thereafter) for conveying the meaning 'in the immediate succession' to sādhana-catuṣṭaya, which topic he is planning to teach much later in the third chapter. Hence, the Bhāṣyakāra's stand on the purport of the word 'atha', according to the Pūrvapakṣin, is rather untenable.

The point at issue raised by the Pūrvapakṣin, in connection with the significance the Ācārya attaches to the term 'atha', does not stand to reason when it is scrutinised in the light of the mantras of the *Muṇḍaka-upaniṣad* (1.2.12-13): *"parīkṣya lokān karmacitān brāhmaṇo nirvedamāyānnāstyakṛtaḥ kṛtena, tadvijñānārtham sa gurumevābhigacchet samitpāṇiḥ śrotriyam brahmaniṣṭham. tasmai sa vidvānupasannāya samyak praśāntacittāya śamānvitāya, yenākṣaram puruṣam veda satyam provāca tām tattvato brahmavidyām* – Having examined that all the worlds acquired through karma as being transitory by cogitating that nothing uncreated (i.e. eternal) can be produced by actions, the seekers would resort to detachment.[36] Consequently, to know the Reality the seeker should duly approach, with sacrificial sticks in hand, a teacher who is learned in Scriptures and is established in Brahman. To such a seeker, who has thus approached in the prescribed manner, whose mind is calm, and who has controlled his senses, that enlightened teacher would duly impart the knowledge of Brahman by which one realises the imperishable Self, the Reality."

We shall presently analyse the dispositional traits of the seeker delineated in the *Muṇḍaka-upaniṣad* declarations cited above:

(1) The expression, *"parīkṣya lokān karmacitān brāhmaṇo nirvedamāyād nāstyakṛtaḥ kṛtena* – Having examined all the worlds acquired through karma

[36] The word 'nirveda' of the text means 'vairāgya' (dispassion).

as being transitory, by cogitating that nothing uncreated (i.e. eternal) can be produced by actions," indicates that the seeker has acquired the first means consisting in nityānityavastu-viveka (or simply 'viveka') which is the discrimination between the eternal and the transient.

(2) The words, *"nirvedam āyāt* – would resort to detachment," connotes that the nityānityavastu-viveka has generated in the seeker the second means consisting of ihāmutrārthabhoga-virāga (or simply 'vairāgya') which is dispassion towards the enjoyments of the pleasures of this world and the hereafter.

(3) The phrase, *"praśāntacittāya śamānvitāya* – whose mind is calm and who has controlled his senses," signifies that as a result of vairāgya, the second means, the seeker has attained the third means – śamādiṣaṭka-saṁpat (śama, dama, uparati and so on).

(4) The portion, *"tadvijñānārthaṁ* – to know the Reality," indicates the fourth means consisting in mumukṣutva which is the seeker's intense longing for Liberation. The passage also signifies the seeker's intense brahma-jijñāsā effected by his earnest yearning for Liberation (mumukṣutva).

(5) The extract, *"tadvijñānārthaṁ sa gurumevābhigacchet samitpāṇiḥ śrotriyaṁ brahmaniṣṭham* – To know the Reality the seeker should duly approach, with sacrificial sticks in hand, a teacher," signifies that propelled by the intense desire to know Brahman (brahma-jijñāsā), the seeker approaches the teacher (gurūpasadana) for gaining Brahma-vidyā. His approaching the Guru in a humble and respectful manner with an attitude of service, evinced by his carrying the sacrificial sticks for the Guru, also constitutes the means for the inquiry into Brahman.

(6) The statement, *"tasmai sa vidvānupasannāya samyak praśāntacittāya śamānvitāya, yenākṣaraṁ puruṣaṁ veda satyaṁ provāca tāṁ tattvato brahmavidyām* – To such a seeker, who has thus approached in the prescribed manner, whose mind is calm, and who has controlled his senses, that enlightened teacher would duly impart the knowledge of Brahman by which one realises the imperishable Self, the Reality," reveals that for learning the Brahma-vidyā, the seeker ought to have the desire for the Knowledge of Brahman and must

possess the sādhana-catuṣṭaya as the necessary prerequisites for the purpose. Indeed, it is a well-established norm that the Guru will definitely bestow the knowledge of Brahman on such a qualified aspirant.

The *Brahma-sūtras* are purported to reflect the true spirit of the Upaniṣadic teaching. Hence, it is perfectly in order to arrive at the conclusion that the author of the *Brahma-sūtra* too regards the fourfold sādhana-catuṣṭaya as the necessary prerequisite for the brahma-jijñāsā (desire to know Brahman). It is precisely the reason that the Sūtrakāra has employed the word 'atha' (thereafter) in the very first aphorism itself to bring out the necessary qualifications of sādhana-catuṣṭaya for a seeker who wishes to embark upon the study of the *Brahma-sūtra*. Therefore, the Ācārya's elucidation of the purport of the word 'atha' is certainly logically tenable. It beautifully reflects the spirit of the Upaniṣadic literature and thus faithfully brings out the intention of the Sūtrakāra.

Undoubtedly, the Sūtrakāra introduces the desire for the Knowledge of Brahman (brahma-jijñāsā) in the first aphorism of the first chapter (Samanvaya-adhyāya) and dwells upon the sādhanas (the means) thereof later on in the third chapter (Sādhana-adhyāya). It is but common sense that the means are meant for their respective results and hence the former should precede the latter. This sequence is known in philosophical discourse as 'arthakrama', that is the 'order of sequence based on their purpose'. The tradition also lays down that in places where this purpose-based sequence (arthakrama) is found differing from the text-sequence-based one (pāṭhakrama), the former supersedes the latter.[37] Therefore, it is only logical that one must acquire the fourfold means first so that they may generate in one the desire to know Brahman.

The feature of introducing the result or purpose first and prescribing its means subsequently, as we observe in the *Brahma-sūtra*, is not unknown in the Scriptural and philosophical treatises. For instance, the Agnihotra rite is enjoined first[38] and the preparation of rice gruel (yavāgū) is prescribed

[37] Vide *"parasparavirodhe arthakramaḥ pāṭhakramaṁ bādhate."*

[38] *"agnihotraṁ juhoti."*

only subsequently,[39] but, since the rice gruel is meant for the purpose of the Agnihotra offering naturally it is to be prepared first and the rite performed subsequently. Likewise, the *Yoga-sūtra* of Patañjali teaches the samādhi (cessation of the mental modes) in the very first chapter 'Samādhipāda' itself and then proceeds to prescribe the antaraṅga (primary) and bahiraṅga (auxillary) sādhanas for attaining the same. Yet, the sādhanas are to precede the purpose, that is the samādhi.[40]

We have already observed that after bringing into existence their purpose, that is the desire for the Knowledge of Brahman (brahma-jijñāsā) in the seeker, the sādhana-catuṣṭaya (fourfold means) do not cease to be,[41] but rather they continue to play a vital role in the seeker's onward pursuit of knowledge, through the stages of śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana, towards the final goal that is the Realisation of Brahman (Brahmāvagati). In this way, the nature of the sādhana-catuṣṭaya differs vitally from the nature of other means pertaining to all sorts of empirical and religious activities and their results. Perhaps this fact is indicated by the Sūtrakāra's treatment of these means by initially delineating sādhana-catuṣṭaya as the prerequisite for brahma-jijñāsā at the very beginning in the first Sūtra itself before embarking upon the inquiry into Brahman and later on also in the Sādhana-adhyāya, that is the third chapter, which precedes the discussion about the result of Liberation which is discussed in the fourth and the final Phala-adhyāya. Earlier, too, we saw how the first of the four means, that is the discrimination between the Eternal and the ephemeral continues to help the seeker throughout his journey to the goal and finally transforms itself to be the direct Realisation of Brahman and the consequent final goal which is Liberation.

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[39] *"yavāgūṁ pacati."*

[40] Parallel instances are often noticed in our worldly transactions also. For example a father gives instructions to his son: (1) You ought to come through with flying colours in your final examinations. (2) Concentrate on your studies. (3) Seek the advice of your esteemed teachers. On receiving these instructions the son understands that the father intends him to first get the teacher's advice, then to study as per the advice, and then as a result he could pass the examinations creditably. Here, the son adheres to the sequence of actions decided by the purpose and he does not follow the sequence suggested by the order in which the instructions were given. This is an obvious case of arthakrama superseding the pāṭhakrama.

[41] Unlike the gruel and its preparation that do not remain when their purpose, that is the Agnihotra rite, is accomplished.

Even after the Knowledge of the Self, the second and the third means, that is vairāgya and śamādiṣaṭka-saṁpat continue to embellish the Man of Realisation as his chief adornments.[42] It is these characteristics that are described in glowing terms in the Scriptural literature, such as in the *Bhagavad-gītā*, as the distinctive traits of the person established in Wisdom (Sthitaprajña).[43] Thus, sādhana-catuṣṭaya, the fourfold means of the desire for the Knowledge of Brahman (brahma-jijñāsā), stands towering above all the other means that play a significant role in attaining the results pertaining to this world and also to the hereafter.

6. Having acquired the fourfold means, the desire to know Brahman and also to know can arise even prior to the desire to know dharma or after it, but not conversely: This Bhāṣya passage sheds ample light on the indisputable significance of the sādhana-catuṣṭaya in effecting brahma-jijñāsā. The phrase, *"teṣu hi satsu* – indeed, when these exist," explains that the seeker must necessarily be equipped with viveka, vairāgya and so on in order that the desire to know (jijñāsitum) Brahman may emerge and in order that he may come to know It (jñātum) also.[44]

This portion of the Bhāṣya delineates the anvaya-vyāpti (invariable concomitance of the existents) between the sādhana-catuṣṭaya and the consequent desire to know Brahman. The *raison d'etre* of the causal status of sādhana-catuṣṭaya gets also substantiated by the concomitance of the non-existents (vyatireka-vyāpti) between the two which is indicated by the expression *"na viparyaye* – not conversely" in the Bhāṣya passage. This vyatireka-vyāpti has been cogently explained by Govindānanda, the author of *Bhāṣyaratnaprabhā* and Padmapāda, the author of *Pañcapādikā*. They say that even if a person devoid of the sādhana-catuṣṭaya strays into having thoughts and deliberations about Brahman either out of curiosity or fortuitously or

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[42] However the fourth means, that is mumukṣutva, the longing for Liberation, ceases to have any relevance for the Man of Realisation since he is already liberated.

[43] Vide sthitaprajña-lakṣaṇa in the *Bhagavad-gītā* (2.54 to 2.72).

[44] Cf. ततोऽस्य संसारबन्धनान्मुमुक्षा भवतीत्याह—मुमुक्षुत्वं च इति। तस्य च नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावब्रह्मज्ञानं मोक्षस्य कारणमित्युपश्रुत्य तज्जिज्ञासा भवति धर्मजिज्ञासायाः प्रागूर्ध्वं च, तस्मात्तेषामेवानन्तर्यं न धर्मजिज्ञासाया इत्याह—तेषु हि इति। न केवलं जिज्ञासामात्रम्, अपि तु ज्ञानमपीत्याह—ज्ञातुं च। – भामती

because of other considerations, then he is not going to be blessed with the Knowledge of Brahman.[45] Thus, both anvaya-vyāpti and vyatireka-vyāpti prove beyond any doubt the necessity of the prior possession of viveka, vairāgya and so on by the seeker in order to become endowed with the desire to know Brahman (brahma-jijñāsā).[46]

If the seeker does possess the sādhana-catuṣṭaya, then the desire to know Brahman can well up in the seeker even prior to the desire to know dharma (dharma-jijñāsā), or deliberation upon the Vedic rites (dharma-mīmāṁsā), or knowledge of Vedic rites (karmāvabodha), or the performance of Vedic rites (karmānuṣṭhāna), nay even prior to the study of the Veda (svādhyāya).

7. Therefore, by the word 'atha' is taught the immediate succession to the wealth of the aforesaid means: After the causal nature of the sādhana-catuṣṭaya has been logically determined, the prior correlate of the immediate succession denoted by the word 'atha' becomes crystal clear. The Bhāṣya, therefore, conclusively avers that it is the wealth of sādhana-catuṣṭaya possessed by the seeker that necessarily precedes the desire to know Brahman and nothing else whatsoever.[47]

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[45] Cf. कथञ्चिद्वा दैववशात् कुतूहलाद्वा बहुश्रुतत्वबुद्ध्या वा प्रवृत्तोऽपि न निर्विचिकित्सं ब्रह्म तत्त्वेनावगन्तुं शक्नोति यथोक्तसाधनसम्पत्तिविरहाद् अन्तर्मुखचेता बहिरेवाभिनिविशमानः। – पञ्चपादिका

Also, cf. अथ कथञ्चित् कुतूहलितया ब्रह्मविचारप्रवृत्तस्यापि फलपर्यन्तं तज्ज्ञानानुदयाद् व्यतिरेकसिद्धिः। – रत्नप्रभा

[46] Cf. एतेषां पूर्वस्य पूर्वस्योत्तरोत्तरहेतुतया मुमुक्षावसानात्, तस्या एव ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाहेतुत्वाद्, युक्तममुष्यास्तदानन्तर्यं, तेषां साक्षात्पारम्पर्याभ्यां तद्धेतुत्वादित्यर्थः। साधनचतुष्टयस्य ब्रह्मविचारादिप्रवृत्तौ दृष्टहेतुत्वमन्वयेनान्वाचष्टे—तेष्विति। तत्रैव व्यतिरेकमाह—नेति। – न्यायनिर्णय

[47] Cf. तेषु हि सत्स्विति। यस्मादन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां, शान्तो दान्तः इत्यादिशास्त्राच्च साधनकलापो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाः पुष्कलकारणं तस्मादित्युपसंहारः। – प्रकटार्थविवरण

10

[अतःशब्दार्थनिर्णयभाष्यम्]

अतःशब्दो हेत्वर्थः। यस्माद्[1] वेद[2] एवाग्निहोत्रादीनां श्रेयःसाधनानाम् अनित्यफलतां [१]दर्शयति – "तद्यथेह कर्मचितो लोकः क्षीयते, एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यचितो लोकः क्षीयते" (छा.उ.८.१.६) [२]इत्यादिः। तथा [३]ब्रह्मविज्ञानादपि [४]परं पुरुषार्थं[3] दर्शयति – "ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्" (तै.उ.२.१) इत्यादिः। तस्माद्यथोक्तसाधनसम्पत्त्यनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्या[4]।

10 A

[ATAḤŚABDĀRTHANIRṆAYABHĀṢYAM]

ataḥśabdo hetvarthaḥ. yasmād veda evāgnihotrādīnāṁ śreyaḥsādhanānām anityaphalatāṁ darśayati – "tadyatheha karmacito lokaḥ kṣīyate, evamevāmutra puṇyacito lokaḥ kṣīyate" (Chā.U.8.1.6) ityādiḥ. tathā brahmavijñānādapi paraṁ puruṣārthaṁ darśayati – "brahmavidāpnoti param" (Tai.U.2.1) ityādiḥ. tasmād-yathoktasādhanasampattyanantaraṁ brahmajijñāsā kartavyā.

10 B

अतःशब्दः *ataḥśabdaḥ* – the word 'ataḥ – therefore'; हेत्वर्थः *hetvarthaḥ* – has the sense of reason; यस्मात् *yasmāt* – because; वेद एव *veda eva* – the Veda itself; अग्निहोत्रादीनाम् *agnihotrādīnām* – of the Agnihotra and so on; श्रेयःसाधनानाम् *śreyaḥsādhanānām* – which are means to prosperity; अनित्यफलताम् *anityaphalatām* – bearing fruits that are transient; दर्शयति *darśayati* – shows; तत् *tat* – therefore;

[१] CSS (fn.) अग्निहोत्रादीनां कर्मणाम् अनित्यफलवत्तां दर्शयति इति ऋजुप्रकाशिकाभिमतः पाठः।

[२] ASS इत्यादि

[३] *Vārtika* ब्रह्मविज्ञानादेव; VV, SES, CSS (fn.) ब्रह्मज्ञानादपि इति पाठान्तरम्

[४] CSS (fn.) परमपुरुषार्थं श्रावयति इति वार्तिकाभिमतः पाठः।

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[1] तस्मादिति उत्तरेण सम्बन्धः। – रत्नप्रभा

[2] The word 'vedaḥ', found in the nominative, is to be construed with the nominative 'ityādiḥ' occurring twice in the sentence.

[3] निरस्तसमस्तदुःखं निरतिशयानन्दं नित्यमित्यर्थः। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

[4] यथा वेदः कर्मफलानित्यत्वं दर्शयति, तथा ब्रह्मज्ञानात् प्रशान्तशोकानलमपारं स्वयञ्ज्योतिरानन्दं दर्शयति इत्यर्थः। जीवत्वादेरध्यासोक्त्या ब्रह्मत्वसम्भव उक्त एव इति भावः। एवमथातःशब्दाभ्यां पुष्कलकारणवतोऽधिकारिणः समर्थनात् शास्त्रमारब्धव्यमित्याह—तस्मादिति। – रत्नप्रभा

यथा *yathā* – just as; इह *iha* – here; कर्मचितः *karmacitaḥ* – gained by activities; लोकः *lokaḥ* – pleasure; क्षीयते *kṣīyate* – perishes; एवम् एव *evam eva* – so also; अमुत्र *amutra* – in the other world; पुण्यचितः *puṇyacitaḥ* – gained by means of meritorious acts; लोकः *lokaḥ* – pleasure; क्षीयते *kṣīyate* – perishes; इत्यादिः *ityādiḥ* – and so on; तथा *tathā* – likewise; ब्रह्मविज्ञानात् *brahmavijñānāt* – from the Knowledge of Brahman; अपि *api* – also; परम् *param* – supreme; पुरुषार्थम् *puruṣārtham* – human goal; दर्शयति *darśayati* – shows; ब्रह्मवित् *brahmavit* – he who knows Brahman; आप्नोति *āpnoti* – attains; परम् *param* – Supreme; इत्यादिः *ityādiḥ* – and so on; तस्मात् *tasmāt* – therefore; यथोक्तसाधनसम्पत्त्यनन्तरम् *yathoktasādhanasampattyanantaram* – in the immediate succession to the acquisition of the wealth of the means enumerated above; ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा *brahmajijñāsā* – the desire to know Brahman; कर्तव्या *kartavyā* – should be there

10 C

[DECIDING THE PURPORT OF THE WORD 'THEREFORE']

The word 'ataḥ – therefore' has the sense of reason. For, the Veda itself shows that the Agnihotra and so on, which are the means to prosperity, bear fruits that are transient by declarations such as, "As here in this world, the pleasures gained by means of an activity perish, so too, there in the other world, the pleasures gained by means of meritorious acts perish." And, the Veda also shows that the supreme human goal ensues from the Knowledge of Brahman by statements such as, "The one who realises Brahman attains the Supreme." Therefore, in the immediate succession to the acquisition of the above-mentioned means, there should be the desire to know Brahman.

10 D

The word 'ataḥ', meaning 'therefore', is generally used to indicate that which is cited in a context as the reason for what ensues in the sequel. But, the Sūtrakāra has not stated anything earlier in the present context as this is the very first Sūtra of the treatise. Hence, we have to necessarily postulate for

the sake of cogency that the reason indicated by the word 'ataḥ' (therefore) has to be associated only with what is expressed by the previous word 'atha' (thereafter) alone, which implies 'in the immediate succession to the acquisition of the fourfold means' (sādhanacatuṣṭaya-sampattyanantaram). But, does not the above-mentioned meaning of the word 'atha' (thereafter) contain inherently within itself the causal force for establishing the logical tenability of sādhana-catuṣṭaya as being the means for generating brahma-jijñāsā (the desire to know Brahman) which is to ensue thereafter? Indeed, there seems to be no necessity for repeating the same sense by the term 'ataḥ' (therefore) once again.

However, the Bhāṣyakāra avers that though the causal nature of the sādhana-catuṣṭaya in generating brahma-jijñāsā has been indicated by the term 'atha' (thereafter), yet it needs to be reiterated and put on a firmer ground as the Pūrvapakṣin could still challenge it.[5] The Pūrvapakṣin's argument is as follows: If the aforesaid sādhana-catuṣṭaya could be acquired, then it may possibly lead to the rise of brahma-jijñāsā (desire to know Brahman). But to acquire the sādhana-catuṣṭaya is itself an impossibility. To explain: A vital member of the sādhana-catuṣṭaya is the aversion to the enjoyment of pleasures here in this world and also hereafter in the higher realms such as heaven – 'ihāmutraphalabhoga-virāga'. Pleasures, which are the fruits of one's meritorious actions, are always perceived as beneficial and desirable by the individual.[6] It is impossible to have an aversion or even dispassion towards the pleasure and enjoyment that are derived from such coveted fruits. Undoubtedly, the worldly enjoyments are impermanent. But, this very fact by itself does not become the reason for detachment. Rather, because of

[5] Cf. अथशब्देन हेतोरुक्तत्वादतःशब्देनापि तस्यैवोक्तौ पुनरुक्तिरित्याशङ्क्य हेतुरूपमर्थमेवाह—यस्मादिति। तस्मादित्युत्तरेण सम्बन्धः। अस्यार्थः—अथशब्देनानन्तर्योक्तिद्वारा पूर्वनिर्वृत्ते ब्रह्मजिज्ञासापुष्कलहेतुचतुष्टये विवक्षितेऽपि तदपवादे शङ्किते तन्निरासेन तद्धेतुत्वमतःशब्देनाथशब्दोक्तहेतुवाचिना व्यवस्थाप्यते। – न्यायनिर्णय

Also, cf. यद्यप्यथशब्देनानन्तर्याभिधानमुखेन पूर्वनिर्वृत्तं पुष्कलकारणं तात्पर्यतः प्रतिपादितं, तथाऽपि तस्यैव हेत्वन्तरेणापवादशङ्कायां तन्निराकरणेन हेतुत्वं पुनरथशब्दोक्तहेत्वभिधायिनाऽतःशब्देन स्थाप्यते। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

Also, cf. अथेति मुमुक्षुत्वानन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्येति प्रवृत्तिसिद्धयेऽनुवादपरिहाराय च कर्तव्यपदाध्याहारेण तावदन्वयः। तत्र ब्रह्मजिज्ञासैव मुमुक्षुणा किमिति कर्तव्या, आवृत्त्या कर्म कस्मान्न क्रियत इति हेत्वाकाङ्क्षायामाह—अतो लोकवेदप्रसिद्धाद्धेतोरिति। तमेव हेतुं स्फुटयति—यस्मादित्यादिना। – प्रकटार्थविवरण

[6] *"anukūlavedanīyaṁ hi phalam īpsitatamalakṣaṇatvāt phalasya."* (*Bhāmatī*) This is based on the definition of karma (object) given by Pāṇini in his aphorism (1.4.49), *"karturīpsitatamaṁ karma."*

the impermanent nature of the objects of this world, diligent persons are seen to strive hard for gaining more and more in order that their pleasure may continue forever.

It is evident that besides the element of pleasure, these coveted worldly enjoyments do contain elements of pain too. But, man possesses the intelligence whereby he learns to avoid these annoying elements of pain. Indeed, no one forsakes food for fear of indigestion! To illustrate with another example: The farmer strives for a good harvest of paddy though it will be intermingled with the unwanted chaff. He takes what is of use and abandons the rest. We do not observe any farmer giving up the harvest just because the paddy comes along with the chaff and the bran! Indeed, aversion to the enjoyment of the pleasurable objects of the world does not stand to reason.

Granted that we come across some timid persons – they are the exceptions – who give up even the most obvious pleasures of the world simply on the ground that these pleasures are perishable in nature. Even so, the pleasures of the fruits of the hereafter, that is of the higher worlds such as heaven, are neither diminishing in nature nor perishable in time. The Scriptures themselves declare clearly that the merit derived from the performance of Vedic rites like Cāturmāsya, Somayāga and so on is imperishable and the pleasure derived therefrom is of an undiminishing nature.[7]

Therefore, the possibility of the first sādhana-catuṣṭaya, viveka or the discrimination between the Eternal and the ephemeral (nityānityavastu-viveka) itself cannot be established and becomes an utter impossibility. Consequently, its result, that is vairāgya, which is dispassion towards the enjoyment of the pleasures here and hereafter too becomes improbable. It has already been established that the doctrine of such an aversion and dispassion does not stand to reason in the case of the intelligent and the diligent. Thus when the first two means, viveka and vairāgya, become impossible to come by, the other two means śamādiṣaṭka-saṁpat and mumukṣutva too become mere words, having no real substance whatsoever.

[7] Vide *"apāma somamamṛtā abhūma* – We drank the Soma juice in the sacrifice and thereby we have become immortal," and *"akṣayyaṁ ha vai cāturmāsyayājinaḥ sukṛtaṁ bhavati* – Verily, the merit of the performer of the Cāturmāsya rite does not decay."

Thus when it is not possible to acquire the sādhana-catuṣṭaya (fourfold means), then it follows that there cannot be the desire to know Brahman also for when the cause ceases to exist, the result too cannot ensue. Thus, according to the Pūrvapakṣin, the first Sūtra ceases to have any authentic meaning or purpose.[8]

The Bhāṣyakāra explains that it is for the purpose of meeting the above contingency that the Sūtrakāra has used the term 'ataḥ' (therefore).[9] What the Bhāṣyakāra means to say is that, it is indeed possible for an intelligent person to consume the right kind and an appropriate quantity of food in order to avoid the pain of indigestion. A farmer certainly knows the art of separating the grain, like paddy or barley, from the unwanted and undesirable chaff. But the pain and misery that invariably accompany each and every object of pleasure (bhogya-vastu) are certainly too innumerable, incomprehensible and also unavoidable. To elucidate: The objects of enjoyment are like food mixed with sweet honey and deadly poison. Even the most diligent and intelligent amongst us would not be able to consume the food with honey

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[8] Cf. सत्यं यथोक्तसाधनसम्पत्त्यनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा भवति। सैव त्वनुपपन्ना, इहामुत्रफलभोगविरागस्यानुपपत्तेः। अनुकूलवेदनीयं हि फलम्, इष्टलक्षणत्वात्फलस्य। न चानुरागहेतावस्य वैराग्यं भवितुमर्हति। दुःखानुषङ्गदर्शनात्सुखेऽपि वैराग्यमिति चेत्, हन्त भोः सुखानुषङ्गाद्दुःखेऽप्यनुरागो न कस्माद्भवति। तस्मात्सुखे उपादीयमाने दुःखपरिहारे प्रयतितव्यम्, अवर्जनीयतया दुःखमागतमपि परिहृत्य सुखमात्रं भोक्ष्यते। तद्यथा—मत्स्यार्थी सशल्कान्सकण्टकान्मत्स्यानुपादत्ते, स यावदादेयं तावदादाय निवर्तते, यथा वा धान्यार्थी सपलालानि धान्यान्याहरति, स यावदादेयं तावदादाय निवर्तते। तस्माद्दुःखभयान्नानुकूलवेदनीयमैहिकं वामुष्मिकं वा सुखं परित्यक्तुमुचितम्। न हि मृगाः सन्तीति शाल्यो नोप्यन्ते, भिक्षुकाः सन्तीति स्थाल्यो नाधिश्रीयन्ते। अपि च दृष्टं सुखं चन्दन-वनितादिसङ्गजन्मक्षयितालक्षणेन दुःखेनाघातत्वादतिभीरुणा त्यज्येतापि, न त्वामुष्मिकं स्वर्गादि, तस्याविनाशित्वात्। श्रूयते हि—'अपाम सोममभूता अभूम' इति, तथा च 'अक्षय्यं ह वै चातुर्मास्ययाजिनः सुकृतं भवति' इति। – भामती

[9] The *Bhāṣyaratnaprabhā*, a lucid commentary on the *Śaṅkara-bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra* by Govindānanda, refers to an interesting and subtle point regarding the purpose served by the word 'ataḥ' to indicate the feasibility of the sādhana-catuṣṭaya. The Pūrvapakṣin makes out his case that discrimination and total dispassion are not feasible to procure as the fruits of the Vedic rites are eternal as proclaimed by the Śruti, "The merit attained by the performer of the Cāturmāsya rite is not subject to decay." And, also Liberation of the Self, consisting in the nature of the Brahman, is not plausible as there is difference between the Self and the Brahman. So, Mokṣa, being different from the Self and hence being on a par with the inanimate objects, like a stone, does not deserve to be termed a human end (puruṣārtha). It is this objection, relating to the impossibility of the desire for Liberation, to set aside which the term 'ataḥ' has been used. Vide *"nanu uktavivekādikaṁ na sambhavati, 'akṣayyaṁ ha vai cāturmāsyayājinaḥ sukṛtam' ityādiśrutyā karmaphalasya nityatvena tato vairāgyāsiddheḥ. jīvasya brahmasvarūpamokṣaśca ayuktaḥ, bhedāt, tasya loṣṭādivat puruṣārthatvāyogācca. tato na mumukṣāsambhava ityākṣepaparihārārthaḥ ataḥ śabdaḥ."* (*Ratnaprabhā*)

alone while separating the poison from the delicious food.[10] By carefully pondering over these facts of life, a wise person discovers the truth of such statements of the wise like, "Pleasures are transient and instead of our enjoying them, we have been devoured by them!"[11]

By such a deep insight into life as a whole the person turns to be a seeker and develops an aversion or an attitude of dispassion towards worldly pleasure. Further, by his perceptive cogitation he becomes aware of the universal law that the end result of every activity is bound to be transient and unreal. Basing his analysis on the same, he rightly infers that even the pleasures of the higher realms such as heaven are also of a transitory nature because they too are products ensuing from the merits gained by the performance of one or the other Vedic rite, or offering charity (dāna) or some other pious acts. Their transitory nature cannot be belied even by the fact that these pious acts have been enjoined in the Scriptures. This inference gets corroborated by the Scriptural declaration (*Chā.U.*8.1.6): "*tadyatheha karmacito lokaḥ kṣīyate, evamevāmutra puṇyacito lokaḥ kṣīyate* – As here in this world, the pleasures, gained by means of an activity, perish, so too there in the other world, the pleasures, gained by means of meritorious acts, perish."

By means of the reason that all pleasures – be they enjoyed here or hereafter – are utterly dependent on their causative acts and are therefore destined to decay, the seeker decides that the other Scriptural utterances, cited above by the opponent to establish his thesis that they, being permanently pleasurable, are merely laudatory or eulogistic in nature (arthavāda) indicating merely that the duration of the enjoyments accrued from the merits born from the Somayāga and the Cāturmāsya rites is merely of a longer duration than that of the other sacrifices.[12]

The seeker, in his svādhyāya (study of one's own branch of Veda), also comes to know of Upaniṣadic passages which state that the knower

[10] Cf. सत्यं मृगभिक्षुकादयः शक्याः परिहर्तुं पाचककृषीवलादिभिः, दुःखं त्वनेकविधानेककारणसम्पातजमशक्यपरिहारम्, अन्ततः साधनपारतन्त्र्यक्षयितालक्षणयोर्दुःखयोः समस्तकृतकसुखाविनाभावनियमात्। न हि मधुविषसम्पृक्तमन्नं विशं परित्यज्य मधुमिश्रं शक्यं शिल्पिवरेणापि भोक्तुम्। – भामती

[11] भोगा न भुक्ता वयमेव भुक्ताः। – भर्तृहरि-वैराग्यशतकम् (१२)

[12] Cf. क्षयितानुमानोपोद्बलितं च 'तद्यथेह कर्मचितः' इत्यादिवचनं क्षयिताप्रतिपादकम्, 'अपाम सोमम्' इत्यादिकं वचनं मुख्यासम्भवे जघन्यवृत्तितामापादयति। – भामती

of Brahman attains Liberation, which is not a product of any activity. In this way, the seeker comes to attain the faculty of discrimination that helps him draw a distinction between the Eternal and ephemeral – the nityānityavastu-viveka – which constitutes the first member of the group of the sādhana-catuṣṭaya (fourfold means). Thereupon, he acquires, step by step, the other members of the sādhana-catuṣṭaya – vairāgya, śamādiṣaṭka-sampat and mumukṣutva.

In the immediate succession to the acquirement of these four means (atha), because such an acquirement is indeed possible (ataḥ),[13] these four means do naturally generate brahma-jijñāsā, that is the desire to know Brahman, the Eternal and the Supreme.[14] In this manner, the Ācārya explains the purport, and brings out the efficacy of the word 'ataḥ' (therefore) of the first aphorism – *"athāto brahmajijñāsā."*[15]

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[13] अत्र अथशब्देन साधनचतुष्टयसम्पत्त्यनन्तर्यमुच्यते। अतःशब्देन साधनचतुष्टयस्य सम्भावना। – सदाशिवेन्द्रसरस्वत्या विरचिता ब्रह्मसूत्रवृत्तिः

[14] While discussing the purport of the Bhāṣya passage *"nādhikārārthaḥ, brahmajijñāsāyā anadhikāryatvāt"* (vide Section 4 D, n.1 & 2) it has been shown, after a detailed investigation, that the present Bhāṣya sentence, *"tasmād yathoktasādhanasampattyanantaraṁ brahmajijñāsā kartavyā,"* should be understood in the above-mentioned sense alone, that is brahmajijñāsā (the desire to know Brahman) should be naturally caused and generated by the aforesaid means consisting of the sādhana-catuṣṭaya.

[15] Cf. तद्यथेह कर्मचितो लोकः क्षीयते, एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यचितो लोकः क्षीयते इति सोपपत्तिकेन प्रबलेन वचनान्तरेण कर्मफलानित्यत्वावगमाद् अक्षय्यादिवाक्यं बहुकालस्थायित्वाभिप्रायमेव न नित्यत्वाभिप्रायमिति सूच्यते। तथा चातःशब्देन तद्यथेह कर्मचितो लोकः वाक्योपस्थापनद्वारेणाथशब्दोपात्तानां श्रवणादिविधिप्रकरणगततत्तद्वाक्यावगतत्वं बोध्यत इति तत्प्रकरणगतवाक्यपरामर्शेन प्रकरणान्तरगताक्षय्यादिवाक्यदौर्बल्यं सूच्यत इति भावः। इममेवाशयं स्पष्टं विवेचयति भाष्यकारः—यस्मादित्यादिना। यस्मात्—तद्यथेह कर्मचितो लोकः क्षीयते एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यचितो लोकः क्षीयते इत्यादिर्वेदोऽग्निहोत्रादि-कर्मणामनित्यफलतां दर्शयति, तथा ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परमित्यादिर्वेदो ब्रह्मज्ञानात् परं पुरुषार्थं दर्शयति, तस्माद् – यथोक्तसाधन-चतुष्टयसम्पत्तिसम्भवस्य वेदबोधितत्वाद् यथोक्तसाधनचतुष्टयसम्पत्त्यनन्तरमित्यथशब्दविवरणम्। अनेन च स्पष्टमवगम्यते—यद् नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकसम्भवप्रतिपादनार्थमेवातःशब्द इति। अत्राक्षय्यादिवाक्यापेक्षया तद्यथेहेतिवाक्यस्य प्राबल्ये ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परमिति वाक्यान्यथानुपपत्तिरपीति सूचनार्थं—तथा ब्रह्मविज्ञानादपीत्यादिवाक्यशेषः, अन्यथा समाने श्रुतित्वे कथं प्राबल्यदौर्बल्यविवेकः इति शङ्का ह्यपरिहरणीया स्यादिति हृदयम्। – प्रदीप

Also, cf. कृतकत्वपरिच्छेदौ नैकान्ततः क्षयिष्णुतां गमयतः परमाणुषु पाकजलोहितस्य कृतकस्य, तेषां च परिच्छिन्नानां नित्यत्वाभ्युपगमाद्, वेदेऽपि अक्षय्यं ह वै चातुर्मास्ययाजिनः सुकृतं भवति अपाम सोममभूमेत्यादिपुण्यफलस्याक्षयित्वश्रवणाद्, अतो विषयभोगाद् न नियमेन विरागो विवेकिनामपि। नापि कूटस्थनित्यवस्त्ववष्टम्भेन मुमुक्षुत्वम्। ततश्च न शमदमादिपरिग्रहः, यतो न तादात्म्यं भोक्तुः सम्भाव्यते। नापि तदवाप्तिः, दुःखाभावेऽपि सुखभोगाभावान्नानवद्यः पुरुषार्थः। अतोऽजीर्णभयान्नाहारपरित्यागः, भिक्षुभयान्न स्थाल्या अनधिश्रयणं दोषेषु प्रतिविधातव्यमिति न्यायः। अतो न तस्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायां हेतुत्वमित्यतस्तस्य हेतुत्वप्रदर्शनार्थोऽतःशब्दः। कथं, यस्माद्वेद एवाग्निहोत्रादीनां श्रेयःसाधनानामनित्यफलतां दर्शयति—तद्यथेह कर्मचितो लोकः क्षीयते, एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यचितो लोकः क्षीयते इत्यादिना। ननु पुण्यस्याप्यक्षयफलत्वं वेद एवाहेत्युक्तं, न तस्य वस्तुबलप्रवृत्तानुमान-विरोधेऽर्थवादस्य नित्यत्वप्रतिपादनासामर्थ्यात्, परमाणूनां पाकजस्य च तद्गुणस्य नित्यत्वाद्। अतो भवत्यनित्यत्वदर्शनं विषयभोगानां मुमुक्षुत्वे हेतुः। यत्पुनर्मुमुक्षुत्वाभावे निमित्तमुक्तं, तत्राह—तथा ब्रह्मज्ञानादपि परं पुरुषार्थं दर्शयति—ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परमित्यादि।

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अत उपसंहरति—तस्माद्यथोक्तसाधनसम्पत्त्यनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्येति। यतः परिपूर्णो हेतुरनन्तरमवश्यं कार्यमारभते, अतः कर्तव्येत्यावश्यकतामाह भाष्यकारः। यतो द्वैतानुषङ्गादतितरामुद्विजमानेन ब्रह्मात्मत्वं च हस्तप्राप्तमिव मन्यमानेन प्रवर्तितव्यमेव ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायां, प्रदीप्तशिरसेव जलराशौ, स्पृशतेव च सुस्वादु फलमङ्गुल्यग्रेणाग्रपादस्थेन। एवं सत्यर्थाद् धर्मजिज्ञासाया नियमेन पूर्ववृत्तत्वमथशब्देन पूर्वोक्तेन न्यायेन निराक्रियते। – पञ्चपादिका

Also, cf. अत्रेयमाशङ्का भवति—आत्मैव नित्यः तद् व्यतिरिक्तं ब्रह्मलोकान्तं सकललौकिकवैदिककर्मसाध्यं फलमनित्यं 'तद्यथेह कर्मचितो लोकः क्षीयते एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यचितो लोकः क्षीयते' (छा.उ.८.१.६) इत्यादिश्रुतेः—इत्येवंरूपेण नित्यानित्यवस्तु-विवेकाद्वैराग्यं भवतीत्युक्तम्। तन्न सम्भवति—'अक्षय्यं ह वै चातुर्मास्ययाजिनस्सुकृतं भवति', अपाम सोमममृता अभूम, 'स्वर्गे लोके न भयं किञ्चनास्ति न तत्र त्वं न जरया बिभेति। उभे तीर्त्वा अशनायापिपासे शोकातिगो मोदते स्वर्गलोके॥' (क.उ.१.१२) इत्यादिवाक्यैः कर्मफलानामपि नित्यत्वशोकादिरहितत्वप्रतिपादनात्। न च 'यत्कृतकं तदनित्यं' इति न्यायेन चिरकालस्थायित्वमात्रप्रतिपादनपराणि तानीति शङ्कनीयम्। वचनविरोधे न्यायस्याभासत्वात्—इति।

न केवलेन न्यायेन तस्यान्यथानयनम्, अपि तु न्यायोपोद्बलितश्रुत्यनुसारेण। तद्यथेहेत्यादिश्रुतिः यत्कृतकं तदनित्यमिति न्यायं 'तद्यथेह कर्मचितो लोकः क्षीयते' इत्यंशेनानूद्य कर्मफलस्यानित्यत्वं प्रतिपादयति। अतः सा उपपत्तिरूपतात्पर्य-लिङ्गोपोद्बलिता तद्रहिताद् 'अक्षय्यं ह वै चातुर्मास्ययाजिनः' इत्यादि वाक्याद् विशेषरूपादपि बलवती। एवम् 'आत्तो वै सशरीरः प्रियाप्रियाभ्याम्' (छा.उ.८.१२.१) इत्यपि वचनं 'न ह वै सशरीरस्य सतः प्रियाप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति अशरीरं वाव सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः' (छा.उ.८.१२.१) इति अन्वयव्यतिरेकरूपोपपत्त्यात्मकतात्पर्यलिङ्गोपोद्बलितं 'स्वर्गे लोके' इति वाक्याद्बलीयः। विशिष्य च हिरण्यगर्भस्यैव भयादिकमाम्नायते 'सोऽबिभेत्, स वै नैव रेमे' (बृ.उ.१.४.२) इत्यादि। तत्र का कथा अन्येषां तल्लोकं गतानां भयादौ। तस्मादक्षय्यवाक्यं आपेक्षिकामृतत्वाभिप्रायेण व्याख्येयम्। तथा चोपबृंहितं 'आभूतसम्प्लवं स्थानममृतत्वं हि भाष्यते' इति। 'स्वर्गे लोके' इति वाक्यञ्च न तत्रत्वमितिवाक्यशेषानुसारेण मृत्युजराशनायादिकृतं दुःखं वारयदपि पारतन्त्र्यादिकृतं न वारयतीति परिहारः।

अमुमर्थं द्योतयितुं अतश्शब्दः। तत्र—यद्यतश्शब्देन अथशब्दोक्तं साधनचतुष्टयं परामृश्यते, तदा अथशब्दोक्तस्यैव पुनरतश्शब्देन परामर्शं कृत्वा तस्य जिज्ञासां प्रति हेतुत्वं प्रतिपाद्यत इति वक्तुमयुक्तं, आनन्तर्यप्रतिपादकेनैवाथशब्देन एतदर्थसिद्धेः—इति शङ्का स्यात्। तन्निराकरणमेवम्—अतश्शब्देन मुख्यया वृत्त्या साधनचतुष्टयसम्पत्तिमात्रपरामर्शोऽपि लक्षणया लब्धात्मकत्वेन तत् परामृश्यते। तेन च अलब्धात्मकत्वशङ्का तदुपोद्बलकतया च अक्षय्यमित्यादिवाक्यं सूच्यते। तत्परिहारश्च लक्षितेन लब्धात्मकत्वेन लभ्यते तदुपपत्तितया तद्यथेत्यादिवाक्यं सूच्यते। एतत्सर्वमभिप्रेत्याह—अतश्शब्दो हेत्वर्थ इति। 'यस्माद्वेद एव' इत्यादिवाक्यं आभिप्रायिकार्थकथनपरम्। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

11

[ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायां ब्रह्मपदार्थनिर्णयभाष्यम्]

ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासा ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा। ब्रह्म च वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणं "जन्माद्यस्य यतः" इति। अत एव न ब्रह्मशब्दस्य जात्याद्यर्थान्तरमाशङ्कितव्यम्।

11 A

[BRAHMAJIJÑĀSĀYĀṂ BRAHMAPADĀRTHANIRṆAYABHĀṢYAM]

brahmaṇo jijñāsā brahmajijñāsā. brahma ca vakṣyamāṇalakṣaṇaṁ "janmādyasya yataḥ" iti. ata eva na brahmaśabdasya jātyādyarthāntaramāśaṅkitavyam.

11 B

ब्रह्मणः *brahmaṇaḥ* – of Brahman; जिज्ञासा *jijñāsā* – desire to know (is the string or analytic sentence); (that alternates with the compound word) ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा *brahmajijñāsā* – 'brahmajijñāsā'; ब्रह्म *brahma* – Brahman; च *ca* – and; वक्ष्यमाण-लक्षणम् *vakṣyamāṇalakṣaṇam* – that which is going to be defined; जन्माद्यस्य यतः इति *janmādyasya yataḥ iti* – from which the birth etc. of this ensues; अत एव *ata eva* – therefore; न *na* – need not; ब्रह्मशब्दस्य *brahmaśabdasya* – of the term 'Brahman'; जात्याद्यर्थान्तरम् *jātyādyarthāntaram* – other senses such as caste; आशङ्कितव्यम् *āśaṅkitavyam* – be imagined

11 C

[ESTABLISHING THE MEANING OF THE TERM 'BRAHMAN' IN THE COMPOUND WORD 'BRAHMAJIJÑĀSĀ']

The compound word 'brahma-jijñāsā' denotes the desire for the Knowledge of Brahman.[1] And, Brahman is that which is going to be defined in the following aphorism, as "from which the birth etc. of this ensues."[2] Therefore, the other senses of the term 'Brahman' like caste need not be imagined.[3]

11 D

1. The compound word 'brahma-jijñāsā' denotes the desire for the Knowledge of Brahman: We had already observed how under the influence

of the *Śabara-bhāṣya* on the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā-sūtra* (1.1.1), *"athāto dharmajijñāsā,"* the pre-Śaṅkara commentators on the *Brahma-sūtra* interpreted the word 'jijñāsā' of the present aphorism, *"athāto brahmajijñāsā,"* in its secondary sense of mīmāṁsā (inquiry).[1] Further, it is considered that Śabara-svāmin takes the compound word 'dharma-jijñāsā' of the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā-sūtra* quoted above (1.1.1), as a fourth case-ending tatpuruṣa compound (dharmāya jijñāsā dharmajijñāsā) denoting 'an inquiry for the purpose of attaining (i.e. accomplishing) dharma'.[2] Following that trodden path, the early commentators of the *Brahma-sūtra* too construed 'brahma-jijñāsā' as a fourth case-ending tatpuruṣa compound dissolving it as 'brahmaṇe jijñāsā', meaning 'an inquiry for the purpose of attaining Brahman'. They were also of the opinion that an analysis of the compound word 'brahma-jijñāsā' in this manner could bring out the very purpose of the Vedāntic inquiry as being the attainment of Brahman and make it the central message of the aphorism.

As a result of this kind of elucidation of the Sūtra, the first aphorism – being the preamble to the entire treatise – could in its ambit envisage all the multifarious inquiries such as inquiry into the means (pramāṇa) for the Knowledge of Brahman, inquiry into the means for attaining (sādhana) Brahman, inquiry into the non-contradiction (avirodha) of the Vedāntic theories with the traditional code, logic and so on, and inquiry into the result (phala) of the Knowledge of Brahman – all of which will be deliberated upon in the treatise. But this sort of interpretation would relegate the inquiry into Brahman *per se* to a secondary status, for these additional inquiries do not constitute the primary inquiry into Brahman, though they are all conducted for the purpose of ultimately attaining Brahman.

This interpretation of the compound word 'brahma-jijñāsā' taking it to be a fourth case-ending tatpuruṣa compound (brahmaṇe jijñāsā brahmajijñāsā) has been criticised and rejected by the Ācārya. The various commentaries on the Bhāṣya like *Bhāmatī*, *Pañcapādikā* and *Ratnaprabhā* adduce the reasons as to why the Ācārya rejects the fourth case-ending tatpuruṣa interpretation.[3]

[1] Refer to Section 2 D, n.2 and 4 D, n.2.

[2] This caturthī is construed in the tense of tādarthya (for the sake of that) as laid down by Pāṇini in his aphorism (2.1.36) – *"caturthī tadarthāthabalihitasukharakṣitaiḥ."*

[3] Cf. ननु धर्माय जिज्ञासा इतिवद् ब्रह्मणे जिज्ञासा इति चतुर्थीसमासः किं न स्यादिति चेद्, उच्यते—जिज्ञासापदस्य हि मुख्यार्थः

The fourth case-ending compound is untenable because the rule of grammar stipulates that for conveying the idea of purpose, the fourth case-ending compound is possible only in respect of the basic material (prakṛti) and its modification (vikṛti),[4] as in the case of a lump of gold (prakṛti) and the golden ear-ring (vikṛti).[5] But this is not the case here as Brahman and its inquiry are not mutually related as the basic material (prakṛti) and its modification (vikṛti). Only the sixth case-ending tatpuruṣa compound, as espoused by the Ācārya, enjoys the sanction of grammar.[6]

In fact, while commenting on the compound word 'dharma-jijñāsā' in the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā-sūtra* (1.1.1), *"athāto dharmajijñāsā,"* Śabara-svāmin clearly states his preference for the sixth case-ending tatpuruṣa compound alone when he explains, *"dharmāya jijñāsā dharmajijñāsā, sā hi tasya jñātumiccha."*[7] Kumārila-bhaṭṭa, the renowned commentator of the *Śabara-bhāṣya*, explains that Śabara-svāmin, the author of the *Mīmāṁsā-bhāṣya*, favoured the sixth case-ending tatpuruṣa compound, since that alone is grammatically sustainable and that by dissolving the compound word 'dharma-jijñāsā' as 'dharmāya jijñāsā', the author himself states that the ultimate sense of 'dharmāya jijñāsā' (inquiry of dharma) is only 'dharmasya jijñāsā'.[8]

इच्छा। तस्याः प्रथमं कर्मकारकम् अपेक्षितम्। पश्चाद् फलम्। ततश्चादौ कर्मज्ञानार्थं षष्ठीसमासो युक्तः। कर्मणि उक्ते सति अर्थाद् फलमुक्तं भवति। इच्छायाः कर्मण एव फलत्वाद्। यथा स्वर्गस्य इच्छा इत्युक्ते स्वर्गस्य फलत्वं लभ्यते तद्वत्। – रत्नप्रभा

[4] "तादर्थ्यसमासे प्रकृतिविकृतिग्रहणं कर्तव्यम्" इति कात्यायनीयवचनेन। – भामती

[5] कुण्डलाय हिरण्यं कुण्डलहिरण्यम्।

[6] Cf. षष्ठीसमासप्रदर्शनेन प्राचां वृत्तिकृतां ब्रह्मणे जिज्ञासा ब्रह्मजिज्ञासेति चतुर्थीसमासः परास्तो वेदितव्यः। 'तादर्थ्यसमासे प्रकृतिविकृतिग्रहणं कर्तव्यम्' इति कात्यायनीयवचनेन यूपदार्वादिष्वेव प्रकृतिविकारभूतेषु चतुर्थीसमासनियमाद्, अप्रकृतिविकारभूत इत्येवमादौ तन्निषेधाद्, 'अश्वघासादयः षष्ठीसमासा भविष्यन्ति' इत्यश्वघासादिषु षष्ठीसमासप्रतिविधानात्, षष्ठीसमासेऽपि च ब्रह्मणो वास्तवप्राधान्योपपत्तेरिति। – भामती

Also, cf. ब्रह्मजिज्ञासापदं समस्तं वृत्तिकाराः ब्रह्मणे जिज्ञासा ब्रह्मजिज्ञासेति चतुर्थीसमासपरतया विभजन्ते। तत्र च प्रकृतिविकृतिभाव एव तादर्थ्यसमासो नान्यत्रेति नियमविरोधाद् न चतुर्थीसमासोऽत्र सावसर इति मत्वा षष्ठीसमासपरतया विगृह्णाति—ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासा ब्रह्मजिज्ञासेति। – प्रदीप

Also, cf. अथातःपदे व्याख्याय ब्रह्मजिज्ञासापदस्य वृत्तिकाराभीष्टचतुर्थीसमासनिरासेन षष्ठीसमासमाह—ब्रह्मण इति। अवयवार्थस्येच्छायाः कर्मप्रयोजनयोरैक्यात् कर्मणः स्वरूपसाधकत्वेन प्राधान्यात् कर्मणिषष्ठीसमासः। तादर्थ्यसमासे प्रकृतिविकृतिग्रहणस्य कर्तव्यत्वात्, तथाभूतयूपदार्वादौ तद्दृष्टेः, अश्वघासादौ षष्ठीसमासाङ्गीकाराद्। न च धर्माय जिज्ञासेतिवदिहापीति वाच्यं। षष्ठीसमासस्यैव तत्रापीष्टत्वाद्। उक्तं हि—सा हि तस्य ज्ञातुमिच्छा इति। न चात्र प्रकृतिविकृतित्वम्। षष्ठीसमासेऽपि ब्रह्मप्राधान्यमार्थिकम्। तस्मादवयवार्थे षष्ठीसमासोऽयुक्त इति भावः। – न्यायनिर्णय

[7] Cf. अत एव धर्मजिज्ञासा इत्यत्रापि सा हि तस्य ज्ञातुमिच्छा इति इच्छां गृहीत्वा षष्ठीसमासो दर्शितः। विचारलक्षणायां तु विचारस्य क्लेशात्मकतया प्रथमं फलाकाङ्क्षत्वाद् धर्माय जिज्ञासा इति चतुर्थीसमास उक्तः। – रत्नप्रभा

[8] Obviously, Śabara-svāmin treats the sixth case ending of 'dharmasya' in the 'residuary sense'

2. And, Brahman is that which is going to be defined in the following aphorism, as "from which the birth etc. of this ensues": In the first aphorism of his treatise, the author is introducing the topic of brahma-jijñāsā (desire to know Brahman). And in order to enable us to understand what he means by the term 'Brahman', the author himself offers in the ensuing aphorism the definition of Brahman as the supreme Self (Paramātman) that is both the efficient and the material cause (abhinna-nimittopādāna-kāraṇa) of the entire universe and one with the individual Self (pratyag-abhinna).[9] Therefore, we have to understand that the compound word 'brahma-jijñāsā' in the first Sūtra in the sense of desire to know the supreme Self (Paramātman) alone.

3. Therefore, other senses of the term 'Brahman' like caste need not be imagined: From the great commentaries on the *Śaṅkara-bhāṣya* of the *Brahma-sūtra*, we learn that while determining the exact meaning of the term 'Brahman' in the present aphorism, the pre-Śaṅkara commentators on the *Brahma-sūtra* examined the premise that the term 'Brahman' could be taken here in the following lexical senses: (1) brahmin caste (brāhmaṇa-jāti), (2) individual self (jīva), (3) the Scripture (Veda) and (4) the Creator (Brahmā or Hiraṇyagarbha).[10] Yet, these commentators reject these premises by adducing elaborate reasons for their rejection. However, the Ācārya points to the definition of Brahman, occurring in the next Sūtra, and thus demolishes all those premises and shows that the detailed exegeses of these pre-Śaṅkara commentators are irrelevant and futile exercises in the present context of the desire to know the supreme Self (brahma-jijñāsā).[11]

(śeṣe ṣaṣṭhī), since that could indirectly indicate 'the purpose', the regular sense of the fourth or the dative case ending. These concepts will be dealt with in detail in the ensuing section.

[9] This is so because the aphoristic definition of Brahman is based on the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* passage describing the Self as being identical with Brahman and as both the material and the efficient cause of the universe.

[10] Cf. वेदस्तत्त्वं तपो ब्रह्म ब्रह्मा विप्रः प्रजापतिः। – अमरकोश

[11] Cf. ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासेत्युक्ते तत्रानेकार्थत्वाद्ब्रह्मशब्दस्य संशयः, कस्य ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासेति। अस्ति ब्रह्मशब्दो विप्रत्वजातौ, यथा ब्रह्महत्येति। अस्ति च वेदे, यथा ब्रह्मोज्झमिति। अस्ति च परमात्मनि, "यथा ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति" इति, तमिमं संशयमपाकरोति—ब्रह्म च वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणमिति। यतो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासां प्रतिज्ञाय तज्ज्ञापनाय परमात्मलक्षणं प्रणयति ततोऽवगच्छामः परमात्मजिज्ञासैवेयं न विप्रत्वजात्यादिजिज्ञासेत्यर्थः। – भामती

Also, cf. अधुना ब्रह्मपदार्थमाह—ब्रह्म चेति। ननु 'ब्रह्म क्षत्रम्, इदं ब्रह्म आयाति, ब्रह्म स्वयम्भूः, ब्रह्म प्रजापति' इति श्रुतिषु लोके च ब्राह्मणत्वजातौ जीवे वेदे कमलासने च ब्रह्मशब्दः प्रयुज्यते इत्याशङ्क्य आह—अत एवेति। जगत्कारणत्वलक्षणप्रतिपादक-सूत्रासाङ्गत्यप्रसङ्गाद् एवेत्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. तत्र यदन्यैर्वृत्तिकारैर्ब्रह्मशब्दस्यार्थान्तरमाशङ्क्य निरस्यते। न खलु ब्राह्मणजातिरिह गृह्यते, प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वाद् जिज्ञास्यत्वाभावाद् नापि तत्कर्तृका जिज्ञासा, त्रैवर्णिकाधिकाराद्, नापि जीवपरिग्रहः, तत्कर्तृत्वे विशेषणानर्थक्यात्, कर्मत्वे नित्यसिद्धत्वाद्, न शब्दराशेर्ग्रहणं, तस्य धर्मजिज्ञासौत्पत्तिकसूत्राभ्यामर्थवत्त्वप्रमाणत्वयोर्निरूपितत्वाद्, नापि हिरण्यगर्भस्य, तदवाप्तेरपि विरक्तस्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपदेशाद्, नापि तत्कर्तृकता, ज्ञानवैराग्ययोः सह सिद्धत्वाद्—इति, तदपि न कर्तव्यमित्याह—अत एव न ब्रह्मशब्दस्य जात्याद्यर्थान्तरमाशङ्कितव्यमिति। – पञ्चपादिका

Also, cf. ब्रह्मपदं षष्ठीविभक्तिकं जिज्ञासापदं चावयवशो व्याचष्टे—ब्रह्म चेति। ननु—ब्रह्मशब्दस्य यस्य ब्रह्म च क्षत्रं चेत्यादौ ब्राह्मणजातौ, ब्रह्म आयातीत्यादौ जीवे, स एनान् ब्रह्म गमयतीत्यादौ हिरण्यगर्भे, ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवतीत्यादौ निर्विशेषब्रह्मणि च प्रयोगेणानेकार्थत्वात् कथमत्र विनिगमनमिति, अत आह—वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणमिति। – प्रदीप

Also, cf. तर्हि किं तद् ब्रह्म यस्य जिज्ञासेत्यत आह—ब्रह्मेति। यतो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासां प्रतिज्ञाय स्वयमाचार्यो ब्रह्मलक्षणं वक्ष्यति, अत एव—ब्रह्महत्येति जातिवचनो ब्रह्मशब्दो दृष्टः, तथा ब्रह्मोज्झमिति वेदवचनः, यो ब्रह्माणं विदधाति पूर्वम् इति हिरण्यगर्भवचनः, तथेहापि स्यादिति नाशङ्कनीयमित्यर्थः। – प्रकटार्थविवरण

Also, cf. ननु ब्रह्मशब्दस्य 'इदं ब्रह्म इदं क्षत्रम्' (बृ.उ.२.४.६/४.५.७) इति ब्राह्मणजातौ 'इदं ब्रह्मायाति, इदमागच्छति' (बृ.उ.४.३.३७) इति जीवे 'तस्मादेतद् ब्रह्म नाम रूपमन्नं च जायते' (मु.उ.१.१.९) इति हिरण्यगर्भे प्रयोगो दृश्यते। 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' (तै.उ.२.१) इति परमात्मनि च। अतः सूत्रगतो ब्रह्मशब्दः किंपरः—इत्यत आह—ब्रह्म चेति। 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' इत्यत्र त्रिविधपरिच्छेदशून्यं मायिकसकलजगत्कर्तृत्वोपादानत्वलक्षितं सत्यत्वादिधर्ममात्रस्वरूपं श्रुतिप्रमाणकं व्यवस्थापयिष्यते, तदेवात्र ब्रह्मशब्देन ग्राह्यमिति भावः। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

12

[षष्ठ्यर्थे सिद्धान्तभाष्यम्]

ब्रह्मण इति कर्मणि षष्ठी, न शेषे, जिज्ञास्यापेक्षत्वाद् जिज्ञासायाः, जिज्ञास्यान्तरानिर्देशाच्च।

12 A

[ṢAṢṬHYARTHE SIDDHĀNTABHĀṢYAM]

indicates Object

brahmaṇa iti karmaṇi ṣaṣṭhī, na śeṣe, jijñāsyāpekṣatvād jijñāsāyāḥ, jijñāsyāntarānirdeśācca.

12 B

ब्रह्मणः इति *brahmaṇaḥ iti* – the word 'brahmaṇaḥ'; कर्मणि *karmaṇi* – in the sense of object; षष्ठी *ṣaṣṭhī* – the sixth case-ending; न *na* – not; शेषे *śeṣe* – in the sense of residual relations; जिज्ञास्यापेक्षत्वाद् जिज्ञासायाः *jijñāsyāpekṣatvād jijñāsāyāḥ* – because the desire to know needs the intended knowable; जिज्ञास्यान्तरानिर्देशात् *jijñāsyāntarānirdeśāt* – because no other intended knowable being stated; च *ca* – and also

12 C

[CONCLUDING COMMENTARY ON THE MEANING OF THE SIXTH CASE-ENDING]

The sixth case-ending in the expression 'of Brahman' (brahmaṇaḥ), is in the sense of 'object' and not in the sense of residual relations because the desire to know needs for completing its sense the intended knowable;[1] and also because no other intended knowable is stated.[2]

12 D

1. The sixth case-ending in the expression 'of Brahman', is in the sense of 'object'[1] and not in the sense of residual relations because the desire to know needs for completing its sense the intended knowable: In this Bhāṣya

[1] Since the term 'Brahman' having the genitive case-ending signifies an object in consonance with the *Pāṇini-sūtra* (2.3.65) *"kartṛkarmaṇoḥ kṛti,"* it is compounded with 'jijñāsā' by the *Vārtika, "kṛdyogā ca ṣaṣṭhī samasyate."*

passage, the Ācārya is alluding to a general point connected with syntax in Sanskrit grammar. The point is as follows: The word 'brahmaṇaḥ' in the vigraha-vākya[2] ('string' or 'analytic sentence') – brahmaṇaḥ jijñāsā – is in the genitive case. Sanskrit grammar recognises that the sixth case-ending has the power of signifying all possible relations (sambandha-sāmānya) other than the specific relations indicated by the case-endings designated as kāraka-vibhaktis such as the object, the agent, the instrument and so on.[3] Thus, the sixth case-ending can denote all unspecified residual relations (sambandha-sāmānya). This function of the sixth case-ending, 'ṣaṣṭhī-vibhakti', is taught in the *Pāṇini-sūtra*[4] (2.3.50), *"ṣaṣṭhī śeṣe."* This sixth case-ending is commonly known as 'śeṣe ṣaṣṭhī', based on the above-quoted *Pāṇini-sūtra* (2.3.50) or simply as 'śeṣa-ṣaṣṭhī' or 'sambandha-sāmānya-ṣaṣṭhī'.

However, the sixth case-ending assumes the role of a kāraka-vibhakti in two cases: when the base (prātipadika or prakṛti) of the sixth case-ending denotes (1) an agent (kartṛ) or (2) an object (karma) by being syntactically connected with a 'kṛdanta', that is a word ending in a kṛt suffix.[5] In such instances the sixth case-ending acts as a kāraka case-ending denoting either the kartṛ (agent) or the karma (object). To illustrate: In the expression

[2] 'Vigraha-vākya' is a string which can alternate, in the present instance, with the derivative compound word.

[3] The term 'kāraka' means that which does an action – *"karoti iti kārakam."* Thus karma, kartā, karaṇa, sampradāna, apādāna and adhikaraṇa are kārakas. The kāraka-vibhaktis are the following: (1) the dvitīyā-vibhakti (second or objective case-ending) denoting karma (object), (2) the tṛtīyā-vibhakti (third or instrumental case-ending) denoting either kartṛ (agent) or karaṇa (instrument), (3) the caturthī-vibhakti (the fourth or dative case-ending) denoting the sampradāna, that is the recipient of what is given, (4) the pañcamī-vibhakti (the fifth or ablative case-ending) denoting apādāna, that is the fixed point from which a thing moves away and (5) the saptamī-vibhakti (the seventh or locative case-ending) denoting adhikaraṇa (the locus). But, why does the nominative case-ending not denote a kāraka? For explanation, the reader is advised to read the *Pāṇini-sūtra* (2.3.46), *"prātipadikārthaliṅgaparimāṇavacanamātre prathamā,"* wherein the denotations to convey the sense of the first case-ending are mentioned. It is to be noted the Pāṇini does not make the 'kartā', even though it be a kāraka, as a denotation of the first case-ending. He rather makes the 'kartā' denoted by the verbal suffixes such as 'tip'.

[4] The Pāṇinian grammar of Sanskrit, known as *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, is a work consisting of eight chapters, with each chapter consisting of four pādas (quarters) and each pāda containing Sūtras in varying numbers.

[5] The 'kṛt' is a grammatical term denoting affixes applied to the verbal roots so as to derive the primary derivatives like kṛtiḥ, karma, karaṇa, and so on which are derived from the verbal root 'kṛ'.

"īśvarasya kṛtiḥ – creation of God," the sixth case-ending denotes an agent (kartṛ-kāraka) and in the expression *"jagataḥ kartā īśvaraḥ* – God is the creator of the universe," the sixth case-ending denotes an object (karma-kāraka). This grammatical function of the sixth case-ending is dealt with in the *Pāṇini-sūtra* (2.3.65), *"kartṛ-karmaṇoḥ kṛti."* In Sanskrit grammar, the sixth case-ending denoting an agent (kartṛ) and an object (karma) are referred to as 'kartari ṣaṣṭhī' and 'karmaṇi ṣaṣṭhī' respectively.

In the vigraha-vākya (string), 'brahmaṇo jijñāsā', the word 'jijñāsā' is a verbal noun (kṛdanta in the feminine), denoting 'the desire to know'. It is derived from the root 'jñā', 'to know', appended with the suffix 'san' which conveys the sense of 'desire'.[6] Hence, the sixth case-ending of 'brahmaṇaḥ' is treated as karmaṇi ṣaṣṭhī by the Ācārya. However, the opponents, in this context the pre-Śaṅkara commentators on the *Brahma-sūtra*, prefer to take it as śeṣe ṣaṣṭhī. In the sequel we shall study the arguments they advanced to support their viewpoint.

In the last section, we observed that the pre-Śaṅkara Vṛttikāra interpreted the compound word 'brahma-jijñāsā' as the fourth case-ending compound. Now, having realised the grammatical difficulty in forming the fourth case-ending compound since there is no prakṛtivikṛti-bhāva between Brahman and its jijñāsā,[7] the Vṛttikāra accepts the compound to be the sixth case-ending compound. However, he holds that the sixth case-ending in 'brahmaṇaḥ' is only in the residuary sense (śeṣe). The residuary sense denotes relation in general (sambandha-sāmānya) and not merely that of the object.

If this interpretation is accepted, then 'brahma-jijñāsā' could denote an inquiry[8] into everything that is connected with Brahman in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the compound word 'brahma-jijñāsā' could

[6] The desiderative form 'jijñāsā' is derived from the verbal derivate 'jijñāsa' which in turn is derived from the verbal root 'jñā' (to know) by adding the suffix 'san' to convey the sense of desire. To explain: The verbal root 'jñā' with the suffix 'san' becomes the verbal desiderative derivate 'jijñāsa' (to desire to know). After adding the kṛt-suffix 'a' by the *Pāṇini-sūtra* (3.8.102), *"a pratyayāt,"* and thereafter adding the feminine suffix 'ṭāp', we arrive at the feminine kṛdanta form 'jijñāsā' (the desire to know). Thus, jijñāsā = [jñā←san]←a]←ṭāp.

[7] Refer to Section 11 D, n.1.

[8] We should be cognisant of the fact that the author of the early *Vṛtti* takes 'jijñāsā' in the sense of inquiry.

comprehend and envisage in its ambit all the inquiries about the nature of Brahman, about the valid means of knowing Brahman, about the logic concerned, about the means to attain the result, about the nature of its attainment and so on. In other words, all the varied inquiries that the Sūtrakāra has delved into during the course of the four chapters of this treatise, would come to be denoted by the compound word 'brahma-jijñāsā'.

On the other hand, if the sixth case-ending is taken in the sense of object (karmaṇi ṣaṣṭhī) then the word 'brahmaṇaḥ' would signify 'of Brahman, the object'. Consequent upon this, the compound would comprehend the jijñāsā of Brahman alone. However, we know that the author of the *Brahma-sūtra* undertakes inquiries into the valid means, the logic and so on. If the first member of the compound (i.e. Brahman) is taken in the accusative sense, that is in the sense of an object – karmaṇi ṣaṣṭhī – then these inquiries pertaining to Brahman would remain outside the scope envisaged for the treatise by the author. Certainly, that would be a blunder. Therefore, the Pūrvapakṣin argues that the compound 'brahma-jijñāsā' must be taken to be in the residuary sixth case-ending compound (śeṣaṣaṣṭhī-samāsa) alone.[9]

The passage of the Bhāṣya, "*jijñāsyāpekṣatvād jijñāsāyāḥ* – because the desire to know needs, for completing its sense, the intended knowable," contains the Ācārya's dismissal of the above-mentioned contention of the earlier Vṛttikāra.[10] To comprehend and appreciate the Ācārya's rebuttal of the Pūrvapakṣin's stand, let us first understand the grammatical structure of the word 'jijñāsā' (desire to know), the second member of the compound word 'brahma-jijñāsā'. This word 'jijñāsā' signifies a desire, a saviṣayaka-padārtha – that has to necessarily have an object to fulfil its sense – which

[9] Cf. षष्ठीसमासपरिग्रहेऽपि नेयं कर्मषष्ठी, किं तु शेषलक्षणा, सम्बन्धमात्रं च शेष इति ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासेत्युक्ते ब्रह्मसम्बन्धिनी जिज्ञासेत्युक्तं भवति। तथा च ब्रह्मस्वरूपप्रमाणयुक्तिसाधनप्रयोजनजिज्ञासाः सर्वा ब्रह्मजिज्ञासार्था ब्रह्मजिज्ञासयावरुद्धा भवन्ति, साक्षात् पारम्पर्येण वा ब्रह्मसम्बन्धात्। कर्मणि षष्ठ्यां तु ब्रह्मशब्दार्थः कर्म, स च स्वरूपमेवेति तत्प्रमाणादयो नावरुध्येरन्, तथा चाप्रतिज्ञातार्थचिन्ता प्रमाणादिषु भवेत्। – भामती

Also, cf. ननु—षष्ठीगर्भसमासेऽपि शेषषष्ठ्येव प्रकृते ग्राह्या, न कर्मषष्ठी। तथा हि सति ब्रह्मकर्मक एव विचारः प्रतिज्ञातः स्यात्। तथा च समन्वयादिविचारस्याप्रतिज्ञाततया शास्त्रे तद्ग्रथनमसङ्गतं स्यात्। शेषषष्ठीपक्षे तु ब्रह्मसम्बन्धिविचारस्य प्रतिज्ञालाभात् समन्वयादिविचारस्यापि परम्परया ब्रह्मसम्बन्धित्वाद् न तद्ग्रथनमसङ्गतं भविष्यति—इति यो मन्यते तं प्रत्याह—ब्रह्मण इति कर्मणीति। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

[10] Cf. वृत्त्यन्तरे तु शेषलक्षणा व्याख्याता, तां निरस्यति न शेष इति। तत्र हेतुमाह—जिज्ञास्यापेक्षत्वाज्जिज्ञासाया इति। – पञ्चपादिका

object in the present case is 'to know'. 'To know', in turn, must have an object as the expression 'to know' is also a saviṣayaka-padārtha, that is its sense remains incomplete, if it is not accompanied by an object (karma). Thus, the desiderative term 'jijñāsā' (desire to know) is grammatically and syntactically tenable only when it is associated with its object (karma). In fact, even when the object (karma) is not explicitly mentioned, the knowledge of it can be determined only if its object is known and not otherwise.

However, there are entities like the sun, the moon, the stars and so on, which when we observe, we do not need to know what it is related to. In other words, on observing them we do not raise the question 'whose is it' (kasya idam). On the other hand, when we hear the expression 'to desire', or 'to know' and in this context the 'desire to know' (jijñāsā), we invariably want to know its object and we raise the question 'what is its object?' that is 'desire of what' and 'knowledge of what'.[11] Therefore, to satisfy this primary need, Brahman is naturally connected with the desiderative derivate verbal base jijñāsa (to desire to know) as its object and not as something related to it in general.

Hence, the Ācārya decides that the sixth case-ending of 'brahmaṇaḥ' is in the sense of an 'object' (karmaṇi ṣaṣṭhī) and not in the sense of residuary relation (sāmānya-ṣaṣṭhī).[12]

2. and also because no other intended knowable is stated: It has been argued and settled that the desire to know (jijñāsā) needs for its grammatical

[11] It is only later that the question 'whose knowledge is it?' arises.

[12] Cf. इच्छायाः प्रतिपत्त्यनुबन्धो ज्ञानं ज्ञानस्य च ज्ञेयं ब्रह्म। नो खलु ज्ञानं ज्ञेयं विना निरूप्यते, न च जिज्ञासा ज्ञानं विना, इति प्रतिपत्त्यनुबन्धत्वात् प्रथमं जिज्ञासा कर्मैवापेक्षते, न तु सम्बन्धिमात्रं, तदन्तरेणापि सति कर्मणि तन्निरूपणात्। न हि चन्द्रमसमादित्यं वोपलभ्य कस्यायमिति सम्बन्ध्यन्वेषणा भवति। भवति तु ज्ञानमित्युक्ते विषायान्वेषणा किंविषयमिति। तस्मात्प्रथममपेक्षितत्वात् कर्मतयैव ब्रह्म सम्बध्यते, न तु सम्बन्धितामात्रेण, तस्य जघन्यत्वात्। तथा च कर्मणि षष्ठी, इत्यर्थः। – भामती

Also, cf. जिज्ञासेत्यत्र सन्प्रत्ययवाच्याया इच्छाया ज्ञानं कर्म। तस्य ज्ञानस्य ब्रह्म कर्म। तत्र सकर्मककियायाः कर्मज्ञानं विना ज्ञातुमशक्यत्वादिच्छाया विषयज्ञानजन्यत्वाच्च प्रथमापेक्षितं कर्मैव षष्ठ्या वाच्यं, न शेष इत्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. कर्मादिभ्योऽन्यः प्रातिपदिकार्थातिरिक्तः स्वस्वामिसम्बन्धादिः शेषः। तत्र नैषा षष्ठी, किन्तु कर्मण्येव, जिज्ञासाया जिज्ञास्यापेक्षत्वाद् ज्ञानं हीच्छायाः प्रतिपत्त्यनुबन्धः, तदभावे जिज्ञासाऽनिरूपणाद्। ज्ञानस्य ज्ञेयं ब्रह्म तद्विना ज्ञानायोगात्। अतः प्रतिपत्त्यनुबन्धत्वाद् आदौ जिज्ञासा कर्मैवापेक्षते, न सम्बन्धमात्रम्। तेनैषा कर्मण्येव षष्ठीत्यर्थः। – न्यायनिर्णय

Also, cf. इच्छायाः प्रतिपत्त्यनुबन्धो ज्ञानं, ज्ञानस्य च ज्ञेयं ब्रह्म, ज्ञेयं विना ज्ञानस्यानिरूपणाद्, ज्ञानं विना च जिज्ञासाया अनिरूपणाद्। अतः प्रतिपत्त्यनुबन्धत्वात् प्रथमं जिज्ञासा कर्मैवापेक्षते, न सम्बन्धिमात्रं, तेन कर्मणि षष्ठीत्यर्थः। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

Also, cf. जिज्ञासा तावद् ज्ञानमपेक्षते। ज्ञानं च ज्ञेयापेक्षम्। ज्ञेयान्तरं च न निर्दिष्टम्। ततो ब्रह्मस्वरूपविषयेयं जिज्ञासेत्यर्थः। – प्रकटार्थविवरण

and syntactic tenability a direct object. But the Pūrvapakṣin proposes hypothetically that something else like 'the means to the Knowledge of Brahman' may be accepted to be its object. In such a case, Brahman could still be related to jijñāsā (desire to know) by the residuary relation (śeṣaṣaṣṭhī).

To refute this point, the Ācārya argues: In the present aphorism, no object other than Brahman is given in the Sūtra to fulfil the need of an object of the desiderative derivate verbal base 'jijñāsa' (to desire to know). Hence, Brahman alone can be syntactically associated with jijñāsā as the direct object (karmatvena). Moreover, it is not befitting to supply an unstated object, like the means for the knowledge of Brahman, to satisfy the expectancy of jijñāsā (desire to know) when it is certainly possible to fulfil the expectancy with that which is specifically mentioned in the Sūtra *"athāto brahmajijñāsā"* – that is Brahman.[13] What is stated here is that without a direct object, the need or expectation for an object (karmākāṅkṣā) of jijñāsā (desire to know) would remain utterly unfulfilled and, as a consequence, the desire to know would continue to remain unidentified too.

In cases like this where the nominal base with sixth case-ending denotes an object of a verbal derivative requiring an object (saviṣayaka-padārtha), such a nominal base is syntactically related with the verbal derivative as its object (karmatvena) and not as something merely related to the verbal derivative in general (sambandha-sāmānyena). Hence, Brahman, the entity which alone forms a component of the compound word 'brahma-jijñāsā', is to be syntactically connected with the desire to know (jijñāsā) as its direct object and not as a residuary (śeṣa) of jijñāsā.

[13] Cf. निर्दिष्टेनाकाङ्क्षापूरणे सम्भवति अध्याहारानुपपत्तेः इत्याशयः। – वार्तिक
Also, cf. जिज्ञासाया जिज्ञास्यापेक्षित्वेऽपि प्रमाणादि जिज्ञास्यमस्तु ब्रह्म तु शेषितया सम्बध्यतामित्याशङ्क्याह—जिज्ञास्यान्तरेति। श्रुतकर्मलाभे नाश्रुतकल्पनेति भावः। – न्यायनिर्णय

13

[आक्षेपभाष्यम्]

ननु शेषषष्ठीपरिग्रहेऽपि ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासाकर्मत्वं न विरुद्ध्यते, सम्बन्धसामान्यस्य विशेषनिष्ठत्वात्।

13 A

[ĀKṢEPABHĀṢYAM]

nanu śeṣaṣaṣṭhīparigrahe'pi brahmaṇo jijñāsākarmatvaṁ na viruddhyate, sambandhasāmānyasya viśeṣaniṣṭhatvāt.

13 B

ननु *nanu* – but; शेषषष्ठीपरिग्रहे अपि *śeṣaṣaṣṭhīparigrahe api* – even if the sixth case-ending is taken in the residuary sense; ब्रह्मणः *brahmaṇaḥ* – of Brahman; जिज्ञासाकर्मत्वम् *jijñāsākarmatvam* – being the object of the desire to know; न *na* – is not; विरुद् ध्यते *viruddhyate* – contradicted; सम्बन्धसामान्यस्य *sambandhasāmānyasya* – of the relationship in general; विशेषनिष्ठत्वात् *viśeṣaniṣṭhatvāt* – because of being based on particular relationships

13 C

[COUNTERARGUMENT]

But, even if the sixth case-ending is taken in the residuary sense, Brahman being the object of the desire to know remains uncontradicted since relationship in general is based on particular relationships.

13 D

The grammatical rule pertaining to the sixth case-ending is that the genitive case-ending signifies the residual relation (śeṣe ṣaṣṭhī), that is the relationship in general according to the dictum, *"sambandhasāmānye ṣaṣṭhī."* However, worldly activity (vyavahāra) owes its occurrence to a particular relation[1] in

[1] The logical dictum states, *"nirviśeṣaṁ na sāmānyam* – Without particulars there can be nothing general (class)." In other words without referring to particulars no 'general' or 'class' (jāti) can be determined.

the form of a kāraka.[2] In other words, just because specific relations are many and because all these specific relations cannot be simultaneously employed in the execution of any individual activity (vyavahāra), one of them needs to be singled out in carrying out a given act. Therefore, the general relation signified by the sixth case-ending in 'brahmaṇaḥ' implies one among the six kāraka relations. This is indeed so when there is no determining factor, like the context (prakaraṇa) or the juxtaposed words (upapada). In all such instances, the general relation connotes one among the six kārakas, that is one among the six relations through which a noun is related to the verb.

However, in the present context, the desiderative verbal base, 'jijñāsa' (to desire to know) in the compound word 'brahma-jijñāsā', is a transitive verb. Being thus internally conditioned – since a transitive verb naturally requires an object to complete its sense – an objective relation (karmatva) becomes applicable.[3] Therefore, the hypothesis offered by the Pūrvapakṣin does provide the objective relation for Brahman (karmatva) with respect to the desire to know (jijñāsā) – indeed the very syntactic relation that the Siddhāntin is keen to establish. Therefore, the suggestion offered by the Pūrvapakṣin does seem quite favourable to the Siddhāntin's viewpoint and hence there seems to be no firm basis for rejecting the Pūrvapakṣin's hypothesis.

However, a careful perusal of the Pūrvapakṣin's counterargument advocating the sense of relationship in general (śeṣa-ṣaṣṭhī) as the meaning of the sixth case-ending (brahmaṇaḥ) reveals his ulterior motive. The Pūrvapakṣin is not really keen to establish the karmatva of Brahman as the ultimate sense of the sixth case-ending, which could stand in syntactical relation with the verb 'to desire to know' (jijñāsa), as much as to envisage all the different kinds of inquiries that could be related to Brahman, in one way or the other, and thus facilitate a 'backdoor' entry of the inquiry and

[2] For the definition and explanation of the term 'kāraka' refer to Section 12 D, fn.3.

[3] Cf. यद्यपि शेषे षष्ठीति सम्बन्धमात्रे षष्ठी विहिता, तथाऽपि व्यवहारो विशेषमवलम्बते, बहवश्च सम्बन्धविशेषाः, तत्रावश्यमन्यतमः प्रतिपत्तव्यः, अन्यथा व्यवहारानुपपत्तेः। तत्र प्रकरणोपपदयोर्विशेषहेत्वोरभावाद्धर्थाद्विशेषक्रियोपादानात् कारकत्वेनैव सम्बन्धः। तत्रापि सकर्मिकायाः कर्मकारकमभ्यर्हितम्, इति कर्मत्वं ब्रह्मणो न विरुध्यते। – पञ्चपादिका

Also, cf. 'षष्ठी शेषे' (पा.सू.२.३.५०) इति विधानात् षष्ठ्या सम्बन्धमात्रं प्रतीतमपि विशेषाकाङ्क्षायां सकर्मकक्रियासन्निधानात् कर्मत्वे पर्यवस्यति इत्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. सामान्यसम्बन्धस्य विशेषसम्बन्धाविरोधेन कर्मताया अविघातेन जिज्ञासानिरूपणोपपत्तेरित्यर्थः। – भामती

the knowledge of Vedic rites by associating them with the Knowledge of Brahman since they could be construed as means that are remotely associated with the attainment of Brahman. This hidden agenda of the opponent will be revealed when the Pūrvapakṣin advances the next step of his argument that we will soon be seeing in the sequel (Section 15).

Concealing this ulterior motive, the Pūrvapakṣin presently offers this suggestion – certainly a surreptitious one – as if he is interested in the residual sense of the sixth case so as to accommodate the Siddhāntin's view, by demonstrating a suitable syntactic relation of karmatva (objectness) of Brahman through the roundabout route of śeṣa-ṣaṣṭhī by which Brahman could be related with the desiderative verbal derivate 'jijñāsā' of the aphorism *"athāto brahmajijñāsā."*[4]

[4] Cf. शेषषष्ठीवादी निगूढाशयश्चोदयति—ननु शेषषष्ठीति। यद्यपि षष्ठी शेषे इति सम्बन्धमात्रे षष्ठी तथाऽपि व्यवहारस्य व्यवहार्यविशेषालम्बनत्वात् सकर्मिकायां क्रियायां कर्मकारकस्याभ्यर्हितत्वात् कर्मत्वं ब्रह्मणो न विरुध्यते। तेन जिज्ञासायाः निरूपणमप्युपपद्यत इत्यर्थः। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

Also, cf. प्रमाणादिप्रतिज्ञानां श्रौतत्वमभिप्रेत्य शङ्कते—नन्विति। षष्ठी शेषे इति सम्बन्धमात्रे तद्विधानेऽपि व्यवहारस्य विशेषनिष्ठत्वात्, सकर्मकक्रियायां कर्मणोऽन्तरङ्गत्वाद्, ब्रह्मणा कर्मणा जिज्ञासानिरूपणं सिध्यतीत्यर्थः। – न्यायनिर्णय

Also, cf. पुनः शेषषष्ठीवाद्याह—ननु शेषषष्ठीपरिग्रहेऽपि ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासाकर्मत्वं न विरुध्यते, सम्बन्धसामान्यस्य विशेषनिष्ठत्वादिति। यद्यपि शेषे षष्ठीति सम्बन्धमात्रे षष्ठी विहिता, तथाऽपि व्यवहारो विशेषमवलम्बते, बहवश्च सम्बन्धविशेषाः, तत्रावश्यमन्यतमः प्रतिपत्तव्यः, अन्यथा व्यवहारानुपपत्तेः। तत्र प्रकरणोपपदयोर्विशेषहेत्वोरभावादर्थाद्विशेषक्रियोपादानात् कारकत्वेनैव सम्बन्धः। तत्रापि सकर्मिकायाः कर्मकारकमभ्यर्हितम्, इति कर्मत्वं ब्रह्मणो न विरुध्यते। – पञ्चपादिका

14

[आक्षेपनिराकरणभाष्यम्]

एवमपि प्रत्यक्षं ब्रह्मणः कर्मत्वमुत्सृज्य सामान्यद्वारेण परोक्षं[1] कर्मत्वं कल्पयतो व्यर्थः[2] प्रयासः स्यात्।

14 A

[ĀKṢEPANIRĀKARAṆABHĀṢYAM]

evamapi pratyakṣaṁ brahmaṇaḥ karmatvamutsṛjya sāmānyadvāreṇa parokṣaṁ karmatvaṁ kalpayato vyarthaḥ prayāsaḥ syāt.

14 B

एवम् अपि *evam api* – even then; प्रत्यक्षम् *pratyakṣam* – direct; ब्रह्मणः *brahmaṇaḥ* – of Brahman; कर्मत्वम् *karmatvam* – objectness; उत्सृज्य *utsṛjya* – rejecting; सामान्यद्वारेण *sāmānyadvāreṇa* – through the means of relationship in general; परोक्षम् *parokṣam* – indirect; कर्मत्वम् *karmatvam* – objectness; कल्पयतः *kalpayataḥ* – of the one who postulates; व्यर्थः *vyarthaḥ* – vain; प्रयासः *prayāsaḥ* – labour; स्यात् *syāt* – there would be

14 C

[COUNTERARGUMENT REFUTED]

Even then, it would be a vain labour for the one who rejecting the direct objectness of Brahman postulates an indirect objectness through the means of relationship in general.

14 D

Here, the Bhāṣyakāra brings to our attention the futile effort resorted to by the Pūrvapakṣin in arriving at the objectness (karmatva) of Brahman in a

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[1] The term 'pratyakṣam' signifies 'direct', 'primary' or 'manifest', and 'parokṣam' denotes 'indirect', 'non-primary' or 'non-manifest'. Vide *"pratyakṣaparokṣatābhidhānaṁ ca prāthamyāprāthamyasphuṭatvāsphuṭatvābhiprāyam."* (*Bhāmatī*)
Cf. प्रत्यक्षं वाच्यं, परोक्षमार्थिकम्। अथवा प्रत्यक्षं प्रथमापेक्षाजं, परोक्षमन्त्यम्। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

[2] Cf. व्यर्थः – व्यर्थं एवेत्यर्थः। – प्रदीप

circuitous and indirect way through śeṣa-ṣaṣṭhī, which he himself is able to achieve with ease through the direct method of karmaṇi ṣaṣṭhī by dint of the fact that the transitive verb – in this context 'jijñāsa', that is 'to desire to know', which is the base of the primary derivative 'jijñāsā' – principally stands in need of an object to fulfil its sense by virtue of the *Pāṇini-sūtra* (2.3.65), *"kartṛkarmaṇoḥ kṛti."*

Though the Ācārya makes this observation, as though seemingly empathetic to the Pūrvapakṣin's viewpoint, his ultimate aim is to summarily reject the hypothesis of the śeṣa-ṣaṣṭhī signifying the relationship in general. This aim of the Siddhāntin will become evident in the sequel (Section 16). Yet, presently, not revealing his ultimate intention of seeking to dismiss the Pūrvapakṣin's argument entirely, the Ācārya provisionally points out the futility of the Pūrvapakṣin's effort.

Thus the Bhāṣyakāra has answered the Pūrvapakṣin in the same vein in which the latter has put forward his counterargument.[3]

ॐ

[3] Cf. निगूढाभिप्राय एव दूषयति—एवमपि प्रत्यक्षं ब्रह्मण इति। वाच्यस्य कर्मत्वस्य जिज्ञासया प्रथममपेक्षितस्य प्रथमसम्बन्धार्हस्य चान्वयपरित्यागेन पश्चात्कथञ्चिदपेक्षितस्य सम्बन्धिमात्रस्य सम्बन्धो, जघन्यः प्रथमः प्रथमश्च जघन्यः, इति सुव्याहृतं न्यायतत्त्वम्। – भामती

Also, cf. कर्तृकर्मणोः कृति इति कृदन्तप्रयोगेऽपि विशेषविधानात्साक्षात्प्रतीतं कर्मत्वं विहाय सम्बन्धसामान्यबलेन कर्मत्वकल्पनं व्यर्थमित्याह—एवमपीति। – प्रकटार्थविवरण

Also, cf. एवमपि साधारणशब्देऽभिप्रेतमर्थं विहायार्थान्तरं परिगृह्य पुनस्तदु द्वारेणाभिप्रेतमर्थं प्रतिपद्यमानस्य व्यर्थः प्रयासः स्यादिति परिहरति—एवमपीति। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

15

[आक्षेपे युक्तिः]

[1]न व्यर्थः[1], ब्रह्माश्रिताशेषविचारप्रतिज्ञानार्थत्वादिति[2] चेत्।

15 A

[ĀKṢEPE YUKTIḤ]

na vyarthaḥ, brahmāśritāśeṣavicārapratijñānārthatvāditi cet.

15 B

न *na* – not at all; व्यर्थः *vyarthaḥ* – in vain; ब्रह्माश्रिताशेषविचारप्रतिज्ञानार्थत्वात् *brahmāśritāśeṣavicārapratijñānārthatvāt* – since it would serve the purpose of premising the inquiries into all matters related to Brahman; इति चेत् *iti cet* – if one argues

15 C

[THE LOGIC IN FAVOUR OF COUNTERARGUMENT]

If one may argue: It is not at all a vain effort for it would serve the purpose of premising the inquiries into all matters related to Brahman.

15 D

From this statement of the Pūrvapakṣin, we come to understand his ulterior motive of trying to bring the inquiry into dharma also as being associated with the inquiry into Brahman through some remote relation such as that of the performance of Vedic rites being a means for the purification of the mind or the point of both Brahman and dharma being related as they are both expounded by the Veda and the like.

The logic intended by the Pūrvapakṣin is this: If we could construe the sixth case-ending of 'brahmaṇaḥ' as a suffix denoting relation in general

[1] पाठभेदः—ननु न व्यर्थः।

[1] The word 'prayāsaḥ' (effort) to be supplied (adhyāhāra) from the previous sentence (Section 14).

[2] The term 'aśeṣa' means 'leaving no residue', that is 'completely'.

(sambandhasāmānya-ṣaṣṭhī), then the expression 'brahmaṇo jijñāsā' (the desire to know Brahman) could envisage in its ambit the inquires into all matters that pertain to Brahman – both direct and indirect – without deliberation into all of them the topic of Brahman would remain itself incompletely expounded.[3]

[3] Cf. शेषवादी स्वाभिसन्धिमुद्घाटयति—न व्यर्थ इति। शेषषष्ठ्यां ब्रह्मसम्बन्धिनी जिज्ञासा प्रतिज्ञाता भवति। तत्र यानि ब्रह्माश्रितानि लक्षणप्रमाणयुक्तिज्ञानसाधनफलानि, तेषामपि विचारः प्रतिज्ञातो भवति। तज्जिज्ञासाया अपि ब्रह्मज्ञानार्थत्वेन ब्रह्मसम्बन्धित्वात्। कर्मणि षष्ठ्यां तु ब्रह्मकर्मक एव विचारः प्रतिज्ञातो भवति इति अभिसन्धिना शेषषष्ठीति उच्यते। अतो मत्प्रयासो न व्यर्थः। ब्रह्म, तत्सम्बन्धिनां सर्वेषां विचारप्रतिज्ञानमर्थः फलं यस्य तत्त्वाद् इत्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. शेषषष्ठीपक्षे सामान्येन यत्किञ्चिद् ब्रह्मयोगि मानयुक्त्यादि तत्सर्वं जिज्ञास्यत्वेनोक्तं स्यात्, प्रतिज्ञातव्यं चैतद्, अन्यथा विचार्यत्वायोगाद्, अतः सम्बन्धमात्रमेवात्रेष्टम्। सामान्ये विशेषान्तर्भावादित्यर्थः। – न्यायनिर्णय

Also, cf. इदानीं शेषवादी स्वाभिप्रायमाह—ब्रह्माश्रितेति। शेषषष्ठीपरिग्रहे सामान्येन यत्किञ्चिद् ब्रह्मसम्बन्धि प्रमाणयुक्तिसाधनादि, येन येन जिज्ञासितेन विना ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितं न भवति, तत् सर्वं जिज्ञास्यत्वेन प्रतिज्ञातं स्यात्। प्रतिज्ञातव्यं चैतद्, अप्रतिज्ञातस्याविचार्यत्वाद्, अतो न विशिष्ट एव सम्बन्धी विवक्ष्यते, सामान्ये तस्यानन्तर्भावादिति भावः। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

Also, cf. कर्मणि षष्ठीपरिग्रहे ब्रह्मस्वरूपविचार एवैकः प्रतिज्ञातः स्याद्, न प्रमाणयुक्तिसाधनफलानां, शेषषष्ठीपरिग्रहे तु सर्वाऽपि ब्रह्मसम्बन्धिनी जिज्ञासा सूत्रिता भवतीति न मामकीनः प्रयासो व्यर्थ इत्याह—न व्यर्थ इति। – प्रकटार्थविवरण

Also, cf. शेषषष्ठीपरिग्रहे सामान्येन यत् किञ्चिद् ब्रह्मसम्बन्धि येन येन जिज्ञासितेन विना ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितं न भवति तत्सर्वं जिज्ञास्यत्वेन प्रतिज्ञातं स्याद्, अतो न विशिष्टसम्बन्धो विवक्ष्यते, सामान्ये तस्याप्यन्तर्भावादिति यद्युच्यते, तदाह—न व्यर्थः। – पञ्चपादिका

16

[सिद्धान्ते युक्तिः]

न, प्रधानपरिग्रहे [1]तदपेक्षितानाम् अपि अर्थाक्षिप्तत्वात्। ब्रह्म हि ज्ञानेनाप्तुमिष्टतमत्वात् प्रधानम्। तस्मिन् प्रधाने जिज्ञासाकर्मणि [2]परिगृहीते यैः जिज्ञासितैः विना ब्रह्म [3]जिज्ञासितं न भवति तानि अर्थाक्षिप्तानि एव इति न पृथक् सूत्रयितव्यानि। यथा राजा असौ गच्छति इत्युक्ते सपरिवारस्य राज्ञो गमनम् उक्तं भवति, तद्वत्।

16 A

[SIDDHĀNTE YUKTIḤ]

na, pradhānaparigrahe tadapekṣitānām api arthākṣiptatvāt. brahma hi jñānenāptumiṣṭatamatvāt pradhānam. tasmin pradhāne jijñāsākarmaṇi parigṛhīte yaiḥ jijñāsitaiḥ vinā brahma jijñāsitaṁ na bhavati tāni arthākṣiptāni eva iti na pṛthak sūtrayitavyāni. yathā rājā asau gacchati ityukte saparivārasya rājño gamanam uktaṁ bhavati, tadvat.

16 B

न *na* – no; प्रधानपरिग्रहे *pradhānaparigrahe* – when the principal has been accepted; तदपेक्षितानाम् *tadapekṣitānām* – of whatever is required by that; अपि *api* – also; अर्थाक्षिप्तत्वात् *arthākṣiptatvāt* – since it becomes available by implication; ब्रह्म *brahma* – Brahman; हि *hi* – indeed; ज्ञानेन *jñānena* – by means of knowledge; आप्तुम् *āptum* – to attain; इष्टतमत्वात् *iṣṭatamatvāt* – because of it being the most desired; प्रधानम् *pradhānam* – is the principal; तस्मिन् *tasmin* – when that; प्रधाने *pradhāne* – the principal; जिज्ञासाकर्मणि *jijñāsākarmaṇi* – the object of the desire to know; परिगृहीते *parigṛhīte* – has been accepted; यैः *yaiḥ* – whatever things; जिज्ञासितैः *jijñāsitaiḥ* – desired to be known; विना *vinā* – without; ब्रह्म *brahma* – Brahman; जिज्ञासितम् *jijñāsitam* – desired to be known; न *na* – not; भवति *bhavati* – becomes; तानि *tāni* – those things; अर्थाक्षिप्तानि एव *arthākṣiptāni eva* – becomes certainly available by implication; इति *iti* – hence; न *na* – not; पृथक् *pṛthak* –

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[1] NSP (I & II), AA, CSS, SES तदपेक्षितानामर्थाक्षिप्तत्वात्

[2] AA, NSP (I & II), CSS, VV, AL इति चेद् न

[3] वार्तिकसम्मतः पाठः—जिज्ञासितं ज्ञातं च न भवति।

separately; सूत्रयितव्यानि *sūtrayitavyāni* – need to be stated in the aphorism; यथा *yathā* – just as; राजा असौ *rājā asau* – that king; गच्छति *gacchati* – sets out; इति उक्ते *iti ukte* – when declared as such; सपरिवारस्य *saparivārasya* – along with his retinue; राज्ञः *rājñaḥ* – of the king; गमनम् *gamanam* – the act of setting out; उक्तं भवति *uktaṁ bhavati* – is taken as declared; तद्वत् *tadvat* – like that

16 C

[RATIONALE FOR THE SIDDHĀNTA VIEW]

Not at all;[1] for, when the principal has been accepted in a statement, then whatever it requires also becomes available by implication.[2] Indeed, Brahman is the most desired object to be attained by means of knowledge and hence it is the principal. When the principal object of the desire to know has been accepted, all that without which Brahman, the principal itself, remains not desired to be known, is by implication certainly taken as a given; hence, they need not be separately set forth in the aphorism.[3] Just as when the declaration, "Here sets out the king," is made, the king's act of setting out together with his retinue is taken as declared. So it is here.[4]

16 D

1. Not at all: The Siddhāntin refutes the Pūrvapakṣin's counter objection. In the vigraha-vākya (string), 'brahmaṇo jijñāsā – the desire to know Brahman', Brahman has a syntactical relation (anvaya) with the desire to know as its direct object (karma) by the *Pāṇini-sūtra* (2.3.65) *"kartṛkarmaṇoḥ kṛti."* And this relation between Brahman and jijñāsā suits the context really well. It is not at all logically tenable to lose sight of this grammatically viable relation of Brahman being related to jijñāsā as its direct object (karma) and look for a secondary or residuary sense, that is 'sambandha-sāmānya' (relation in general).

Of course, there are sentences like *"mātuḥ smarati* – He reminisces about his mother" wherein one recalls something related to one's mother such as

the food she cooks, her love and so on. In such cases one should certainly take the sixth case-ending in the sense of 'relation in general' (sambandha-sāmānya) and thereby indirectly get the sense of object (karma) also.[1] But the present string 'brahmaṇo jijñāsā' is different in nature from such sentences in deference to Pāṇini's grammar.

Indeed, the Pūrvapakṣin's argument has miserably faltered and fallen through. He has construed – though not ignorantly, but rather wantonly – the sixth case-ending of 'brahmaṇaḥ' in the śeṣa-ṣaṣṭhī, thereby positing the primary deliberation on Brahman to be of secondary importance and has deviously posited the secondary deliberation of those inquiries pertaining to Brahman, such as its means and the rest, as of primary importance thereby relegating the inquiry into Brahman *per se* to a secondary status. Thus, on the whole his argument smacks of wrong intention and lacks the ring of Truth.[2]

2. when the principal has been accepted in a statement, then whatever it requires becomes available by implication: This is an axiomatic statement and is in the form of a 'vastusaṅgraha-vākya', that is a sentence that puts in a nutshell the matter to be elaborated in its sequel.

3. Indeed, Brahman is the most desired object to be attained by means of knowledge and hence it is the principal. When the principal object of the desire to know has been accepted, all that without which Brahman, the principal itself, remains not desired to be known, is by implication

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[1] When we say, "He reminisces about his mother," we mean that the things related to the mother are being remembered on account of the sixth case-ending in the residuary sense. This act of reminiscence is possible only when the mother becomes an object of remembrance. That is how the Pūrvapakṣin arrives at the objectness (karmatva) of Brahman through a relation in general (sambandha-sāmānya).

[2] Cf. वाच्यस्य कर्मत्वस्य प्रथमम् अपेक्षितस्य प्रथमसम्बन्धार्हस्य च अन्वयपरित्यागेन, पश्चात् कथञ्चिद् अपेक्षितस्य सम्बन्धिसामान्यस्य सम्बन्धो जघन्यः प्रथमः कृतः, प्रथमश्च जघन्यः इति सुव्याहृतं न्यायतत्त्वम्। – भामती

Also, cf. त्वत्प्रयासस्य इदं फलं न युक्तं, सूत्रेण मुखतः प्रधानस्य ब्रह्मणो विचारे प्रतिज्ञाते सति तदुपकरणानां विचारस्य आर्थिकप्रतिज्ञाया उदितत्वाद् इत्याह सिद्धान्ती न प्रधानेति। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. अप्रधानविचाराणां मुख्यया वृत्त्या शब्देनोपादानं, प्रधानविचारस्य चार्थाक्षेपकल्पनं न युक्तमिति भावः। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

Also, cf. अप्रधानविचारं मुखतः प्रतिज्ञाय प्रधानस्याऽऽक्षेपकल्पनाद् वरं प्रधानविचारं मुखतः प्रतिज्ञाय तदपेक्षितानामर्थाक्षेप-कल्पनं, ततो नायं लाभ इत्याह—न प्रधानेति। – प्रकटार्थविवरण

certainly taken as a given; hence, they need not be separately set forth in the aphorism: In an earlier section we had observed that the signification of 'brahma-jijñāsā' is 'brahma jñātum icchā – the desire to know Brahman'.[3] In this vigraha-vākya (string), grammatically, Brahman figures as subordinate as it is a 'viśeṣaṇa' to knowledge (jñāna), which itself, in its turn, is subsidiary to the desire (icchā), the principal. Brahman is the subsidiary, but merely from the standpoint of grammatical construction. In reality, Brahman is the primary![4]

To explain: Desire for Brahman depends for its emergence on knowledge of Brahman (its existence and so on), and that knowledge, too, for its existence depends upon Brahman, which is the object of such knowledge. Thus, Brahman stands out as the principal – even though it is not so in the grammatical sense – because it is the direct object (karma) of the desire to know (jijñāsā).[5] The unspoken agent (kartṛ), whose is the 'desire to know', spoken in the present aphorism, *"athāto brahmajijñāsā,"* is a mumukṣu (the seeker longing for Liberation) who has acquired the sādhana-catuṣṭaya as suggested by the word 'atha'. The main goal and desire of such a seeker is to know Brahman and thereby attain Liberation. Indeed, the seeker, through the means of knowledge, desires Brahman the most. Hence, Brahman alone figures as the principal object of his desire. In this context, it would be relevant to note the definition of object (karma) given by Pāṇini in his *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (1.4.49), *"karturīpsitatamaṁ karma* – Object is that which the agent desires the most to attain."[6]

All this evinces that it is Brahman that figures as karma or direct object of the seeker's desire to know (jijñāsā). Further, because such an individual

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[3] Vide Section 4 D, n.2.

[4] Cf. वास्तवं प्राधान्यं ब्रह्मणः। – भामती

[5] Here is an example to illustrate how the principal and the subordinate could vary in the context of grammar and the actual world of happening. We have expressions like 'rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ' (the king's soldier). Here, in the string, grammatically, the soldier figures as principal and the king as subordinate but as things stand in the actual world the soldier is subordinate to the king!

[6] Compare the wording of the Bhāṣya sentence *"brahma hi jñānena āptum iṣṭatamatvāt pradhānam"* with that of the *Pāṇini-sūtra* cited above.

desires intensely to attain Brahman by means of knowledge, he therefore also desires to know such other aspects of inquiry, like the method or the means by which he could get the right knowledge of Brahman, the varied logical reasoning necessary to obtain such a knowledge, the result of the knowledge of Brahman and so on. These subsidiary inquiries would have no relevance in the absence of the desire to know Brahman which is the principal or the most fundamental object (karma) of inquiry. Hence, it stands to reason to conclude that as far as the seeker's desire to know (jijñāsā) is concerned, Brahman alone is the principal and all other inquiries which the opponent has premised through the relation of śeṣa-ṣaṣṭhī are subordinate to that principal, that is the inquiry into Brahman.

Hence, the Ācārya argues: When the desire to know the principal is already premised in the aphorism, the desire to know its subordinate aspects has to naturally and necessarily follow on its own accord and hence these inquiries are to be taken for granted. Therefore, the inquiries conducted into those subordinate aspects in the *Brahma-sūtra* need not be separately premised in the present Sūtra.[7]

4. Just as when the declaration, "Here sets out the king," is made, the king's act of setting out together with his retinue is taken as declared. So it is here: The Ācārya drives home his point by an analogy of the king and his retinue. Even now, newspapers report only about the visit of the President of a country. They do not separately report, in that context, about the visit of his secretaries, security personnel and his paraphernalia for it goes without saying that the entourage accompanies the President. There is no need to make a specific mention of his paraphernalia because they are subordinate to the President; their visit is taken for granted and it need not be mentioned separately.

In the same manner, the Sūtrakāra too introduces the desire to know the principal direct object, that is Brahman, and by doing so he indicates the principal status of Brahman and the subordinate status of the other

[7] Cf. यस्माद् ब्रह्मावाप्तिः पुरुषार्थः, तेन तद् ज्ञानेनासुमिष्टतमम्, अतस्तदर्थत्वात् प्रवृत्तेः प्रधानं तत्। तस्मिन् प्रधाने जिज्ञास्यमाने, येन जिज्ञासितेन विना न सम्पूर्णा जिज्ञासा, तत् सामर्थ्यादेव तादर्थ्येन जिज्ञास्यते, न पृथगभिधानेन कृत्यमस्ति। – पञ्चपादिका

topics dealt with in the treatise. Indeed, the principal inquiry into Brahman, naturally of its own accord, ensures that the subordinate deliberations – such as the inquiry into nature (svarūpa) of Brahman, the inquiry into the means (pramāṇa) of its knowledge and so on – are also brought into its purview.[8]

If, on the other hand, we were to accept the opponent's argument as valid, then the Sūtrakāra would be deemed to be committing the error of treating Brahman, which is most desired to be attained, on a par with its subordinates like the definitions, the means of knowledge, the logic pertaining to it and so on. It would certainly be wrong on our part to attribute such an error to Bādarāyaṇa, the sagacious author of the *Brahma-sūtra*.

Therefore, it is only right that the Ācārya concludes that in the compound word 'brahma-jijñāsā', the sixth case-ending of 'brahmaṇaḥ' in the vigraha-vākya, 'brahmaṇaḥ jijñāsā', signifies the object. In this way, Brahman gets syntactically connected, as a direct object, with jijñāsā (the desire to know).

[8] Cf. यथा राजाऽसौ गच्छतीत्युक्ते यावता परिवारेण विना राज्ञो गमनं न सम्पद्यते, तावतो गमनमाक्षिप्तमिति न पृथगभिधीयते लोके, तद्वदिहापि स्वरूपप्रमाणयुक्तिसाधनप्रयोजनानि ब्रह्मज्ञानपरिपूर्णतार्थमर्थादेव जिज्ञास्यत्वान्न पृथक् सूत्रयितव्यानि। – पञ्चपादिका

17

[सिद्धान्ते युक्त्यन्तरभाष्यम्]

श्रुत्यनुगमाच्च[1]। "यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते" (तै.उ.३.१) इत्याद्याः श्रुतयः "तद्विजिज्ञासस्व, तद्ब्रह्म" (तै.उ.३.१) इति प्रत्यक्षमेव[2] ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासाकर्मत्वं दर्शयन्ति। तच्च कर्मणि षष्ठीपरिग्रहे सूत्रेण अनुगतं भवति। तस्माद् 'ब्रह्मणः' इति कर्मणि षष्ठी।

17 A

[SIDDHĀNTE YUKTYANTARABHĀṢYAM]

śrutyanugamācca. "yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante" (Tai.U.3.1) ityādyāḥ śrutayaḥ "tadvijijñāsasva, tadbrahma" (Tai.U.3.1) iti pratyakṣameva brahmaṇo jijñāsākarmatvaṁ darśayanti. tacca karmaṇi ṣaṣṭhīparigrahe sūtreṇa anugataṁ bhavati. tasmād 'brahmaṇaḥ' iti karmaṇi ṣaṣṭhī.

as object of enquiry | tvam

17 B

श्रुत्यनुगमात् च *śrutyanugamāt ca* – also because of its conformity with the Scriptures; यतः *yataḥ* – whence; वै *vai* – verily; इमानि *imāni* – these; भूतानि *bhūtāni* – beings; जायन्ते *jāyante* – are born; इत्याद्याः *ityādyāḥ* – beginning with; श्रुतयः *śrutayaḥ* – the Scriptural passages; तत् *tat* – that; विजिज्ञासस्व *vijijñāsasva* – you desire to know; तत् *tat* – that; ब्रह्म *brahma* – Brahman; इति *iti* – thus in the manner of this passage; प्रत्यक्षम् एव *pratyakṣam eva* – explicitly; ब्रह्मणः *brahmaṇaḥ* – of Brahman; जिज्ञासाकर्मत्वम् *jijñāsākarmatvam* – the state of being an object of the desire to know; दर्शयन्ति *darśayanti* – present; तत् च *tat ca* – the same also; कर्मणि *karmaṇi* – in the sense of object; षष्ठीपरिग्रहे *ṣaṣṭhīparigrahe* – if the sixth case-ending is taken; सूत्रेण *sūtreṇa* – by the aphorism; अनुगतम् *anugatam* – conformed to; भवति *bhavati* – becomes; तस्मात् *tasmāt* – therefore; ब्रह्मणः इति *brahmaṇaḥ iti* – of the word 'brahmaṇaḥ'; कर्मणि *karmaṇi* – in the sense of object; षष्ठी *ṣaṣṭhī* – the sixth case-ending

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[1] कर्मषष्ठ्या इति शेषः। – प्रदीप

[2] प्रत्यक्षं – साक्षाद्, विनैवाक्षेपमिति यावत्। – प्रदीप

17 C

[ANOTHER RATIONALE FOR THE SIDDHĀNTA]

The sixth case-ending is in the sense of object, also because it is in conformity with the Scriptures.[1] The Scriptural passages beginning with "That whence verily these beings are born" through the passage, "Desire to know that. That is Brahman," demonstrate explicitly that Brahman is the direct object of the desire to know.[2] And that would be in conformity with the aphorism if the sixth case-ending herein is taken in the sense of object.[3] Therefore, the sixth case-ending of the word 'brahmaṇaḥ' is in the sense of object.[4]

17 D

1. The sixth case-ending is in the sense of object, also because it is in conformity with the Scriptures: This is the 'vastusaṅgraha-vākya', that is the summary statement, which is to be elaborated in its sequel.

2. The Scriptural passages beginning with "That from which these beings are born" through the passage, "Desire to know that. That is Brahman," demonstrate explicitly that Brahman is the direct object of the desire to know: The passage cited in the Bhāṣya is meant to be a 'pratīka', that is a part or portion of a long passage, that represents the entire tract. The whole Upaniṣadic passage (*Tai.U.*3.1) is as follows: *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante, yena jātāni jīvanti, yatprayantyabhisaṁviśanti, tad vijijñāsasva, tad brahma* – That whence verily these beings are born; that by which, these that are born, live; and that to which, when departing, these return; that you should seek to know – that is Brahman."

3. And that would be in conformity with the aphorism if the sixth case-ending herein is taken in the sense of object: The above-mentioned Upaniṣadic passage ending with "Desire to know that. That is Brahman," beyond doubt directly presents Brahman as the object (karma) of the desire to know (jijñāsā). Therefore, to fall in line with and conform with the tenor and drift of the Upaniṣadic passage, the sixth case-ending of the word 'brahmaṇaḥ'

in the string 'brahmaṇaḥ jijñāsā' that alternates with the compound word 'brahma-jijñāsā' in the aphorism, *"athāto brahmajijñāsā,"*should be taken in the sense of object alone.[3]

The great expounders of Advaita-vedānta such as Prakāśātman, the highly venerated author of the *Vivaraṇa*, a subcommentary on the *Pañcapādikā* of Padmapāda, opine that the present section of the Bhāṣya clearly indicates that the aphorism under study is based on the Upaniṣadic passage cited, *"tad vijijñāsasva, tad brahma."* Since *Brahma-sūtra's* aim is to expound cogently the salient thoughts of the Upaniṣads, it is imperative that the aphorism be interpreted to fall in line with that basic Upaniṣadic tract (viṣaya-vākya) indicating the objective relation (karmatva) of Brahman with jijñāsā (desire to know).[4]

4. Therefore, the sixth case-ending of the word 'brahmaṇaḥ' is in the sense of object: This sentence of the Bhāṣya concludes the discussion regarding the meaning of the sixth case-ending, the discussion that was begun by the identically worded sentence, *"brahmaṇo jijñāsā brahmajijñāsā,"*of the Bhāṣya. (Vide Section 11.)

ॐ

[3] Cf. श्रुतिसूत्रयोरेकार्थत्वलाभात् च इत्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

[4] Cf. किञ्च शास्त्रप्रवृत्तिरेव कर्मणि षष्ठीं गमयति। कथम्, एवं हि शास्त्रमारब्धव्यम्। पुण्यचितो लोकः क्षीयते इत्यादि श्रुतेर्न्यायतश्च पुण्यस्य क्षयदर्शनाद् विरक्तस्य ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परमित्यादिश्रुतेर्ब्रह्मज्ञानात्पुरुषार्थसिद्धिः परेति। अतस्तज्ज्ञातुमिच्छतः श्रुत्या यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते इत्येवमाद्यया तत्प्रतिपादनपूर्वकं तद्विजिज्ञासस्वेति साक्षादेव कर्मतया ज्ञेयत्वेनानुशासनं यत्, तदिदम् अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासेति सूचितम्। तेन कर्मषष्ठीपरिग्रहे श्रुतिन्यायसूचनपरं सूत्रं तदनुगतं भवति, अन्यथा लक्ष्यानानुगतमसम्बद्धं स्यात्। – पञ्चपादिका

Also, cf. साधिकारविषयस्य विचारविधेः प्रतिपादके वाक्ये ब्रह्मणः कर्मकारकत्वं निर्दिष्टं, सूत्रस्य च तदेकार्थत्वात् तत्रापि ब्रह्मणः कर्मत्वमेवमेवशब्देन वक्तव्यमिति दर्शितम्। – पञ्चपादिकाविवरण

Also, cf. कर्मणि षष्ठीपरिग्रहे हि सूत्रेण स्वविषयीभूतश्रुतेरनुगमो भवति, तत्र तद्विजिज्ञासस्व, श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यः इति साक्षात् कर्मत्वेन ब्रह्मणः परिग्रहादित्यर्थः। – वार्तिक

Also, cf. प्रतिपादके वाक्ये ब्रह्मणः कर्मकारकत्वनिर्देशात् सूत्रस्य च तदेकार्थत्वात् सूत्रेऽपि ब्रह्मणः कर्मत्वमेव ग्राह्यमित्याह— श्रुत्यनुगमादिति। तदेव दर्शयति—यतो वेति। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

18

[जिज्ञासार्थविचारभाष्यम्]

ज्ञातुम् इच्छा जिज्ञासा। अवगतिपर्यन्तं ज्ञानं सन्वाच्यायाः इच्छायाः कर्म, फल-विषयत्वादिच्छायाः। ज्ञानेन हि प्रमाणेनावगन्तुमिष्टं ब्रह्म। ब्रह्मावगतिर्हि पुरुषार्थः, निःशेषसंसारबीजाविद्याद्यनर्थनिबर्हणात्। तस्माद् ब्रह्म [1]जिज्ञासितव्यम्[1]।

18 A

[JIJÑĀSĀRTHAVICĀRABHĀṢYAM]

jñātum icchā jijñāsā. avagatiparyantaṁ jñānaṁ sanvācyāyāḥ icchāyāḥ karma, phalaviṣayatvādicchāyāḥ. jñānena hi pramāṇenāvagantumiṣṭaṁ brahma. brahmāvagatirhi puruṣārthaḥ, niḥśeṣasaṁsārabījāvidyādyanarthanibarhaṇāt. tasmād brahma jijñāsitavyam.

18 B

ज्ञातुम् *jñātum* – to know; इच्छा *icchā* – desire (is the string); (that alternates with the desiderative derivate) जिज्ञासा *jijñāsā* – 'jijñāsā'; अवगतिपर्यन्तम् *avagatiparyantam* – culminating in Realisation; ज्ञानम् *jñānam* – knowledge; सन्वाच्यायाः *sanvācyāyāḥ* – denoted by the suffix 'san'; इच्छायाः *icchāyāḥ* – of the desire; कर्म *karma* – is the object; फलविषयत्वात् *phalaviṣayatvāt* – because fruit is the object; इच्छायाः *icchāyāḥ* – of desire; ज्ञानेन *jñānena* – through knowledge; हि *hi* – indeed; प्रमाणेन *pramāṇena* – by the valid means to know; अवगन्तुम् *avagantum* – to realise; इष्टम् *iṣṭam* – desired; ब्रह्म *brahma* – Brahman; ब्रह्मावगतिः *brahmāvagatiḥ* – Realisation of Brahman; हि *hi* – verily; पुरुषार्थः *puruṣārthaḥ* – is the human goal; निःशेष-संसारबीजाविद्याद्यनर्थनिबर्हणात् *niḥśeṣasaṁsārabījāvidyādyanarthanibarhaṇāt* – because it annihilates the evils of nescience etc., the seeds of the entire transmigration; तस्मात् *tasmāt* – therefore; ब्रह्म *brahma* – Brahman; जिज्ञासितव्यम् *jijñāsitavyam* – should be desired to be known

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[1] NSP (I & II), AA, CSS *Pradīpa* विजिज्ञातव्यम्; AA (fn.) जिज्ञासितव्यम्; *Vārtika* विजिज्ञासितव्यम् इत्युक्तम्। All the published commentaries, excepting the *Pradīpa* read जिज्ञासितव्यम्

[1] इत्युक्तं सूत्रकृता इति शेषः।

18 C

[EXAMINING THE MEANING OF 'JIJÑĀSĀ']

'Desire to know' is the string that alternates with the desiderative derivate 'jijñāsā'.[1] The object of the desire denoted by the suffix 'san' is the knowledge[2] that culminates in Realisation because the fruit alone is to be the object of desire.[3] Indeed, it is by knowledge, the valid means to know, that Brahman is desired to be realised.[4] The Realisation of Brahman is verily the human goal because it annihilates the evils of nescience etc., that are the seeds of the entire transmigration.[5] Therefore, Brahman should be desired to be known.[6]

18 D

1. 'Desire to know' is the string that alternates with the desiderative derivate 'jijñāsā': The usual grammatical explanation of the term 'jijñāsā' is 'jñātum icchā jijñāsā'. Yet, the Ācārya makes an explicit mention of it here with the obvious purpose of countering the view of the earlier Vṛttikāra who views that the term 'jijñāsā' as used in the aphorism *"athāto brahmajijñāsā"* in the secondary sense of mīmāṁsā (inquiry).[2] The Ācārya's elucidation makes it abundantly clear that the term 'jijñāsā' is used to convey its derivative sense and hence the main subject of the aphorism is the 'desire to know Brahman' and not 'the inquiry into Brahman'.

2. The object of the desire denoted by the suffix 'san' is the knowledge: According to the rules of Pāṇinian grammar, 'san' is a desiderative suffix and it can be added to any verbal root (dhātu) to denote the sense of 'desire' of the individual who is the kartṛ (agent) of the act denoted by the verbal root.[3] The Bhāṣya, therefore, states that knowledge (i.e. the meaning of the verbal root 'jñā') is the object (karma) of the desire (icchā) expressed by the suffix 'san'.

3. that culminates in Realisation because the fruit alone is to be the object of desire: This observation that the Ācārya makes here is obviously to ward off the following two-pronged criticism of the Pūrvapakṣin:

[2] Cf. श्रुतिसूत्रयोरेकार्थत्वलाभात् च इत्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

[3] धातोः कर्मणः समानकर्तृकादिच्छायां वा। – पाणिनिसूत्र (३.१.७)

(1) Our day-to-day experience establishes that it is only the fruit of human effort that constitutes the object of the desire of man and nothing else. And, what constitutes such a fruit is either happiness (sukha-prāpti) and the means to attain it (sukha-sādhana) or the avoidance of misery (duḥkha-nirākaraṇa) and its means.[4] Hence, these alone can be designated as 'puruṣārtha': "puruṣaiḥ arthyate iti puruṣārthaḥ – That which is sought after by human beings." But the Knowledge of Brahman cannot be categorised as 'puruṣārtha' because the knowledge that is gained through the Vedāntic study is itself never found to be of the nature of happiness or a means to the same or of the nature of avoidance of miseries or its means. Indeed, even after one has obtained the knowledge from the perusal of the Vedāntic texts, the individual experiences no special happiness; rather, he continues to be afflicted with miseries as he was before he attained knowledge.[5] Therefore, the Knowledge of Brahman cannot be a puruṣārtha (human goal) for it fails to be an object of the individual's desire. Thus, according to the Pūrvapakṣin, the statement of the Sūtrakāra positing the Knowledge of Brahman to be the object of human desire appears logically incongruous and runs counter to experience.

(2) Also, if the desire to know Brahman were the only thing that was to be introduced or premised in the introductory first aphorism, *"athāto brahmajijñāsā,"* then the various inquiries pertaining to the Knowledge of Brahman that are to be conducted by the Sūtrakāra from the very next Sūtra onwards would be left unpremised and not introduced in the preambulary first Sūtra. It would be rather unfair on the part of the Sūtrakāra to do so.

The Bhāṣyakāra gives his rejoinder to the above-mentioned objections of the Pūrvapakṣin. It is certainly true that fruit or result (phala) alone can be the object of human desire (puruṣārtha) and the *bare* knowledge of Brahman gained from Scriptural study cannot be the actual fruit and hence cannot be the object of human desire. Yet, when the great sage, the Sūtrakāra, Bhagavān Bādarāyaṇa, unequivocally declares 'Brahma-jñāna'

[4] That is: *sukhaṁ, sukhasādhanaṁ ca tathā duḥkhanirākaraṇaṁ tatsādhanaṁ ca.*

[5] Cf. न ज्ञानमिच्छाविषयः। सुखदुःखावाप्तिपरिहारौ वा तदुपायो वा तद्वारेणेच्छागोचरः। न चैवं ब्रह्मज्ञानम्। न खल्वेतदनुकूलमिति वा प्रतिकूलनिवृत्तिरिति वानुभूयते। नापि तयोरुपायः, तस्मिन्सत्यपि सुखभेदस्यादर्शनाद्, अनुवर्तमानस्य च दुःखस्यानिवृत्तेः। – भामती

(the Knowledge of Brahman) as the object of desire, a human goal, we have to necessarily conclude that he intends only such a Knowledge of Brahman that can be a fruit (phala) and hence can be the object of the desire. Therefore, we have to reason that by the Knowledge of Brahman what is meant by the Sūtrakāra is the final culmination of knowledge, the very sacrosanct Realisation (Avagati, Sākṣātkāra or Aparokṣānubhūti) of Brahman.[6] That is, the Brahma-jñāna spoken of in the aphorism, *"athāto brahmajijñāsā,"* is the actual Realisation of Brahman that is declared as the goal in such Upaniṣadic passages (*Bṛ.U.*2.4.5/4.5.6) as *"ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ* – It is the Self, that needs to be realised."

Such a Realisation can certainly be the object of the aspirant's desire, for when one realises Brahman, that very moment, he, as explicitly declared by the Upaniṣadic statement (*Mu.U.*3.2.9), *"brahma veda, brahmaiva bhavati* – The knower of Brahman becomes one with Brahman," becomes one with the supreme Brahman and gets released from all evils and miseries as described by the Upaniṣadic declaration (*Īśa.U.*7), *"tatra ko mohaḥ kaḥ śoka ekatvamanupaśyataḥ* – How can delusion and sorrow be there for him who has realised the oneness of Self." Thus, the Knowledge of Brahman that the Sūtrakāra indicates as the object of desire of the aspirant (mumukṣu) is, indeed, a puruṣārtha (human goal) for it is certainly the means to attain the fruit (phala) of supreme fulfillment and the destruction of saṁsāra. Thus, the jijñāsā of Brahman does constitute a perfect object of human desire.

It is to be carefully noted that the Ācārya states that the object of desire is 'avagatiparyantaṁ jñānam', that is the 'knowledge that culminates in Realisation'; he does not state that the object of desire is 'avagatisvarūpaṁ jñānam', that is the 'knowledge in the form of Realisation'. The idea is this: 'to culminate' signifies to reach or to achieve a result or a goal by a gradual process – step by step progress through effort. As a result, the word 'jijñāsā' (desire to know) of the aphorism could virtually include all the various steps that the aspirant, who is fired with the intense desire to know Brahman,

[6] Cf. तस्मान्न सूत्रकारवचनमात्रादिषिकर्मता ज्ञानस्येत्यत आह—अवगतिपर्यन्तम् इति। न केवलं ज्ञानमिष्यते किं त्ववगतिं साक्षात्कारं कुर्वदवगतिपर्यन्तं सन्वाच्याया इच्छायाः कर्म। – भामती

undertakes in his pursuit of attaining the goal of Realisation.[7] These various steps of gradual progress are: (1) taking refuge in the Guru (gurūpasadana), (2) learning from him (śravaṇa) the knowledge of the identity of the Self and Brahman (jīvabrahma-aikya), (3) conducting a logical inquiry (manana) into what he has thus learnt from the Master, and finally (4) meditating constantly (nididhyāsana) on the knowledge he has thus gained.[8] Indeed, it is only by going through these stages untiringly that an intelligent aspirant can come to attain the goal, the Realisation of the oneness of the Self (Brahmāvagati, Brahmānubhava or Brahmātma-sākṣātkāra).

From the above discussion one may thus conclude that though the Pāṇinian list of grammatical roots (dhātu-pāṭha) recognises the verbal root 'jñā' in the sense of knowledge (*jñā avabodhane*), yet on the strength of the juxtaposition or association of the desiderative suffix 'san' meaning 'desire,'[9] the verbal root 'jñā' in the present context is to be understood in this special sense: knowledge that culminates in the Realisation of Brahman through the process of gurūpasadana, śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana.[10]

[7] Cf. फलविषयत्वादिच्छायाः तदुपायं फलपर्यन्तं गोचरयतीच्छेति शेषः। – भामती

[8] Of these four steps, the first one of gurūpasadana is prescribed by the Upaniṣadic statement (*Mu.U.*1.2.12) *"tadvijñānārthaṁ sa gurumevābhigacchet* – To know that Brahman, the aspirant shall approach a Master." And the other steps of śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana are advised by the Upaniṣadic statements (*Bṛ.U.*2.4.5/4.5.6) such as *"ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ* – The Self should be realised, should be heard about, should be cogitated upon and should be incessantly meditated upon."

[9] *"icchārthakasanpratyayasamabhivyāhārabalāt."*

[10] In this regard, we could find other parallels too. For example, the Pāṇinian list of verbal roots (dhātu-pāṭha) recognises the root 'gam' in the simple sense of 'to go' (*gaṃl gatau*). However, when the same root is suffixed with 'san' and used as in the illustrative sentence, 'kāśīṁ jigamiṣati' (i.e. kāśīṁ gantum icchati), meaning 'he desires to go to Kāśī', the root 'gam' cannot be taken in the simple sense of 'going' for such a bare going does not by itself constitute a fruit (phala) and hence the act of going alone cannot be the object of the person's desire. Therefore, on the strength of the juxtaposition of desiderative suffix 'san' with the root 'gam', we have to understand the denotation of the 'san' suffix in 'jigamiṣa' (to desire to go) in a special sense as the act of going that culminates in the person's actual arrival at Kāśī and his direct Realisation (pratyakṣānubhava) of that holy city. As a result, 'the desire to go to Kāśī', includes in its scope all the necessary steps a person may have to take for realising the goal such as arranging for necessary resources for the journey, undertaking the actual act of travelling and so on and so forth. Like how 'kāśī-jigamiṣā' (the desire to go to Kāśī) is an all-inclusive desire so too is the 'brahma-jijñāsā' (the desire to know Brahman) of the Sūtra under deliberation.

Thus, in a single stroke, by construing the knowledge (jñānam) in the desiderative derivate 'jijñāsā' as *"avagatiparyantaṁ jñānam,"* the Ācārya has answered both the objections of the Pūrvapakṣin: (1) that the Knowledge of Brahman cannot be a human goal (puruṣārtha) and (2) that the various inquiries pertaining to the Knowledge of Brahman are not premised in the introductory first aphorism, *"athāto brahmajijñāsā."*

The above vital point of the knowledge (jñānam) in the desiderative derivate 'jijñāsā' as 'avagatiparyantaṁ jñānam' also meets another possible objection of the Pūrvapakṣin: Individuals desire that which they can effect by their effort and desist from desiring such things which are beyond the scope of effort according to the dictum: "icchākarmatvaṁ kṛtisādhyatvavyāpyam – Objects of desire (icchākarmatva) are invariably capable of being effected by efforts (kṛtisādhya)." But knowledge is not something that can be effected by effort. To explain: it is only the knowledge about a given thing, like gold, that generates in him a desire to have it and thereby whips him up to undertake an activity to gain it. But, in the case of brahma-jijñāsā, there appears to be a logical anomaly for knowledge (jñāna) is pointed out to be rather the culmination of effort (kṛti) when logically knowledge (jñāna) has to precede effort (kṛti).[11]

The Bhāṣya statement under our perusal thus indicates a suitable answer to this conundrum by explaining that the verbal root 'jñā' in 'brahma-jijñāsā', because of its juxtaposition with the san-suffix and being associated with Brahman as the object of desire signifies not a mere knowledge of Brahman but that knowledge which emerges as a result of gurūpasadana, śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana and culminates in Realisation. Since, all these have to be effected by human effort (kṛtisādhya), the Knowledge of Brahman too is deemed to be effected by human effort.[12]

[11] A person first comes to know of a certain thing, then he develops a desire for it and then alone does he make an effort to gain it. Hence the well-known sequence of human behaviour: *"jānāti, icchati, yatate iti kramo lokasiddhaḥ."*

[12] Vide *"tatra cāvabodho yadyapi na kṛtisādhyaḥ, tathā'pi vicārasādhyatvādiviśiṣṭaḥ sa vicārasya kṛtisādhyatvāt tādṛśa iti na doṣaḥ."* (*Pradīpa*) We can illustrate this point with an example from karma-kāṇḍa: The individual self (jīva) is never born and never dies and it is only the adjuncts (upādhi) like the physical body that take birth and later perish. Yet, because of the individual

4. Indeed, it is by knowledge, the valid means to know, that Brahman is desired to be realised: In this statement of the Ācārya, the expression 'jñānena pramāṇena' signifies the 'means of knowledge, that is the valid means to know', and is intended to denote the means consisting in the right knowledge, which is of the nature of a conviction that cannot be invalidated by another cognition thus sublating it to be an error – *"aprāmāṇyajñāna-anāskanditena niścayātmakena yathārthajñānena."*

In the earlier sections, we have seen that the aspirant who has acquired the sādhana-catuṣṭaya (fourfold means) and who has come to know the Upaniṣadic statements such as (*Tai.U.*2.1, *Mu.U.*3.2.9 & *Chā.U.*6.9.4 in respective order) *"brahmavidāpnoti param* – The knower of Brahman attains the Supreme," *"brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati* – One who knows Brahman becomes indeed Brahman," *"tat tvam asi* – That thou art," and so on develops an intense desire for the Realisation of Brahman, by correctly ascertaining the purport of such Scriptural statements. The Upaniṣads themselves declare (*Mu.U.*3.2.6) that the ascertainment of the purpose of the Upaniṣads alone leads to Liberation through statements such as *"vedāntavijñānasuniścitārthāḥ... parimucyanti sarve* – Only those are Liberated, who, by inquiring into the Upaniṣads, have ascertained their purport."

The present Bhāṣya statement, therefore, comes to mean that Brahman is realised only by correctly ascertaining the purport of the Upaniṣadic statements. The cause–effect relationship between the inquiry into the Vedānta (Upaniṣads) and the Realisation of Brahman is recognised by the Scripture when they prescribe the inquiry of the Upaniṣads – that is manana – besides the learning of the Vedānta, for the rise of the latter.[13]

Thus, the present sentence of the Bhāṣya enables us to discover in the aphorism itself a suggestion for answering the question raised by the opponent that if the present aphorism were only to premise the desire for

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self's association with these upādhis, the individual self (jīva) is described in the karma-kāṇḍa, as being born and as being dead and specific rituals too are enjoined for these occasions.

[13] Vide the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* enunciation (2.4.5/4.5.6), *"ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ* – The Ātman must be realised, must be heard, must be inquired into and must be incessantly meditated upon."

Knowledge of Brahman, how can it accord well with various inquiries into Brahman that are undertaken from the very next aphorism onwards. The answer is verily what is suggested by the Sūtra: These inquiries are undertaken because they are instruments and are sure aids to the Realisation of Brahman which a mumukṣu (seeker of Liberation) desires intensely.

5. The Realisation of Brahman is verily the human goal because it annihilates the evils of nescience etc., that are the seeds of the entire transmigration: The direct Realisation of Brahman (Brahmāvagati) is the human goal (puruṣārtha) because it is sought after by human beings so that they could become liberated from all kinds of sorrows along with their root cause once and for all.

The *raison d'etre* as to why the direct Realisation of the supreme Reality is given the designation of 'puruṣārtha' is explained by the Ācārya in the expression: *"niḥśeṣasaṁsārabījāvidyādyanarthanibarhaṇāt* – Because it puts an end to the ignorance (avidyā) as well as its subtle, yet firmly ingrained impressions (saṁskāra or vāsanā), in their entirety which cause the cycle of transmigration (saṁsāra)."

All wish for freedom from life's incessant pains and seek the attainment of absolute bliss. Although the individual Self is verily the supreme Self, still due to the influence of avidyā one takes oneself to be the body, mind and so on (adhyāsa) and, consequently, suffer from all kinds of miseries. As a result of practicing nididhyāsana, that is the incessant reflection on the nature of the Ultimate learnt from one's Guru, an individual discovers himself to be all bliss, free of any kind of association with pain. It is only this kind of direct Realisation that destroys ignorance as well as its impressions and the resultant transmigration. That is why 'Brahmāvagati', that is the direct Realisation of the oneness of the Self, is given the appellation of 'puruṣārtha'.[14]

Unlike Vācaspati, the erudite author of the *Bhāmatī*, which is the gloss on the *Brahmasūtra-śaṅkarabhāṣya*, Anubhūtisvarūpācārya (author

[14] Cf. अविद्यादीत्यादिग्रहणेन तत्संस्कारोऽवरुध्यते। अविद्यादिनिवृत्तिस्तूपासनाकार्यादन्तःकरणवृत्तिभेदात् साक्षात्कारादिति द्रष्टव्यम्। उपसंहरति तस्माद्ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यम् उक्तलक्षणेन मुमुक्षुणा। न खलु तज्ज्ञानं विना सवासनविविधदुःख-निदानमविद्योच्छिद्यते। न च तदुच्छेदमन्तरेण विगलितनिखिलदुःखानुषङ्गानन्दघनब्रह्मात्मतासाक्षात्काराविर्भावो जीवस्य। – भामती

of *Prakaṭārthavivaraṇa*), Ānandagiri (author of *Nyāyanirṇaya*) and Govindānanda (author of *Ratnaprabhā*) interpret the compound component 'avidyādi' in a different manner. While Vācaspati-miśra takes the 'firmly ingrained impressons' (saṁskāra) by the term 'ādi' (meaning 'etcetera') in 'avidyādi', the latter commentators dissolve the compound as 'avidyā ādiḥ asya (anarthasya)' thereby construing the word 'ādi' to mean 'beginning'. With this string of the compound 'avidyādi', the expression *"niḥśeṣasaṁsāra-bījāvidyādyanarthanibarhaṇāt"* would come to mean: 'since the direct Realisation of Brahman uproots the evils which *begin* with avidyā, the seed of the entire transmigration' (Brahmāvagati is designated as 'puruṣārtha').[15]

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With this present statement, the Bhāṣyakāra has concluded his exposition on the meaning of term 'jijñāsā'. We have already mentioned that the present Jijñāsā-sūtra is based on the statement of the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad*, *"tad vijijñāsasva, tad brahma."*[18] This passage contains an imperative finite verb 'vijijñāsasva', which has the suffix 'sva' that carries the sense of injunction, and therefore appears to be an injunctive sentence. Therefore, it is generally held that the Ācārya has also constructed this concluding sentence of his analysis on the term 'jijñāsā' with the potential passive participle 'jijñāsitavyam' so that his statement too conforms in tenor to the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad* statement.

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[16] The meaning and implication of the present Bhāṣya sentence were briefly touched upon in the Section 4 D, n.2.

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[18] Refer to Section 17 D, n.3.

In this context, the celebrated glossators like Vācaspati-miśra and Prakāśātman[19] hold opposite views regarding the nature of the above-cited *Taittirīya* Scriptural passage, and the present aphorism, and the Bhāṣya statement thereon.

Vācaspati maintains that since the Ācārya has clearly presented the compound word 'brahma-jijñāsā' in the aphorism as signifying merely the 'desire to know Brahman' and since we find the impossibility of any element of injunction with respect to desire *per se* and also if we are to presume that the Sūtrakāra has based the first aphorism on the said *Taittirīya-upaniṣad* statement, *"tad vijijñāsasva, tad brahma,"* then we are bound to logically conclude that this *Taittirīya-upaniṣad* sentence also would have to be assessed in the same way as the Jijñāsā-sūtra has been interpreted. That is, according to the Sūtrakāra, the word 'jijñāsasva' in the Upaniṣadic Mantra is intended to convey nothing more than 'the desire to know Brahman' and hence the imperative force of the suffix 'sva' remains ineffective and fails to convey the sense of injunction.

Prakāśātman, renowned as the 'Vivaraṇakāra', approaches the problem in a totally different way. He deems that the above-cited *Taittirīya* Scriptural passage is undoubtedly an injunctive sentence enjoining an inquiry into Brahman. The present aphorism, as it is based on that very Upaniṣadic passage, has to necessarily crystallise that very thought of the Upaniṣadic tract. Therefore, the term 'jijñāsā' of the aphorism, *"athāto brahmajijñāsā,"* should be understood in its secondary sense (lakṣyārtha) of mīmāṁsā, that is 'inquiry' into Brahman. Therefore, in the aphorism, the term 'brahma-jijñāsā' signifies the 'desire for the Knowledge of Brahman', which in turn is to be effected by inquiry (vicāra) and not merely through knowledge which results from the general comprehension of the Scripture from the teacher.[20] Thus, inquiry (that is 'vicāra' or 'mimāṁsā') is intrinsic and an integral part (antarṇīta) of the term 'jijñāsā' and not something foreign to it or something imposed on it from outside. Hence, vicāra could certainly be the lakṣyārtha or

[19] The venerated author of the famous *Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa*, a subcommentary on Padmapādācārya's *Pañcapādikā*, which is a direct commentary on the *Brahmasūtra-śaṅkarabhāṣya*.

[20] Cf. विचारपूर्वकसाध्यज्ञानविषयेच्छा जिज्ञासाशब्दात् प्रतीयते न उपदेशमात्रसाध्यज्ञानविषयेच्छा। – पञ्चपादिका

the secondary sense of jijñāsā.[21] Therefore, there is no question of burdening the word with an additional denotative power (atirikta-śaktikalpanā) to signify an altogether unconnected different meaning. Thus, 'brahma-vicāra', that is 'inquiry into Brahman' is, indeed, the subject of the aphorism *"athāto brahmajijñāsā."* But, in order to complete the sense of the sentence, the injunctive verbal form 'kartavyā' (meaning 'must be undertaken') has to be supplied (adhyāhṛta). This view of the author of *Vivaraṇa* seems to receive strength from the Bhāṣya sentence, *"tasmād brahma jijñāsitavyam,"* which has an injunctive tone.

However, while commenting upon the Samanvaya-sūtra (1.1.4), *"tattu samanvayāt,"* the Ācārya argues with force and establishes the fact that Knowledge, the cognition of the oneness of the Self, cannot be ordained at all and it cannot even be 'touched' by any injunction and, therefore, the injunctive suffixes, like 'sva', 'tavya' and so on, remain ineffective and as such they are meant only for turning man away from his instinctive extrovertedness. This unequivocal firm stand taken by the Bhāṣyakāra does seem to support the view of Vācaspati-miśra, the Bhāmatīkāra. It is in concurrence with this unassailable viewpoint of the Ācārya and the thoughts of *Bhāmatī* that we have rendered the meaning of the present sentence of the Bhāṣya.

However, as we have seen in the earlier sections, there were some early pre-Śaṅkara traditions that treated the word 'brahma-jijñāsā' of the Sūtra as a synonym of 'brahma-mīmāṁsā' or 'brahma-vicāra' signifying 'inquiry into Brahman' from the powerful spell cast by Śabara-svāmin's masterly elucidation of the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā-sūtra* (1.1.1), *"athāto dharmajijñāsā."* It was perhaps the Ācārya who was first to raise his voice against this way of interpretation and provide a cogent explanation of the Sūtra in line with the Upaniṣadic message and teachings.

[21] Lakṣyārtha or secondary meaning is defined as that which is related to the primary word-sense – *"śakyasambandho lakṣaṇā."* Here is an example to illustrate the concept: When only a part of a village is burnt, it is often said 'the village is burnt'. Here 'village' is used in the secondary sense to mean 'a part of the village' – *"grāmaikadeśe dagdhe grāmo dagdha iti vyavahāravat."*

19

[ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञास्यत्वसम्भवाक्षेपभाष्यम्]

तत् पुनः ब्रह्म [1]प्रसिद्धम् अप्रसिद्धं वा स्यात्। [2]यदि प्रसिद्धं न विजिज्ञासितव्यम्। अथ अप्रसिद्धं, नैव शक्यं जिज्ञासितुम् इति।

19 A

[BRAHMAṆO JIJÑĀSYATVASAMBHAVĀKṢEPABHĀṢYAM]

tat punaḥ brahma prasiddham aprasiddhaṁ vā syāt. yadi prasiddhaṁ na vijijñāsitavyam. atha aprasiddhaṁ, naiva śakyaṁ jijñāsitum iti.

19 B

तत् *tat* – that; पुनः *punaḥ* – nevertheless; ब्रह्म *brahma* – Brahman; प्रसिद्धम् *prasiddham* – well-known; अप्रसिद्धम् *aprasiddham* – not well-known; वा *vā* – or; स्यात् *syāt* – must be; यदि *yadi* – if; प्रसिद्धम् *prasiddham* – well-known; न *na* – not; विजिज्ञासितव्यम् *vijijñāsitavyam* – should be desired to be known; अथ *atha* – on the other hand; अप्रसिद्धम् *aprasiddham* – not well-known; न एव *na eva* – not at all; शक्यम् *śakyam* – possible; जिज्ञासितुम् *jijñāsitum* – to be desired to be known; इति *iti* – thus

19 C

[OBJECTION TO THE POSSIBILITY OF BRAHMAN BEING DESIRED TO BE KNOWN]

Nevertheless, that Brahman must be either well-known or not well-known. If it is well-known, then it need not be desired to be known. On the other hand, if it is not well-known then, too, it is impossible to be desired to be known.

19 D

While concluding his discussion on the term 'jijñāsā' and its object in the last section, the Ācārya has categorically stated that Brahman is what is desired most to be known by the mumukṣu, that is the seeker who desires

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[1] CSS *Pañcapādikā* प्रसिद्धं वा स्याद्? अप्रसिद्धं वा।

[2] AA (fn.) यदि तत् प्रसिद्धम्

to be blessed with Liberation. This implies that the Vedānta-darśana teaches the mumukṣu how to realise Brahman and become liberated.

It is at this juncture that the Pūrvapakṣin raises an objection that the Vedānta-darśana does not have a definite viṣaya (subject) to teach. In order to appreciate fully the objections of the Pūrvapakṣin, we have to take into consideration the following points:

(1) According to the time-honoured tradition of Indian authors, it is essential that every treatise must, in the very beginning, indicate the 'anubandha- catuṣṭaya', the four preambulary factors of the treatise: (a) the viṣaya, that is the subject matter that the treatise proposes to teach, (b) the prayojana, that is the ultimate goal to be attained by means of the knowledge of the subject explicated in the treatise, (c) the sambandha or the relation between viṣaya and prayojana and (d) the adhikārī or the person who is to undertake the study of the treatise. The objection of the Pūrvapakṣin directly pertains to the very first member of the anubandha-catuṣṭaya, that is the viṣaya or the subject matter.[1]

(2) At the very beginning of the *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya*, the Pūrvapakṣin objected to the very commencement of the *Brahma-sūtra* – "*śāstraṁ na ārabdhavyam* – the treatise ought not to be begun" – since it has neither a suitable subject to teach, nor a proper purpose to serve. We have seen how the Bhāṣyakāra had effectively countered this objection.[2] However, the opponent is again inclined to raise the same objection. Perhaps he is emboldened to do so in reaction to the Bhāṣyakāra's interpretation of the aphorism to yield the following meaning: Having acquired the fourfold means, the aspirant being endowed with the desire for the Realisation of Brahman inquires into the nature of Brahman, the means to know it, the result of the knowledge of Brahman and so on that are taught from the second aphorism onwards since these inquiries are the sure aids for the mumukṣu to attain the direct Realisation of Brahman.

[1] If the first factor is discarded, it is only natural that the other three are bound to be automatically discarded. Moreover, while elucidating the words 'atha' and 'ataḥ', the Bhāṣyakāra has shown how the aphorism itself contains reference to the adhikārī and prayojana, the fourth and the second of the four preambulary factors of the treatise.

[2] For details see the *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya*, Sections 1, 2 and 3.

(3) The Pūrvapakṣin's objection emanates from the observation of human behaviour in general. An individual, through a source of knowledge, first comes to know about the existence of a certain thing. Thereafter, he considers whether that object is beneficial to him or not. If beneficial, he develops a desire for attaining (īpsā) it and thereafter undertakes the effort with a view to obtaining it.[3] Thus, the order of man's behaviour is: *"jānāti, icchati, yatate* – to know, to desire, and to act." Therefore, if an individual is not aware about a certain thing, it goes without saying that there arises no question of his desire for it or any effort to obtain it. Since, desire denotes invariably the want to gain or possess, it is essential to note that the desire to gain an object will also not arise when one is already in possession of the object and is aware of its possession too.

From this background of common sense and the other above-mentioned factors, the Pūrvapakṣin endeavours to demonstrate the impossibility of brahma-jijñāsā. He argues that in the context of brahma-jijñāsā there could be two alternatives: (1) prior to the rise of brahma-jijñāsā the aspirant has already known Brahman from the Upaniṣadic texts or (2) he has not known it at all.

In case the first alternative is given credence and we believe that the aspirant has known Brahman through the Vedāntic sources, then the following conclusion would ensue: Since the Upaniṣads are 'apauruṣeya' (i.e. not of human origin) and are therefore free from all defects that pertain to affect human compositions[4] and because their validity is self-evident (svataḥ-prāmāṇya) and uncontradicted (abādhita), the Knowledge of Brahman gained by the mumukṣu from the Upaniṣads, the sole authentic source of knowledge,[5] must be certainly in the form of a firm conviction (niścayātmaka) and its averment cannot be assailed by any counter cognition

[3] On the other hand, if the person finds the thing harmful to him, he develops an aversion (jihāsā) and acts accordingly.

[4] The defects that pertain to human compositions are: (1) bhrama (delusion), (2) pramāṇa-apāṭava (inefficiency of the instrument of knowledge), (3) vipralipsā (deception) and (4) pramāda (inadvertence).

[5] As to how the Upaniṣads are the sole authentic authority for the Knowledge of Brahman will be discussed in detail by the Bhāṣya in the third Sūtra – *"śāstrayonitvāt."*

(apramāṇyajñāna-anāskandita). Thus, even when the mumukṣu has learnt about Brahman from the Upaniṣads, at that very time itself he would have gained the perfect knowledge of Brahman. Therefore, there cannot arise in him the desire for gaining Brahman for no individual would seek to gain a thing which he already possesses. Further, since the mumukṣu has already gained the firm knowledge of Brahman, it would be ridiculous to teach him the inquiry into Brahman (brahma-vicāra) from the second aphorism onwards by way of assisting him to gain the Knowledge of Brahman!

On the other hand, in order to obviate the above predicament, if we were to choose the second alternative and assume that the mumukṣu does not already know Brahman through the Upaniṣads, the sole source of the knowledge of Brahman, then too there arises the identical problem of the impossibility of desiring the Knowledge of Brahman, for the mumukṣu having no prior knowledge of Brahman, there cannot arise in him the desire for attaining Brahman as it is commonsense that one can only desire that about which one has prior knowledge.

Thus, the statement of the Ācārya, "*tasmād brahma jijñāsitavyam* – Therefore the Knowledge of Brahman should be sought,"[6] becomes untenable whatever be the alternative to which one takes recourse. And, other than these two alternatives, no third alternative is plausible. When, in this way, there can be no brahma-jijñāsā possible at all, because of the absence of Brahman, the subject matter (viṣaya), there is obviously no need for the *Brahma-sūtra* too that intends to inquire into the Knowledge of Brahman.[7]

The author of *Pañcapādikā* states that that which has not at all been comprehended by the mind cannot be explicated, as the Scripture cannot

[6] Vide Section 18 D, n.6.

[7] Cf. वेदान्तेभ्योऽपौरुषेयतया स्वतःसिद्धप्रामाण्येभ्यः प्रसिद्धमप्रसिद्धं वा स्यात्। यदि प्रसिद्धं, वेदान्तवाक्यसमुत्थेन निश्चयज्ञानेन विषयीकृतं, ततो न जिज्ञासितव्यं, निष्पादितक्रिये कर्मणि अविशेषाधायिनः साधनस्य साधनन्यायातिपातात्। अथाप्रसिद्धं वेदान्तेभ्यः, तर्हि न तद्वेदान्ताः प्रतिपादयन्तीति सर्वथाप्रसिद्धं नैव शक्यं जिज्ञासितुम्। अनुभूते हि प्रिये भवतीच्छा न तु सर्वथाननुभूतपूर्वे। न चेष्यमाणमपि शक्यं ज्ञातुं, प्रमाणाभावात्।...तस्मात्प्रसिद्धस्य ज्ञातुं शक्यस्याप्यजिज्ञासनाद् अप्रसिद्धस्येच्छाया अविषयत्वाद् अशक्यज्ञानत्वाच्च न ब्रह्म जिज्ञास्यमित्याक्षेपः। – भामती

Also, cf. यदि वेदान्तविचारात् प्रागेव ब्रह्म ज्ञातं, तर्हि अज्ञातत्वरूपविषयत्वं नास्ति। अज्ञानाभावेन तन्निवृत्तिरूपफलमपि नास्तीति न विचारयितव्यम्। अथ अज्ञातं केनापि तर्हि तदुद्देशेन विचारः कर्तुं न शक्यते, अज्ञातस्य उद्देशायोगात्। तथा च बुद्धौ अनारूढस्य विचारात्मकशास्त्रेण वेदान्तैश्च प्रतिपादनायोगात् तत्प्रतिपाद्यत्वरूपः सम्बन्धो नास्ति इति ज्ञानानुत्पत्तेः फलमपि नास्ति इत्यनारभ्यं शास्त्रमित्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

expound a topic which is unknown. Also, being unknown, it does not serve any purpose (prayojana or phala). In case it is already known, then too it cannot become an object of the act of expounding nor the desire to know. This comes to mean that an object – whether known or unknown – cannot legitimately become a subject (viṣaya) of exposition. As such, the subject matter being non-existent, it can have no relation (sambandha) with the śāstra and thus ceases to be desired to be known (jijñāsya).[8] This is the sum and substance of the objection contained in the present section.

◈

In this objection of the Pūrvapakṣin, the expression *"tad brahma* – that Brahman," is noteworthy. It signifies the twofold nature of Brahman which is taught in the Upaniṣads: (1) 'Saguṇa', that is possessing attributes like omniscience, omnipresence, omnipotence, agency in the process of creation, sustenance and destruction of the universe and so on and (2) 'Nirguṇa', that is free of the above-mentioned attributes as they are merely the characteristics that arise from the limiting adjuncts (aupādika).

These concepts will become clearer in the next section which contains the answer to the present objection.

[8] Cf. तत् पुनर्ब्रह्म प्रसिद्धमप्रसिद्धं वा स्यात्। यदि प्रसिद्धं, न जिज्ञासितव्यम्। अथ प्रसिद्धं, नैव शक्यं जिज्ञासितुम् इति प्रयोजनविषयसम्बन्धानाक्षिपति। कथं, प्रसिद्धशब्देन प्रतिपन्नमुच्यते। तद् यदि प्रतिपन्नमन्येन केनचित्, तदाऽस्य शास्त्रस्य न विषयः। कस्मात्, प्रतिपाद्यत्वेन हि विषयता, प्रतिपन्ने च तस्मिन्नकिञ्चित्करं शास्त्रम्, इति नास्य विषयः स्यात्। ततश्चानेनानवगमाद्नास्य प्रयोजनं ब्रह्मावगतिः स्यात्। अतः प्रयोजनमप्याक्षिप्तम्। अथाप्रसिद्धं न शक्यं जिज्ञासितुम्। कथं, यन्न कदाचिदपि बुद्धौ समारूढविशेषं, कथं तत् प्रतिपाद्येत, अतः प्रतिपादनाशक्तेर्न तत् स्पृशत्यपि शास्त्रम्। प्रसिद्धं पुनर्यदि नामानेन प्रतिपाद्यते प्रसिद्धत्वादेव। तथाऽपि न तेनार्थेन निरालम्बनम्, अप्रसिद्धं पुनरालम्बनमपि न स्यात्। अतो न केनचिदर्थेन सम्बद्धं शास्त्रम्, इति सम्बन्ध आक्षिप्तः। – पञ्चपादिका

20

[आक्षेपपरिहारभाष्यम्]

उच्यते – अस्ति तावद् ब्रह्म नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावं सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्तिसमन्वितम्[1]।

ब्रह्मशब्दस्य हि व्युत्पाद्यमानस्य नित्यशुद्धत्वादयो धर्माः प्रतीयन्ते, [t]बृहतेर्धातोः अर्थानुगमात्।

सर्वस्य आत्मत्वाच्च ब्रह्मास्तित्वप्रसिद्धिः। सर्वो हि आत्मास्तित्वं प्रत्येति, 'न नाहम् अस्मि' इति। यदि हि न आत्मास्तित्वप्रसिद्धिः स्यात्, सर्वो लोकः 'नाहम् अस्मि' इति प्रतीयात्। आत्मा च[2] ब्रह्म[3]।

20 A

[ĀKṢEPAPARIHĀRABHĀṢYAM]

ucyate – asti tāvad brahma nityaśuddhabuddhamuktasvabhāvaṁ sarvajñaṁ sarvaśaktisamanvitam.

brahmaśabdasya hi vyutpādyamānasya nityaśuddhatvādayo dharmāḥ pratīyante, bṛhaterdhātoḥ arthānugamāt.

sarvasya ātmatvācca brahmāstitvaprasiddhiḥ. sarvo hi ātmāstitvaṁ pratyeti, 'na nāham asmi' iti. yadi hi na ātmāstitvaprasiddhiḥ syāt, sarvo lokaḥ 'nāham asmi' iti pratīyāt. ātmā ca brahma.

20 B

उच्यते *ucyate* – this is answered; अस्ति *asti* – is; तावत् *tāvat* – certainly; ब्रह्म *brahma* – Brahman; नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावम् *nityaśuddhabuddhamuktasvabhāvam* – which is by nature eternal, pure, conscious and free; सर्वज्ञम् *sarvajñam* – omniscient; सर्वशक्तिसमन्वितम् *sarvaśaktisamanvitam* – possessed of all powers; ब्रह्मशब्दस्य *brahmaśabdasya* – of the word 'Brahman'; हि *hi* – indeed; व्युत्पाद्यमानस्य *vyutpādyamānasya* – when grammatically analysed; नित्यशुद्धत्वादयः

[t] AA, VV बृंहतेर्धातोः

[1] वेदान्तेभ्यः प्रसिद्धम् इति शेषः। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

[2] चकारः अवधारणार्थः।

[3] वस्तुगत्या इति शेषः। – वार्तिक

nityaśuddhatvādayaḥ – eternity, purity and so on; धर्माः *dharmāḥ* – properties; प्रतीयन्ते *pratīyante* – are cognised; बृहतेः धातोः *bṛhateḥ dhātoḥ* – of the verbal root 'bṛh'; अर्थानुगमात् *arthānugamāt* – because of conformity to the senses; सर्वस्य *sarvasya* – of all; आत्मत्वात् *ātmatvāt* – since it is the self; च *ca* – also; ब्रह्मास्तित्वप्रसिद्धिः *brahmāstitvaprasiddhiḥ* – the existence of Brahman is well-known; सर्वः *sarvaḥ* – everybody; हि *hi* – indeed; आत्मास्तित्वम् *ātmāstitvam* – the existence of one's own self; प्रत्येति *pratyeti* – cognises; न *na* – not that; न अहम् अस्मि *na aham asmi* – I do not exist; इति *iti* – thus; यदि *yadi* – if; हि *hi* – indeed; न *na* – not; आत्मास्तित्वप्रसिद्धिः *ātmāstitvaprasiddhiḥ* – the evident existence of the self; स्यात् *syāt* – were there; सर्वः लोकः *sarvaḥ lokaḥ* – everybody; न *na* – not; अहम् *aham* – I; अस्मि *asmi* – am; इति *iti* – as; प्रतीयात् *pratīyāt* – would cognise; आत्मा *ātmā* – self; च *ca* – certainly; ब्रह्म *brahma* – Brahman

20 C

[OBJECTION REJECTED]

This objection is answered. There does exist Brahman[1] which is by nature eternal, pure, conscious, free,[2] omniscient and possessed of all powers.[3]

The imports of eternity, purity and the rest are indeed perceived when the word 'Brahman' is grammatically analysed as these conform to the senses of the verbal root 'bṛh'.[4]

The existence of Brahman is also well-known since it is the self of all. Indeed, all cognise the self's existence as 'not that I do not exist'. If indeed the evident existence of the self were not there, then everybody would cognise himself as 'I am not'.[5] The self is indeed Brahman.[6]

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1. This objection is answered. There does exist Brahman: The verb 'asti' means 'is', or 'exists'. Since the present sentence is meant to answer the question as to whether Brahman is known or not known from the Vedāntic texts and not meant as a reply to the question as to whether Brahman exists or not, the expression *"vedāntebhyaḥ prasiddham* – well-known from the Vedāntic texts" is added (adhyāhṛta) to complete the sense of the sentence.

It is advantageous to recall the question for which this reply has been put forward. If a thing were totally unknown, then no desire to know (jijñāsā) it would ensue and consequently undertaking an inquiry (vicāra) into it would be out of question. Indeed, no one desires to know or conduct an inquiry into an absolutely non-existent entity like 'the hare's horn' (śaśaśṛṅga)! Since the Sūtra *"athāto brahmajijñāsā"* introduces the desire to know Brahman (brahma-jijñāsā) as a necessary prelude to the series of inquiries pertaining to Brahman, it is evident that the Sūtra presupposes that the seeker has gained from the Upaniṣads preliminary information or knowledge about Brahman. Such a basic knowledge about Brahman is indeed feasible because an individual would generally take up the study of the Vedānta-darśana after completing his basic svādhyāya, that is study of one's own section of the Veda (which includes the Upaniṣads too) and the methodical study of the Vedāṅgas, like the Vedic Etymology (nirukta), Grammar (vyākaraṇa) and so on.

As a result of his prior study of the Veda and the Vedāṅgas such an individual would have certainly gained the capacity to understand the purport of Vedic words and sentences by analysing their meanings, context, purpose, drift and tenor. From the perusal of the many Upaniṣadic tracts and passages that abound in the Vedas (*Tai.U.*2.1, *Chā.U.*6.2.1, *Chā.U.*6.9.4 & *Tai.U.*2.6 in respective order) such as *"brahmavidāpnoti param, tadeṣābhyuktā, satyaṁ jñānam anantaṁ brahma* – The knower of Brahman attains the Supreme. Brahman is Existence, Knowledge and Infinite," as well as the detailed section that commences with *"sadeva somya idamagra āsīd, ekamevādvitīyam* – Existence alone was all this before creation, one alone, without a second" and concludes with *"tat tvam asi* – That thou art," and such passages as *"asanneva sa bhavati, asad brahmeti veda cet, asti brahmeti ced veda, santamenaṁ tato viduḥ* – One oneself turns non-existent, if one deems Brahman is not; but if one comes to know that Brahman is, then he is recognised as existent," he is expected to have gained the basic Knowledge of Brahman.

In view of all this, it is certain that the compound word 'brahma-jijñāsā' (desire to know Brahman) of the aphorism *"athāto brahmajijñāsā"* presupposes that even before the rise of the desire to know, the student does know about

Brahman, in a general way from the Upaniṣadic sources, though not with full clarity.[4]

Hence, the Bhāṣyakāra chooses the first of the two alternatives offered by the opponent and goes on to suggest within its ambit a suitable clarification to dispel the difficulty that arises from accepting the first alternative.

2. which is by nature eternal, pure, conscious, free: In the Upaniṣads, Brahman is taught in two aspects or modes: (1) as being unlimited (niravacchinna) and therefore by nature eternal (nitya), pure (śuddha), conscious (buddha)[5] and ever free (mukta) thus delineating Brahman as being free from all the limiting adjuncts and (2) as being qualified by attributes such as omniscience, omnipotence and so on thus presenting Brahman from the limited standpoint of its conditioning unlike the natural state.

When the creation of the world commences leading to the multiplicity of names and forms, the above-mentioned attributes such as omniscience and omnipotence can be meaningfully applied to Brahman with reference to the pluralistic superimposed creation and not when Brahman alone is, free of the superimposed world of plurality. This nature of Brahman as being possessed of such qualities as omniscience and omnipotence is termed as 'sopādhikarūpa' (nature of Brahman as being associated with upādhis) or 'saguṇarūpa' (nature of Brahman as being possessed with qualities).

On the other hand, the nature of Brahman as being free from all limiting adjuncts pertaining to creation is described in the Upaniṣads in such terms as eternal, pure, conscious and these are indeed the very essential nature (svarūpa) of Brahman and hence this nature is independent of the presence or absence of the world of plurality. This nature of Brahman is termed 'nirupādhikarūpa' (the nature devoid of adjuncts) or 'nirguṇarūpa' (nature of Brahman as being devoid of qualities).

It is these two forms – the nirupādhika and the sopādhika – that have come to have the respective appellations 'svarūpa-lakṣaṇa', that is definition

[4] प्रागपि ब्रह्ममीमांसाया अधीतवेदस्य निगमनिरुक्तव्याकरणादिपरिशीलनविदितपदतदर्थसम्बन्धस्य "सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्" इत्युपक्रमात् "तत्त्वमसि" इत्यन्तात्सन्दर्भाद् नित्यत्वाद्युपेतब्रह्मस्वरूपावगमस्तावदापाततो विचाराद्विनाप्यस्ति। अत्र च ब्रह्मेत्यादिनावगम्येन तद्विषयमवगमं लक्षयति, तदस्तित्वस्य सति विमर्शे विचारात्प्रागनिर्णयात्। – भामती

[5] Unlike the empirical knowledge, the knowledge that is devoid of the subject–object dichotomy.

from the standpoint of its essential nature and 'taṭastha-lakṣaṇa' that is definition *per accidens* or the definition through a property other than its essential nature.[6]

Since the mumukṣu has come to have a general knowledge of Brahman, pertaining to both the above-mentioned aspects from his initial perusal of the Upaniṣadic tracts during the course of his svādhyāya, he naturally desires to know both these aspects of Brahman in detail and with utmost clarity so as to have the right comprehension. It is for the purpose of satisfying this yearning of the aspirants that the *Brahma-sūtra* conducts the deliberation (vicāra) upon both these sets of Scriptural passages – the passages that reveal Brahman in the nirupādhika or nirguṇa aspect and those that present Brahman as the sopādhika or saguṇa.

In the Bhāṣya passage we are studying, the terms 'nitya' (eternal), 'śuddha' (pure), 'buddha' (conscious) and 'mukta' (free) explicate Brahman in its adjunctless (nirupādhika) or attributeless aspect (nirguṇa). Hence, they cannot be expected to have any empirical sense so as to signify a characteristic mark pertaining to anything comparable to that of the world. The term 'nitya' (eternal), therefore, is taken to simply exclude the miseries that characterise ephemerality. Likewise, 'śuddha' (pure) is meant to preclude the pains generated by the impurities of the adjuncts like the body, mind, senses and organs of action. So also, 'buddha' (conscious) eliminates the distress arising from the absence of thinking and the loss of consciousness. The word 'mukta' (free) stands for being always free (sadaiva muktaḥ) from all sorts of miseries arising from the mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self.[7]

[6] 'Svarūpa-lakṣaṇa' consists in defining the lakṣya (intended definable) by the properties which always exist in it: *"svarūpāntargatatve sati yadvyāvartakaṁ tat svarūpalakṣaṇam."* 'Taṭastha-lakṣaṇa' consists in defining the lakṣya by means of such properties that do not always exist in the lakṣya: *"yāvallakṣyakālamanavasthāyitve sati yadvyāvartakaṁ tat taṭasthalakṣaṇam."*

[7] Cf. नित्येति क्षयितालक्षणं दुःखमुपक्षिपति। शुद्धेति देहाद्युपाधिकमपि दुःखमपाकरोति। बुद्धेत्यपराधीनप्रकाशमानन्दात्मानं दर्शयति, आनन्दप्रकाशयोरभेदात्। स्यादेतत्। मुक्तौ सत्यामस्यैते शुद्धत्वादयः प्रथन्ते, ततस्तु प्राग् देहाद्यभेदेन तद्धर्मजन्मजरा-मरणादिदुःखयोगादित्यत उक्तम्—मुक्त इति। सदैव मुक्तः सदैव केवलोऽनाद्यविद्यावशात्तु भ्रान्त्या तथावभासत इत्यर्थः। – भामती
Also, cf. अवच्छेदत्रयशून्यत्वसिद्धेर्नित्यपदस्य तत्परत्वाद्, दोषभूयिष्ठत्वाद्यभावेन शुद्धत्वाद्, अजडत्वेन बुद्धत्वाद्, अविद्याद्यपरतन्त्रतया मुक्तत्वात्, कुतश्चिदप्यव्यावृत्तज्ञानशक्तितया सर्वज्ञतादिसिद्धेः, धात्वर्थानुरोधादेवोक्तब्रह्मसिद्धिः, नित्यत्वादिशून्ये निरङ्कुशमहत्त्वायोगात्। – न्यायनिर्णय

This very nature of the Self being eternally free from the superimposition (adhyāsa) and superimposition caused limitations explains the nature of the Self as being naturally free from all the multifarious miseries of saṁsāra.

3. omniscient and possessed of all powers: If the section of the Bhāṣya sentence *"nityaśuddhabuddhamuktasvabhāvam"* presents the adjunct-free aspect (nirupādhika or nirguṇarūpa) of Brahman revealed by the Upaniṣads, the dual attributes of 'sarvajñam' (omniscient) and 'sarvaśakti-samanvitam' (omnipotent), occurring in the later part of the Bhāṣya sentence, intend to present Brahman in its sopādhika or saguṇarūpa aspect, that is the nature of Brahman as seen through the upādhis or adjuncts. We have already mentioned how these two attributes constitute the 'taṭastha-lakṣaṇa' (definition *per accidens* or the definition through a property that is extrinsic to Brahman).

It should be carefully noted that these two attributes presented in the Bhāṣya also suggest Brahman as being the nimitta-kāraṇa or the efficient cause of the universe (jagat-kartṛtva). Indeed, the presence or absence of knowledge and power in a being determine the presence or absence of its being an efficient cause. Indeed, the potter happens to be the efficient cause (nimitta-kāraṇa) of the pot because he has the full knowledge about the pot and is equipped with the power to create it, unlike another person who because of the absence of the knowledge about the pot or the power to create it fails to be its efficient cause (nimitta-kāraṇa). Therefore, being omniscient and omnipotent, Brahman must be the nimitta-kāraṇa (efficient cause) of the entire Universe.[8] We shall be studying later as to how the second aphorism, *"janmādyasya yataḥ,"* explicates the nature of Brahman by defining Brahman as the cause of the Universe.

4. The imports of eternity, purity and the rest are indeed perceived when the word 'Brahman' is grammatically analysed as these conform to the senses of the verbal root 'bṛh': This brief passage of the Bhāṣya contains many suggestions of Vedāntic import. This passage is obviously intended to meet the Pūrvapakṣin's objections which are as follows: It has been claimed

[8] Cf. तदनेन जगत्कारणत्वमस्य दर्शितं, शक्तिज्ञानभावाभावानुविधानात्कारणत्वभावाभावयोः। – भामती

that Brahman is known from the Upaniṣadic passages like *"satyaṁ jñānam anantaṁ brahma* – Brahman is Existence, Consciousness, Infinite." But such a claim is untenable as it is quite reasonable to doubt whether the student has grasped any import at all from such passages, for the Upaniṣads themselves offer varied viewpoints on Brahman in sentences (*Chā.U.*3.18.1 & 4.10.4 respectively) such as *"ākāśo brahma* – The space is Brahman," *"prāṇo brahma* – The life-breath is Brahman" and so on. In all these cases, the term 'Brahman' cannot be taken to denote an entity of the above description (eternal, pure, free, etc.) as explained by the Sūtra and the Bhāṣya thereon. Further, in daily vyavahāra, that is in our worldly transaction, the word 'Brahman' is not seen to be used in the sense which the Siddhāntin envisages. In fact, the lexicons recognise the neuter word 'Brahman' in the senses of 'Scripture', 'truth', and 'penance' alone and not in the above-mentioned senses the Advaitin explicates.[9] These being the ground realities, how can the Sūtra reasonably assert that the aspirant has come to know about an entity 'Brahman' of such unsurpassable glory and greatness from the Upaniṣads? In this Bhāṣya statement the Ācārya has provided an adequate reply to this significant contention of the Pūrvapakṣin.

The idea is this: When the sense of a certain word in a passage – be it Scriptural or otherwise – is found to be doubtful or ambiguous, and when the worldly usages (loka-vyavahāra) do not assist in deciphering it, and when the lexical meanings too are found unsuitable to the content, context and drift of the passage, we have to take recourse to the etymology of the word or its grammatical derivation in all such instances to get at its right meaning.[10] Here too the term 'Brahman' is to be understood from its derivative sense.

Accordingly, if we analyse the derivation of the word 'Brahman', we observe that it is derived from the verbal root 'bṛh', which is in the sense of

[9] Cf. वेदस्तत्त्वं तपो ब्रह्म। – अमरकोश

[10] For example the conventional and the lexical meaning of the word 'pitā' is 'one who has given birth' (*"tātastu janakaḥ pitā"* – *Amarakośa*). But this sense does not suit the word 'pitā' in the context of the sentence *"sa pitā pitarastāsāṁ kevalaṁ janmahetavaḥ"* (*Raghuvaṁśa* of Kālidāsa, 1.24). Here, the context is that of King Dilīpa's subjects. Hence, taking recourse to its grammatical analysis, we arrive at the meaning of the word 'pitā' as the 'one who protects' as this word is derived from the verbal root 'pā' (to protect).

'to grow' (*bṛhi vṛddhau*) denoting excellence (atiśaya). The word 'Brahman', therefore, denotes an 'entity of excellence and greatness'.[11]

The Pūrvapakṣin has cited Upaniṣadic passages like *"ākāśo brahma* – The space is Brahman," *"prāṇo brahma* – The life-breath is Brahman" to buttress his stand. In these Upaniṣadic sentences, the word 'Brahman' is associated through the relations of non-difference and apposition (abhedena sāmānādhikaraṇya-sambandhena) with the words 'ākāśa' (space) and 'prāṇa' (life-breath), that have a restricted and therefore a relative greatness – āpekṣikaṁ mahattvam.[12]

But in the Upaniṣadic sentences like (*Tai.U.*2.1), *"satyaṁ jñānam anantaṁ brahma,"* there occurs no word like 'ākāśa' or 'prāṇa' that denotes an entity of restricted excellence and relative greatness which thereby can restrict the derivational sense of the word 'Brahman'. Hence, the sentences quoted by the Pūrvapakṣin are on an entirely different footing when compared with the Upaniṣadic sentences like *"satyaṁ jñānam anantaṁ brahma."* That being the case, it is only logical to conclude that the word 'Brahman' in the sentence *"satyaṁ jñānam anantaṁ brahma"* intrinsically signifies an entity possessed of greatness, the magnitude of which is unrestricted and unexcelled by anything in any manner whatsoever for the words 'satyam', 'jñānam' and 'anantam' are associated with 'Brahman' through the relation of identity – abheda-sambandha or sāmānādhikaraṇya-sambandha – and thus 'satyam,' 'jñānam' and 'anantam' come to denote 'absolute existence', 'ever shining perfect consciousness', and 'supreme infinite' respectively. And, this sense of 'Brahman' splendidly suits the total purport of the Upaniṣadic sentence *"satyaṁ jñānam anantaṁ brahma."*[13]

Such an unrestricted and unparallelled excellence of Existence, Consciousness and Infinite becomes evident from the context in which the sentence occurs. The entire Upaniṣadic tract (*Tai.U.*2.1) is as follows:

[11] Cf. वृद्धिकर्मा बृहतिः अतिशायने वर्तते। – भामती

[12] The Advaitins delineate the eternity of space and the greatness of life-breath as being relative and limited.

[13] तदत्र ब्रह्मपदे व्युत्पाद्यमाने बृहतेः धातोः वृद्धिकर्मणः अर्थानुगमात्, प्रयोगानुगमे च असति विशिष्टार्थविषयस्य आपेक्षिकमहत्त्वस्य अपरिग्रहात्, सर्वतो निरवग्रहमहत्त्वसम्पन्नं वस्तु वाक्यार्थान्वयि ब्रह्मपदादनुगम्यते । – पञ्चपादिका

"brahmavidāpnoti param. tadeṣābhyuktā. satyaṁ jñānamanantaṁ brahma. yo veda nihitaṁ guhāyāṁ parame vyoman. so'śnute sarvān kāmān saha. brahmaṇā vipaścitā iti – The knower of Brahman attains the Supreme. Here is a verse that explains this: Existence, Consciousness and Infinite is 'Brahman'. He who realises Brahman in the supreme space lodged within the heart enjoys all objects of desire simultaneously by being one with the omniscient Brahman." The context too clearly indicates that the words 'satyam', 'jñānam' and 'anantam' that are co-located (sāmānādhikaraṇya) with 'Brahman', denote the unsurpassing excellence and the boundless nature of the word-sense pertaining to existence, consciousness and infinity.

Thus, the word 'Brahman' signifies an entity that is changeless, eternal and unrestricted by any factors that are known to impose limitations such as kāla (time), rūpa (form), deśa (space), vastu (entity), itaraśeṣatva (subordination to another) and avidyā-kāma-karma-pāratantrya (dependence on nescience, desire and action).[14] In this manner when derivationally interpreted and properly understood with reference to the context of the Upaniṣadic tract, the word 'Brahman' certainly signifies an entity which in its intrinsic nature is eternity, purity, knowledge and freedom (nitya-śuddha-buddha-muktasvabhāvaṁ vastu brahma).[15]

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[14] Vide *"sarvato niravagrahamahattvasampannaṁ vastu vākyārthānvayi brahmapadād anugamyate. tataśca kālakṛtāvacchedanimittasyālpatvasyābhāvāt sadā sattvānnityaṁ kiñcidvastu brahmapadāt pratīyate. tathā rūpāntarasadbhāve tadrūpavikalatvāt tadavacchedakṛtamalpatvaṁ syāt, tacca brahmapadādevāpāsyate. tasmād ekarasamadvaitaṁ vastu brahmapadāt pratīyate. etena deśakṛto'pi paricchedo nirākṛto veditavyaḥ. vastvantarasadbhāve hi tadapekṣayaitāvati sadbhāvaḥ, nātaḥ paramasti, iti syāt—etasmād vyāvṛtta iti, tadabhāve na paricchinnabuddhirbhavati."* (*Pañcapādikā*) The idea is: the word 'Brahman' denotes an entity of such perfection and greatness that is absolute in every respect because there is no reason or factor to restrict or delimit it.

[15] Cf. न केवलं "सदेव सोम्येदम्" इत्यादीनां वाक्यानां पौर्वापर्यपर्यालोचनया इत्थम्भूतब्रह्मावगतिः। अपि तु ब्रह्मपदमपि निर्वचनसामर्थ्यादिममेवार्थं स्वहस्तयति। निर्वचनमाह—बृहतेर्धातोरर्थानुगमात्। वृद्धिकर्मा हि बृहतिरतिशायने वर्तते। तच्चेदमतिशायनमनवच्छिन्नं पदान्तरावगमितं नित्यशुद्धबुद्धत्वाद्यस्याभ्यनुजानातीत्यर्थः। – भामती

Also, cf. श्रुतौ सूत्रे ब्रह्मशब्दस्य प्रयोगान्यथानुपपत्त्या कश्चिदर्थोऽस्तीति ज्ञायते। प्रमाणवाक्ये निरर्थकशब्दप्रयोगादर्शनात्। स चार्थो महत्त्वरूप इति व्याकरणान्निश्चीयते। "बृहि वृद्धौ" (पाणिनिधातुपाठ) इति स्मरणात्। सा च वृद्धिर्निरवधिकमहत्त्वमिति, सङ्कोचकाभावात् श्रुतावनन्तपदेन सह प्रयोगाच्च ज्ञायते। निरवधिकमहत्त्वं चान्तवत्त्वादिदोषवत्त्वे सर्वज्ञत्वादिगुणहीनत्वे च न सम्भवति। लोके गुणहीनदोषवतोरल्पत्वप्रसिद्धेः। अतो बृंहणाद् ब्रह्मेति व्युत्पत्त्या देशकालवस्तुतः परिच्छेदाभावरूपं नित्यत्वं प्रतीयते। अविद्यादिदोषशून्यत्वं शुद्धत्वं, जाड्यराहित्यं बुद्धत्वं, बन्धकालेऽपि स्वतो बन्धाभावः मुक्तत्वं, च प्रतीयते। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. प्रकरणोपपदयोः सङ्कोचकयोरभावे वृद्धिकर्मणो बृहतेर्निरङ्कुशमहत्त्वबोधसामर्थ्याद् देशतः कालतो वस्तुतश्चानवच्छेदेन सिद्धो नित्यः, नित्यपदस्यावच्छेदत्रयशून्यतापरत्वाद्, दोषभूयिष्ठे गुणहीने लोकेऽल्पताबुद्धिदर्शनादशुद्धत्वं, ब्रह्मणि तु

In exactly the same manner, the word 'Brahman' does denote the entity being possessed also of attributes such as omniscience (sarvajñatva) and omnipotence (sarvaśaktisamanvita). It has to be so, for if certain things were not known or were to fall beyond its power, then the excellence and greatness of this entity would be relative and not absolute, that is Its knowledge and potency would remain restricted to that extent. And this restriction is not permissible in view of the derivational meaning of the term 'Brahman' as an entity of illimitable and immeasurable excellence and greatness. The entity denoted by the term 'Brahman' has to be thus definitely omniscient and omnipotent too.

At this juncture, it would be of added advantage to fortify the Siddhāntin's position if we take into account another argument offered by the Siddhāntin: Only if an entity and its nature were to be known through a 'pramāṇa' (instrument of knowledge), then alone can relative excellence and greatness be ascribed to that entity. But in the case of Brahman, besides the Upaniṣads, there is no such means like pratyakṣa (perception) or anumāna (inference) to vouchsafe Its existence or to determine Its nature. The Upaniṣads alone reveal It, in terms of the nomenclature 'Brahman' and by its derivation it points to Its nature of being infinite excellence and unrestricted greatness. In the absence of any means (pramāṇa) other than the Upaniṣads to determine Brahman, we have no authority or means of knowledge to restrict Brahman's nature (svabhāva) of unlimited excellence, matchless greatness, unqualified omniscience and supreme omnipotence. Indeed, the other pramāṇas (means of knowledge) like anumāna (inference) cannot restrict the excellence and greatness of Brahman because they merely follow the Śruti in the sphere of Brahma-vidyā. Hence, we are logically bound to conclude that the greatness and excellence of the entity termed 'Brahman' in the Upaniṣads are unrestricted and unfettered (anavacchinna and nirańkuśa).

दोषदवीयस्त्वाच्छुद्धत्वम्। अत एव जाड्यरहिततया बुद्धत्वम्। अत एवाविद्याकामकर्मपारतन्त्र्यरहिततया मुक्तत्वं, क्वचिदप्यव्यावृत्त-ज्ञानशक्तित्वं सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वशक्तित्वं च ब्रह्मणः सिध्यति। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

Also, cf. ब्रह्मशब्दमहिम्नैव नित्यं, व्यापकं, शुद्धं, चिद्रूपं, सुखस्वरूपं च ब्रह्म सामान्यतः किञ्चिद् ज्ञायत एव। बृहधातोर्हि व्याप्तिरर्थः। व्यापकत्वं देशतः कालतो वस्तुतश्चावच्छेदशून्यत्वं नित्यत्वं शुद्धत्वं बुद्धत्वं च मुक्तत्वं विना नोपपद्यते। अशुद्धत्वेऽपि तु दोषवत्त्वान्निरतिशयं महत्त्वं न स्याद्, इत्यविद्यादिदोषशून्यत्वरूपं शुद्धत्वं बन्धकालेऽपि स्वतो बन्धशून्यत्वादिरूपं लभ्यत इत्याह—नित्यशुद्धेत्यादिना—बृहतेर्धातोरर्थानुगमादित्यन्तेन। – प्रदीप

Therefore, the Ācārya is indubitably right when he asserts that when the Upaniṣadic term 'Brahman' is derivationally viewed, it points to the nature of Brahman consisting of unlimited eternity, unrestricted purity, unfettered consciousness, absolute freedom, supreme omniscience and illimitable omnipotence.

5. The existence of Brahman is also well-known since it is the self of all. Indeed, all cognise the self's existence as 'not that I do not exist'. If indeed the evident existence of the self were not there, then everybody would cognise himself as 'I am not': The first sentence of this passage *"sarvasya ātmatvācca brahmāstitvaprasiddhiḥ* – The existence of Brahman is also well-known since it is the Self of all" is a vastusaṅgraha-vākya, that is a statement summarising what is to be elaborated in the sequel.

In the previous passages of this section, we have seen that even prior to the rise of the desire for the Knowledge of Brahman (brahma-jijñāsā), the student of the Vedānta-darśana, during the period of his svādhyāya, had come to possess an idea about Brahman as being 'some existence' of the inherent nature of eternity, purity and so on and possessed of such attributes as omniscience and omnipotence. It has also been explained that for a seeker the only source of information about Brahman are the Upaniṣadic passages and his appreciation of the term 'Brahman' through its derivative signification (lakṣyārtha). Thus, the aspirant's knowledge about Brahman acquired during the course of his svādhyāya and by his personal deliberations accounts well for the rise of his desire to know Brahman and prods him to conduct an in-depth inquiry further into Brahman (brahma-vicāra).

As regards the inquiry into Brahman, the Pūrvapakṣin presently poses a germane question. He argues: The Advaitin's claim is that the entire *Brahma-sūtra* is intended to teach the student the oneness of the Self – *"ātmaikatvavidyāpratipattaye sarve vedāntā ārabhyante."*[16] Therefore, according to the Advaitin, the expression 'brahma-jijñāsā' in the aphorism stands actually for 'brahmātmaikatva-jijñāsā', that is the desire to realise the identity of the Self's oneness with Brahman, which subject matter is found

[16] Vide *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya*, Section 15 D, n.7.

enshrined in the Mahāvākyas (great declarations or great propositions) such as (*Chā.U.*6.9.4) "*tat tvam asi* – That thou art." But from the discussions that we have had so far, it is evident that the student has come to know about Brahman alone in general. That is to say, what he has come to know from the Upaniṣads is merely the 'tatpadārtha', the meaning of the word 'tat' (denoting 'Brahman') pertaining to the Mahāvākya "*tat tvam asi.*" But the mere knowledge of the meaning of a lone word 'tat' is of no avail for it is always a 'paripūrṇaṁ vākyam' (complete sentence) alone, and never an isolated word, that constitutes the śabda-pramāṇa (verbal authority) and becomes a pramāṇa-vākya (authoritative sentence) for establishing the existence of a given entity. It is that knowledge which is born from such an authoritative sentence – pramāṇa-vākya-janyaṁ śabdajñānam – about the existence of the entity that can generate an intense desire which could galvanise one to undertake a thorough inquiry into that entity for attaining its complete knowledge. It follows therefore that the knowledge of the meaning of word 'tat' in the Mahāvākya is insufficient and incapable of prompting any vicāra (inquiry). This being the fact, how can the knowledge of the existence of Brahman (tatpadārtha-jñāna), which is known during the period of one's svādhyāya, justify the rise of the brahma-jijñāsā (the desire to know Brahman) so as to account for the composition of the *Brahma-sūtra,* the subject matter of which is the Knowledge of the oneness of the Self with Brahman?

The answer of the Ācārya to the above question is emphatic and contained in the very first sentence of the passage: "*sarvasya ātmatvācca brahmāstitvaprasiddheḥ* – The existence of Brahman is well-known since it is the Self of all." The salient idea of this sentence is this: Brahman is denoted not only by the word 'tat' ('that') of the Mahāvākya, but also by the word 'tvam' ('you' or 'thou').[17] The word 'tvam', in the Mahāvākya "*tat tvam asi,*" stands for the individual self (jīva), the substrate of the 'I'- notion (ahaṁkārāspada). Everybody, with no exception whatsoever, even a totally

[17] Cf. तदेवं तत्पदार्थस्य ब्रह्मणः नित्यशुद्धत्वादिरूपेण प्रसिद्धिमभिधाय त्वम्पदार्थरूपेणाप्यस्य प्रसिद्धिम् आह—सर्वस्यात्मत्वाच्चेति। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

uneducated rustic or a dullard to the core, has the direct perception of his self for all are conscious — 'I am'. None can declare themselves as 'I am not'.

True. Everybody has the direct perception of the existence of his own self, the substrate of 'I'- notion (ahaṅkāra) as 'I am'. But how does this direct perception of the self establish the existence of Brahman? And, how can the ever-furnished direct perception of the self help us in understanding the total sense of the Mahāvākya *"tat tvam asi"*? The Ācārya answers these questions superbly in the sequel.

6. The self is indeed Brahman: The direct perception of oneself, the substrate of the 'I' notion, does by itself establish the existence of Brahman, because the content of the 'I' notion is Brahman alone.

To comprehend this fact, we have to analyse the structure of the Mahāvākya (great proposition) *"tat tvam asi* – That thou art." Here, 'that' (tat) and 'thou' (tvam) are in 'direct appositional relation' (sākṣāt sāmānādhikaraṇya-sambandha), also termed the 'relation of identity' (abheda-sambandha). 'Brahman', the denotation of 'tat' (tat-padārtha), is revealed in the Upaniṣads as an entity having the nature of eternity, purity and so on as well as being possessed of such attributes like omniscience and omnipotence. The 'jīva', the individual self, the denotation of 'tvam' (tvam-padārtha), in the Mahāvākya *"tat tvam asi,"* is known through the intrinsic cognition 'I am'. In this manner, the student has the comprehension of the denotations of both 'tat' (tat-padārtha) and 'tvam' (tvam-padārtha). And, it is a well-known fact that the cognition of the denotations of the words contained in a sentence (i.e. padārtha-jñāna) is the direct and immediate cause for the rise of the cognition of the sentence (i.e. vākyārtha-jñāna).[18]

It follows, therefore, that when the denotations of the words 'tat' and 'tvam' are comprehended, they give rise to the knowledge of the Mahāvākya *"tat tvam asi"* consisting in the fact that the jīva, the denotation of the word 'tvam', is of the nature of, and identical with, Brahman, the denotation of the word 'tat'. In this way, the aspirant is also aware of the Upaniṣads declaring the oneness of Brahman as his own self, even before there arises in him the

[18] वाक्यार्थज्ञानं प्रति वाक्यघटकपदार्थज्ञानं साक्षात्कारणम्।

desire to know Brahman (brahma-jijñāsā). Therefore, the seeker does possess the prior information – though not with clarity – about the meaning of the entire sentence *"tat tvam asi."*

Besides the Mahāvākya *"tat tvam asi,"* there are also innumerable Scriptural passages (e.g. *Bṛ.U.*4.4.5 & 2.5.19 respectively) like *"ayam ātmā brahma* – This Self is Brahman" and *"ayamātmā sarvānubhūḥ* – This Self, the perceiver of everything, is Brahman" that directly teach the seeker the identity of the self with Brahman.

It is only because this basic knowledge that he has gained from his personal svādhyāya and his deliberations thereon does not bestow upon him the requisite clarity which alone can engender Realisation, the aspirant desires the clarity and experiential Knowledege of Brahman (brahma-jijñāsā), which desire prods him to take up the inquiry into Brahman (brahma-vicāra or brahma-mīmāṁsā) for its actualisation.

This is the pregnant thought which is contained in the brief, bold and axiomatic statement, *"ātmā ca brahma* – The self is indeed Brahman," in the Bhāṣya.

21

[पूर्वतनाक्षेपस्मारकभाष्यम्]

[1]यदि तर्हि लोके ब्रह्म आत्मत्वेन प्रसिद्धम्[1] अस्ति, ततो ज्ञातमेव इत्यजिज्ञास्यत्वं पुनरापन्नम्।

21 A

[PŪRVATANĀKṢEPASMĀRAKABHĀṢYAM]

yadi tarhi loke brahma ātmatvena prasiddham asti, tato jñātameva ityajijñāsyatvaṁ punarāpannam.

21 B

यदि *yadi* – if; तर्हि *tarhi* – in that case; लोके *loke* – in the world; ब्रह्म *brahma* – Brahman; आत्मत्वेन *ātmatvena* – by reason of Its being the self; प्रसिद्धम् *prasiddham* – well-known; अस्ति *asti* – is; ततः *tataḥ* – in that case; ज्ञातम् एव *jñātam eva* – It is certainly already known; इति *iti* – hence; अजिज्ञास्यत्वम् *ajijñāsyatvam* – the status of not being desired to be known; पुनः *punaḥ* – again; आपन्नम् *āpannam* – is applicable

21 C

[THE EARLIER OBJECTION RECALLED]

If, then, in the world, Brahman is well-known by reason of Its being identical with the self, in that case, It is certainly already known; therefore, it becomes again applicable that Brahman is not desired to be known.

21 D

If, as stated above in the earlier section, everybody is quite aware of his own self as 'I am,' and if this self is not really different from Brahman, it naturally follows that Brahman is well-known to all. Therefore, none would entertain any brahma-jijñāsā (desire to know Brahman) or take up the consequent

[1] AA (fn.) यदि लोके

[1] आत्मत्वेन हेतुना ब्रह्म प्रसिद्धं यदि इति योजना। – प्रदीप

brahma-vicāra (inquiry into Brahman). Consequently, they would not have to study the *Brahma-sūtra*, that is the *Śārīraka-sūtra* or the *Vedānta-darśana*, to know Brahman. Hence, the *Brahma-sūtra* does not serve any purpose at all. This, in essence, is the objection of the Pūrvapakṣin.[2]

The *Bhāmatī* interprets this Bhāṣya statement *"loke brahma ātmatvena prasiddham"* to mean: "In the world, Brahman is well-known as Ātman." The Bhāṣyakāra cannot be oblivious to the obvious fact that such a statement will go counter to the general experience of the world. Indeed, the people in this world (loka) are conscious of the existence of their own self as 'I am'; yet, they are unaware of the fact that Brahman is their very self. Therefore, the Bhāmatīkāra rightly construes the word 'loka' (world) in the special sense of the 'world of successive teachers and the taught'.[3] In the world of the wise and the erudite, Brahman is well-known as the self, since these men of insight have comprehended this truth through the study of the Upaniṣads. This interpretation is in tune with the Ācārya's own statement in the next section: *"dehamātraṁ caitanyaviśiṣṭamātmeti prākṛtā janā laukāyatikāśca pratipannāḥ* – ordinary persons and the Lokāyatas consider the self as the mere body possessed of consciousness."

The Bhāṣya states *"brahma ātmatvena"* that conveys the sense of "Brahman being the self." But this poses a difficulty for the Mahāvākyas, such as *"tat tvam asi," "ayam ātmā brahma," "ahaṁ brahmāsmi"* and so on, which have been cited so far, and which declare the self that is experienced by all as Brahman and not the other way round. Hence, the Bhāmatīkāra adds this clarificatory note: "When Ātman is known as Brahman, then Brahman too is automatically known to be the Ātman.[4]

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[2] Cf. यदि तर्हि लोके ब्रह्माऽऽत्मत्वेन प्रसिद्धमस्ति, ततो ज्ञातमेवेत्यजिज्ञास्यत्वं पुनरापन्नमिति विषयमाक्षिपति। असिद्धं हि वस्तु साध्यमानं विषयः, सिद्धं तु न पुनः साध्यते, इति न शास्त्रस्य विषयः। – पञ्चपादिका

Also, cf. एवं तर्हि प्रत्यक्षगोचरत्वादात्मनः शास्त्रैकसमधिगम्यताऽभावाच्छास्त्रविषयत्वं न स्यादित्याक्षिपति। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

[3] Cf. अध्यापकाध्येतृपरम्परा लोकः। – भामती

[4] Cf. तत्र "तत्त्वमसि" इति वाक्याद्यदि ब्रह्म आत्मत्वेन प्रसिद्धमस्मिन् 'आत्मा ब्रह्मत्वेन' इति वक्तव्ये 'ब्रह्म आत्मत्वेन' इति अभेदविवक्षया गमयितव्यम्। – भामती

The Ācārya's intention is only to emphasise the identity of the self and Brahman, the very spirit and import of the Mahāvākyas like *"tat tvam asi"* and so on.

22

[समाधानभाष्यम्]

न, तद्विशेषं प्रति विप्रतिपत्तेः। देहमात्रं चैतन्यविशिष्टम् आत्मा इति प्राकृताः जनाः [१]लौकायतिकाश्च प्रतिपन्नाः। [२]इन्द्रियाण्येव चेतनानि आत्मा इत्यपरे। मनः इत्यन्ये। विज्ञानमात्रं क्षणिकम् इत्येके। शून्यम् इत्यपरे। अस्ति देहादिव्यतिरिक्तः संसारी, कर्ता भोक्ता इत्यपरे। भोक्तैव केवलं, न कर्ता इत्येके। अस्ति तद् व्यतिरिक्तः ईश्वरः, सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तिः इति केचित्। आत्मा स भोक्तुः इत्यपरे। एवं बहवो विप्रतिपन्नाः युक्तिवाक्यतदाभाससमाश्रयाः सन्तः[1]। तत्र अविचार्य, यत्किञ्चित् प्रतिपद्यमानः निःश्रेयसात् प्रतिहन्येत, अनर्थं च इयात्।

22 A

[SAMĀDHĀNABHĀṢYAM]

na, tadviśeṣaṁ prati vipratipatteḥ. dehamātraṁ caitanyaviśiṣṭam ātmā iti prākṛtāḥ janāḥ laukāyatikāśca pratipannāḥ. indriyāṇyeva cetanāni ātmā ityapare. manaḥ ityanye. vijñānamātraṁ kṣaṇikam ityeke. śūnyam ityapare. asti dehādivyatiriktaḥ saṁsārī, kartā bhoktā ityapare. bhoktaiva kevalaṁ, na kartā ityeke. asti tadvyatiriktaḥ, īśvaraḥ, sarvajñaḥ sarvaśaktiḥ iti kecit. ātmā sa bhoktuḥ ityapare. evaṁ bahavo vipratipannāḥ yuktivākyatadābhāsasamāśrayāḥ santaḥ. tatra avicārya, yatkiñcit pratipadyamānaḥ niḥśreyasāt pratihanyeta, anarthaṁ ca iyāt.

22 B

न *na* – no; तद्विशेषं प्रति *tadviśeṣaṁ prati* – with regard to its particular nature; विप्रतिपत्तेः *vipratipatteḥ* – because of conflicting views; देहमात्रम् *dehamātram* – merely the physical body; चैतन्यविशिष्टम् *caitanyaviśiṣṭam* – possessed of sentience; आत्मा *ātmā* – the self; इति *iti* – thus; प्राकृताः जनाः *prākṛtāḥ janāḥ* – ordinary men; लौकायतिकाः च *laukāyatikāḥ ca* – and the Lokāyata philosophers; प्रतिपन्नाः *pratipannāḥ* – conceive; इन्द्रियाणि *indriyāṇi* – organs; एव *eva* – alone;

[१] ASS, AA, NSP (I & II), KKK, CSS लोकायतिकाश्च

[२] AA (fn.) इन्द्रियाणि मनो वा इति तदेकदेशिनः

[1] युक्तियुक्त्याभासवाक्यवाक्याभाससमाश्रयाः सन्तः इति योजना। – भामती

चेतनानि *cetanāni* – sentient; आत्मा *ātmā* – self; इति *iti* – thus; अपरे *apare* – others; मनः *manaḥ* – the mind; इति *iti* – thus; अन्ये *anye* – others; विज्ञानमात्रम् *vijñānamātram* – bare cognition; क्षणिकम् *kṣaṇikam* – momentary; इति *iti* – thus; एके *eke* – some; शून्यम् *śūnyam* – the void; इति *iti* – thus; अपरे *apare* – still others; अस्ति *asti* – is; देहादिव्यतिरिक्तः *dehādivyatiriktaḥ* – distinct from the physical body, etc.; संसारी *saṁsārī* – transmigrating soul; कर्ता *kartā* – agent; भोक्ता *bhoktā* – enjoyer; इति *iti* – thus; अपरे *apare* – yet others; भोक्ता एव *bhoktā eva* – enjoyer alone; केवलम् *kevalam* – merely; न *na* – no; कर्ता *kartā* – the agent; इति *iti* – thus; एके *eke* – some others; अस्ति *asti* – is; तद्व्यतिरिक्तः *tadvyatiriktaḥ* – distinct from that (bhoktā); ईश्वरः *īśvaraḥ* – the Lord; सर्वज्ञः *sarvajñaḥ* – omniscient; सर्वशक्तिः *sarvaśaktiḥ* – omnipotent; इति *iti* – thus; केचित् *kecit* – some; आत्मा *ātmā* – the self; सः *saḥ* – He; भोक्तुः *bhoktuḥ* – of the enjoyer; इति *iti* – thus; अपरे *apare* – others; एवम् *evam* – in this manner; बहवः *bahavaḥ* – many; विप्रतिपन्नाः *vipratipannāḥ* – holding conflicting views; युक्तिवाक्यतदाभाससमाश्रयाः *yuktivākyatadābhāsasamāśrayāḥ* – basing on fallacious reasoning and the distortions of Scriptural sentences; सन्तः *santaḥ* – are prevalent; तत्र *tatra* – under such circumstances; अविचार्य *avicārya* – without inquiring; यत्किञ्चित् *yatkiñcit* – anything; प्रतिपद्यमानः *pratipadyamānaḥ* – accepts; निःश्रेयसात् *niḥśreyasāt* – from Beatitude; प्रतिहन्येत *pratihanyeta* – would lose; च *ca* – and; अनर्थम् *anartham* – evil; इयात् *iyāt* – would fall a prey to

22 C

[COMMENTARY CONSTITUTING THE ANSWER]

No, because there are conflicting views regarding the self's particular nature.[1] The ordinary persons and the Lokāyata philosophers conceive the self as the mere body possessed of sentience. Others think that the sentient organs constitute the self. Some others hold that the mind is the self.[2] Others view that the mere momentary cognition is the self.[3] Some others think that it is the void.[4] Some others hold the view that the transmigrating soul, distinct from the physical body etc., which is the agent and the enjoyer, is the self.[5] Some affirm that the self is a mere enjoyer alone, and not an agent.[6] Some others think that quite different

from the enjoyer (bhoktā), is the omniscient and the omnipotent Lord.[7] Others view the Lord to be the self of the enjoyer.[8] Thus, there are many who hold conflicting views basing themselves on fallacious reasoning and the distortions of Scriptural texts.[9] Under such circumstances, the one who without inquiry accepts anything among them would lose the highest Beatitude and fall into calamity.[10]

22 D

1. No, because there are conflicting views regarding the self's particular nature: The Ācārya's answer to the Pūrvapakṣin's question[2] is as follows: No doubt, the student has acquired a prior knowledge about the existence and to some extent about the nature of Brahman by his study of various Upaniṣadic passages, and from his deliberations on the derivational meaning of the term 'Brahman', as well as by the universal and undeniable awareness of his own self, the Ātman, which is, in fact, Brahman itself.[3] However, such a knowledge or understanding that he has acquired is rather simple in nature, a mere intellectual appreciation and an uncertain comprehension of the sacrosanct Scriptural Truth. Therefore, he gets shaken when he is confronted by an array of conflicting views of different philosophical schools regarding the real nature of Brahman and the self (jīva).

The seeker's difficulty gets particularly compounded when he realises that all other schools counter the obvious purport of the Mahāvākyas like *"tat tvam asi,"* which expound the identity of the self and Brahman. When one is eager to decide upon the true nature of a thing but is confronted with diametrically opposed views (vipratipatti), about which one is incapable of finding a clear reasoning to either confirm or to refute, such stumbling blocks and confusion are indeed inevitable.[4]

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[2] Vide Section 21.

[3] Vide Section 20.

[4] Vide *Nyāya-sūtra* (1.1.23) offers the definition of a doubt (saṁśaya): *"vipratipatteḥ upalabdhyanupalabdhyavyavasthātaśca viśeṣāpekṣo vimarśaḥ saṁśayaḥ."* Compare 'viśeṣāpekṣaḥ' of this Nyāya aphorism with *"tadviśeṣaṁ prati"* of this Bhāṣya section.
Cf. तदनेन विप्रतिपत्तिः साधकबाधकप्रमाणाभावे सति संशयबीजमुक्तम्। ततश्च संशयाज्जिज्ञासोपपद्यत इति भावः। – भामती

Therefore, under such distressing and tiresome circumstances, it is quite natural that he develops an intense desire to get at the real nature of the identity of the self and Brahman, which is unequivocally advocated by the Upaniṣads, through a thorough inquiry assisted by such treatises as the *Brahma-sūtra* which elaborates and exemplifies the Upaniṣadic message of oneness of the self and Brahman and refutes all the diverse and divergent opinions advocated by the other schools of philosophy.[5]

The Bhāṣya statement, *"tadviśeṣaṁ prati vipratipatteḥ* – Because there are conflicting views regarding the self's particular nature," is of immense significance as it is suggestive of a certain essential point pertaining to logic. In a dispute on the particular nature of a given thing, the substrate (dharmin) – termed vivādāspada or vivādādhikaraṇa – the very entity about which there is the dispute or controversy, is itself *sans* dispute. This is so because without admitting in general the existence of this undisputed common substrate, there can be no argument; also no conflicting views can be entertained by the disputing contenders.[6] In this way the very controversy establishes the presence of substrates whose existence is thus beyond dispute.

We observe that in the passages under discussion, the Ācārya has presented nine divergent views held by different schools of philosophy. Among them, one set of views pertains to the nature of the 'I'-experience (ahaṁpratyaya-viṣaya), that is the jīva, the denotation of the word 'tvam' (tvam-padārtha), in the Mahāvākya *"tat tvam asi."* The second set of views

[5] Vide *"avagatiparyantaṁ jñānaṁ sanvācyāyā icchāyāḥ karma...jñānena hi pramāṇena avagantum iṣṭaṁ brahma"* of the Bhāṣya in Section 18 D, n.3.

[6] The idea is this: The contending discussants can have a dispute as to whether the self is eternal or non-eternal (ātmā nityaḥ, anityo vā) only when the dissenting factions have agreed upon the existence and the reality of the common substrate of their dispute, that is the self. Without agreeing upon the self's existence, no faction can conduct an argument. Thus, it is absolutely essential that every argument must have a common substrate that is beyond dispute. In the absence of a common 'vivādādhikaraṇa', it is impossible to envisage an argument at all. Indeed, there cannot be a disputation between two factions like *"ātmā nityaḥ, manaḥ anityo vā* – Is the self eternal or the mind non-eternal," for there is no common basis for the argument to proceed. Vide *"vivādādhikaraṇaṁ dharmī sarvatantrasiddhāntasiddho'bhyupeyaḥ, anyathā anāśrayā bhinnāśrayā vā vipratipattayo na syuḥ. viruddhā hi pratipattayo vipratipattayaḥ, na cānāśrayāḥ pratipattayo bhavanti, anālambanatvāpatteḥ, na ca bhinnāśrayā viruddhāḥ. na hi 'anityā buddhiḥ', 'nitya ātmā' iti pratipattivipratipattī."* (*Bhāmatī*)

centres around the nature of Brahman, that is the denotation of the word 'tat' (tat-padārtha). The third set is on the nature of the non-difference of these two, which is the purport of the sentence as a whole (vākyārtha). In this way, these nine differing views can be reduced to three sets or groups on the basis of their respective common substrates: (1) the nature of jīva, (2) the nature of Brahman and (3) the nature of their oneness. Being the vivādādhikaraṇas, the acceptance of these three substrates is incontrovertible and therefore the existence of these substrates stands substantiated.

We may further reduce even these three sets of views to two comprehensive sets – one set comprising the Advaitin and the other set consisting of the other eight. To explain: The above three common substrates (vivādādhikaraṇa) – the nature of jīva (tvam-padārtha), the nature of Brahman (tat-padārtha), and the nature of their oneness (i.e. the vākyārtha) – are known in general to all the nine arguing factions from their experience and from the Scriptural authority. Therefore, all these differing views presented by the Ācārya may centre around one single point, as to whether these three common substrates' (vivādādhikaraṇa) special nature (viśeṣa-dharma) as expounded by the Upaniṣads is viewed by these nine schools of philosophy to be tenable or not. The Advaitins uphold the Upaniṣadic position while the rest don't.

2. The ordinary persons and the Lokāyata philosophers conceive the self as the mere body possessed of sentience. Others think that the sentient organs constitute the self. Some others hold that the mind is the self: The Ācārya first begins presenting the conflicting views that centre around the nature of the jīva, that is the denotation of 'thou' (tvam-padārtha) of the Mahāvākya *"tat tvam asi* – That thou art." He commences with the gross view about the nature of the jīva and progressively proceeds to the subtler ones.

The expression 'prākṛtāḥ janāḥ', that is ordinary persons, is intended to denote those individuals who possess no Scriptural or scientific knowledge[7] and whose minds therefore have no acumen to see the validity or comprehend any subtle truth. This term denotes those who merely go by what appeals to

[7] Cf. शास्त्रज्ञानशून्याः प्राकृताः। – रत्नप्रभा

their senses and live their life according to the whims and fancies of their mind without any regard for a life of thought and reasoning.

The Lokāyatas, a category of the Cārvākas,[8] on the other hand, are materialistic philosophers, who uphold the view that the senses alone are the means of valid cognition, and the world is just a product of four elements – Earth, Water, Fire and Air – and hence these four elements alone are real.[9]

The word 'deha' (body), here refers to the physical body and denotes the physical structure – from the head to the foot. The word 'mātram', meaning 'mere',[10] and the adjectival phrase 'caitanya-viśiṣṭam' (possessed of sentience) are meant to denote that no sentient principle (caitanya) apart from the physical body exists and therefore sentience cannot be an attribute of anything other than the body.

These Lokāyata philosophers maintain that this physical body, possessed of the attribute of sentience is alone the self, the Ātman, the substrate of the 'I'-notion (ahaṅkārāspadam). To this end, they advance their argument that the well-known worldly experiences and the consequent verbal usages such as "*manuṣyaḥ ahaṁ gacchāmi* – I am a man and I go," are authentic for they remain unsublated by experiences to the contrary[11] and go on to establish that the substrate of the 'I'-notion is the physical body alone for that alone can constitute the content of the 'man-notion' (manuṣya-pratyaya) and the 'go-notion' (gamana-pratyaya).[12]

The other two schools presented here in the present Bhāṣya statement are the 'Indriyātma-vādins', that is the 'upholders of the theory of the organs as the self', and 'Manaḥ-ātmavādins' that is the 'upholders of the doctrine of the mind as the self'. These are different sub-schools or categories among the Cārvāka school of materialism itself. They too advance their own particular arguments supporting their respective theories.

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[8] लोकायतिकाः चार्वाकविशेषाः। – वार्तिक

[9] The Cārvāka school of materialism accepts all the five elements, inclusive of space, to be real, while the Lokāyatas consider only the four elements (i.e. exclusive of space) to be real.

[10] "*deha eva, dehamātram.*"

[11] that is during the period when one is moving

[12] Cf. मनुष्योऽहमित्यात्मनि मनुष्यत्वाभिमानो गच्छामीति च गन्तृत्वाभिमानो देहविषयत्व उपपद्यते। देहमात्रमिति सशिरस्कपिण्डाभिप्रायं द्रष्टव्यम्। मात्रशब्देन न देहातिरिक्तं स्वतन्त्रं चैतन्यमन्यविशेषणं वा, किन्तु देहाकारपरिणतभूत-चतुष्टयान्तर्भूतमेवेति दर्शयति। आत्मेति अहंप्रत्ययालम्बनमित्यर्थः। प्राकृता इति। शास्त्रोपदेशासंस्कृतमतयो दृष्टमात्राविकल्पितव्यवहारिण इत्यर्थः। लोकायतिका इति भूतचतुष्टयतत्त्ववादिनः प्रसिद्धाः। – पञ्चपादिका

The Indriya-ātmavādins argue that the experiences like 'I see', 'I hear', 'I am blind', 'I am deaf', and so on help us identify the substrate of 'I'-notion as being one with the seeing eye, the hearing ear, the blind eye, the deaf ear and so on respectively. Indeed, all beings have multiple senses. But that does not cause any problem or confusion for when one sense is active and acts as substrate of the 'I'-notion, the other senses remain inactive or act as subordinates to the active one and thus do not become the substrates of the 'I'-notion. This determination and change of chief–subordinate relation is adjudicated by the nature of the respective individual experiences themselves.

The Manaḥ-ātmavādins posit the mind as the self. They argue that in the dream state, when the physical body and the senses are totally functionless and when the mind alone is active, an individual does have such experiences as 'I go', 'I see' and so on. Hence, the substrate of the 'I'- notion cannot be the organs of knowledge and actions but has to be decidedly the mind that is alone endowed with the residual impressions (saṁskāra) such as 'going', 'seeing' and so on. In the waking state too, the content of the 'I'-notion is the mind alone; in this state, it is the mind alone that functions as the 'I' by wielding the physical body and the senses as instruments according to its needs.[13]

3. Others view that the mere momentary cognition is the self: Here, we meet the Buddhist Yogācāra school of philosophers who are also known as the 'Vijñāna-vādins'. In the *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya*,[14] we saw in brief that these Buddhists are the upholders of the Ātmakhyāti-vāda. These Buddhists maintain that the 'vijñāna' that is the 'cognition' (or 'awareness') alone is real and all other objects – both internal and external – are unreal. According to them, in the experience of the 'I'-cognition (ahaṁkāra-vijñāna) there is nothing real except that very vijñāna or the cognition.

[13] Cf. इन्द्रियाणां चक्षुरादिमनःपर्यन्तानामेकैकस्मिन्नसत्यपि शरीरे रूपादिज्ञानानामभावात् तेषामेव व्यस्तानां चेतनत्वमहंप्रत्ययविषयत्वं च मन्यन्ते, क्रमेण वरगोष्ठीवदितरेतरगुणभावम्। तथाचेन्द्रियधर्मसामानाधिकरण्यमहंप्रत्ययस्य दृश्यते —काणोऽहं मूकोऽहमित्यादि। मन एव चेतनमहंप्रत्ययस्य विषयमन्ये मन्यन्ते। दृश्यते हि स्वप्न इन्द्रियदशकोपरमेऽपि मनस एव— अहमिति सर्वव्यवहारास्पदत्वमिति वदन्तः। – पञ्चपादिका

[14] Vide Section 4 D, n.2.

The 'I' cognition or vijñāna cognises itself as 'aham' (I); in other words, the substrate of the 'I'-cognition (ahaṅkāra-vijñanāspadam) is nothing but the 'I'-cognition (ahaṅkāra-vijñāna) itself. According to the Yogācāra school of Buddhism, vijñāna alone is the paramārtha-sat (final or absolute) and it is also by nature 'kṣaṇika', that is liable to destruction at the very moment it rises – thus, it rises and falls every moment.[15] They explain the simultaneous rise and the fall of the momentary vijñānas to be of an absolutely uninterrupted succession, like the continuously burning flame of a lamp (dīpa-jvālā). They assert that it is because of this 'vijñāna', the reality, all activities of the entire humanity proceed ceaselessly. Therefore, it is vijñāna that is the sole substratum of the whole world.[16]

4. Some others think that it is the void: Here come the Mādhyamika Buddhist school with its doctrine of the 'void' (śūnya). These philosophers are also called 'Śūnya-vādins', that is the 'advocates of the doctrine of void'.

They oppose the stand taken by the Vijñāna-vādins and argue thus: In the state of deep sleep there remains no trace of 'vijñāna', including that of the self-cognition (ahaṅkāra-vijñāna). In fact, we recognise this 'self-cognition' (ahaṅkāra-vijñāna) to be rising suddenly, as though by an accident, at the very moment one wakes up. Such an entity, the vijñāna, is not ever there but comes about at a particular time (kadācit), by accident (akasmāt), and for no fixed reason (akāraṇa) and therefore cannot be regarded as 'paramārtha-sat' (absolutely real). Therefore, the Śūnya-vādins conclude that the ahaṅkāra-vijñāna ('I'-cognition) is a mere appearance and a projection of the śūnya or non-existence.[17] Since these Mādhyamika Buddhists argue that the śūnya is the ultimate reality, these philosophers have gained the title 'Nihilists'.

[15] The famous dictum of the Vijñāna-vādins is : *"yat sat tat kṣaṇikam* – Whatever is real is momentary." The word 'kṣaṇika' (momentary) is intended to signify that the vijñāna rises and perishes every moment continuously.

[16] विज्ञानमात्रं क्षणिकमित्येक इति मात्रग्रहणेन नाहमित्याकारादिवर्णत्रयातिरिक्तं किञ्चिदवभासते, यदहंप्रत्ययस्य विषयः कल्प्येत। तेन विज्ञानमेव स्वरसभङ्गुरमविरतोदयमखिललोकयात्रानिलयमनुभवभग्नपक्षान्तरमहमित्युत्पद्यत इत्यन्ये मन्यन्ते। – पञ्चपादिका

[17] सुषुप्ते विज्ञानलेशस्याप्यभावादकस्मादेवाहमिति समुदयदर्शनादकारणस्य कादाचित्कस्य परमार्थवस्तुत्वाभावादसदवभास एवाहङ्कार इत्यपरे सञ्चिरन्ते। – पञ्चपादिका

The upholders of all these above-mentioned five theories do not recognise the Veda as pramāṇa, that is an authentic means of knowledge. Hence, they are classed as 'nāstikas' (non-believers), as opposed to the 'āstikas' (believers), who accept the Veda as an authentic pramāṇa.

Presently, the Ācārya introduces the philosophical schools, which are regarded 'āstika', since they owe allegiance to the Veda-pramāṇa,[18] though they all advocate conflicting theories on the nature of the self, the substrate of the 'I'-cognition.

5. Some others hold the view that the transmigrating soul, distinct from the physical body etc., which is the agent and the enjoyer, is the self: Three schools of philosophies – the Vaiśeṣika, the Nyāya and also the Mīmāṁsā – are comprehended by this Bhāṣya statement. The word 'asti' ('is' or 'exists') at the very beginning of the sentence, carries the force of an assertion that the Ācārya evinces. It throws ample light on how vehemently the previous theory of the śūnya or void is argued against by these philosophers.

These philosophical systems assert that the content of the 'I'-cognition (ahamanubhava-gocara) is a positive entity, does exist constantly, and is not a 'śūnya' or 'void'. The arguments of these three philosophical systems may be summarised as follows: It is only the 'I'-experience of an individual that gives him the capacity to enjoy (bhoktṛtva) objects. Indeed, no entity bereft of the 'I'-experience is ever known to enjoy anything. In other words, the enjoyer is always conscious of himself as one who enjoys; he is invariably aware, *"ahaṁ bhuñje bhogān* – I enjoy the objects of enjoyment." This experience establishes that the self that enjoys, which is the substrate of 'I'-notion, is definitely a positive entity, for anything that is void can never be imagined to be aware of itself in the form of 'I enjoy'.[19]

Also, the entity that enjoys is also noticed to be a being that is fairly permanent for the enjoyer recognises himself as, "I sowed the seeds months back and now I am reaping the crops, the fruits of my labour," and also by

[18] Cf. वेदबाह्यमतानि उक्त्वा तार्किकादिमतमाह अस्तीति। – रत्नप्रभा

[19] It is not logical to think of 'vandhyā-putra' (the barren-woman's son), an 'asadvastu' (void), as having an experience of 'I enjoy'.

such expressions as, "when I was a little boy, I enjoyed the love and affection of my parents and now as an old man, I enjoy the love and affection of my children and grandchildren." This sort of recognition (pratyabhijñā) – pertaining to the enjoyer-self establishes the permanance of the experiencer 'I' that continues to exist throughout the lifetime of an individual as an agent of the varied activities and as an enjoyer of their fruits.[20]

Also, we observe that immediately after its birth, the infant is found to be sucking the breast milk of its mother. This sucking of mother's milk is an activity conducive to the infant (anukūla-vyāpāra) undertaken by it on its own volition (pravṛtti-prayatna). This volition presupposes the child's prior recollection about the activity of sucking as a means conducive to its good.[21] That recollection also requires as a precondition the child's prior experience of sucking the milk as a means to attain his good.[22] And because the child is just born, we have to postulate that the required prior experience of sucking the milk as conducive to its good (sukhasādhana) must have taken place before its birth, that is during its previous lifetime. This establishes a prior lifetime of the individual. It is also certain that in the previous lifetime also, the individual, as a new born child, had the experience of sucking the then mother's milk, indicating the individual's yet another prior birth, and thus a series of previous births have to be logically necessarily postulated. All this establishes that the enjoyer-individual, the substrate of 'I'-notion, must have a ceaseless series of births and also deaths, since beginningless time.

In this way, the enjoyer self is proved to be a positive and eternal entity, different from the physical body, senses, mind, momentary cognition and the void – for these are inert and incapable of having the permanent 'I enjoy'-experience for even if they were to be considered capable of this experience they cannot last for more than a single life period.

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[20] Cf. अहमुल्लेखशून्यस्य भोक्तृत्वस्यादर्शनात् तस्य च प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् स्थिरत्वसिद्धेः स्थिरस्य चावधिहेत्वनुपलब्धेर्नित्यत्वम्। – पञ्चपादिका

[21] Hence the unfailing dictum of logic: *"pravṛttiṁ pratīṣṭasādhanatāsmaraṇaṁ (jñānaṁ) kāraṇam* – Conduciveness consists in remembering that it is the means of the fulfilment of desire."

[22] For one cannot recollect a thing, unless one has experienced it earlier. Hence, the Logicians define recollection as a cognition born as a result of prior experience: *"anubhavajanyaṁ jñānaṁ smaraṇam."*

In fact, we have no proof, whatsoever, for fixing the beginning or the end of this individual, the experiencing 'I' entity, at a point of time and space. On the other hand, there are many proofs – of which only a few have been adduced above – to show that this 'I'-experiencer is eternal (nitya) and all-pervasive (vibhu).[23] Thus, it is established that the object of the 'I'-notion (ahaṅkāra-viṣaya) is a positive, eternal entity, it is an agent (kartā) as well as enjoyer (bhoktā), it transmigrates (saṁsāri), it is eternal (nitya) and all-pervasive (vibhu), and is different from the matter vestures such as the physical body, senses and so on. It is this entity or individual that is well-known in the Scriptures by the term 'Ātman'.

This is the conception of the self as held by the Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya and the Mīmāṁsā schools of Indian philosophy.

6. Some affirm that the self is a mere enjoyer alone, and not an agent: Here we see the Sāṅkhya and Yoga philosophers giving their view on the nature of the self. The Ācārya highlights the most striking aspect of their theory that distinguishes it from all the other schools of philosophy by stating that according to these two schools, the substrate of the 'I'-notion, the self, is not an agent, but is a mere enjoyer alone. The three words 'eva' (mere), 'kevala' (alone) and 'na' (not), all having the force of preclusion, are meant to firmly assert the point that the self does not have any agenthood (kartṛtva) at all.[24]

The Sāṅkhya and Yoga philosophers argue as follows: It is the activity of an entity, that justifies its agenthood (kartṛtva). But, activity is absolutely

[23] The self is proved to be eternal since otherwise one would have to reap the fruits of what one has never done and would also be denied the opportunity of experiencing the results of one's own actions (kṛtahāna-akṛtābhyāgama). After it has been established that the self is eternal, the question of its dimension arises. Dimension, in general, is of three kinds: (1) Atomic (aṇu-parimāṇa), (2) Medium (madhyama-parimāṇa) and (3) All-pervasive (vibhu-parimāṇa). The entities having either an atomic dimension or an all-pervasive one are eternal since the entities having a medium dimension are all evidenced by our experience to be transient. So far as the other two dimensions are concerned, these philosophers declare that we cannot say that the self is atomic as it goes against the experience of bliss in the whole body when in the scorching heat, one has a dip in the Ganges. Now, eliminating the medium size too for the reason that our direct experience evinces that all that which has a medium dimension is transient, we are led to conclude that the self is all-pervasive (vibhu-parimāṇa).

[24] The Vaiśeṣikas, Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṁsakas had established the enjoyership (bhoktṛtva) also as pertaining to the self. (vide Section 22 D, n.5)

incompatible with the nature of the self, the object of 'I'-notion. It has been already established by the philosophers[25] of the Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya and the Mīmāṁsā schools that the self is eternal (nitya) and all-pervasive (vibhu) and distinct from the body, senses, mind and so on. The body, senses, mind and so on act and not the Ātman, the self. It is not reasonable to argue that the Ātman alone acts using his body, sense, mind and so on, as his instruments for the self cannot undertake any act as it is an all-pervading entity with no parts. Indeed, how then can such an entity be associated with any activity, such as moving, shaking, evolving and so on?

We do experience 'going', 'seeing' and so on and there are corresponding verbal usages too such as 'I go', 'I see' implying the self's association with actions. However, as explained above, since the very nature of the self does not permit any sort of activity in it, the aforesaid experiences of 'I go', 'I see' and so on and their corresponding verbal usages are to be assessed as merely figurative and assumptive actuated by the transference of the activities pertaining to the body, senses, mind and so on to the self, since it is the self that enjoys the fruits of their activities.

The Sāṅkhyans elucidate this concept of seeming action by the self, albeit its true enjoyment, by an example: The king resides in the palace and is a non-doer. It is his army that actually wages the war. Yet, the act of going to the war is erroneously superimposed on the king. It is to be noted that even though the king does not actually fight the war, yet the victory, that is the enjoyment, belongs to him alone (rājā jayati).

The universe, as the Sāṅkhyans view it, is merely an evolution and transformation (pariṇāma) of the 'mūla-prakṛti' or 'primal nature', the ultimate causal material of the entire universe. It is this mūla-prakṛti that undertakes, of its own accord, the whole process of evolving this vast complex world of variety starting from the minutest thing to the biggest object. Hence, there can be no necessity, nay even the possibility, of the self undertaking any activity. Indeed, the whole world is fashioned by the mūla-prakṛti for the enjoyment of the self.

[25] Vide Section 22 D, n.5.

7. Some others think that quite different from the enjoyer (bhoktā), is the omniscient and the omnipotent Lord: So far, the Ācārya has given details as to how the philosophers of the various schools have propounded conflicting theories centring around the nature of the substrate of 'I'-cognition. This substratum of the cognition of 'I' is the jīva, the individual self, which constitutes the denotation of the word 'thou' (tvam-padārtha) of the Upaniṣadic statement *"tat tvam asi* – That thou art."

The Ācārya now takes up the views of philosophers belonging to Pātañjala-yoga and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools on the nature of the Lord even though they differ on several philosophical viewpoints. They conceive that different from the enjoyer is the omniscient and omnipotent Īśvara, the signification of the term 'tat' of the Upaniṣadic proposition *"tat tvam asi."*

The Mīmāṁsakas and the Sāṅkhyans do not recognise the existence of Īśvara. The Pātañjala-yoga recognises Īśvara but He is not postulated to be the cause of the world, but only as a particular self (puruṣa-viśeṣa), who is untouched by hindrances, karmas, fruition or by latent impressions[26] and who, if meditated upon, helps the seeker in attaining samādhi, the final stage of the Aṣṭāṅga-yoga.

Consequently, the Mīmāṁsā, Sāṅkhya and Yoga philosophers fall beyond the purview of the point of view regarding Īśvara, being the denotation of 'that' of the Upaniṣadic sentence *"tat tvam asi"* – for this sentence declares the identity of Īśvara with the jīva – because the concept of Īśvara is non-existent in the Mīmāṁsā and Sāṅkhya schools. Though the Yoga school has the concept of Īśvara it does not theorise Him to be the creator of the world at all.

We have already seen the views of the philosophers belonging to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools about the nature of jīva, the individual self, the denotation of the word 'thou'.[27] The Nyāya philosophers[28] spell out their view on Īśvara, the denotation of 'that' as being totally different from that

[26] Cf. क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयैरपरामृष्टः पुरुषविशेष ईश्वरः। – योगसूत्र (१.२४)

[27] Vide Section 22 D, n.5.

[28] Later Vaiśeṣika philosophers did accept the concept of Īśvara though there is no such mention in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras.*

of the jīva. To establish the point that Īśvara is different from jīva, these philosophers argue as follows: All things, without exception, that consist of parts (sāvayava), are invariably products (kārya), created by conscious agents (cetana-kartṛ) who have a comprehensive knowledge of the products and their parts and can control them effectively.[29] To illustrate: a pot consists of parts; hence, it is a product and therefore it is the creation of an intelligent creator, that is the potter who has a comprehensive knowledge of it and remains in complete control while bringing it into existence. Taking a cue from this analogy of the pot and its creator, the potter, we may infer the following: This vast universe of the earth, the sun, the stars and so on – all consists of parts; hence, this too must be a product of a single Creator,[30] who has to have comprehensive knowledge of the entire world and its innumerable constituents and also must have the capacity (śakti) to control them, just as the potter has the knowledge and control with regard to his product, that is the pot. That Creator of the world, who is different from the likes of us, is called 'Īśvara' (Lord).[31]

Thus, the syllogistic proposition presented above establishes the existence of the omniscient and omnipotent Īśvara. As such, the basic nature of Īśvara, the denotation of 'tat' (that), is omniscience (sarvajñatva) and omnipotence (sarvaśaktimattva), which certainly distinguishes Him from the jīva, the individual self, the denotation of the term 'tvam' (thou) as the latter has only limited knowledge (kiñcijjñatva) and limited power (alpaśaktimattva). Therefore, according to the Nyāya school, the Scriptural declaration, "*tat tvam asi* – That thou art," is to be interpreted in a secondary sense alone and consequently it is not purported to teach the identity of the denotations of 'tat' (that) and 'tvam' (thou).

8. Others[32] view the Lord to be the self of the enjoyer: The view cited in this

[29] Cf. उपादानगोचरापरोक्षज्ञानचिकीर्षाकृतिमत्त्वम्। – तर्कदीपिका

[30] An assumption of more than one creator would fail to explain the astonishing harmony prevailing among the constituents of the world.

[31] Cf. यथा घटादिकार्यं कर्तृजन्यं तथा क्षित्यङ्कुरादिकमपीति। न च तत्कर्तृत्वमस्मदादीनां सम्भवतीत्यतस्तत्कर्तृत्वेनेश्वरसिद्धिः। – न्यायसिद्धान्तमुक्तावली।

[32] It is interesting to notice the wording of the Bhāṣya in this sentence. It is understandable that

Bhāṣya sentence is the final conclusion of the Upaniṣads and the same is upheld by the *Brahma-sūtra* by conducting searching deliberations on various aspects and problems connected with this Upaniṣadic doctrine.

The word 'saḥ' (he) occurring in this Siddhānta sentence (*"ātmā sa bhoktuḥ ityapare"*) is significant. Being a pronominal term, it denotes, in the normal course, Īśvara, the omniscient and omnipotent Lord described in the preceding sentence as presenting the theory of the Yoga and the Nyāya schools. Also, being the declensional form of 'tad', it could as well stand for the 'tat-padārtha' (the signification of the word 'tat') of the great proposition *"tat tvam asi."*

The word bhoktṛ[33] (the enjoyer), denotes the 'jīva', the individual self, which experiencing the objects of enjoyment, remains conscious as *"ahaṁ bhuñje bhogān* – I enjoy things." This conscious enjoyer is the tvam-padārtha, the denotation of the term 'tvam' (thou), of the above-mentioned Mahāvākya *"tat tvam asi."* The word 'ātmā' in the Bhāṣya sentence signifies 'svarūpa', that is 'one's own nature'.[34]

Thus, the intended purport of the Bhāṣya sentence is: Īśvara, the denotation of 'tat' is of the nature of the conscious enjoyer,[35] the denotation of 'tvam'. Conversely, to say the denotation of 'tvam' (tvam-padārtha), the jīva, is essentially not different from the signification of 'tat' (tat-padārtha),

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the Ācārya has referred to various other schools of philosophy as 'others' ('anya' or 'apara'). But, even while referring to the Siddhānta-pakṣa, that is his own view, he uses the word 'apare', meaning 'others'. What could be the reason for this anomaly – the usage of the word 'apare' (others) to refer to his own viewpoint? It should be noted that the context here is that of the student who is confronted with an array of conflicting philosophical positions. And here it is from his standpoint that the Ācārya is presenting the statement. And, therefore, from the student's standpoint, it just feels like all these are various schools presenting their varied theses. Hence, the use of the word 'apare' (others) even while referring to his own viewpoint. Also, it is also probable that the Ācārya, like an impartial presenter of various philosophical theses, wishes to give an unbiased overview of all theses. And hence, he prefers not to use an expression like 'vayaṁ brūmaḥ' ('we say').

[33] The nominal stem of the genitive 'bhoktuḥ' of the Bhāṣya sentence *"ātmā sa bhoktuḥ"*

[34] Cf. भोक्तुर्जीवात्मनस्त्वंपदार्थस्याहंप्रत्ययगोचरस्य स तत्पदार्थ आत्मा स्वरूपम्। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका
Also, cf. भोक्तुस्स्वरूपमीश्वरः इति सिद्धान्तिन इत्यर्थः। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण
Also, cf. भोक्तुर्जीवस्य अकर्तुः साक्षिणः स ईश्वर आत्मा स्वरूपमिति वेदान्तिनो वदन्तीत्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

[35] conscious as 'I enjoy'

that is Īśvara.[36] Now, the corollary which is inevitably entailed from this Bhāṣya sentence is: Both the individual selfhood (jīvatva) and the enjoyership (bhoktṛtva) that are experienced as 'I enjoy' in the locus of the denotation of tvam (thou) are merely superimposed since they are caused by the beginningless, indefinable nescience (anādyanirvācyā avidyā). Hence, the denotation of 'tvam' (thou), that is the jīva, the individual self, is in essence non-different from Īśvara, the Lord, the creator of the universe, just as the space conditioned by the pot (ghaṭākāśa) is by nature non-different from the all-pervasive space. This is the sum and substance of this deceptively simple sentence of the Bhāṣya.

It is worth noticing that the Ācārya has presented, in the briefest possible way the central doctrines and conclusions of many divergent philosophical systems, starting with the grossest doctrine of the Lokāyatas and concluding with the subtlest doctrine of the Upaniṣads. The Ācārya's presentation constitutes a brief account of as many as nine philosophical systems (sarvadarśana-saṅgraha).[37]

It is quite probable that the Ācārya has also another purpose in mind while presenting these conflicting doctrines of the rival philosophical schools in the last lap of his long discussion on brahma-jijñāsā. By way of presenting these different philosophical systems, he probably indicates that these rival doctrines will be adequately and logically examined and refuted in the *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya*. Consequently, a sincere study of the *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* is bound to help the aspirant gain the necessary intellectual acumen to tread the path to Liberation with conviction and dedication.

The Ācārya, the most ardent adherent of the Advaita doctrine of the Upaniṣads, stands alone, like a gallant generalissimo to fight the army of opponents arrayed against him. Yet, as he himself says in his *Taittirīya-*

[36] Cf. तत् त्वमेव त्वमेव तत्। – कैवल्योपनिषद् (१.१६)

[37] This is the briefest and the earliest known prototype for the famous *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha* of Svāmī Vidyāraṇya (14th century). That compendium too commences with the Cārvāka system and concludes with the Advaita-vedānta system of Śaṅkarācārya.

bhāṣya,[38] he is brimming over with enthusiasm and confidence to challenge and refute the discordant notes of the rival schools that are not consonant with the Upaniṣadic symphony.

9. Thus, there are many who hold conflicting views[39] basing themselves on fallacious reasoning and the distortions of Scriptural texts: The seeker who has an intense desire to attain Liberation (mumukṣu) through the Knowledge of Brahman has thus come to observe the prevailing philosophical maze and endless controversies centring around the nature of the Ātman, the nature of Brahman, and the nature of their identity. The various schools of philosophy advocate their respective doctrines of the self and Brahman and these doctrines are divergent and diametrically opposed to one another.

Indeed, how could these contradictory views regarding the real nature of a single entity all be right? Can an entity be by nature a 'cow' and 'non-cow' simultaneously? Therefore, it is certain that only one among these philosophies is teaching the right doctrine that enjoys the full support of infalliable logic and authentic Scriptural declarations,[40] while all others are advocating wrong views on the basis of some pseudo-logic and misconstrued Scriptural texts.[41]

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[38] Cf. चिन्तयसि च त्वं न तु निर्णेष्यसि, किं न निर्णेतव्यमिति वेदवचनं, न, कथं तर्हि, बहुप्रतिपक्षत्वात्। एकत्ववादी त्वं वेदार्थपरत्वात्। बहवो हि नानात्ववादिनो वेदबाह्याः त्वत्प्रतिपक्षा, अतो ममाशङ्का न निर्णेष्यसीति। एतदेव मे स्वस्त्ययनं—यन्मामेक-योगिनमनेकयोगिबहुप्रतिपक्षमात्थ। अतो जेष्यामि सर्वानारभे च चिन्ताम्। – तैत्तिरीयभाष्य (२.८)

[39] Cf. विप्रतिपत्तेः विरुद्धप्रतिपत्तेः। – प्रदीप

[40] Cf. The view of the Siddhāntin, that is *"ātmā sa bhoktuḥ,"* is based on genuine logic and authentic Scriptural authority while the rest of the views are based on fallacious reasoning and distorted Scriptural authorities. Vide *"yuktiśca vākyaṁ ca yuktivākye, yuktivākye ca tadābhāsau ca yuktivākyatadābhāsāḥ, ta eva samyagāśrayo yathāyogaṁ vipratipattau yeṣām, te yuktivākyatadābhāsasamāśrayā ityarthaḥ. tatra siddhāntapakṣiṇo yuktivākyasamāśrayatvam, itareṣāṁ tu tadābhāsasamāśrayatvamiti vibhāgaḥ."*(*Vārtika*)

[41] Vide *"ātmā sa bhokturityapare"* – God is of nature of the self, that is God is non-different from the self. This is the Siddhānta view, which alone is based on right logical reasoning and authentic Scriptural statements. The other views are based on fallacious reasoning (yuktyābhāsa) and on the distortions wrought out of Scriptural statements (śrutyābhāsa). *Ratnaprabhā* exemplifies lucidly the Bhāṣya sentence – *"bahavo vipratipannā yuktivākyatadābhāsasamāśrayāḥ santaḥ."* This gloss adduces a proper syllogistic proposition to prove the identity of the self with Brahman: "The self is verily Brahman because of having the state of being the soul like Brahman," and also presents an authentic Upaniṣadic statement, a Mahāvākya *"tat tvam asi"* to the same effect. These two evidences, both yukti and Śruti, are authentic

10. Under such circumstances, the one who without inquiry accepts anything among them would lose the highest Beatitude and fall into calamity: Finding himself caught in a whirlpool of philosophical arguments, the student ardent in his inquiry to know the Truth, contemplates that under these circumstances he cannot arrive at any right conclusion by straightaway choosing any one of these conflicting theses without ascertaining with due investigation as to which of the doctrines is of an authentic nature enjoying the right logical endorsement and Scriptural sanction.

Since he has already mastered the Veda with its accessories, the Vedāṅgas, he knows for certain that the Liberation he longs for can be attained through

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since the conclusion arrived at from them is not sublated. He explains the semblance of a syllogism and Scriptural statement (yuktyābhāsa and śrutyābhāsa) of the other schools as follows: "Body etc. constitute the self since they are objects of 'I-cognition' unlike a pot." This syllogistic proposition lacks authenticity since the probandum (sādhya) of this proposition is controverted by the following syllogistic proposition: "Body etc. are not-self as they are the products of physical elements as well as because they are perceptible." The other theories which postulate the body, organs, mind, intellect, void, agent and experiencer, experiencer alone and God as the ultimate Reality are respectively based on these Scriptural statements. "*sa vā eṣā puruṣo'nnarasamayaḥ*" (*Tai.Ā.*2.1.1), "(*cakṣurādayaḥ*) *te ha vācamūcuḥ*" (*Bṛ.U.*1.3.2), "*mana uvāca*" and "*yo'yaṁ vijñānamayaḥ*" (*Bṛ.U.*4.4.22) "*asadevedamagra āsīt*" (*Chā.U.*6.2.1), "*kartā*" and "*boddhā*" (*Pra.U.*4.9), "*anaśnannanyaḥ*" (*Śve.U.*4.6), and "*ātmānamantaro yamayati.*" Since all the theories mentioned above are not based on an authentic evidence and Scriptural statements, they miserably fail to put forward incontrovertible views about the nature of ultimate Reality.

Cf. तत्र युक्तिवाक्याश्रयाः सिद्धान्तिनः "जीवो ब्रह्मैव, आत्मत्वाद् ब्रह्मवत्" इत्यादियुक्तेः "तत्त्वमसि" (छा.उ.६.८.७) इत्यादिश्रुतेश्च अबाधितायाः सत्त्वात्। अन्ये तु देहादिरात्माऽहंप्रत्ययगोचरत्वाद् व्यतिरेकेण घटादिवदित्यादियुक्त्याभासं, "स वा एषा पुरुषोऽन्नरसमयः" (तै.आ.२.१.१) इन्द्रियसम्वादे "(चक्षुरादयः) ते ह वाचमूचुः" (बृ. उ.१.३.२) "मन उवाच" "योऽयं विज्ञानमयः" (बृ.उ.४.४.२२) "असदेवेदमग्र आसीत्" (छा.उ.६.२.१) "कर्ता" "बोद्धा" (प्र. उ .४.९) "अनश्नन्नन्यः" (श्वे.उ.४.६) "आत्मानमन्तरो यमयति" इति वाक्याभासं च आश्रिता इति विभागः। देहादिरनात्मा भौतिकत्वाद् दृश्यत्वाद् इत्यादिन्यायैः "आनन्दमयोऽभ्यासाद्" (ब्र.सू.१.१.१२) इत्यादिसूत्रैश्च आभासत्वं वक्ष्यते। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. शरीरात्मतादिवादाः सर्वेऽपि वेदान्तवाक्येभ्योऽवगम्यन्ते। तत्र देहात्मवादः—"स वा एष पुरुषोऽन्नरसमयः" इति वेदान्तवाक्यमूलः। इन्द्रियात्मतावादः—"तस्माद्वा एतस्मादन्योऽन्तर आत्मा प्राणमयः" इति वाक्याधीनः। मन आत्मतावादः क्षणिकविज्ञानात्मतावादः शून्यात्मतावादश्च क्रमेण—"तस्माद्वा एतस्मात्प्राणमयाद् अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा मनोमयः" "तस्माद्वा एतस्मान्मनोमयाद् अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा विज्ञानमयः," "असद्वा इदमग्र आसीद्" इति वेदान्तवाक्येभ्यः प्रसिध्यन्ति। देहातिरिक्तकर्तृत्व-भोक्तृत्वादिविशिष्टस्त्वात्मा "ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत" इति वाक्येन उत्क्रान्तिगत्यागतिनिरूपणपरैर्वाक्यैः "स एनान् ब्रह्म गमयति" इत्यादिभिर्वाऽवगम्यते। तादृश एवात्मा न कर्ता, किन्तु भोक्तेति वादस्तु—"असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुषः" इति वाक्यात्प्रतीयते। जीवव्यतिरिक्तसर्वज्ञत्वादिविशिष्टेश्वरनिरूपणपराणि तु "यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित्," "पराऽस्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च," "द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया" इत्यादीनि बहूनि वाक्यानि सगुणविद्यापराणि ब्रह्ममीमांसायामेव विचार्यमाणानि दृश्यन्ते। "आत्मा स भोक्तुः" इति पक्षस्तु "तत्त्वमसि" "अहं ब्रह्मास्मि," "विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म," "अयमात्मा ब्रह्म," इति महावाक्यतात्पर्यानुसारी, इति सर्वेऽपि पक्षा वेदान्तप्रमाणाध्ययनकाले प्रतीयन्त इति वेदान्तवाक्यैरेवान्यथाऽन्यथाऽत्मतत्त्वं प्रतिपाद्यत इति विप्रतिपत्तीनां बहूनामवसरो वर्तत इति वेदान्तेभ्यः प्रसिद्धोऽप्यात्मा विप्रतिपन्नरूप एव प्रतिपद्यत इति भावः। – प्रदीप

the correct knowledge about the Truth alone, and never by untruth, and he is also aware that if he rushes to choose a doctrine without adequate inquiry into all aspects of these theses, there is every chance of his falling into the clutches of a wrong philosophical doctrine and thus become a victim to falsity. This could make him a 'nāstika' too – a non-believer of the Vedic doctrines – and thereby lead him to all sorts of evil and land him in an irremediable catastrophe (anartha).

Having come from a prior Vedic and Upaniṣadic background, he naturally develops, in the first place, a desire to know Brahman (brahma-jijñāsā) by the correct means of knowledge (pramāṇa), for it has been stated in the Upaniṣads that the knower of Brahman alone attains the supreme[42] and gains Liberation.[43] The student is also aware by virtue of his Vedic background that the Knowledge of Brahman can be gained only by means of a concentrated and devoted inquiry (mīmāṁsā) into Brahman, the Reality, that is advocated by the Upaniṣads, by discarding all the other confounding rival theses and also by his personal effort of eliminating the various doubts pertaining to the Upaniṣadic Truth. Thus, the seeker's fervent desire for the Knowledge of Brahman (brahma-jijñāsā) itself galvanises him to undertake such a dedicated, energetic and stupendous inquiry.

There is one more reason which can explain why the seeker develops a natural propensity or inclination towards the Upaniṣadic school alone and not towards any of the other schools of thought that have been enumerated. We had seen[44] that all these nine schools of thought presented here could be reduced to two sets or groups based on whether their theses pertaining to the three common substrates (vivādādhikaraṇa) of the argument – that is the nature of the jīva (tvam-padārtha), the nature of Brahman (tat-padārtha), and the nature of their oneness (vākyārtha) – which he has known from his personal reflection coupled with his prior knowledge of the Scriptures are

[42] ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्। – तैत्तिरीयोपनिषद् (२.१)

[43] Cf. The Bhāṣya statements: *"avagatiparyantaṁ jñānaṁ sanvācyecchāyāḥ karma," "jñānena hi pramāṇena avagantumiṣṭaṁ brahma"* and *"brahmāvagatirhi puruṣārthaḥ."* (Section 18)

[44] Vide Section 22 D, n.1.

falling in line with the Upaniṣadic thought or not. As indicated in that context, the Vedāntic school (i.e. the ninth school in the order of enumeration) alone upholds the positive position favouring the Upaniṣadic thought while the rest reject the Upaniṣadic message and hence his natural inclination towards the Vedāntic school.

The following is an explanation of the positions of the various schools of philosophy enumerated here with a view to contrasting them with the position held by Advaita. The Lokāyatas and their allies (schools 1, 2 & 3) view that the cognition of the Ātman as distinct from the physical body, the senses, or the mind, as a mere figment of imagination. Hence, the cognition born from the Mahāvākyas such as *"tat tvam asi* – That thou art" is according to them only an illusion.

The Bauddhas (schools 4 & 5) do not at all recognise the Ātman as a permanent and positive entity. They do not also accept any entity such as Īśvara or the supreme Lord, that could be the signification of 'tat' (that) in the Mahāvākya *"tat tvam asi."* Being nāstikas (atheists) they join the earlier three schools in declaring the Veda an anathema and the verbal cognition that arises from the Mahāvākya such as *"tat tvam asi* – That thou art" as erroneous. In fact, the Buddhists totally deny verbal testimony (śabda-pramāṇa) itself the status of being a means to valid cognition (prāmāṇya)!

The Sāṅkhyans (school 7) and the Mīmāṁsakas (one among the schools under the 6th group) do recognise the Veda as an authoritative means of cognition (śabda-pramāṇa). Yet, they disapprove the existence of Īśvara (the denotation of 'tat'). And hence, in their view, the Upaniṣadic sentence *"tat tvam asi"* is not of much significance at all since it is not meant to teach any truth to be realised for attaining Liberation; but, it is a Mantra (incantation) meant to be recited simply for gaining some worldly result.[45]

[45] They view *"tat tvam asi"* and the other Mahāvākyas to be like the sound charms 'hum', 'phaṭ' (carrying no sense) or like the Garuḍa-mantra, which is an incantation addressed to the deity 'Garuḍa' and meant to be recited for curing oneself from the poison of a snakebite.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers (school 8) also recognise the authority of the Vedas, and unlike the Sāṅkhyan and the Mīmāṁsakas (the Vaiśeṣika included), accept the existence of Īśvara, as the creator of the world and as the denotation of the word 'tat' of the great proposition *"tat tvam asi."* Yet, they consider Īśvara as entirely different from the individual self,[46] the denotation of 'tvam'. Hence, they view with abhorrence the very view that the Mahāvākya *"tat tvam asi"* is meant to teach the identity of the jīva and Īśvara, since such an identity according to them does not exist at all and is sacrilegious to say the least. Prompted by this notion, they endeavour to establish that the sentence just describes the self as Brahman, in a figurative way, that is in a metaphoric sense (gauṇa-prayoga) alone. The following example will make amply clear as to how they explain *"tat tvam asi"* to be a 'gauṇa-prayoga'. In a description praising a brilliant student as a lion,[47] and in the Vedic praises of the sacrificial post as the Sun[48] and of the sacrificer as being the sacrificial animal,[49] even while fully recognising the undeniable differences of the student, the post, and the sacrificer from the lion, the sun, and the animal respectively, one does figuratively posit their identity for the sake of eulogy. In just the same way, the sentence *"tat tvam asi* – That thou art" and the other Mahāvākyas carry no real significance of identity. It is only an encomium, mere praise!

It is only the Upaniṣadic philosophers, to wit, the Vedāntins (school 9), who hold the verbal cognition of the Mahāvākya *"tat tvam asi"* – that understands the significance of the word 'tvam' (thou), based on its appositional relation with the word 'tat' in the Mahāvākya – to signify the detached pure witness (pratyagātman) as being identical with the all-pervasive Consciousness, the very implication of the word 'tat'.[50]

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[46] For details, see Section 22 D, n.7.

[47] siṁho māṇavakaḥ

[48] *"ādityo yūpaḥ."*

[49] *"yajamānaḥ paśuḥ."*

[50] *"tvaṁ padārthadhīḥ asaṅgaśuddhasākṣicaitanyālambanā."*

Thus, we see that all these nine schools of philosophy[51] actually centre around one point – whether the verbal cognition of 'thou' in the Mahāvākya *"tat tvam asi"* is an error, or a figurative conception, or a right cognition.

As an intelligent person, coming from the Vedic and Upaniṣadic background, the seeker would definitely take cognisance of this conspicuous and important difference between the position of the Vedāntic school and that of the rest. And because the great propositions, like *"tat tvam asi"* itself, have been the main source of his knowledge about Brahman, it is only natural that he develops first the desire to know Brahman[52] and its nature and not the other things.[53]

[51] The following is a bird's eye view of various Schools of Philosophy and their views:

S. No.	*Schools of Philosophy*	*Jīva*	*Jagat*	*Īśvara*	*Jīva-brahma-aikya*
1	Lokāyata (Cārvāka)	Body	Real	Reject	Reject
	Indriya-ātma-vāda (Cārvāka)	Organs	Real	Reject	Reject
	Manaḥ-ātma-vāda (Cārvāka)	Mind	Real	Reject	Reject
2	Vijñāna-vāda	Cognition	False	Reject	Reject
3	Śūnya-vāda	Void	False	Reject	Reject
4	Vaiśeṣika	Saṁsārī – as kartā and bhoktā	Real	Reject	Reject
5	Nyāya	Saṁsārī – as kartā and bhoktā	Real	Accept as Jagat-kartā	Reject
6	Mīmāṁsā	Saṁsārī – as kartā and bhoktā	Real	Reject	Reject
7	Sāṅkhya	Saṁsārī – as bhoktā alone	Real	Reject	Reject
8	Yoga	Saṁsārī – as bhoktā alone	Real	Accept not as Jagat-kartā but as a Puruṣa-viśeṣa.	Reject
9	Advaita-vedānta	The sāṁsārika-jīva, characterised by kartṛtva and bhoktṛtva, is of the vyāvahārikasatta alone and not pāramārthika.	The world of names and forms is of the vyāvahārikasatta alone and not pāramārthika.	The Lord, possessed of such attributes like omniscience and omnipotence, is of the vyāvahārikasatta alone and not pāramārthika.	Accept

[52] Vide *"adhītavedāntasya brahmajijñāsopapatteḥ."* (Section 7 D, n.2)

[53] That is the physical body, the senses, the mind, the momentary cognition, the void, the transmigrating self, the self that is the bhoktā alone, and the Īśvara being distinct from the jīva.

At the same time, being a cautious person too though endowed with faith, he is not prepared to accept straightaway the Upaniṣadic position without comprehending it to his complete satisfaction. He is fully aware that the matter at hand is a serious one and his choice in this matter could make all the difference between bondage and Liberation. Thus, the strong desire for Liberation and for its means consisting in the crystal clear comprehension of the Knowledge of Brahman galvanises the student to take refuge in a kind-hearted Guru for not only learning from him the Upaniṣadic Truth, but also for beseeching his assistance in conducting the necessary inquiries pertaining to all aspects of this sacrosanct Wisdom.

Before we conclude the section it will be of interest to compare the wording and the tenor of the Bhāṣya text on brahma-jijñāsa commencing with *"tat punaḥ brahma prasiddham aprasiddhaṁ vā syāt"* (Section 19) and concluding with *"anarthaṁ ca iyāt"* (the present section) with those of the following excerpts from the *Śābara-bhāṣya* on 'dharma-jijñāsā': *dharmaḥ prasiddho vā syād aprasiddho vā. sa cet prasiddho na jijñāsitavyaḥ. athāprasiddho natarām. tadetad anarthakaṁ dharmajijñāsāprakaraṇam. athavā arthavad dharmaṁ prati hi vipratipannā bahuvidaḥ kecidanyaṁ dharmamāhuḥ. kecidanyam. so'yamavicārya pravartamānaḥ kañcidevopādadāno vihanyeta. anarthaṁ ca ṛcchet. tasmād dharmo jijñāsitavya iti. sa hi niḥśreyasena puruṣaṁ samyunaktīti pratijānīmahe.* The parallelism is pleasingly striking indeed.

23

[ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाविचारोपसंहारभाष्यम्]

तस्माद् ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपन्यासमुखेन वेदान्तवाक्यमीमांसा तदविरोधितर्कोपकरणा निःश्रेयसप्रयोजना प्रस्तूयते॥

23 A

[BRAHMAJIJÑĀSĀVICĀROPASAṀHĀRABHĀṢYAM]

tasmād brahmajijñāsopanyāsamukhena vedāntavākyamīmāṁsā tadavirodhi-tarkopakaraṇā niḥśreyasaprayojanā prastūyate.

23 B

तस्मात् *tasmāt* – consequently; ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपन्यासमुखेन *brahmajijñāsopanyāsamukhena* – by way of introducing the presentation with the 'desire to know Brahman'; वेदान्तवाक्यमीमांसा *vedāntavākyamīmāṁsā* – an inquiry into the Upaniṣadic sentences; तदविरोधितर्कोपकरणा *tadavirodhitarkopakaraṇā* – accompanied by logical argumentation not hostile to it; निःश्रेयसप्रयोजना *niḥśreyasaprayojanā* – which has Liberation as its aim; प्रस्तूयते *prastūyate* – is being commenced

23 C

[CONCLUDING COMMENTARY ON THE DESIRE TO KNOW BRAHMAN]

Consequently, an inquiry into the Upaniṣadic enunciations is commenced by the Sūtrakāra, by the way of introducing the presentation with the 'desire to know Brahman',[1] which inquiry is accompanied by logical argumentation not hostile to it[2] and which has Liberation as its aim.[3]

23 D

1. Consequently, an inquiry into the Upaniṣadic enunciations is commenced by the Sūtrakāra, by the way of introducing the presentation with the 'desire to know Brahman': The seeker with a burning desire to know Brahman (brahma-jijñāsā) has taken refuge in the kind-hearted Guru beseeching his help to gain clarity on the Upaniṣadic message so that his

understanding is not hindered by the divergent views of the varied schools of philosophy confronting him and so that he may with ease realise the Upaniṣadic Truth, the very *summum bonum* (Brahmāvagati). Observing the student's intense love for the Knowledge and yet knowing fully well that the Knowledge the student aspires for cannot be gained without conducting a methodical inquiry into the subtle purport of the Upaniṣadic sentences, the Guru initiates him into the study of the *Brahma-sūtra.* This is the force of the word 'tasmāt' at the beginning of the Bhāṣya sentence of this section.[1]

The Sūtrakāra and following him the Bhāṣyakāra too have made a pertinent mention of brahma-jijñāsā, for it is this brahma-jijñāsā that has enabled the student to embark on this journey to Truth, and has impelled him to come beseeching the Guru's help. Also, it is this brahma-jijñāsā alone of the eager student that has prompted the Guru to accept the novice as his disciple and initiate him into the Upaniṣadic inquiry.

The *Kaṭhopaniṣad*[2] provides a parallel to illustrate this very idea of the importance of brahma-jijñāsā in this solemn journey. With a strong desire for Self-knowledge, the young Naciketas approaches his Guru Yama and requests him to teach the knowledge of the Self. It was the intense love for the subject that urged the initially unwilling Yama to accept Naciketas as his disciple. Here, too, the Guru Yama is found commencing the discussion

[1] Govindānanda, the author of *Ratnaprabhā,* elucidates beautifully the intent of the Ācārya. That Liberation is attained by the Knowledge of the oneness of the Self and Brahman is alone the truth. Taking recourse to views other than this one can never attain the *summum bonum* of Realisation. Moreover, if one views the self as something other than Brahman and considers it to be the body, senses and so on, then one is sure to fall into the abysmal darkness of transmigration (saṁsāra) by that very act of sin as declared by the *Īśa-upaniṣad*: *"andhaṁ tamaḥ praviśanti"* (*Īśa.U.*12) and *"ye ke cātmahano janāḥ"* (*Īśa.U.*3). This is further substantiated by this declaration: "He who conceives the existent self as something else than its real nature of Brahman is a (self-denying) thief who has committed the greatest sin of the theft of his self. That is why the Ācārya concludes the elucidation of the aphorism, *"athāto brahmajijñāsā,"* by exhorting mumukṣus (those desiring Liberation) to undertake the deliberation upon the Upaniṣads to be blessed with the Beatitude.

Cf. ब्रह्मात्मैक्यज्ञानादेव मुक्तिरिति वस्तुगतिः। मतान्तराश्रयणे तदभावाद् मोक्षासिद्धिः। किञ्च, आत्मानमन्यथा ज्ञात्वा तत्पापेन संसारान्धकूपे पतेद्, "अन्धं तमः प्रविशन्ति" (ईश.उ.१२) "ये के चात्महनो जनाः" (ईश.उ.३) इति श्रुतेः, "योऽन्यथा सन्तमात्मानमन्यथा प्रतिपद्यते। किं तेन न कृतं पापं चोरेणात्मापहारिणा॥" इति वचनाच्चेत्यर्थः। अतः सर्वेषां मुमुक्षूणां निःश्रेयसफलाय वेदान्तविचारः कर्तव्य इति सूत्रार्थमुपसंहरति—तस्मादिति। – रत्नप्रभा

[2] See *Kaṭhopaniṣad,* Vallīs 1 and 2 for the entire account.

on Ātman by making a statement appreciating the unshakable and strong desire of Naciketas for Brahma-vidyā (brahma-jijñāsā).[3]

The present statement of the Bhāṣya and the above discussion thereon elucidates the following points: (1) The Ācārya takes the term 'brahma-jijñāsā' of the aphorism, *"athāto brahmajijñāsā,"* in its direct sense alone, that is the 'desire to know Brahman' and not as 'brahma-mīmāṁsā', the 'inquiry into Brahman'. (2) The Ācārya views that the Sūtrakāra has assessed this 'brahma-jijñāsā' as the basic cause for effecting the 'brahma-mīmāṁsā' and hence the former 'brahma-jijñāsā' (cause) is different from the latter 'brahma-mīmāṁsā' (effect). (3) The Ācārya considers that the first aphorism *"athāto brahmajijñāsā"* on brahma-jijñāsā as a formal opening statement[4] by the Sūtrakāra indicating the commencement of the treatise *Brahma-sūtra* (also known by the appellations of *Śārīrika-mīmāṁsā* or *Vedānta-darśana*).

Here, the compound word 'brahmajijñāsopanyāsamukhena' literally means 'by way of introducing the presentation with the desire to know Brahman'. The vigraha-vākya (string) is: brahmajijñāsāyāḥ brahma jñātum icchāyāḥ, upanyāsaḥ tadbodhakaśabdaprayogaḥ, sa eva mukhaṁ dvāraṁ,[5] tena. Here, the third case-ending signifies non-difference (abheda-tṛtīyā) and the word 'mukhena' ending with the third case-suffix is used as an adverb (kriyā-viśeṣaṇa), that is as a modifier of the activity of commencement denoted by the verb 'prastūyate'. Consequently, the statement about brahma-jijñāsā

[3] Cf. विद्याभीप्सिनं नचिकेतसं मन्ये। – कठोपनिषद् (१.२.४)

[4] Vide *"brahmajijñāsā-upanyāsamukhena"* of the Bhāṣya statement.

[5] Cf. The well-known synonyms are 'gṛha-dvāra' and 'gṛha-mukha'. The *Chāndogya-upaniṣad* narrates the story of king Jānaśruti learning from the sage Raikva an upāsanā termed 'saṁvarga-vidyā' (Upāsanā in which its object (upāsya) is contemplated upon as gathering into itself other entities). The king offers rich gifts to the sage and requests him to teach this vidyā. Thereupon, the sage considered the offering of gifts itself as the 'mukha' for imparting the knowledge to the king (vide *Chā.U.*4.2.5). The *Śaṅkara-bhāṣya* and the gloss of Ānandagiri pertaining to this passage takes the Upaniṣad word 'mukhena' as a regular synonym of 'dvāreṇa' (by the opening or through the doorway) and interprets: *"on account of the eligibility* of the disciple for receiving the besought knowledge." It is likely that in the present case also the Bhāṣyākāra is of the view that the Sūtrakāra considers the seeker's brahma-jijñāsā as constituting his eligibility for the inquiry of Brahman to be undertaken.

– brahmajijñāsopanyāsa, that is the first Sūtra – is non-different (abhinna) from the inquiry that is being undertaken. That is to say, this very first Sūtra itself constitutes and marks the commencement of the inquiry. By way of illustrating the grammatical principle involved here, one may cite the standard example offered by the grammarians, "viṣameṇa dhāvati – He walks unevenly," meaning "his walking is uneven" (i.e. the manner of his gait is not balanced).

It is in keeping with these points pertaining to the compound word 'brahma-jijñāsopanyāsamukhena' that the Bhāṣya sentence has been translated as: 'by way of introducing the presentation with the desire to know Brahman'.

However, the reputed commentators of the Vivaraṇa school, like its initiator Prakāśātman and others following him having interpreted 'brahma-jijñāsā' in the Sūtra, *"athāto brahmajijñāsā,"* in the secondary sense of brahma-mīmāṁsā have preferred to understand the expression, 'brahmajijñāsopanyāsa-mukhena' as 'brahmajijñāsopanyāsa-vyājena' meaning thereby 'that under the pretext (vyāja) of the 'desire to know Brahman' the deliberation upon Brahma has been initiated'.[6]

2. which inquiry is accompanied by logical argumentation not hostile to it: On this point, the commentators raise a question: The inquiry (mīmāṁsā) into the Upaniṣadic enunciation by itself constitutes a highly developed form of logic and reasoning for it is conducted according to well-defined and formulated norms. So, why should it be aided by a logic (tarka) that is extraneous to it?

The qualifying compound 'tadavirodhitarkopakaraṇā – accompanied by logical arguments not hostile to it' is significant. Indeed, brahma-mīmāṁsā

[6] Cf. ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपन्यासव्याजेन जिज्ञासापदेनान्तर्णीतमीमांसा वेदान्तवाक्यानामारभ्यते। – पञ्चपादिका

Also, cf. भाष्यं व्याचष्टे—ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपन्यासव्याजेनेति। जिज्ञासापदेनान्तर्णीतं विचारमुपलक्ष्य तत्कर्तव्यतापरं सूत्रमित्युक्तं भवति। – पञ्चपादिकाविवरण

Also, cf. ननु सूत्रे विचारवाचिपदाभावात् तदारम्भः कथं सूत्रार्थ इत्यत आह—ब्रह्मेति। ब्रह्मज्ञानेच्छोक्तिद्वारा विचारं लक्षयित्वा तत्कर्तव्यतां ब्रवीति इति भावः। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपन्यासमुखेन विशिष्टा मीमांसा प्रस्तूयत इति सम्बन्धः। विशिष्टज्ञानेच्छोक्तिव्याजेन विचारारम्भपरं सूत्रम्। न हीच्छा ज्ञानं वा साक्षात्कर्तव्यम्। तथा चेष्यमाणज्ञानोपायविचारकार्यतार्थं सूत्रमित्यर्थः। – न्यायनिर्णय

Also, cf. ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपन्यासमुखेनेच्छाप्रदर्शनव्याजेन विचारपरं सूत्रमित्यर्थः। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

(inquiry into Brahman), that is the vedāntavākya-mīmāṁsā (inquiry into the Upaniṣadic enunciations) is a 'tarka' (reasoning), that is a refined form of inferential reasoning (Nyāya) and textual exegesis[7] (mīmāṁsā), both of which are held in high esteem.

It is an undeniable fact that the exegetical methodology for the Uttaramīmāṁsā-darśana (Vedānta) is to a considerable extent aided and strengthened by the technique of textual exegesis (tarka), singularly developed by the Pūrvamīmāṁsā-darśana for interpreting and analysing the various subtle points in the Vedic texts.

It is also equally true that the inferential and deductive logic adopted in the course of inquiries in the *Brahma-sūtra* is the same as the remarkably refined logic (tarka) that one finds in abundance in the Nyāya-darśana. This explains why a vast number of the aphorisms in the *Brahma-sūtra* are in the form of 'hetu',[8] that is 'reason', in the five-limbed syllogism (pañcāvayava-nyāya-prayoga) that has been perfected in the Nyāya-darśana. Perhaps, with the exception of the *Brahma-sūtra* of the Vedānta-darśana, in no other Indian system – not even in the Nyāya-darśana – do we find its Sūtra literature with such a high proportion of aphorisms in the form of a 'hetu'. Hence, it is certain that the Sūtrakāra himself is fully aware of the aid that he has received from the Nyāya-darśana. At the same time, he is also not oblivious to the limitations and the inconclusiveness of its tarka.[9] Also, we notice that the Bhāṣyakāra very often declares that the Vedānta-darśana is not dependent on logic alone, for its mainstay is the Śruti.

Yet, he does not fail to recognise in the *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* the aid that brahma-mīmāṁsā receives from the tarka (logic) – the exegetical reasoning of the Pūrvamīmāṁsā-darśana and the inferential reasoning of the Nyāya-darśana.

The adjectival compound component 'tad-avirodhi' means 'not hostile to it'. Here, 'tad' could denote either the 'mīmāṁsā', that is 'textual exegesis',

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[7] Vide "*mīmāṁsāsaṁjñakastarkaḥ*" cited by Vācaspati-miśra in his *Tātparya-ṭīkā* on Udyotakara's *Nyāyavārtika* (1.1.1).

[8] The word 'hetu' denotes 'reason' and it refers to the second member of the 'five-limbs' (pañcāvayava) of the syllogistic proposition (anumāna-vākya) of the Nyāya-darśana.

[9] Vide "*tarkāpratiṣṭhānāt* – Owing to the inconclusiveness of reasoning." (*Brahma-sūtra*, 2.1.11)

the later part of the preceding compound, *"vedāntavākyamīmāṁsā,"* or the 'vedāntavākya', that is the Vedāntic sentences, the first part of the compound. But 'avirodhi' ('not hostile to it') as an adjective of the exegetical reasoning (mīmāṁsā) is not tenable since the exegetical methodology of the Advaitin, which is taken from the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā, is not viewed as hostile to any of the approaches and conclusions of the Vedānta-darśana.[10] On the other hand, the adjective 'avirodhi' would be abundantly meaningful if it is applied to the inferential logic of the Nyāya-darśana for very often it is prone to go astray and to assume an authority that counters the final conclusions of the Śruti (Vedānta-vākya). This dangerous tendency of the inferential logic is condemned even by the celebrated Nyāya-bhāṣyakāra when he declares (*Nyāya-bhāṣya*, 1.1.1), *"yat punaḥ anumānaṁ pratyakṣāgamaviruddhaṁ nyāyābhāsaḥ saḥ* – Inference is merely a pseudo-logic if it counters the facts arrived at by perception and Scripture."

By describing logic in this manner, *"tadavirodhitarkopakaraṇā* – which inquiry is accompanied by logical argumentation not hostile to the Vedānta-vākya," the Ācārya has not only accepted the role of reasoning in the Vedāntic inquiry but also has clearly defined and limited its role in the Vedānta-mīmāṁsā. It is important to note that unlike the karma-mīmāṁsā (inquiry into Vedic rituals), the brahma-mīmāṁsā (inquiry into Brahman) does need the assistance of logic, but only as an aid or rather like a loyal assistant in the Upaniṣadic teaching and inquiry, and is therefore not allowed to assume the status of an independent authority to decide on any matter pertaining to the Upaniṣads. Of this limited, yet a very important, role of reasoning, the Ācārya reminds us, whenever necessary, in the course of *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya*.

3. and which has Liberation as its aim: This all important inquiry into the Upaniṣadic enunciations, that is being commenced, is definitely of immense help to the aspirant in his deliberation on Brahman for it fully enables him to unambiguously and correctly ascertain the purport of the Upaniṣadic sentences (vākyārtha-nirṇaya) which alone will help him gain the Realisation

[10] But the Ācārya does not hesitate to point out its wrong application in certain instances, in the Vedāntic section by his opponents, the Mīmāṁsakas. (Vide Section 7 D, n.5.)

of the identity between the self and Brahman (brahmātmaikya-sākṣātkāra). When this is gained, that very moment, the seeker becomes one with the eternally pure, conscious, ever free Brahman (nitya-śuddha-buddha-mukta-svabhāvaṁ brahma) and becomes liberated from all the miseries once and for all. Therefore, the ultimate purpose of this Vedāntavākya-mīmāṁsā is Liberation alone.

In the light of the detailed study of various aspects of the present aphorism, we may summarise the meaning of the first Sūtra, *"athāto brahmajijñāsā,"* in accordance with the two schools of Advaita-vedānta, the Bhāmatī and the Vivaraṇa,[11] as follows:

(1) Bhāmatī school: After acquiring the fourfold means (atha) — because it is possible to acquire them as the Veda itself indicates so, therefore (ataḥ) — there arises [bhavati or asti] in the aspirant the desire to attain the highest puruṣārtha (human goal) consisting in the Realisation of Brahman (brahma-jijñāsā).

The Bhāmatī school opines that the above is the elucidation that one gets from the very words (śrutārtha) of the Sūtra and that this meaning of the Sūtra suggests by implication (ārthikārtha) that for ascertaining the nature of Brahman without ambiguity[12] an inquiry into the Vedāntic enunciations must be undertaken (brahmanirṇayāya brahmavicāraḥ kartavyaḥ).

(2) Vivaraṇa school: After acquiring the fourfold means (atha) — because it is possible to acquire them as the Veda itself indicates so, therefore (ataḥ) — for attaining the highest puruṣārtha (human goal) consisting in the Realisation of Brahman an inquiry into Brahman[13] (brahma-jijñāsā) is to be undertaken [kartavyā].

[11] For details refer to Section 18 D, n.6.

[12] According to the Bhāmatī school, it is this ascertainment that leads to nididhyāsana (meditation) which alone is the direct means for Realisation.

[13] According to the Vivaraṇa school, the ascertainment of the purport of the Vedāntic sentences by śravaṇa constitutes the direct means to Realisation.

Jijñāsādhikaraṇaracanā – Structure of Jijñāsādhikaraṇa

An adhikaraṇa or topical section is constituted of five aspects.[1] We shall presently see all these five aspects pertaining to Jijñāsādhikaraṇa:

(1) Viṣaya or Subject: The Upaniṣadic declarations that enjoin upon the seeker to investigate into Brahman such as (*Bṛ.U.*2.4.5, *Chā.U.*8.7.1, *Tai.U.*3.1 respectively in order), *"ātmāvāredṛṣṭavyaḥ," "so'nveṣṭavyaḥ, savijijñāsitavyaḥ," "tad vijijñāsasva"* form the subject matter of the Jijñāsādhikaraṇa.

(2) Saṁśaya or Doubt: Indeed, everybody is definite about his self. He recognises himself as a limited being, such as 'I am a man,' 'I am tall' and so on. But, when he learns from the Scripture that he is the self identical with Brahman, he becomes doubtful about his real nature since the experience of himself being the limited self contradicts the fact of the self being identical with the infinite Brahman that is taught by the Scripture.

(3) Pūrvapakṣa or *Prima Facie* View: The Pūrvapakṣin holds the view that there is no need to investigate into the Upaniṣadic enunciations urging one to study the Vedāntas for the following reasons: (1) There cannot be any superimposition (adhyāsa) between the self and not-self since they are opposed to each other like light and darkness.[2] (2) Because of the impossibility of adhyāsa, there cannot be any doubt about the nature of the self as everybody knows his self. (3) Without a doubt being there, the Vedāntic inquiry pertaining to the nature of self as Brahman is rendered infructuous. Consequently it is not at all necessary to undertake deliberation on the nature of self.

(4) Siddhānta or the Established View: The absence of superimposition as advocated by the Pūrvapakṣin does not stand to reason for the 'I'-cognition being universally experienced, the instance of superimposition cannot be denied. Also, the psycho-physical organism (kāryakaraṇa-saṅghāta) cannot be the self for the Upaniṣads have described the self to be eternal pure Consciousness devoid of any association (saṅga) with the upādhis

[1] For a discussion on the term 'adhikaraṇa', refer to Jijñāsādhikaraṇa, Section 1 D.

[2] Vide *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya*, Section 1 D, n.1.

(conditionings). This way, when one is confronted with the Upaniṣadic statements describing the nature of self, one becomes bewildered and doubtful about the nature of his self. Thus, it becomes categorically imperative for one to terminate this annoying doubt for which it is essential to take upon oneself the onerous task of deliberating upon the Upaniṣadic statements that describe the nature of the self.

(5) Saṅgati or Connectedness: Being the very first adhikaraṇa, saṅgati, that is connectedness, with an earlier adhikaraṇa does not arise.

Jijñāsādhikaraṇasāra – Essence of Jijñāsādhikaraṇa

Vaiyāsika-nyāyamālā, a composition of Svāmī Vidyāraṇya, consists of verses that lucidly explain the essential constituents of each of the adhikaraṇas of the *Brahma-sūtra*. The following two verses of *Vaiyāsika-nyāyamālā* (11 & 12) present in a nutshell the philosophical issues discussed in the Jijñāsādhikaraṇa:

अविचार्यं विचार्यं वा ब्रह्माध्यासानिरूपणात्।
असन्देहाफलत्वाभ्यां न विचारं तदर्हति॥
अध्यासोऽहंबुद्धिसिद्धोऽसङ्गं ब्रह्म श्रुतीरितम्।
सन्देहान्मुक्तिभावाच्च विचार्यं ब्रह्म वेदतः॥

avicāryaṁ vicāryaṁ vā brahmādhyāsānirūpaṇāt,
asandehāphalatvābhyāṁ na vicāraṁ tadarhati.
adhyāso'haṁbuddhisiddho'saṅgaṁ brahma śrutīritam,
sandehānmuktibhāvācca vicāryaṁ brahma vedataḥ.

A brief exposition of these two verses would be of great help in comprehending the topics discussed in the Bhāṣya of the Ācārya.

Is it necessary or not to deliberate upon Brahman, the self? The Pūrvapakṣin emphatically denies the need of conducting any deliberation on the self, the Brahman, since there is no possibility of superimposition of the not-self (body, senses, etc.) upon the self as both the self and not-self are diametrically opposed like light and darkness.[1] Moreover, no one doubts the presence of his self. Since the self is thus known, it is not at all obligatory upon one to undertake an inquiry into the Ātman–Brahman. Also, because the self is known, the deliberation upon Ātman–Brahman will not lead to any significant consequence. This concludes the prima facie view.

The Siddhāntin replies that it is evident in the 'I'-cognition that the body, senses and so on are superimposed on the self. Nobody would have used the term 'I' for body, senses and so on if there had not been any mutual superimposition of the self and the not-self. This fact of the existence of superimposition is further corroborated by the Upaniṣadic statements which

[1] Vide *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya*, Section 1 D, n.1.

describe the self as being identical with Brahman, the pure Consciousness, that is devoid of any association with the conditionings (upādhi). The 'I'-cognition *vis-a-vis* the Upaniṣadic declaration about the purity of Ātman–Brahman engenders doubt about the true nature of self. Consequently, for the removal of this doubt, the aspirant has to embark upon deliberation on the nature of Ātman–Brahman that is presented by the Upaniṣads. It is this deliberation (vicāra) alone that will bestow upon one the Realisation of the Self and the consequent Liberation. This can be illustrated with the popular rope–snake example. The knowledge of rope, the substrate, terminates the illusion of snake and its accompanying effects like fear, trembling and so on. In the same way, Knowledge (direct Realisation) of self's true nature as being identical with Brahman, puts an end to the superimposition and the miseries that are consequent upon it. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the seeker to conduct an investigation into the nature of the Ātman–Brahman. And, it is for this purpose that the *Brahma-sūtras* have been composed by Bādarāyaṇa.

॥ इति जिज्ञासाधिकरणं समाप्तम् ॥

iti jijñāsādhikaraṇaṁ samāptam

Thus Concludes the Topical Section:
Desire to Know.

॥ जन्माद्यधिकरणम् ॥

Janmādyadhikaraṇam

Topical Section:
Conglomerate Beginning with Birth

Section 1

[अवतरणिकाभाष्यम्]

ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यम् इत्युक्तम्। [1]किंलक्षणं पुनः तद् ब्रह्म इत्यत आह भगवान् सूत्रकारः—

Section 1 A

[AVATARAṆIKĀBHĀṢYAM]

brahma jijñāsitavyam ityuktam. kiṁlakṣaṇaṁ punaḥ tad brahma ityata āha bhagavān sūtrakāraḥ—

Section 1 B

ब्रह्म *brahma* – Brahman; जिज्ञासितव्यम् *jijñāsitavyam* – is to be desired to be known; इति *iti* – thus; उक्तम् *uktam* – it has been stated; किंलक्षणम् *kiṁlakṣaṇam* – of what definition; पुनः *punaḥ* – then; तत् *tat* – that; ब्रह्म *brahma* – Brahman; इति *iti* – to this; अतः *ataḥ* – therefore; आह *āha* – says; भगवान् *bhagavān* – the venerable; सूत्रकारः *sūtrakāraḥ* – aphorist

Section 1 C

[PREFATORIAL COMMENTARY]

Brahman, it has thus been stated, is to be desired to be known.[1] What is the definition, then, of that Brahman?[2] Therefore, to this question, the venerable aphorist says[3] —

Section 1 D

1. Brahman, it has thus been stated, is to be desired to be known: For a detailed discussion on the significance of the expression 'brahma jijñāsitavyam' of this Bhāṣya sentence, see the Jijñāsādhikaraṇa.[1] In this context, it will also be advantageous to see the brief summary of the views held by the exponents of the Bhāmatī and the Vivaraṇa schools on the meaning of the first aphorism *"athāto brahmajijñāsā."*[2]

[1] Tel, ASS, AA (fn.) किंलक्षणकम्

[1] Vide Jijñāsādhikaraṇa, Section 18 D, n.6.

[2] Vide Jijñāsādhikaraṇa, Section 23 D, n.3.

2. What is the definition, then, of that Brahman? When it has been stated that Brahman is to be inquired into, it goes without saying that the subsidiary inquiries such as the pramāṇa (means of knowledge) for knowing Brahman, sādhana (practices) for realising Brahman, phala (result) of the Realisation and so on that go along with the primary inquiry of the nature of Brahman are also inquired into.[3] Yet, because of the primacy of the inquiry of the nature of Brahman, without which the above-mentioned subsidiary inquiry cannot proceed, the *Brahma-sūtra* first takes upon itself the onus of defining Brahman.[4]

We have seen[5] that every standard philosophical or scientific treatise in the classical Indian tradition is expected to consist of three parts: (1) 'uddeśa', that is the enunciation of the principal subject matter of the treatise, (2) 'lakṣaṇa', that is the right definition of the subject thus enunciated through a means of knowledge (pramāṇa) and (3) 'parīkṣā', that is a thorough investigation of the accuracy and soundness of the definition as well as the authenticity (prāmāṇya) and the consistency or harmony of the proofs that have been cited (lakṣaṇa-samanvaya).[6]

As far as the treatise *Brahma-sūtra* is concerned, the first aphorism, *"athāto brahmajijñāsā,"* offers the uddeśa by providing the enunciation of Brahman

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[3] Vide *"pradhānaparigrahe tadapekṣitānām api arthākṣiptatvāt. brahma hi jñānenāptumiṣṭatamatvāt pradhānam. tasmin pradhāne jijñāsākarmaṇi parigṛhīte yaiḥ jijñāsitaiḥ vinā brahma jijñāsitaṁ na bhavati tāni arthākṣiptāni eva iti na pṛthak sūtrayitavyāni. yathā rājā asau gacchati ityukte saparivārasya rājño gamanam uktaṁ bhavati, tadvat."* (Bhāṣya, Jijñāsādhikaraṇa, Section 16)

[4] Cf. मुमुक्षुणा ब्रह्मज्ञानाय वेदान्तविचारः कर्तव्य इत्युक्तम्। ब्रह्मणो विचार्यत्वोक्त्या अर्थात् प्रमाणादिविचाराणां प्रतिज्ञातत्वेऽपि ब्रह्मप्रमाणं ब्रह्मयुक्तिरित्यादिविशिष्टविचाराणां विशेषब्रह्मज्ञानं विना कर्तुमशक्यत्वात् तत्स्वरूपज्ञानाय आदौ लक्षणं वक्तव्यं। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. अत्र यद्यपि ब्रह्मस्वरूपज्ञानस्य प्रधानस्य प्रतिज्ञया तदङ्गान्यपि प्रमाणादीनि प्रतिज्ञातानि तथापि स्वरूपस्य प्राधान्यात्तदेवाक्षिप्य प्रथमं समर्थ्यते। – भामती

Also, cf. यदैवेदमित्युक्तं, तदैव ब्रह्मणो लक्षणं प्रमाणं युक्तिः साधनं प्रयोजनमिति सर्वं व्याख्येयत्वेन प्रतिज्ञातम्। तत्र स्वरूपस्याभ्यर्हितत्वात् तत् प्रथमं वक्तव्यम्—किंलक्षणं पुनस्तद् ब्रह्मेति, अत आह भगवान्—जन्माद्यस्य यत इति। – पञ्चपादिका

Also, cf. यद्यपि ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञास्यत्वप्रतिज्ञावचनेनार्थात् प्रमाणादिविचाराः प्रतिज्ञाताः, तथापि ब्रह्मप्रमाणं, ब्रह्मयुक्तिरित्यादिविशिष्ट-विचाराणां विशेषणभूतब्रह्मप्रतिपत्तिसापेक्षत्वात् प्रथमं स्वरूपं वक्तव्यमित्याह—किंलक्षणं पुनरिति। – प्रकटार्थविवरण

Also, cf. यद्यपि प्रधानस्य जिज्ञास्यत्वेन प्रतिज्ञया तदङ्गान्यपि प्रमाणादीनि प्रतिज्ञातानि तथाऽपि स्वरूपस्य प्राधान्यात् तदेव प्रथमं विचार्यमित्यभिप्रेत्याह—किंलक्षणमिति। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

Also, cf. ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञास्यत्वोक्त्याऽर्थात् प्रमाणादिविचाराणां प्रतिज्ञातत्वेऽपि ब्रह्मप्रमाणं ब्रह्मयुक्तिरित्यादिविशिष्टविचाराणां विशेषणमित्यपेक्षत्वादादौ ब्रह्मस्वरूपं वाच्यमित्याह—किंलक्षणमिति। – न्यायनिर्णय

[5] Vide *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya*, Section 3 D, n.1.

[6] Cf. तथा चोक्तं वात्स्यायनेन न्यायभाष्यकृता—"त्रिविधा च शास्त्रस्य प्रवृत्तिः—उद्देशः लक्षणं परीक्षा च" इति। – वार्तिक

as the very subject matter of the treatise. The second aphorism, "*janmādyasya yataḥ,*" offers the lakṣaṇa or definition of Brahman, the uddeśa. The third aphorism, "*śāstrayonitvāt,*" declares that the Upaniṣads (sarve vedāntāḥ) constitute the pramāṇa or the means of knowledge for determining Brahman (uddeśa) as being an existent reality. The fourth aphorism, "*tattu samanvayāt,*" affirms that even while becoming the means for establishing Brahman, all the Upaniṣadic enunciations harmoniously point to Brahman being their very subject matter (uddeśa). Commencing with the fifth aphorism and till the end of the first chapter, the treatise reiterates and confirms by a series of arguments this harmony and unanimity among the Upaniṣadic enunciations.

In the course of these arguments, the first chapter cogently answers and firmly refutes the objections of all the rival philosophers who question and endeavour to disprove this harmony within the Upaniṣadic corpus in indicating the nature of Brahman as explicated by the Advaitin. Since the first chapter is thus wholly devoted to establish the harmony within the Upaniṣadic teachings, this chapter is titled the 'Samanvayādhyāya' or the 'Chapter on Harmony'.

Having thus observed the context of the second aphorism, "*janmādyasya yataḥ,*" as being the lakṣaṇa-vākya (statement of definition) of Brahman, let us investigate the significance of the interrogative sentence used by the Bhāṣyakāra – "*kiṁlakṣaṇaṁ punaḥ tad brahma* – What is the definition, then, of that Brahman?" – while he introduces this second Sūtra. This sentence of the Bhāṣya makes it amply clear that the Ācārya wants us to assess the aphorism as a suitable answer to the question that he has raised.[7]

The sentence of the Bhāṣyakāra, in fact, voices the question of the aspirant who desires to know Brahman. We had seen[8] that the aspirant through his personal deliberations and his prior Scriptural study (svādhyāya) knows in a general way the nature of Self, which is the denotation of 'thou' (tvam-padārtha), the nature of Brahman, which is the denotation of 'That' (tat-padārtha), as well as the nature of the identity between these two, which is the denotation (vākyārtha) of the Mahāvākya "*tat tvam asi* – That thou art" as a

[7] Cf. जगज्जन्मस्थितिध्वंसा यतः सिध्यन्ति कारणात्। तत् स्वरूपतटस्थाभ्यां लक्षणाभ्यां प्रदर्श्यते। – पञ्चपादिकाविवरण

[8] See the Bhāṣya on the Jijñāsādhikaraṇa, Sections 20 to 22.

whole. Even after this sort of general understanding, the aspirant's brahma-jijñāsā (desire to know Brahman) still persists because it remains yet to be decided as to whether the above-mentioned nature of the Self, Brahman and their mutual identity are tenable or not, for he observes that all other schools of philosophy other than Advaita maintain divergent views on their nature and vehemently oppose the identity of the denotations of 'That' and 'thou' as being utterly untenable, while it is the Upaniṣadic thought alone that views such an identity as perfectly tenable. Further, even within the Upaniṣadic corpus, he comes across statements that seem to occasionally support the views of other schools of philosophy. The aspirant, therefore, seeks to determine the real nature of the self and Brahman for it is only then that he can see the tenability of their identity. All these he endeavours to achieve by a thorough deliberation on the Upaniṣads, which is what the *Brahma-sūtra* purports to do.

Thus, the expression 'brahmajijñāsā', in the first aphorism is denotative of the seeker's desire to know the nature of Brahman, which nature is non-different from self (pratyagabhinnaṁ jīvābhinnaṁ brahma). That the brahma-jijñāsā of the seeker motivates him to take recourse to the Upaniṣads is only natural, for his brahma-jijñāsā had been kindled by the Upaniṣadic utterances, which alone extol the Knowledge of Brahman by enunciations such as (*Tai.U.*2.1, *Mu.U.*3.2.9, *Bṛ.U.*2.4.5 & *Chā.U.*8.7.1 respectively in order) "*brahmavidāpnoti param* – The knower of Brahman attains the Supreme," "*brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati* – The knower of Brahman becomes Brahman," "*ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ, śrotavyaḥ, mantavyaḥ, nididhyāsitavyaḥ* – O dear one! The Self is to be seen, is to be heard, is to be inquired into and is to be intensely contemplated upon" and "*so'nveṣṭavyaḥ sa vijijñāsitavyaḥ* – This Self is to be sought, it is to be desired to be known."

The Bhāṣyakāra could have as well introduced the second aphorism "*janmādyasya yataḥ*" simply as, "*uddiṣṭasya brahmaṇo lakṣaṇam āha sūtrakāraḥ* – The Sūtrakāra declares the definition of Brahman that has been enunciated." But he has preferred to introduce the aphorism by means of an interrogative sentence, "*kiṁlakṣaṇaṁ punaḥ tad brahma* – What is the definition, then, of

that Brahman?" Obviously he wants us to pay attention to the fact that the aphorism states the exact answer to the question raised by the aspirant – arising out of his brahma-jijñāsā – seeking the nature of that Brahman which is identical with the self and the nature of which is opposed to any sort of dichotomy between the Brahman and self.

The Bhāṣyakāra could have also preferred this interrogative form of introduction to the Sūtra *"janmādyasya yataḥ"* as it could demonstrate the objection which the opponent raises against the feasibility of defining Brahman,[9] the nature of which is to be known as being identical with the self (pratyagabhinnaṁ brahma).

In the Indian philosophical systems, definition (lakṣaṇa)[10] is recognised to be of basically two types:[11]

[9] किमाक्षेपे नाऽस्त्येव लक्षणमित्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

[10] 'Lakṣaṇa' or a 'definition' consists in an attribute which distinguishes the definiendum (lakṣya) from the entities not intended to be defined (alakṣya). This defining attribute is also described as the 'uncommon property (asādhāraṇa-dharma) of the lakṣya (definiendum). Uncommonness (asādhāraṇatā) is the fact of being co-extensive (samaniyata) with the 'distinguishing attribute of the things to be defined' (lakṣyatāvacchedaka). If the distinguishing entity (vyāvartaka) alone were to constitute the defining attribute (lakṣaṇa), then this attribute has got to be given the qualification (viśeṣaṇa) of 'being other than those which are different from the thing intended to be defined' (tadbhinna-bhinnatva).

As such, this defining attribute should be free from the defects (doṣa) of under-pervasion (avyāpti), over-pervasion (ativyāpti) and absurdity (asambhava). Now, let us understand the concept of definition by describing the above-mentioned three defects (doṣa) from which a correct logical definition must be free: (1) Under-pervasion (avyāpti) is found in a definition which consists in an attribute which is found in only some instances of the lakṣya (definiendum) and not in all. To explain: The tawny colour (kapilatva) as a suggested 'defining attribute' of 'cow' suffers from the defect of under-pervasion as it is present only in some of them. Thus, it covers only a section of the definiendum (lakṣya). Therefore, this definition suffers from the defect of under-pervasion. (2) The 'state of having horns' (śṛṅgitva), as a defining attribute of a cow, suffers from the defect of over-pervasion (ativyāpti) as it is found in buffaloes, deer and so on, which are not intended to be defined. (3) The third defect of absurdity (asambhava) is found where the definitional statement expresses an attribute which is not found in any instance of what is to be defined. The state of having one hoof (ekaśaphatva) as a defining attribute of a cow suffers from the defect of absurdity. Consequently, the defining attribute should be free from all these blemishes so that it may correctly determine and demarcate the entity intended to be defined.

[11] Cf. लक्षणन्तु द्विविधम्—तटस्थलक्षणं स्वरूपलक्षणमिति। वैथाऽज्ञायमानं हि वस्तु प्रथमतस्तटस्थलक्षणेनाऽऽपाततः, अनन्तरं

(1) Taṭastha-lakṣaṇa or Upa-lakṣaṇa: This is translated as 'definition *per accidens*', or as 'definition by the incidental'. This is the definition of an entity through an attribute that is incidental to it, that is by an attribute which has arisen due to the entity's incidental association with something extraneous to it.[12]

An example will illustrate the concept of taṭastha-lakṣaṇa. When a stranger is unable to identify the house of a particular person, say Devadatta, in a street where all the houses look alike, a resident bystander helps him by offering a description to identify Devadatta's house: "kākavad devadattagṛham – The house on which the crow is perched is the house of Devadatta." Using this defining characteristic, the newcomer distinguishes Devadatta's house from the rest. Here, based on its association with the crow, the lakṣaṇa (defining mark), the house (lakṣya) has been defined. This lakṣaṇa is purely momentary, or even accidental, since the crow might not have been there a few moments ago and it will definitely fly away a few moments later. Yet, the crow does serve as an 'incidental definition' of the house. This is what is meant by 'taṭastha-lakṣaṇa' or 'definition *per accidens*'.

Another example of taṭastha-lakṣaṇa is "śākhāgre candraḥ – The moon is that which is at the tip of the tree branch." The moon of the second or the third night is a thin semicircle and is rather difficult to spot in the western sky. When a distant tree is pointed out, and then its branch, and thereafter the branch's tip, and then when the slender moon is indicated, it is spotted easily as it is positioned in the sky, so to say, just above the tip of the tree branch. Here, we observe that the moon has been indicated through its seeming positional and incidental relation with the tree's branch.

It is to be carefully noted that the definition of an entity by dint of its attributes (dharma-lakṣaṇa), that is advocated by the Naiyāyikas, is also to be categorised as taṭastha-lakṣaṇa. The definition (lakṣaṇa) of earth (lakṣya) by the property (dharma) of smell (gandha) suffers from the defect of underpervasion (avyāpti) in such cases as that of the effects (kārya) of the

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स्वरूपलक्षणेन प्रतिपद्यते—यथा 'शाखाग्रे चन्द्रः', 'प्रकृष्टप्रकाशश्चन्द्रः' इति। तत्र तटस्थलक्षणेनात्यन्तविजातीयव्यावृत्तिमात्रं क्रियते, सदृशविजातीयव्यावृत्तिस्तु स्वरूपलक्षणेन। – प्रदीप

[12] "*kādācitkaṁ sad vyāvartakaṁ taṭasthalakṣaṇam* – Being transient, an attribute that differentiates is termed 'taṭastha-lakṣaṇa'."

earth such as the earthen pots at the first moment of their production. This is so because the Naiyāyikas define the cause as that which invariably exists prior to its effect – *"kāryaniyatapūrvavṛtti kāraṇam"* (*Tarka-saṅgraha*). The clay is the samavāyi-kāraṇa (inherent cause) of a pot, which in turn is postulated to be the samavāyi-kāraṇa (inherent cause) of the property of smell (gandha). Thus, being the samavāyi-kāraṇa of this property of smell, the pot does not have property of smell at the first moment when it is brought into existence by dint of the very definition of the cause that is explicated by the Nyāya philosophy. Consequently the property of smell, by which we have defined earth, does not exist in the pot at the moment of its production.[13] Hence, this definition of earth as that which has smell (gandha) as its property is regarded as the 'definition *per accidens*'.

(2) Svarūpa-lakṣaṇa: This is the definition of an entity through its own essential nature and may be termed as 'intrinsic-nature definition'.[14]

Here is an example to illustrate svarūpa-lakṣaṇa: On a night of the full moon accompanied by the twinkling stars, the moon is often defined as "prakṛṣṭaprakāśaḥ candraḥ – Superior effulgence is the moon." This is a definition of the full moon based on its essential nature. Here, the moon (candra) and the superior effulgence (prakṛṣṭa-prakāśa) are not different from each other but rather they are both one and the same. Yet, for the purpose of offering a definition, the superior effulgence (prakṛṣṭa-prakāśa) is imagined to be distinct from the moon (candra) and the moon is defined as that which is of the nature of superior effulgence.

In the present context, the Pūrvapakṣin argues, that it may be pointed out

[13] According to the Nyāya philosophy cause and effect are mutually different. If the pot was also to have always the property of smell, then the very causality fails as there would be no difference between the earth and its effect, the pot. Hence, the Naiyāyikas are forced to posit, due to their philosophical position of cause and effect being different, that the pot does not have the property of the smell at the first moment of its birth. Thereby, they assert that the cause earth is different from the effect pot. The Advaitins do not agree to the philosophical position of the Naiyāyikas of the cause and effect being absolutely different from each other.

[14] *"svarūpameva lakṣaṇaṁ vyāvartakam svarūpalakṣaṇam* – When an entity's own nature, by differentiating the entity, serves as the entity's definition, then it is termed 'svarūpa-lakṣaṇa'."

that Brahman, which is desired to be known by the Advaitin as identical with the self (pratyagabhinnaṁ brahma) cannot be deemed to have any of these definitions – neither svarūpa-lakṣaṇa nor taṭastha-lakṣaṇa – for the reasons that are going to be delineated below.

All that is experienced by us in this world is invariably impure (aśuddha), limited (parimita), destructible (vidhvaṁsi) and lacking in consciousness (acetana). How can these properties, which alone are comprehended, constitute the svarūpa-lakṣaṇa of Brahman which is of a diametrically opposite nature – ever pure (sadā-viśuddha), unlimited (aparimita), eternal (nitya), and of the nature of consciousness (cetana)?[15] Can darkness ever become the svarūpa-lakṣaṇa of light?

It is futile to argue that the Upaniṣads themselves offer the svarūpa-lakṣaṇa of the supreme Brahman in such statements as (*Tai.U.*2.1 & 3.6 respectively) *"satyaṁ jñānam anantaṁ brahma* – Brahman is reality, knowledge, infinite," *"ānando brahma* – Brahman is bliss" and so on because we have never known or experienced in the world such entities like reality, infinite and so on. All that we are aware of, says the Pūrvapakṣin, is only that which is limited and perishing in nature. Therefore, as far as we are concerned, these words of the Upaniṣads are mere words which have no substance. Indeed, how can such things, absolutely unknown, be mentally grasped as the meanings of the words, even if they be the words of the Upaniṣads, and become the svarūpa-lakṣaṇa of Brahman.[16] Can the barren woman's son (vandhyā-putra) ever have the status of the svarūpa-lakṣaṇa of Brahman?

In view of all these arguments, the Pūrvapakṣin asserts that there cannot be any svarūpa-lakṣaṇa of Brahman, which Brahman is identical with the self (pratyagabhinnaṁ brahma), and which alone is spoken of as desired to be known (jijñāsyaṁ brahma) in the first Sūtra *"athāto brahmajijñāsā."*

Elaborating the impossibility of taṭastha-lakṣaṇa also for Brahman, the Pūrvapakṣin continues his argument. 'Smell' (gandha) is known to be an

[15] Cf. तत्र यद्यावदनुभूयते तत्सर्वं परिमितमविशुद्धमबुद्धं विध्वंसि च, न तेनोपलब्धेन तद्विरुद्धस्य नित्यशुद्धबुद्धस्वभावस्य ब्रह्मणः स्वरूपं शक्यं लक्षयितुम्। न हि जातु कश्चित्कृतकत्वेन नित्यं लक्षयति। – भामती

[16] Cf. प्रसिद्धं हि लक्षणं भवति, नात्यन्ताप्रसिद्धम्। एवं च न शब्दोऽप्यत्र प्रक्रमते, अत्यन्ताप्रसिद्धतया ब्रह्मणोऽपदार्थस्यावाक्यार्थत्वात्। तस्माल्लक्षणाभावाद् न ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यमित्याक्षेपाभिप्रायः। – भामती

attribute (dharma) of the earth[17] and hence it can serve as dharma-lakṣaṇa (definition by attribute) of the earth. But no attribute could be cited to be the definition of Brahman, the jijñāsya (desired to be known). It is wrong to argue that the Upaniṣads themselves cite the birth (sṛṣṭi), existence (sthiti) and destruction (laya) of the world as the definition of Brahman for these are decidedly the attributes of the world alone. How can these properties of the world, which are totally unconnected with Brahman, be construed as the definitions of Brahman? In fact, what is desired to be known in the present context is Brahman that is non-different from the Self (pratyagabhinnaṁ brahma) and this Brahman is said to be devoid of all attributes (nirguṇa or nirdharmaka). Therefore, a definition of this attributeless Brahman by attributes would be nothing but an oxymoron!

No doubt, the Scriptures describe attributes such as omniscience (sarvajñatva) and omnipotence (sarvaśaktimattva) as invariable attributes of Brahman. But the omniscient, omnipotent Brahman is Īśvara, the Godhead, who is to be worshipped (upāsya) for attaining the Knowledge of the identity of the Self with Brahman (brahmātmaikyāvagati). The omniscient Brahman, the Godhead, is different from the individual self (jīvātman) that is endowed with only limited knowledge (kiñcijjñatva) and limited power (alpaśaktimattva). But, here, in the context of brahma-jijñāsā, what is desired to be known is that supreme Brahman which is identical with the self (pratyagabhinnaṁ brahma) and which is devoid of all attributes. For this reason too, there can be no definition of Brahman that is desired to be known (jñeyaṁ brahma) through Its attributes (dharma-lakṣaṇa).

The branch at the top of the tree helps one to identify the moon, and the crow does the same in helping one distinguish the house of Devadatta from other houses. Hence, they could respectively serve as taṭastha-lakṣaṇa or definitions *per accidens* of the moon and the house of Devadatta respectivley. But, we find no such extraneous factor that can serve as the taṭastha-lakṣaṇa of Brahman that is non-different from the self (pratyagabhinnaṁ brahma) and which is desired to be known.

[17] गन्धः पृथिवीस्वरूपाविनाभावी धर्मः।

This detailed analysis, declares the Pūrvapakṣin, establishes that there cannot be any definition – neither taṭastha-lakṣaṇa nor svarūpa-lakṣaṇa – of Brahman that is identical with the inner self (pratyagabhinnaṁ brahma), which according to the Advaitin is what is desired to be known (jijñāsyaṁ brahma).

It is to be borne in mind that whatever exists and is real is certainly definable. Only the son of a barren woman (vandhyā-pūtra) is non-existant and is unreal, and hence indefinable. Thus, being indefinable, it follows as a logical corollary that the Advaitin's 'pratyagabhinnaṁ brahma' too is unreal, like the son of a barren woman, and hence Brahman cannot be jijñāsya (desired to be known) at all. Will there be anybody, in his right senses, desirous of knowing or conducting an inquiry about the son of a barren woman?

Because of the reasons adduced above, brahma-jijñāsā is completely a false notion. Hence, the inevitable conclusion is: Vedānta-darśana has no subject that is desired to be known or to be inquired into by a reasoning man. Hence, the *Brahma-sūtra*, a treatise of the Vedānta-darśana, need not be commenced at all and if started its perusal may be dropped for good! This is the vehement assertion of the Pūrvapakṣin.

It is this serious objection that is evinced by the interrogative sentence of the Bhāṣya, *"kiṁlakṣaṇaṁ punaḥ tad brahma* – What is the definition, then, of that Brahman." In this sentence, the word 'kim' (what) of the expression 'kiṁ-lakṣaṇam,' signifies a strong objection and the phrase 'tad brahma' purports that Brahman which is identical with the self (pratyagabhinnaṁ brahma), which, according to the Advaitins, has been enunciated in the first aphorism, *"athāto brahmajijñāsā,"* as a subject matter that is desired to be known. Thus, this simple, yet valid, question of the humble inquiring seeker turns out to be a formidable objection of a hostile critic whose objections on the validity of the subject matter (viṣaya) of the *Brahma-sūtra* were refuted time and time again in the previous *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya* and Jijñāsādhikaraṇa.[18]

[18] Vide Section 1-3 and 6 of the *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya* and Section 2 and Section 14 of the Jijñāsādhikaraṇa.

By highlighting the above objection, the Bhāṣya sentence suggests the 'saṅgati', that is the 'connectedness' of the present topic of definition of Brahman (Janmādyadhikaraṇa) with the previous topic of the desire to know Brahman (Jijñāsādhikaraṇa). Since the objection (ākṣepa) is the connecting link (saṅgati) here, this 'saṅgati' is termed 'ākṣepasaṅgati'.

We have already discussed in brief the structure of the *Brahma-sūtra*.[19] The treatise consists of 191 adhikaraṇas (topical sections), each of which is devoted to inquire and bestow clarity on a particular Upaniṣadic doctrine. These 191 adhikaraṇas are arranged into four adhyāyas (chapters), and each of these adhyāyas is, in turn, divided into four pādas (quarters). In order to maintain cogency and continuity in the treatise, all these 191 topical sections are arranged in a sequence following certain principles of rational and systematic thought flow. These principles of logical thought flow are termed as 'saṅgati', which can be translated as 'principles of connectedness' or 'flow' or 'relation'.[20] Thanks to these saṅgatis, the whole treatise *Brahma-sūtra* looks like an edifice of grandeur, designed and built by the great Sūtrakāra Bādarāyaṇa, indeed a remarkable virtuoso.

The Advaita tradition insists that the students of the *Brahma-sūtra* and the Bhāṣya thereon, should clearly understand these saṅgatis, as this would help immensely in comprehending and appreciating the purport and conclusion of the adhikaraṇas in all their aspects and enable the students to acquire a holistic understanding of the entire *Brahma-sūtra*.

Traditionally four broad divisions of the saṅgatis are recognised in the śāstra:
(1) Śāstra-saṅgati: The relevance or connectedness of the adhikaraṇa (topical section) with the main theme of the treatise.
(2) Adhyāya-saṅgati: The connectedness of the adhikaraṇa with the theme of the adhyāya (chapter) in which it occurs.
(3) Pāda-saṅgati: The connectedness of the topic with the purport of the pāda (quarter) in the which the adhikaraṇa is.[21]

[19] Vide Introduction to *Brahmasūtra-catuḥsūtrī* and Jijñāsādhikaraṇa, Section 1 D.
[20] Cf. सङ्गतिर्नाम पूर्वापरवाक्यैकवाक्यताप्रयोजकाकाङ्क्षाजनकज्ञानविषयविशेषः। – वार्तिक
[21] *"śāstre'dhyāye tathā pāde nyāyasaṅgatayastridhā."* Here, the term 'nyāya' is used to mean the logical conclusions of the adhikaraṇas in the treatise.

(4) Avāntara-saṅgati: Besides the above three saṅgatis, each adhikaraṇa in the treatise must have a good rational link with the adhikaraṇa immediately preceding it. This connectedness is termed 'avāntara-saṅgati' and is meant to be the logical link between two consecutive adhikaraṇas. This avāntara-saṅgati is in turn of six types. They are: (1) Upodghāta (introductory), (2) Dṛṣṭānta (illustrative), (3) Prasaṅga (contextual), (4) Apavāda (providing exception), (5) Pratyudāharaṇa (illustrative to the contrary) and (6) Ākṣepa (objection).[22]

[22] Cf. उपोद्घातोऽथ दृष्टान्तः प्रसङ्गश्चापवादिकी। प्रत्युदाहरणाक्षेपाविति सा षड्विधा मता॥ प्रवृत्तं हृदये कृत्वा पूर्वं तद्धेतुचिन्तनम्। यदुपोद्घातमाहुस्तं तच्च पूर्वमवादिषम्॥ पूर्वदृष्टञ्च सिद्धान्तं कृत्वा साधर्म्यमात्रतः। प्रत्याख्यानमाहुर्यद् दृष्टान्तं सङ्गतिं बुधाः॥ या जातिरुच्यते न्याये प्रतिदृष्टान्तसञ्ज्ञनी। सर्वत्र सुलभा चेयं सङ्गतिः पण्डितैर्मता॥ स्मृताऽनुपेक्षायोग्यत्वं प्रसङ्गं पण्डिता विदुः। सा च देवाधिकरणे दर्शनीया प्रयत्नतः॥ सामान्यन्यायसंसिद्धो बलवद्भिरपोद्यते। प्रमाणैः सोऽपवादः स्यादपशूद्रे च सा मता॥ यद्ययं यदभिप्रेतो न भवेदिति मन्यसे। भवताऽभिमतोऽर्थोऽपि न भवेत् सा क्रियासमा॥ प्रत्युदाहरणञ्चैतद्या मदुक्ता क्रियासमा। सर्वत्र प्रविशेत् साऽपि सङ्गतिर्जातिरूपतः॥ पूर्वसिद्धान्तमाक्षिप्य प्रवर्तेत यदोत्तरम्। आक्षेपसङ्गतिः साऽत्र विज्ञेया पण्डितोत्तमैः॥ – वार्तिक

The connectedness between the topic under discussion and that which is going to be expounded immediately is technically known as 'saṅgati'. The following is a technical discussion on 'saṅgati' (connectedness) based on the verse quoted in *Rāmarudrī*, a highly scholastic commentary on *Dinakarī*, which again is a commentary on *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* of the renowned Naiyāyika Viśvanātha Pañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya. This discussion will throw light on the thoughts of the Naiyāyikas on the concept of saṅgati. The verse quoted by *Rāmarudrī* is as follows: "*sa prasaṅga upodghāto hetutā'vasarastathā, nirvāhakaikakāryaikye ṣoḍhā saṅgatiriṣyate.*"

According to the above-quoted verse saṅgati is of six types: (1) **Prasaṅga-saṅgati**: Not to be oblivious to that which is relevantly recalled constitutes 'prasaṅga-saṅgati'. To illustrate: Annambhaṭṭa, the author of *Tarkasaṅgraha*, categorises the valid cognition (pramiti) into four types: pratyakṣa (perception), anumiti (inferential cognition), upamiti (cognition arising out of comparison) and śābda (verbal cognition) and immediately touches upon their unique causes, that is the means for these valid cognitions respectively as: pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna and śabda. In the *Tarkasaṅgraha-dīpikā*, his commentary on the *Tarkasaṅgraha*, Annambhaṭṭa describes the relevance of the exposition of the four unique causes of the four kinds of valid cognition, which being a product directs one's thought to its instrument cause. ("*yathā yathārthānubhava-rūpapramāvibhajanānantaraṁ pramākaraṇavibhajane prasaṅgaḥ saṅgatiḥ.*") (2) **Upodghāta-saṅgati:** This consists in showing concern for the justification of what is being expounded. To illustrate: When pramāṇa (means of valid knowledge) as the unique cause (asādhāraṇa-kāraṇa) of a valid cognition (pramiti) is to be discussed, the exposition of the nature of the unique cause (asādhāraṇa-kāraṇatā) ensues by upodghāta-saṅgati ("*prakṛtopapādakatvam upodghātaḥ.*") (3) **Hetutā-saṅgati**: When either the cause or the effect is known, the desire to conversely know the effect or the cause respectively thereof constitutes this hetutā-saṅgati. Both the states of being the cause and the effect are to be understood by the hetutā-saṅgati. It is on this basis, the author of *Rāmarudrī* points out, that the exposition of anumāna (the means of inferential cognition) after the treatment of anumiti (inferential knowledge) in *Cintāmaṇi*, the celebrated work of Navya-nyāya by Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, is

Each adhikaraṇa in the *Brahma-sūtra* can have one or more of these saṅgatis. This present Janmādyadhikaraṇa, as we saw, arises as a result of the objection (ākṣepa) posed by the Pūrvapakṣin against what has been established in the course of the preceding Jijñāsādhikaraṇa – that Brahman is the desired entity and the one to be inquired into (jijñāsya);[23] therefore, it is ākṣepa-saṅgati that forms the connecting link between the Janmādyadhikaraṇa and the preceding Jijñāsādhikaraṇa. Also, since the second aphorism, *"janmādyasya yataḥ,"* defines Brahman, the subject, which has already been enunciated in

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considered to be in order. (*"evaṁ ca kāraṇe kārye vā jñāte kimasya kārye kāraṇaṁ veti jijñāsodayena upajīvakatvamupajīvyatvaṁ ca dvayamapi saṅgatiḥ. ata eva cintāmaṇāvanumitinirūpaṇānantaram anumānanirūpaṇamapi saṅgacchate."*) (4) **Avasara-saṅgati**: This is the connectedness born out of a contextual opportunity. To explain: After a subject has been expounded and when there arises the context for the exposition of two subjects as a consequence of the earlier exposition, and when one of the ensuing subjects has been withheld because of the student's desire to know the other widely accepted subject and when this student's desire (jijñāsā) has been satiated by its exposition, there immediately arises the contextual opportunity to expound the subject that was earlier withheld. This contextual opportunity is termed 'avasara-saṅgati'. *Rāmarudrī* explains it as follows: After perception has been expounded, the exposition of both inference (anumāna) and comparison (upamāna) simultaneously becomes due by hetutā-saṅgati. As the inferential evidence (anumāna) is subscribed to by a greater number of philosophical systems, the student desires to know it first. For this reason, the treatment of comparison (upamāna) is withheld. Now after inference (anumāna) has been treated, the exposition of comparison (upamāna) becomes due by avasara-saṅgati (*"avasaraḥ – anantaravaktavyatvaṁ, yathā pratyakṣanirūpaṇānantaraṁ tatkāryatvenā'numānopamānayorubhayornirūpaṇaprāptau bahuvādisammatatvena prathamamanumāna eva jijñāsodayena anumānanirūpaṇena pratibandhaka-jijñāsānivṛttāvavasarasaṅgatyā upamānanirūpaṇamiti mantavyam."*). (5) **Nirvāhakaikya-saṅgati**: This refers to the contextual connectedness when more topics than one become due for exposition as, for example, the elaboration of parāmarśa and anumiti (inferential cognition) after perception (pratyakṣa) has been expounded. To explain: The exposition of parāmarśa and anumiti becomes due by nirvāhakaikya-saṅgati since it is only perception which has occasioned the exposition of more than one topic. (*"yathā pratyakṣanirūpaṇānantaraṁ parāmarśānumityornirūpaṇe nirvāhakaikyaṁ saṅgatiḥ."*) (6) **Kāryaikya-saṅgati**: This consists in expounding more concepts than one which are conducive to a single concept, for example, the exposition of vyāpti (concomitance) and the residence of the hetu (probans) in the pakṣa, that is 'pakṣadharmatā', becomes due by this connection when inferential cognition is going to be delineated. (*"yathā anumitilakṣaṇaikakāryānukūlatvasaṅgatyā pakṣadharmatāṁ nirūpayitum āha ityādau vyāptipakṣadharmatayoranumitilakṣaṇakāryaikyaṁ saṅgatiḥ."*) Besides these, there are other instances of connectedness which become applicable as a consequence of an objection (ākṣepa), a counter-example (udāharaṇa) and so on. In other words, many more instances of connectedness could be possible in a treatise other than the above-explained six saṅgatis.

[23] Vide *"brahma jijñāsitavyam ityuktam."* (Bhāṣyam, Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Section 1)

the previous Jijñāsādhikaraṇa,[24] the saṅgati of the present adhikaraṇa is also that of the 'prasaṅga-saṅgati'.[25]

3. Therefore, to this question, the venerable aphorist says: The term 'Bhagavān', which has been rendered as 'venerable' in Bhāṣya statement, literally means the 'Lord'. Bhāṣyakāra Ācārya Śaṅkara uses this expression for the Sūtrakāra, Śrī Veda Vyāsa, also called Bādarāyaṇa. From this usage of the Bhāṣyakāra, we are able to peep into his heart and observe the enormous reverence and devotion that Ācārya Śaṅkara has for the Sūtrakāra.

The term 'Bhagavān' is also reflective of the capacity of the Sūtrakāra Veda Vyāsa to comprehend the head and the heart (āśaya) of all his disciples – all of us who are students of the *Brahma-sūtra* – as evidenced by the definition of the term 'Bhagavān' found in the Smṛtis: *"utpattiṁ ca vipattiñca bhūtānāmāgatiṁ gatiṁ, vetti vidyāmavidyāṁ ca sa vācyo bhagavān iti* – The term 'Bhagavān' is denotative of Him who possesses the knowledge of the birth, sorrows, transmigration, knowledge and ignorance of all beings." This Lordly nature of the venerable Veda Vyāsa is well-known in the Paurāṇic literature. On the glory of Veda Vyāsa, Sage Parāśara declares thus: *"kṛṣṇadvaipāyano vyāsaḥ sākṣāt nārāyaṇo hyasau, ko hyanyaḥ puṇḍarīkākṣānmahābhāratakṛd bhaved* – Indeed Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana Vyāsa is verily the Lord Nārāyaṇa for who else than lotus-eyed Lord can be the author of such a *magnum opus* as the *Mahābhārata*?"[26]

Before we enter into the analysis of the Sūtra as explained by the Bhāṣyakāra it will be of added advantage if we understand in a little more detail the nature of svarūpa-lakṣaṇa, how the svarūpa-lakṣaṇa contrasts with taṭastha-

[24] Vide *"brahma ca vakṣyamāṇalakṣaṇaṁ 'janmādyasya yataḥ' iti."* (Bhāṣyam, Jijñāsādhikaraṇa, Section 11)
Also, vide *"kiṁlakṣaṇaṁ punaḥ tad brahma ityata āha bhagavān sūtrakāraḥ"* in the present section.

[25] Cf. किमाक्षेपे। नाऽस्त्येव लक्षणमित्यर्थः। आक्षेपेणास्योत्थानाद् आक्षेपसङ्गतिः। लक्षणद्योतिवेदान्तानां स्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्गानां लक्ष्ये ब्रह्मणि समन्वयोक्तेः श्रुतिशास्त्राध्यायपादसङ्गतयः। – रत्नप्रभा

[26] Cf. भगवानिति विशेषणेन सूत्रकारस्य शिष्याशयाभिज्ञतां दर्शयति। "उत्पत्तिं च विपत्तिञ्च भूतानामागतिं गतिम्। वेत्ति विद्यामविद्यां च स वाच्यो भगवानिति॥" (विष्णुपुराण ६.५.७८) इति स्मृतेः। भगवत्त्वं च तस्य सर्वपुराणप्रसिद्धम्। तथा चाह पराशरः "कृष्णद्वैपायनो व्यासः साक्षान्नारायणो ह्यसौ। को ह्यन्यः पुण्डरीकाक्षान्महाभारतकृद्भवेत्॥" इति। – वार्तिक

lakṣaṇa, and also how this Sūtra *"janmādyasya yataḥ"* functions directly as taṭastha-lakṣaṇa and from the context of the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad,* on which it is based, also graduates to the svarūpa-lakṣaṇa.

In contrast with the taṭastha-lakṣaṇa (definition *per accidens*), which is based on factors extraneous to the lakṣya (definiendum), the svarūpa-lakṣaṇa (intrinsic-nature definition) pertains to those aspects which constitute the very being of the definiendum – *"svarūpameva lakṣaṇaṁ svarūpalakṣaṇam."*

Whatever is expressed in language can at best be a metaphor of what is being defined or described, for language cannot even capture the empirical reality much less Brahman, the transcendental supreme Reality. Dharmarājādhvarīndra, the author of *Vedānta-paribhāṣā,* basing himself on the Upaniṣads, defines Brahman in terms of Truth, Knowledge and Infinity. These constitute the very nature of Brahman and hence Truth, Knowledge and Infinity form the svarūpa-lakṣaṇa of Brahman. Ānanda Jhā, the author of the gloss *Bhagavatī* on *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* elucidates this further: Svarūpa-lakṣaṇa of Brahman is that which, albeit imagined as a property, does not essentially differ from Brahman, the lakṣya (definiendum), but which being its very identity, constitutes the intrinsic-nature definition of Brahman. Truth, Knowledge, Infinity, Bliss and so on are the very being of Brahman; yet, the Upaniṣads press them into service, as though they are the properties of Brahman, just in order that it may be possible to identify the supreme Brahman for it is utterly evident that absolute Bliss, Truth, Consciousness and Infinity are not to be found in anything empirical (vyāvahārika) or illusory (prātibhāsika). So, they being the very nature of Brahman, satyam (Truth), jñānam (Consciousness), anantam (Infinity) and ānandam (Bliss) define Brahman.[27]

It will be of added advantage here to comprehend how Appayya-dīkṣita,

[27] Cf. तत्र लक्षणं द्विविधं स्वरूपलक्षणं तटस्थलक्षणं चेति तत्र स्वरूपमेव लक्षणं स्वरूपलक्षणम्। यथा सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्मेत्यादिकं स्वरूपलक्षणम्। तत्र—लक्षणप्रमाणयोर्मध्ये। तत्र—लक्षणयोर्मध्ये। स्वं—लक्ष्यं, तद्रूपमेव—तदात्मकं सदेव यल्लक्षणं—ज्ञापकं भवति, तत्स्वरूपलक्षणमिति भावः। इत्यादिकं—इति श्रुतिप्रतिपाद्यं सत्यज्ञानादिकम्। स्वरूपलक्षणं ब्रह्मण इति शेषः। अयं भावः—यत् तत्त्वतो न भिद्यते लक्ष्यात् किन्तु काल्पनिकधर्मभावापन्नं सद् लक्ष्यस्य परिचायकं भवति, तत्स्वरूपलक्षणम्। "यथा सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म," "आनन्दं ब्रह्म" इत्यत्र सत्यादिकं न ब्रह्मणो भिन्नं तन्मात्रस्यैव सत्पदार्थत्वात्। किन्तु तादात्म्येन तदादेः ब्रह्मण्येव सत्त्वं नाब्रह्मणि व्यावहारिके प्रातिभासिके वा कस्मिंश्चिदिति भवति तदादिकं लक्षणं ब्रह्मणः इति। – भगवतीव्याख्यासमेता वेदान्तपरिभाषा

the author of *Kalpataru-parimala*[28] construes the definition of Brahman given in the Sūtra, *"janmādyasya yataḥ,"* as indicating the svarūpa-lakṣaṇa through the means of taṭastha-lakṣaṇa. He calls our attention to the fact that such a lakṣaṇa (definition) has to be established as would differentiate the lakṣya (definiendum) from all other entities. He then explains the difference in the operation between taṭastha-lakṣaṇa and svarūpa-lakṣaṇa. A definition based on the incidental factors (taṭastha-lakṣaṇa) distinguishes the definiendum (lakṣya) from dissimilar entities (vijātīya-vastu) whereas the intrinsic-nature definition (svarūpa-lakṣaṇa) differentiates the definiendum (lakṣya) from similar entities (sajātīya-vastu) also. To explain: Through the taṭastha-lakṣaṇa 'śākhāgre candraḥ – the moon is that which is at the tip of the tree branch', the moon is differentiated from all the luminaries positioned in a different quarter, that is from the vijātīya luminaries. But by this taṭastha-lakṣaṇa the moon is not distinguished from the luminaries existing in the space over the tree branch where the moon has been indicated to exist. But, after the function of taṭastha-lakṣaṇa in differentiating the moon from all the luminaries of a different quarter is accomplished and then thereafter when the svarūpa-lakṣaṇa of the moon 'prakṛṣṭaprakāśaḥ candraḥ – superior effulgence is the moon' is employed, the moon stands differentiated even from those luminaries that are in the vicinity of the moon, that is from the sajātīya luminaries.

The definition of Brahman given in the aphorism, *"janmādyasya yataḥ,"* does not exactly define Brahman *per se* as being the causal factor, for the birth, the sustenance and the dissolution of the world are not such properties as would differentiate Brahman from all other entities such as Pradhāna and Puruṣa as these also could fall under the purview of the defining Sūtra *"janmādyasya yataḥ."* Therefore, Appayya-dīkṣita compares this definition of *"janmādyasya yataḥ"* with the taṭastha-lakṣaṇa of the moon as provided by the maxim of the moon over the tree branch (śākhāgre candraḥ). Thus the taṭastha-lakṣaṇa of Brahman is purported to differentiate Brahman from

[28] Cf. The *Bhāmatī* is the commentary on the *Brahmasūtra-śaṅkarabhāṣya*. On the *Bhāmatī* is the gloss *Kalpataru* by Amalānanda. The *Kalpataru-parimala* is the famous gloss by Appayya-dīkṣita on the *Kalpataru* of Amalānanda.

those causes which do not at all bear similarity to Brahman and does not differentiate Brahman from Pradhāna, Puruṣa and so on which are somewhat similar to Brahman in terms of their causality. Once the taṭastha-lakṣaṇa has accomplished its function of differentiating Brahman from dissimilar entities, the svarūpa-lakṣaṇa of Brahman *"ānandaṁ brahmeti vyajānāt* – He knew Bliss[29] as Brahman" garnered from the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad* tract (3.1) *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni"*[30] defines Brahman as the compact mass of Existence, Knowledge, Infinity and Bliss and thus differentiates Brahman from even those entities like Pradhāna and Puruṣa that seem similar to Brahman in the causality of the world. It is in this way that the Sūtra *"janmādyasya yataḥ,"* serves as taṭastha-lakṣaṇa *per se* and with reference to the context of the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad,* whereupon it is based, also serves as svarūpa-lakṣaṇa.

Appayya-dīkṣita elucidates this when he remarks that the aphorist purports to use the taṭastha-lakṣaṇa (definition *per accidens*) as a means to determine the svarūpa-lakṣaṇa (intrinsic-nature definition) of Brahman which alone differentiates Brahman from all entities as the superior effulgence (prakṛṣṭaprakāśaḥ) is meant to distinguish the moon from all other luminaries of the night sky.[31]

[29] From the context of the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad* the term 'ānanda' (Bliss) also implies 'satyam' (Reality), 'jñānam' (Consciousness) and 'anantam' (Infinity).

[30] For the whole *Taittirīya-upaniṣad* tract refer to Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Section 3, n.2. fn.16.

[31] Cf. सकलेतरव्यावृत्तलक्ष्यबोधनसमर्थमिह लक्षणं निर्धारणीयं, जगज्जन्मादिकं तु न तथा, किन्तु शाखाग्रे चन्द्र इतिवत्तटस्थलक्षणम्। यथा दिगन्तरस्थिततारकादिभ्य एव व्यावर्तकं, न तु शाखोर्ध्वदेशगतचन्द्रसमीपवर्तितारकादिभ्यः, एवं जगज्जन्मादिकमसम्भावितकारणभावेभ्य एव व्यावर्तकं, नतु सम्भावितकारणभावेभ्यः प्रधानपुरुषादिभ्यः। अतः प्रकृष्टप्रकाशवत्सकलेतरव्यावृत्तलक्ष्यबोधनसमर्थं स्वरूपलक्षणमेवेह तटस्थलक्षणद्वारा सूत्रकृता निर्दिधारयिषितं, नतु तटस्थलक्षणमेव। – कल्पतरुपरिमल

Also, cf. सर्वथाऽज्ञायमानं हि वस्तु प्रथमतस्तटस्थलक्षणेनाऽऽपाततः, अनन्तरं स्वरूपलक्षणेन प्रतिपद्यते—यथा 'शाखाग्रे चन्द्रः', 'प्रकृष्टप्रकाशश्चन्द्रः' इति। तत्र तटस्थलक्षणेनात्यन्तविजातीयव्यावृत्तिमात्रं क्रियते, सदृशविजातीयव्यावृत्तिस्तु स्वरूपलक्षणेन। – प्रदीप

Also, cf. तस्माद् ब्रह्मपरे वाक्ये जन्मादिधर्मजातस्योपलक्षणत्वाद् ब्रह्मसंस्पर्शाभावात् सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्तिसमन्वितं परमानन्दं ब्रह्मेति जन्मादिसूत्रेण ब्रह्मस्वरूपं लक्षितमिति सिद्धम्। – पञ्चपादिका

Also, cf. एवञ्च यद् जगज्जन्मस्थितिलयकारणं, तदानन्दस्वरूपं ब्रह्मेति स्वरूपलक्षणपरतयाऽपि जन्मादिसूत्रं योजितमिति द्रष्टव्यम्। – ऋजुप्रकाशिका

Also, cf. ननु जगतो जन्मादेर्वा ब्रह्मसम्बन्धाभावाद् न लक्षणत्वमित्याशङ्क्य तत्कारणत्वं लक्षणमिति पञ्चम्यर्थमाह यत इतीति। यच्छब्देन सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तमानन्दरूपं वस्तूच्यते। 'आनन्दाद्येव' (तै.उ.३.६) इति निर्णीतत्वात्, तथा च स्वरूपलक्षणसिद्धिरिति मन्तव्यम्। – रत्नप्रभा

2

[ब्रह्मलक्षणसूत्रम्]

जन्माद्यस्य यतः। (१।१।२)

2 A

[BRAHMALAKṢAṆASŪTRAM]

janmādyasya yataḥ. (1.1.2)

2 B

जन्मादि *janmādi* – that which begins with the birth; अस्य *asya* – of this; यतः *yataḥ* – whence

2 C

[SŪTRA DEFINING BRAHMAN[1]]

(Brahman is that) whence that which begins with the birth of this (world) ensues.

2 D

1. Sūtra defining Brahman: In the earlier section, it was discussed that the first aphorism, "*athāto brahmajijñāsā,*" enunciates the subject matter (viṣaya) of the treatise to be Brahman that is identical with the self (pratyagabhinnaṁ brahma). Thereupon, the sincere student raises a searching question about the nature of Brahman, or we may also posit that the hostile critic has raised a serious objection about the very possibility of Brahman being defined. It is only natural that the teacher should answer the question of the student, who is desirous of knowing that nature of Brahman in a direct manner, and also meet directly the criticism advanced by the Pūrvapakṣin who controverts the very possibility of defining Brahman. In the present aphorism, "*janmādyasya yataḥ,*" the Sūtrakāra executes both these tasks effectively, as though in a single stroke, by offering a splendid definition of Brahman, the nature of which is identical with the self.

As stated in the earlier section, the whole of the first chapter (Samanvayādhyāya), starting from the next, that is the third aphorism *"śāstrayonitvāt,"* is devoted to establishing that all the Upaniṣadic enunciations are the means, evidence or grounds (pramāṇa) that support the authenticity of the definition being offered presently in the second Sūtra, *"janmādyasya yataḥ,"* as all Upaniṣadic enunciations are only meant to teach this nature of Brahman in the manner presented by the second Sūtra. Thus, there is a remarkable harmony and complete unanimity among these Upaniṣadic enunciations, the very means which reveal the nature of Brahman. It is because of this reason that the first chapter goes by the name 'Samanvayādhyāya', that is the 'chapter on harmony or unanimity' among the Upaniṣadic enunciations, the means of knowledge (pramāṇa). The present topical section Janmādyadhikaraṇa is thus a vital part of the entire Samanvayādhyāya.

The whole of the second chapter has been devoted to proving that the nature of Brahman as taught in the Janmādyadhikaraṇa is in no way contradicted by the Smṛti (traditional code of law) or by the principles of logic (tarka) or by any other Scriptural enunciation (Veda-vākya). It is because of this reason that the second chapter is known by the title 'Avirodhādhyāya', that is the 'chapter establishing the absence of contradiction'.

The third chapter of the *Brahma-sūtra* concentrates mainly on the sādhana or the means and methodology as well as certain topics associated with the sādhana that assist the aspirant in realising and experiencing Brahman (Brahmāvagati or Brahmānubhava) which is non-different from the Self (pratyagabhinnaṁ brahma) as defined in the Janmādyadhikaraṇa. It is for this reason that the third chapter is known as 'Sādhanādhyāya', that is the 'chapter on the means'.

The fourth, that is the last chapter of the *Brahma-sūtra,* largely contains topics that discuss the phala (result) gained from the Realisation of Brahman as being identical with the Self (pratyagabhinnaṁ brahma), which is the very subject matter of the present Sūtra *"janmādyasya yataḥ."* The fourth chapter is therefore rightly termed 'Phalādhyāya' or the 'chapter on the fruit'.

From the above discussion, it becomes abundantly clear that the teaching and conclusion of the Janmādyadhikaraṇa, which is the natural corollary of the previous Jijñāsādhikaraṇa, form an important section of the entire *Brahma-sūtra*. Thus, the Jijñāsādhikaraṇa and the Janmādyadhikaraṇa jointly play a pivotal role in guiding and steering the flow and course of the subject matter of the entire *Brahma-sūtra*. As these two adhikaraṇas and their conclusions constitute the crux of the Śāstra, the conclusions of all the other adhikaraṇas are expected to be in conformity with the conclusions arrived at in these two adhikaraṇas, so that they may enjoy the required śāstra-saṅgati. In view of all this, it is imperative for the student of the *Brahma-sūtra* to correctly understand the contents and the conclusions of these two adhikaraṇas.

3

[लक्षणसूत्रपदभाष्यम्]

जन्म उत्पत्तिः आदिः अस्य इति तद्गुणसंविज्ञानो बहुव्रीहिः। जन्मस्थितिभङ्गं समासार्थः।

जन्मनश्च आदित्वं श्रुतिनिर्देशापेक्षं, वस्तुवृत्तापेक्षं च। श्रुतिनिर्देशस्तावद् "यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते" (तै.उ.३.१) इति। अस्मिन् वाक्ये जन्मस्थितिभङ्गानां क्रमदर्शनात्। वस्तुवृत्तमपि जन्मना [1]लब्धसत्ताकस्य धर्मिणः स्थितिप्रलयसम्भवात्।

अस्य इति प्रत्यक्षादिसन्निधापितस्य धर्मिणः इदमा निर्देशः। षष्ठी जन्मादिधर्म-सम्बन्धार्था। यतः इति कारणनिर्देशः[1]।

3 A

[LAKṢAṆASŪTRAPADABHĀṢYAM]

janma utpattiḥ ādiḥ asya iti tadguṇasaṁvijñāno bahuvrīhiḥ. janmasthitibhaṅgaṁ samāsārthaḥ.

janmanaśca āditvaṁ śrutinirdeśāpekṣaṁ, vastuvṛttāpekṣaṁ ca. śruti-nirdeśastāvad "yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante" (Tai.U.3.1) iti. asmin vākye janma-sthitibhaṅgānāṁ kramadarśanāt. vastuvṛttamapi janmanā labdhasattākasya dharmiṇaḥ sthitipralayasambhavāt.

asya iti pratyakṣādisannidhāpitasya dharmiṇaḥ idamā nirdeśaḥ. ṣaṣṭhī janmādidharmasambandhārthā. yataḥ iti kāraṇanirdeśaḥ.

3 B

जन्म *janma* – birth; उत्पत्तिः *utpattiḥ* – origination; आदिः *ādiḥ* – is the first; अस्य *asya* – of this; इति *iti* – in this way; तद्गुणसंविज्ञानः बहुव्रीहिः *tadguṇasaṁvijñānaḥ bahuvrīhiḥ* – the bahuvrīhi compound in which the sense of the qualifying member figures; जन्मस्थितिभङ्गम् *janmasthitibhaṅgam* – the conglomerate of the birth, the sustenance and the destruction; समासार्थः *samāsārthaḥ* – is the meaning of the compound

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[1] ASS (fn.) लब्धात्मकस्य

[1] कारणत्वं कार्योत्पत्त्यादिनिरूपिताव्यभिचरितप्रयोजकत्वम्।

जन्मनः *janmanaḥ* – of the birth; च *ca* – indeed; आदित्वम् *āditvam* – the state of being the first; श्रुतिनिर्देशापेक्षम् *śrutinirdeśāpekṣam* – is based on the Scriptural statement; वस्तुवृत्तापेक्षम् *vastuvṛttāpekṣam* – based on the nature of things; च *ca* – as well as; श्रुतिनिर्देशः *śrutinirdeśaḥ* – the statement of the Scripture; तावत् *tāvat* – is thus; यतः *yataḥ* – whence; वै *vai* – indeed; इमानि *imāni* – these; भूतानि *bhūtāni* – beings; जायन्ते *jāyante* – are born; इति *iti* – thus; अस्मिन् *asmin* – in this; वाक्ये *vākye* – passage; जन्मस्थितिभङ्गानाम् *janmasthitibhaṅgānām* – among the birth, the sustenance and the destruction; क्रमदर्शनात् *kramadarśanāt* – because a sequence is seen; वस्तुवृत्तम् *vastuvṛttam* – the nature of things; अपि *api* – also; जन्मना *janmanā* – through the birth; लब्धसत्ताकस्य *labdhasattākasya* – that which has come into existence; धर्मिणः *dharmiṇaḥ* – of a substrate; स्थितिप्रलयसम्भवात् *sthitipralayasambhavāt* – because the sustenance and destruction can occur

अस्य इति *asya iti* – the word 'asya' ('of this'); प्रत्यक्षादिसन्निधापितस्य *pratyakṣādisannidhāpitasya* – of that which is presented by perception etc.; धर्मिणः *dharmiṇaḥ* – of the substrate; इदमा *idamā* – by the stem 'idam' ('this'); निर्देशः *nirdeśaḥ* – indication; षष्ठी *ṣaṣṭhī* – the sixth case-ending; जन्मादिधर्मसम्बन्धार्था *janmādidharmasambandhārthā* – has the sense of relating it to the attributes such as birth etc.; यतः इति *yataḥ iti* – the word 'yataḥ' ('whence'); कारणनिर्देशः *kāraṇanirdeśaḥ* – is the indication of the cause

3 C

[COMMENTARY ELUCIDATING THE WORDS OF THE DEFINING SŪTRA]

The compound word 'janmādi', which alternates with the string 'that which begins with birth', is a bahuvrīhi compound in which the sense of the qualifying member (janma) figures. The meaning of the compound word 'janmādi' is: 'the conglomerate of the birth, the sustenance and the destruction'.[1]

That the birth is mentioned at the beginning in the conglomerate is based on the Scriptural statement, as well as on the nature of things. The statement of the Scripture intended here is this (*Tai.U.*3.1): "Whence, indeed, these beings are born." In this passage, a sequence is seen among

the birth, the sustenance and the destruction. Also, the nature of things is such that the sustenance and the destruction are possible only in respect of a substrate that has come into existence through the birth.[2]

The stem 'idam' ('this') of the word 'asya' ('of this') is indicative of the substrate presented to us by perception etc.[3] The sixth case-ending in 'asya' ('of this') has the sense of relating the substrate to the attributes such as birth etc.[4] The word 'yataḥ' ('whence') is the indication of the cause.[5]

3 D

1. The compound word 'janmādi', which alternates with the string 'that which begins with birth', is a bahuvrīhi compound in which the sense of the qualifying member (janma) figures. The meaning of the compound word 'janmādi' is: 'the conglomerate of the birth, the sustenance and the destruction': The present sentence touches upon certain important grammatical points pertaining to Sanskrit compounds (samāsa). Therefore, it is good to have a preliminary knowledge of some of their salient features. In Sanskrit, 'samāsa' (compound word) is a 'padavidhi' (rule governing the word) in which semantically and syntactically connected case-inflected words undergo a grammatical process to become a single unit to yield a qualified sense.[2] There are mainly four compounds (samāsa) in Sanskrit grammar: (1) Avyayībhāva (2) Tatpuruṣa (3) Bahuvrīhi and (4) Dvandva.

The Avyayībhāva compound mostly has the first member as the prominent one and the compound assumes the role of an indeclinable (avyaya) although the second member is not an indeclinable. In the compound 'yathāmati' (matim anatikramya), meaning 'to the best of one's intelligence', the first member 'yathā' is an indeclinable (avyaya) and the second member 'mati' is not an indeclinable. But after the compounding of both the words has taken effect, the word 'mati' also behaves like an indeclinable in deference to the nature of the prominent word 'yathā'. Since the non-indeclinable word 'mati' has become an indeclinable, the compound is designated as 'Avyayībhāva'[3]

[2] Vide *"pṛthagarthānāṁ padānām ekārthībhāvaḥ samāsaḥ* – an act of integrating separate words into one."

[3] अनव्ययम् अव्ययं भवतीति अव्ययीभावः।

in accordance with the *Pāṇini-sūtra* (5.4.50), *"kṛbhvastiyoge sampadyakartari cviḥ,"* in association with the *Vārtika "abhūtatadbhāva iti vaktavyam."*

The word 'Tatpuruṣa', having the string 'tasya puruṣa', is itself a Tatpuruṣa compound. In Tatpuruṣa compounds, the meaning of the final member is mostly prominent. That is why the verb 'ānaya' (bring) in the sentence 'rājapuruṣam ānaya' has 'puruṣa' (the king's servant) as its object, and not 'rājan', the king. Besides the six types – dvitīyā-tatpuruṣa, tṛtīyā-tatpuruṣa, and so on – the Tatpuruṣa also has two sub-categories: (a) Dvigu and (b) Karmadhāraya. A Tatpuruṣa compound whose first member is a word denoting a number is called 'Dvigu',[4] for example, 'pañcagavam' ('a group of five cows'). A Tatpuruṣa compound which has co-referential words (samānādhikaraṇa) as its members is termed 'Karmadhāraya', for example, 'nīlotpalam' (blue lotus).

A compound which conveys the sense of the particle 'ca' (and)[5] in which all the meanings of the constitutent members are mostly prominent is termed a 'Dvandva' compound. As such, the verb usually agrees with the constitutent members, for example, 'rāmakṛṣṇau āgacchataḥ – Both Rāma and Kṛṣṇa come'.

The aphorism of Paṇini (2.2.24), *"anekamanyapadārthe,"* enjoins and defines Bahuvrīhi compound. When two or more words, usually in the nominative case, are optionally compounded to convey the sense of a word other than the constituents of the compound, the compound thus formed is termed 'Bahuvrīhi'. For example 'pītāmbaraḥ – one who wears yellow garments'.

The Bahuvrīhi compounds, apart from their many categories, have two important sub-categories: (1) Tadguṇa-saṁvijñāna-bahuvrīhi and (2) Atadguṇa-saṁvijñāna-bahuvrīhi. The following illustration will clarify these terms. The above-mentioned compound word 'pītāmbaraḥ' is a tadguṇa-saṁvijñāna-bahuvrīhi, since the person denoted by the compound word actually wears yellow garments. This means that in a tadguṇa-saṁvijñāna-bahuvrīhi, the meaning of the constituent members figures in the denotation

[4] Vide the *Pāṇini-sūtra* (2.1.52) *"saṅkhyāpūrvo dviguḥ."*
[5] Vide the *Pāṇini-sūtra* (2.2.29) *"cārthe dvandvaḥ."*

of the compound word. In contrast, when the meaning of the constitutent member or members of the compound does not figure in the denotation of the compound, then it is termed 'atadguṇa-saṁvijñāna-bahuvrīhi'.[6] In the sentence 'dṛṣṭasamudram ānaya – Bring the one who has seen the ocean', the word 'dṛṣṭasamudram' is an atadguṇa-saṁvijñāna-bahuvrīhi as the meaning of the constituent member 'samudra' (ocean) does not figure in the denotatum of the compound 'dṛṣṭasamudram'. To explain: When a 'dṛṣṭasamudra-person' is being brought, the ocean is not brought along with him! Hence this compound is an example of atadguṇa-saṁvijñāna-bahuvrīhi.[7]

In the context of the second aphorism, *"janmādyasya yataḥ,"* the word 'janmādi' is a Bahuvrīhi compound which signifies 'a conglomerate' or 'a group' ('samūha' or 'samāhāra') of 'the birth, the sustenance and the destruction'. This is conveyed by the Bhāṣya sentence: *"janmasthitibhaṅgaṁ samāsārthaḥ."*[8] This compound word 'janmādi' is a 'tadguṇa-saṁvijñāna-bahuvrīhi' for as such the group denoted by the compound 'janmādi' also includes the sense of the birth (janma) in it.[9] If the compound word 'janmādi' were an 'atadguṇa-saṁvijñāna-bahuvrīhi', the 'conglomerate' or the 'group' would not include janma (birth) in it. But then all the three – that is the birth, the sustenance and dissolution – are intended to be included for a logically

[6] Cf. तस्य बहुव्रीहिमुख्यार्थस्य अन्यपदार्थस्य विशेषणीभूतानां गुणानां समासघटकपदार्थानामपि संविज्ञानं सम्यग्बोधः यस्मिन् सः तद्गुणसंविज्ञानो बहुव्रीहिः तादृशसंविज्ञानशून्यः अतद्गुणसंविज्ञानबहुव्रीहिः।

[7] Cf. बहुव्रीहिसमासो द्विविधः—तद्गुणसंविज्ञानोऽतद्गुणसंविज्ञानश्च। तस्य समासस्य गुणानामवयवानामप्यन्यपदार्थवत् क्रियान्वयार्थं विज्ञाने तद्गुणसंविज्ञानबहुव्रीहिः, अन्यथा त्वपरः। विवक्षातश्चास्य समासस्य निर्णयः—कुत्रचित् चित्रगुमानयेति वाक्यस्य चित्रगोभिः साकमानयनविवक्षायां प्रयोगो भवति, कुत्रचिच्च नेति हि वस्तुस्थितिः। – प्रदीप

Also, cf. द्विविधो हि बहुव्रीहिः—तद्गुणसंविज्ञानाऽतद्गुणसंविज्ञानश्चेति। तत्र विगृह्यमाणपदार्थस्यान्यपदार्थोपसर्जनतया समासार्थेऽन्तर्भाव्य विज्ञानं यत्र भवति, स तद्गुणसंविज्ञानो बहुव्रीहिर्नाम भवति। तद्यथा—लम्बकर्णो देवदत्त इति। तमनन्तर्भाव्य तद्विज्ञानं यत्र, सोऽतद्गुणसंविज्ञानः—यथा चित्रगुर्देवदत्त इति। – वार्तिक

[8] In the expression *"janmasthitibhaṅgaṁ samāsārthaḥ,"* which is the Bhāṣya's explanation for the word 'janmādi' of the Sūtra *"janmādyasya yataḥ,"* the word 'janmasthitibhaṅgam' is in singular number and in the neuter gender implying that it is a samāhāra-dvandva. Being a samāhāra-dvandva, this word indicates the conglomeration of more features than one and as such the causes as described by the birth, the sustenance and the destruction are taken collectively, and not individually, to define Brahman. This is the reason why the compound word 'janmādi' in the aphorism *"janmādyasya yataḥ"* is purported to imply a conglomerate. Vide *"ato janmasthitibhaṅgairnirūpitāni trīṇi kāraṇatvāni militānyeva lakṣaṇamiti matvā sūtre samāhāro dyotita iti dhyeyam."* (*Ratnaprabhā*)

[9] Cf. तथा च जन्मनः समासार्थैकदेशस्य गुणत्वेन संविज्ञानं यस्मिन् बहुव्रीहौ स तद्गुणसंविज्ञान इत्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

tenable definition of Brahman. If the birth (janma) was not to be included in the conglomerate (samūha) denoted by the compound word 'janmādi', that is if this compound were to be atadguṇa-saṁvijñāna-bahuvrīhi, then it will not be possible to define Brahman as the efficient cause of the world.[10] And, if Brahman was to be defined only as the material cause by the Sūtra, "*janmādyasya yataḥ,*" then there will be over-pervasion (ativyāpti) of the definition of Brahman to the inert Pradhāna of the Sāṅkhyas. The Upaniṣads endeavour to define Brahman as both the material and the efficient cause of the world as we shall see in the sequel.[11] It is for this reason that the Bhāṣyakāra states that the compound 'janmādi' is a 'tadguṇa-saṁvijñāna-bahuvrīhi'.[12]

2. That the birth is mentioned at the beginning in the conglomerate is based on the Scriptural statement, as well as on the nature of things. The statement of the Scripture intended here is this (*Tai.U.*3.1): "Whence, indeed, these beings are born." In this passage, a sequence is seen among the birth, the sustenance and the destruction. Also, the nature of things is such that the sustenance and the destruction are possible only in respect of a substrate that has come into existence through the birth: The compound word 'janmādi' in the aphorism, "*janmādyasya yataḥ,*" presents birth in the first position among the triad of the birth, the sustenance and the destruction. All Āstika schools of Indian philosophy hold that these occur one after another in a never-ending cycle. This would mean that the birth of the world must have been preceded by its destruction and that destruction too preceded by sustenance, which sustenance again preceded by birth,

[10] Vide Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Section 5 D, n.4.

[11] Vide Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Section 5 D, n.4 and Section 3 D, n.5.

[12] Cf. जन्म आदिरस्य स्थित्यादेरित्यतद्गुणसंविज्ञाने स्थितिभङ्गमात्रं जन्मादिशब्दार्थः स्यात्। ततश्चोभयकारणत्वालाभान्नोपलक्षणत्वं सिध्येत्। न च स्थितिलयमात्रहेतुत्वं तथा, जन्महेतोरन्यत्वे लक्ष्यस्य परिच्छेदादब्रह्मत्वात्। अतो जन्मनोऽपि विशेष्यान्तर्भावाद् धर्मजातस्य संहतिप्रधानस्य हेतुर्ब्रह्मेत्युपलक्षणसिद्धिरित्यर्थः। – न्यायनिर्णय

Also, cf. प्रकृते च जन्मपदार्थमन्तर्भाव्यैव समासार्थविज्ञानाद् भवति तद्गुणसंविज्ञानो बहुव्रीहिः। अतद्गुणसंविज्ञाने तु स्थितिभङ्गयोरेव समासार्थत्वाद् नाभिमताभिन्ननिमित्तोपादानत्वरूपब्रह्मलक्षणसिद्धिः। कथं, तदुच्यते, यदि तावद् व्याकृतजगत्स्थितिभङ्गहेतुत्वं ब्रह्मलक्षणं विदध्यात्, तदा तन्निमित्तत्वविवक्षायामदृष्टादौ, उपादानत्वविवक्षायां तु परकल्पितप्रधानादावतिव्याप्तं स्याद्, उभयरूपहेतुत्वविवक्षायामपि मिलितयोरदृष्टप्रधानयोर्ब्रह्मत्वप्रसक्तिः। न च निमित्तत्वमत्र कर्तृत्वं विवक्षितं, येन नोक्तातिव्याप्तिरिति वाच्यं, स्थितिप्रलययोः कर्तृनिमित्तत्वादर्शनात्तद्विवक्षानुपपत्तेः। न हि घटादेरुत्पत्तौ कुलालादितन्त्रत्वे दृष्टेऽपि स्थितिप्रलययोस्तत्तन्त्रत्वं दृष्टं, येन तद्धेतुत्वमात्रात् तत्कर्तृत्वलाभः स्याद्, अप्रामाणिकत्वेनासम्भवप्रसङ्गात्। तस्मात् तल्लाभार्थं जन्मग्रहणं कर्तव्यं, तस्य कर्तृनियतत्वदर्शनेनासम्भवासम्भवात्। – वार्तिक

and the birth preceded again by destruction and thus the unending cycle of the birth, the sustenance and the destruction. That being the case, the Pūrvapakṣin argues that to describe birth as the first member of the triad is arbitary and misleading.

It is by way of meeting this objection of the Pūrvapakṣin that the Ācārya makes the statement: "*janmanaśca āditvaṁ śrutinirdeśāpekṣam vastuvṛttāpekṣaṁ ca.*" The thought conveyed by this Bhāṣya statement is that the Sūtrakāra can mention only one of the members of the triad as the first. Suppose, he has chosen the sustenance or the destruction as the first member of the triad, that is 'sthityādi' or 'bhaṅgādi' respectively, the same question as to why sustenance (sthiti) and destruction (bhaṅga) have been chosen as the first member of the triad would certainly arise.[13] This being the case, the Sūtrakāra has preferred to mention birth as the first member of the triad since it is in line with the Upaniṣadic enunciation: "*yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante, yena jātāni jīvanti yatprayantyabhisaṁviśanti. tad vijijñāsasva. tad brahma* – That whence verily these beings are born; that by which, these that are born, live; and that to which, when departing, these return; that you should seek to know – that is Brahman." Indeed, the Upaniṣadic passage on the basis of which the Sūtrakāra is presenting the definition of Brahman describes the members of the triad in a definite sequence of the birth, the sustenance and the destruction. Therefore, the Bhāṣyakāra argues that the Sūtrakāra is well-justified in describing birth to be the first member of the triad.

Even then a question could arise: Is not the sequence delineated by the Upaniṣadic passage an arbitrary one? To answer this question, the Ācārya cites the nature of the things (vastuvṛtta) as the deciding factor in determining the order of the members of the triad of the birth, the sustenance and the dissolution.[14] Indeed, both the Upaniṣads and the Sūtrakāra have followed only that sequence which is universally observable in the nature of all things

[13] Even if the Sūtrakāra were to mention all the members of the triad by their individual names, then too he will have to choose one sequence or the other. Even then questions could arise: Why 'janmasthitibhaṅgam'? Why not 'sthitibhaṅgajanma'? And, why not 'bhaṅgajanmasthiti'?

[14] Cf. ननु आदित्वं जन्मनः कथं ज्ञातव्यं संसारस्याऽनादित्वाद् इत्यत आह—जन्मनश्चेति। मूलश्रुत्या वस्तुगत्या च आदित्वं ज्ञात्वा तदपेक्ष्य सूत्रकृता जन्मन आदित्वमुक्तमित्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

and beings – being born, they are found to exist and then later perish.[15] Hence, there is no question of any arbitrariness at all on the part of either the Śruti or the Sūtrakāra.

The extract of the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad*, cited in the Bhāṣya, which refers to the above-mentioned sequence of the birth, the sustenance and the destruction, is indicative of the whole of the first six sections of the third chapter of the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad*.[16] This, the Ācārya himself makes it clear in the final section of his commentary of this Sūtra by citing the range of the Upaniṣadic tract and thereby bringing to our attention the extent of the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad* that is to be taken for consideration and deliberation in this Sūtra *"janmādyasya yataḥ."*

3. The stem 'idam' ('this') of the word 'asya' ('of this') is indicative of the substrate presented to us by perception etc.: Having explained the term 'janmādi' of the aphorism, *"janmādyasya yataḥ,"* the Ācārya takes up the next word 'asya' for elucidation. This word consists of two parts: (a) the undeclined stem 'idam' and (b) the sixth or the possessive case-ending 'sya'. The Bhāṣya gives their denotations sequentially.

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[15] Cf. नहि प्रलीय तिष्ठति। स्थित्वा वा जायते। नापि जनित्वैव प्रलीयते, क्षणिकत्वनिराकरणात्। अतो जनित्वा स्थित्वा प्रलीयते। एवमादिरयं प्रपञ्चः। – पञ्चपादिका

Also, cf. एतत्सूत्रलक्षितवाक्ये जन्माऽऽदौ निर्दिष्टं यस्माद्, यस्माच्च वस्तुनो वृत्तं स्वभावोऽपि जनित्वा स्थित्वा प्रलीयत इत्येवंभूतः, अलब्धात्मकस्य जन्मना स्थितिप्रलययोरसम्भवाद्, अतो जन्मन आदित्वमित्यर्थः। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

[16] भृगुर्वै वारुणिः। वरुणं पितरमुपससार। अधीहि भगवो ब्रह्मेति। तस्मा एतत्प्रोवाच। अन्नं प्राणं चक्षुः श्रोत्रं मनो वाचमिति। तꣳ होवाच। यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते। येन जातानि जीवन्ति। यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति। तद्विजिज्ञासस्व। तद् ब्रह्मेति। स तपोऽतप्यत। स तपस्तप्त्वा॥ १॥ इति प्रथमोऽनुवाकः॥

अन्नं ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात्। अन्नाद्ध्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते। अन्नेन जातानि जीवन्ति। अन्नं प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्तीति। तद्विज्ञाय। पुनरेव वरुणं पितरमुपससार। अधीहि भगवो ब्रह्मेति। तꣳ होवाच। तपसा ब्रह्म विजिज्ञासस्व। तपो ब्रह्मेति। स तपोऽतप्यत। स तपस्तप्त्वा॥ १॥ इति द्वितीयोऽनुवाकः॥

प्राणो ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात्। प्राणाद्ध्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते। प्राणेन जातानि जीवन्ति। प्राणं प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्तीति। तद्विज्ञाय। पुनरेव वरुणं पितरमुपससार। अधीहि भगवो ब्रह्मेति। तꣳ होवाच। तपसा ब्रह्म विजिज्ञासस्व। तपो ब्रह्मेति। स तपोऽतप्यत। स तपस्तप्त्वा॥ १॥ इति तृतीयोऽनुवाकः॥

मनो ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात्। मनसो ह्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते। मनसा जातानि जीवन्ति। मनः प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्तीति। तद्विज्ञाय। पुनरेव वरुणं पितरमुपससार। अधीहि भगवो ब्रह्मेति। तꣳ होवाच। तपसा ब्रह्म विजिज्ञासस्व। तपो ब्रह्मेति। स तपोऽतप्यत। स तपस्तप्त्वा॥ १॥ इति चतुर्थोऽनुवाकः॥

विज्ञानं ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात्। विज्ञानाद्ध्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते। विज्ञानेन जातानि जीवन्ति। विज्ञानं प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्तीति। तद्विज्ञाय। पुनरेव वरुणं पितरमुपससार। अधीहि भगवो ब्रह्मेति। तꣳ होवाच। तपसा ब्रह्म विजिज्ञासस्व। तपो ब्रह्मेति। स तपोऽतप्यत। स तपस्तप्त्वा॥ १॥ इति पञ्चमोऽनुवाकः॥

आनन्दो ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात्। आनन्दाद्ध्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते। आनन्देन जातानि जीवन्ति। आनन्दं प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्तीति। सैषा भार्गवी वारुणी विद्या। परमे व्योमन्प्रतिष्ठिता। स य एवं वेद प्रतितिष्ठति। अन्नवानन्नादो भवति। महान्भवति प्रजया पशुभिर्ब्रह्मवर्चसेन। महान् कीर्त्या॥ १॥ इति षष्ठोऽनुवाकः॥

The expression 'idamā' of the Bhāṣya means 'idam iti prakṛtyā – by the stem idam' and it denotes 'this world', that is the world which we all experience as an object of our cognition. It is to be noted that the word 'idam' (this) is a pronoun and wherever it occurs, its denotation depends on such external factors (bahiraṅga-hetu) like the context (prakaraṇa), the words juxtaposed (samabhivyāhāra) and so on. It is through these external factors (bahiraṅga-hetu) that it connotes a particular entity or a set of limited entities. But when those external factors (bahiraṅga-hetu) are absent – as we observe in the present case – the word, 'idam' ('this') by its very nature, connotes the totality of all that we are experiencing as 'this'. This explains why the Bhāṣyakāra describes the denotation of 'idam' as indicative of the substrate (dharmin) that is presented to us by the means of knowledge such as perception.[17] Therefore, the word 'idam' (this) denotes all that is knowable (prameya), through all the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) – perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna), verbal authority (śabda), presumption (arthāpatti) and non-apprehension (anupalabdhi).[18] The Ācārya prefers to refer to the denotation of 'idam' (this) as the 'substrate' (dharmin) – and not as 'world' (jagat) – since the denotation of 'idam' (this) is purported to constitute the substratum (dharmin) of all our experiences of attributes (dharma) of every description in this world,[19] including the very attributes of the birth, the sustenance and the destruction of the whole world in its entirety as expressed by the compound 'janmādi'.

4. The sixth case-ending in 'asya' ('of this') has the sense of relating the substrate to the attributes such as birth etc.: The main purpose of the sixth

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[17] Cf. "अस्य" इति भाष्येण पदभागस्येदमः प्रकृतिमात्रस्यार्थनिर्देशः। तथाहि—सर्वत्र सर्वनाम प्रक्रमादिकारणान्तरबलेन कतिपयाभिधेयपरं, तदभावे स्वमहिम्ना प्रमाणविषयमात्राभिधायकम्। – पञ्चपादिका

Also, cf. सर्वनाम्नो हि बुद्धिस्थमात्रे शक्तिः। यत्रोपपदप्रक्रमादि तत्सङ्कोचकमुपलभ्यते, तत्र तद्वशाद् द्रव्यादिशब्दवत् सामान्यवाचकमपि सर्वनाम बुद्धिस्थविशेषेऽवधार्यते, नान्यथा, सर्वनामत्वव्याघातात्, प्रकृते तूपपदप्रक्रमादितत्सङ्कोचकाभावादविशेषेण प्रत्यक्षादिभिः षड्भिः प्रमाणैस्तदाभासैश्चोपस्थापितं बुद्धौ सन्निधीयमानं प्रपञ्चमात्रमिदमा निर्दिश्यते। – वार्तिक

[18] Cf. इदमः प्रत्यक्षार्थमात्रवाचित्वमाशङ्क्य उपस्थितसर्वकार्यवाचित्वमाह—अस्येतीति। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. इदमः सन्निहितवाचित्वात् प्रत्यक्षमात्रपरामर्शित्वमाशङ्क्य प्रतीतिमात्रं सन्निधिरिति गृहीत्वा प्रातिपदिकार्थमाह—अस्येति। – न्यायनिर्णय

Also, cf. सङ्कोचकारणाभावात्प्रत्यक्षादिसन्निधापितं समस्तं गृह्यत इत्यर्थः। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

[19] Such as 'This is cow', This is white', 'This runs' and so on

or the genitive case-ending is to refer to a suitable relation by which the denotation of its stem may be related to the denotation of the juxtaposed word.[20] In the present context, the sixth case-ending is to be taken only in the sense of relation in general and not in the sense of any particular relation because no single relation can connect the complete world of names and forms, which is the meaning of the stem 'idam', having the denotation of 'janmādi', which is the conglomerate of the birth, the sustenance and the destruction.[21]

From the above discussion an important point on the nature of Brahman becomes evident as a corollary. By employing the word 'asya', in the aphorism *"janmādyasya yataḥ,"* and thereby specifying that the world, that is the effect (kārya-prapañca), is the denotation of the stem 'idam', it becomes emphasised that this world of names and forms alone is related to the 'janmādi' (birth etc.), and not Brahman, the cause (kāraṇa) of this world. Brahman thus ever remains unconnected with 'janmādi', that is the birth, the sustenance and the destruction. Based on this observation, we can conclude that the Sūtrakāra does not advocate the 'brahmapariṇāma-vāda', that is the theory that Brahman transforms itself into its effect, the world. For, according to this theory, the cause also, in the process of transforming itself into the effect,[22] gets related to the 'janmādi' (birth, sustenance and destruction).

5. The word 'yataḥ' ('whence') is the indication of the cause: The word 'yataḥ' occurring in the aphorism, *"janmādyasya yataḥ,"* is virtually the same as has been used in the Upaniṣadic passage (*Tai.U.*3.1), *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni*

[20] षष्ठ्याः स्वप्रकृत्यर्थस्य समभिव्याहृतपदान्तरार्थान्वयप्रयोजकसम्बन्धाभिधायकत्वम्।

[21] Birth (janma) signifies the relation of the entity with the first moment of its existence (ādyakṣaṇasambandha); sustenance (sthiti) denotes the entity remaining in existence or its continuing to be alive (sthāyitvam avicchinnajīvitvaṁ vā); and destruction (bhaṅga), the entity's relation with annihilation (nāśa) at its last moment of its existence. The world is thus related with these three features of the birth, the existence and the destruction by three different relations and not by a single relation.

Cf. ननु जन्मादीनां जगतश्च कः सम्बन्धः? इत्यपेक्षायां सर्व एव सम्बन्धः सम्भवतीत्याह—षष्ठीति। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

[22] That is like the milk that transforms itself into curd. This transformation theory (pariṇāma-vāda) seems to have been advocated by some early pre-Śaṅkara Advaita teachers, obviously under the influence of the Sāṅkhya system and is also propounded by the Viśiṣṭādvaitins of the post-Śaṅkara era.

jāyante," which has already been cited above.[23] The word 'yataḥ' is derived by adding the secondary suffix 'tasil' (tas) to the pronominal stem 'yad'. The suffix 'tasil' carries the sense of the ablative case-ending[24] which indicates the causal source by the Pāṇinian rule (1.4.30) "*janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ.*" The causal source of the agent of the verbal root 'jan' ('to be born') is the 'apādāna' or 'the ablative'. To express this, the fifth case-ending is added to the word in order that the causal source becomes denoted.

The word 'yataḥ', occurring in the Sūtra, "*janmādyasya yataḥ,*" is also meant to convey the sense of causality indicated by the instrumental (third) and the accusative (second) case-endings in 'yena' and 'yat' found in the following two consecutive Upaniṣadic passages, "*yena jātāni jīvanti, yat prayanti abhisaṁviśanti,*" of the same *Taittirīya-upaniṣad* (3.1) passage quoted above. Here, in the Janmādi-sūtra, the suffix 'tas' in 'yataḥ' is thus the substitute for the second case ending, third case ending, fifth case ending and the seventh case ending (i.e. yat, yena, yasmāt and yasmin respectively) as prescribed by the Pāṇinian rule (5.3.14) "*itarābhyo'pi dṛśyante.*"

In this manner the word 'yataḥ' in the aphorism is meant to comprehend the entire range of causality: yat, yena, yasmāt and yasmin. This is the actual deeper import of the Bhāṣya sentence: "*yataḥ iti kāraṇanirdeśaḥ.*"

The stem of 'yataḥ', that is 'yad', is a relative pronoun and is a correlate of 'tad', denoting Brahman. Consequently, the pronoun 'tad', conveying the sense of Brahman, is to be mentioned in the correlative sentence containing the pronoun 'yad' so that the argument may be concluded. The Bhāṣya takes up this task in the very next section[25] that sums up the thoughts presented by the Sūtra "*janmādyasya yataḥ.*"

The Ācārya's statement, "*yataḥ iti kāraṇanirdeśaḥ* – The word 'yataḥ' ('whence') is the indication of the cause," deserves close examination. The

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[23] Refer to n.2, fn.16 of the present Section.

[24] Vide "*pañcamyāstasil.*" (*Pāṇini-sūtra,* 5.3.7)

[25] "तद् ब्रह्म" इति वाक्यशेषः।

Indian philosophical systems, by and large, classify causes (kāraṇa) into two categories: the upādāna-kāraṇa (the material cause) and the nimitta-kāraṇa (efficient cause). The clay is the material cause of a pot and the potter is its efficient cause. It is in this context that a valid query about the nature of Brahman's causality with regard to the world could arise: Does Brahman constitute the material cause of the world or its efficient cause or both? Later, when towards the end of the first chapter (samanvayādhyāya), in a set of five aphorisms (1.4.23-27) beginning with *"prakṛtiśca pratijñādṛṣṭāntānuparodhāt,"* the Sūtrakāra concludes his discussion on the samanvaya (harmony) of the Upaniṣadic enunciations he, so to say, recalls the purport of the present aphorism, *"janmādyasya yataḥ,"* and establishes in that section that Brahman constitutes simultaneously the material as well as the efficient cause of the world. In other words, the causality is comprised of both the materiality (upādānatva) and the operativeness (nimittatva), a unique 'two-in-one'. This, the philosophers have termed as 'abhinna-nimittopādāna-kāraṇa' (the causalities of material and operative blended into one).

Anticipating this important prospective conclusion by the aphorist, now in the present aphorism itself, the Ācārya uses the expression *"yataḥ iti kāraṇanirdeśaḥ"* and thereby indicates that the word 'yataḥ' in the aphorism, *"janmādyasya yataḥ,"* is purported to mean both the above-mentioned causalities – upādāṇa-kāraṇa (material cause) and nimitta-kāraṇa (efficient cause) – both blended into one.

4

[लक्षणवाक्यभाष्यम्]

अस्य जगतः नामरूपाभ्यां व्याकृतस्य, अनेककर्तृभोक्तृसंयुक्तस्य, प्रतिनियतदेश-कालनिमित्तक्रियाफलाश्रयस्य मनसा अपि अचिन्त्यरचनारूपस्य जन्मस्थितिभङ्गं[1] यतः सर्वज्ञात् सर्वशक्तेः कारणाद् भवति 'तद् ब्रह्म' इति वाक्यशेषः।

4 A

[LAKṢAṆAVĀKYABHĀṢYAM]

asya jagataḥ nāmarūpābhyāṁ vyākṛtasya, anekakartṛbhoktṛsaṁyuktasya, pratiniyatadeśakālanimittakriyāphalāśrayasya manasā api acintyaracanārūpasya janmasthitibhaṅgaṁ yataḥ sarvajñāt sarvaśakteḥ kāraṇād bhavati 'tad brahma' iti vākyaśeṣaḥ.

4 B

अस्य जगतः *asya jagataḥ* – of this world; नामरूपाभ्याम् *nāmarūpābhyām* – by name and form; व्याकृतस्य *vyākṛtasya* – differentiated; अनेककर्तृभोक्तृसंयुक्तस्य *anekakartṛbhoktṛsaṁyuktasya* – containing many agents and enjoyers; प्रतिनियत-देशकालनिमित्तक्रियाफलाश्रयस्य *pratiniyatadeśakālanimittakriyāphalāśrayasya* – which is the abode of well-defined places, times, causes, actions and fruits; मनसा अपि *manasā api* – even by the mind; अचिन्त्यरचनारूपस्य *acintyaracanārūpasya* – the nature of whose design is inconceivable; जन्मस्थितिभङ्गम् *janmasthitibhaṅgam* – the conglomerate of the birth, the sustenance and the destruction; यतः *yataḥ* – whence; सर्वज्ञात् *sarvajñāt* – from the omniscient; सर्वशक्तेः *sarvaśakteḥ* – from the omnipotent; कारणात् *kāraṇāt* – from the cause; भवति *bhavati* – happens; तत् *tat* – that is; ब्रह्म *brahma* – Brahman; इति *iti* – this; वाक्यशेषः *vākyaśeṣaḥ* – is the complementary part of the sentence

4 C

[THE COMMENTARY ELUCIDATING THE STATEMENT OF DEFINITION[1]]

Of this world – which is differentiated by name and form,[2] containing

[1] जन्म च स्थितिश्च भङ्गश्च तेषां समाहारः।

many agents and enjoyers,[3] the abode of well-defined places, times, causes, actions and fruits,[4] the nature of whose design is inconceivable even by the mind[5] – of this very world whence ensues the conglomerate of the birth, the sustenance and the destruction, that omniscient and omnipotent cause – 'That is Brahman'. This is the complementary part of the aphoristic statement so as to complete its sense.[6]

4 D

1. The commentary elucidating the statement of definition: While writing the Bhāṣya for this section, it is evident that the Ācārya has kept in mind the ancient philosophical disputation that is echoed in the Upaniṣadic literature (*Śve.U.*1.1-2): *"kiṁ kāraṇaṁ brahma kutaḥ sma jātā jīvāma kena kva ca sampratiṣṭhāḥ, adhiṣṭhitāḥ kena sukhetareṣu vartāmahe brahmavido vyavasthām. kālaḥ svabhāvo niyatiryadṛcchā bhūtāni yoniḥ puruṣa iti cintyā, saṁyoga eṣāṁ na tvātmabhāvād ātmāpyanīśaḥ sukhaduḥkhahetoḥ* – Students of the Vedas deliberate among themselves: What is the cause? Is it Brahman? Whence are we born? By what are we sustained? Where is our final rest? Under whose dispensation, we, who know the Vedas, are subjected to joy and sorrow? Time, Nature, Law of Karma, Yadṛcchā (chance), Elements, the Prakṛti (primary material), Ātman (individual) – neither these nor a combination of all these can be the cause on examination since all these are under the control of the conscious Self. The individual too cannot be the cause as it is also under the grip of joy and sorrow which are the results of actions and hence the individual too is not a master of itself."

It will become evident from the sequel that the four adjectives used by the Bhāṣya passage to describe the world, that is the effect, justifies the causality of Brahman alone and rejects that of others.[2]

The Bhāṣya text of this Section 4 is closely associated with that of the Section 6 of the Janmādyadhikaraṇa for both are devoted to establish the causality of

[2] Cf. प्रधानकालग्रहलोकपालक्रियायदृच्छास्वभावं ब्रह्म जगज्जन्मादिकारणमिति कुतः सम्भावनेत्यत आह अस्य जगत इति। – भामती

Brahman with reference to the world as delineated in the second aphorism *"janmādyasya yataḥ."* The discussion in the intermediate Section 5 is only to remove a possible error in understanding the meaning of 'janmādi' that is elaborated in the present section.

In this Bhāṣya passage, four detailed and purportful adjectives are used for describing the world. These adjectives are meant to justify the two attributes of omniscience (sarvajñatva) and omnipotence (sarvaśaktimattva)[3] that are shown as belonging to Brahman, the cause of the world, which cause is denoted by the term 'yataḥ' ('whence') in the Sūtra *"janmādyasya yataḥ."*

The following is the structural analysis of the Bhāṣya passage of this section. The compound 'janmasthitibhaṅgam', that is the 'conglomerate of the birth, the sustenance and the destruction' that the Bhāṣyakāra refers to in this section constitutes the final sense of the compound 'janmādi' as already explained in the earlier section. In the complementary part, *"tad brahma* – That is Brahman" that has been supplied (adhyāhṛta) by the Bhāṣyakāra to complete the sentence-sense (vākyārtha), the word 'tad' (that) is to correlate the relative pronoun 'yataḥ' ('whence' or 'from which') of the Sūtra *"janmādyasya yataḥ."* Likewise, the verb 'bhavati' ('happens' or 'ensues') is also added (adhyāhṛta) to complete the sentence-sense (vākyārtha). The noun 'Brahman' (brahma) is drawn (anuvṛtta) from the preceding first aphorism on brahma-jijñāsā – *"athāto brahmajijñāsā"* for it is as a consequence of the brahma-jijñāsā (desire to know Brahman) that there arises the second Sūtra in order to answer the question: *"kiṁ tad brahma* – What is that Brahman?"

2. Of this world – which is differentiated by name and form: This description of the universe, the effect, postulates the special causality (asādhāraṇa-kāraṇatva) of a sentient entity with regard to the creation of the world as the efficient cause (nimitta-kāraṇa) and thereby rejects the causality of non-sentient beings like the Time, Nature, Pradhāna and so on. This is so because the things that are differentiated by name and form, such as a pot and a

[3] Refer to the expression *"sarvajñāt sarvaśakteḥ kāraṇāt"* of the Bhāṣya sentence in this section.

cloth, are found to be invariably created by sentient (cetana) entities alone like a potter and a weaver respectively.

It is the sentient being alone that can conceive forms and thereafter create them as external entities possessing definite forms with specific names, such as a pot, a cloth and so on. Therefore, the creatorship with regard to a pot – let alone the universe – cannot belong to any insentient entity.[4]

3. containing many agents and enjoyers: This description of the world is meant to preclude the causality of the world originating from intelligent deities like Indra, Lokapāla (guardian deities), Graha (planetary deities) and so on for these deities themselves happen to be the agents and enjoyers of their actions and their respective results. Hence, they also fall under the category of the world (jagatkoṭi) with regard to which the causality is presently being investigated. Therefore, it is certain that these intelligent beings too cannot be the efficient cause of the universe.[5]

[4] Cf. अत्र नामरूपाभ्यां व्याकृतस्य इति चेतनभावकर्तृकत्वसम्भावनया प्रधानाद्यचेतनकर्तृकत्वं निरुपाख्यकर्तृकत्वं च व्यासेधति। यत्खलु नाम्ना रूपेण च व्याक्रियते तच्चेतनकर्तृकं दृष्टं यथा घटादि। विवादाध्यासितं च जगन्नाम्ना रूपेण च व्याकृतं तस्माच्चेतनकर्तृकं सम्भाव्यते। चेतनो हि बुद्धावालिख्य नामरूपे घट इति नाम्ना रूपेण च कम्बुग्रीवादिना बाह्यं घटं निष्पादयति। अत एव घटस्य निर्वर्त्यस्याप्यन्तःसङ्कल्पात्मना सिद्धस्य कर्मकारकभावः 'घटं करोति' इति। यथाहुः "बुद्धिसिद्धं तु न तदसद्" इति। तथा चाचेतनो बुद्धावनालिखितं करोतीति न शक्यं सम्भावयितुमिति भावः। – भामती

Also, cf. कारणस्य सर्वज्ञत्वादिसम्भावनार्थानि जगतो विशेषणानि यथा कुम्भकारः प्रथमं कुम्भशब्दाभेदेन विकल्पितं पृथुबुध्नोदराकारस्वरूपं बुद्धावालिख्य तदात्मना कुम्भं व्याकरोति बहिः प्रकटयति तथा परमकारणमपि स्वेक्षितं नामरूपात्मना व्याकरोति इत्यनुमीयते इति मत्वाऽऽह नामरूपाभ्यामिति। इत्थम्भावे तृतीया आद्यकार्यं चेतनजन्यं कार्यत्वात् कुम्भवदिति प्रधानशून्योर्निरासः। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. व्याक्रियमाणं हि वस्त्वभिधेयरूपं स्वनामगर्भं विकल्पपूर्वमेव व्याक्रियत इति स्वसंवेद्यमेतत्। – पञ्चपादिका

Also, cf. घटादौ स्वनामरूपगर्भविकल्पपूर्विका व्याक्रिया स्वसंवेद्या, अतो जगत्कार्यस्यापि तथाभावादचेतनाभावकर्तृकत्वं न सम्भवतीति भावः। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

Also, cf. प्रधानादिहेतुत्वनिरासेन ब्रह्महेतुत्वं सम्भावयितुं कार्यप्रपञ्चं श्रुतिसिद्धं द्वैराश्येन विशिनष्टि नामेति। तृतीयेत्थम्भावे। घटादौ स्वनामरूपगर्भविकल्पपूर्वकव्याक्रियादृष्टेः जगतोऽपि तथात्वानुमानादचेतनाभावकर्तृकत्वमयुक्तम्। विमतं चेतनभावकर्तृकं नामरूपात्मकत्वाद् घटादिवदित्यर्थः। – न्यायनिर्णय

[5] Cf. चेतना ग्रहा लोकपाला वा नामरूपे बुद्धावालिख्य जगज्जनयिष्यन्ति कृतम् उक्तस्वभावेन ब्रह्मणेत्यत आह अनेककर्तृभोक्तृसंयुक्तस्य इति। – भामती

Also, cf. हिरण्यगर्भादिजीवजन्यत्वं निरस्यति अनेकेति। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. तर्हि चेतना भावरूपाश्च ग्रहा लोकपाला अन्येऽपि वा जीवा नामरूपे बुद्धावालिख्य जगज्जनयिष्यन्ति किं ब्रह्मणेति अत आह अनेककर्तृभोक्तृसंयुक्तस्येति। तदेवं कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वमपि नामरूपात्मकत्वात् कार्यप्रपञ्चान्तर्गतमिति जीवकर्तृकत्वमपि निरस्तम्। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

Also, cf. तर्हि चेतना भावाश्च जीवभेदा नामरूपे बुद्धावालिख्य जगज्जनयिष्यन्ति किं ब्रह्मणेत्याशङ्क्याह अनेकेति। – न्यायनिर्णय

In this expression *"anekakartṛbhoktṛsaṁyuktasya,"* we can observe that the Bhāṣyakāra has made a mention of both the kartā (the agent of action) and the bhoktā (the enjoyer of the fruits of the action). Such a mention is meaningful for we can notice that the kartā and the bhoktā could be different in certain actions and their respective results. The cook cooks food for his master who is its enjoyer. So, too, the priest (ṛtvik) performs the rituals for the yajamāna (host of the ritual) who alone is the enjoyer of the results of those rites. In the case of the Śrāddha ritual, the son performs the annual ceremonies for the departed ancestors who become their enjoyers. Here, the son is the kartā, and not the bhoktā. So, too, in the Vaiśvānara-iṣṭī, which is performed by the father at the birth of the son for his welfare, the father is merely the kartā while the son is the bhoktā. Thus, the purpose is well-served when the Bhāṣyakāra includes both the kartā and bhoktā in the compound word *"anekakartṛbhoktṛsaṁyuktasya."*[6]

4. the abode of well-defined places, times, causes, actions and fruits: Ānandagiri, the author of *Nyāyanirṇaya* and Govindānanda, the author of *Ratnaprabhā* explain the compound *"pratiniyatadeśakālanimitta-kriyāphalāśrayasya"* of the Bhāṣya statement as: *"pratiniyatāni vyavasthitāni deśakālanimittāni yeṣāṁ kriyāphalānāṁ tadāśrayasya* – which is the abode of actions whose fruits are well-defined by definite places, occasions and causes."[7]

Vācaspati-miśra, the author of *Bhāmatī* resorts to a different explanation: *"(deśaḥ kālaḥ nimittaṁ kriyā phalaṁ ca) deśakālanimittakriyāphalāni iti itaretaradvandvaḥ. deśādīni ca tāni pratiniyatāni ceti vigrahaḥ. tadāśrayaḥ jagat, tasya."* According to this interpretation the world is the abode of definite places, definite times, definite causes, definite acts and definite fruits. To explain: Certain creatures like the black antelope is seen only in the upper ranges of the Himalayas (pratiniyata-deśa) and nowhere else; the cuckoo calls

[6] Cf. केचित्कर्तारो भवन्ति, यथा सूदर्त्विगादयः, न भोक्तारः। केचित्तु भोक्तारः, यथा श्राद्धवैश्वानरेष्यादिषु पितापुत्रादयः, न कर्तारः। तस्मादुभयग्रहणम्। – भामती

[7] Cf. कारणस्य सर्वज्ञत्वं सम्भावयति प्रतिनियतेति। प्रतिनियतानि व्यवस्थितानि देशकालनिमित्तानि येषां क्रियाफलानां तदाश्रयस्येत्यर्थः। स्वर्गस्य क्रियाफलस्य मेरुपृष्ठं देशः देहपातादूर्ध्वं कालः उत्तरायणमरणादिनिमित्तं प्रतिनियतम्। एवं राजसेवाफल-ग्रामादेर्देशादिव्यवस्था ज्ञेया। तथा च यथा सेवाफलं देशाद्यभिज्ञदातृकं तथा कर्मफलं फलत्वादिति सर्वज्ञत्वसिद्धिरिति भावः। – रत्नप्रभा
Also, cf. प्रतिनियतानि...निर्मातुमर्हतीत्यर्थः। – न्यायनिर्णय
Also, cf. कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वमपि...उत्तरायणादिमरणमस्य। – पञ्चपादिका

only during the spring time (pratiniyata-kāla) of the year; the impregnation of the storks (balāka) is by definite causes (pratiniyata-nimitta) as that of the thunder clap of the early clouds of the rainy season; some sacrificial acts are restricted (pratiniyata-kriyā) for the brāhmaṇa, some for the kṣatriya and so on; some enjoy definite fruits (pratiniyata-phala) of joy, some sorrow, and the very persons who were happy become miserable and the miserable turn happy too.

Indeed this universe is a cosmos – not chaos! Such a universe of such definite regulated happenings cannot be effected by accident or by an insentient entity. No entity that is short of omniscience and omnipotence can be postulated as the Creator of this exceptionally well-regulated and well-designed cosmos.[8]

5. the nature of whose design is inconceivable even by the mind: This description emphasises the above-mentioned point of the Creator being omniscient (sarvajña) and omnipotent (sarvaśakti) more forcefully.[9] The nature of the design and function of even a physical body pertaining to one single individual is beyond the range of comprehension of our mind. Then, far more remote, indeed, should be the chance of any person comprehending the design, nature, function and so on of all the countless and wonderful varieties of objects and beings that populate this wondrous, magnificent and variegated universe, let alone the more complicated task of creating them all![10]

[8] Cf. देशकालनिमित्तक्रियाफलानि इतीतरेतरद्वन्द्वः। देशादीनि च तानि प्रतिनियतानि चेति विग्रहः। तदाश्रयो जगत् तस्य। केचित्खलु प्रतिनियतदेशोत्पादाः यथा कृष्णमृगादयः। केचित्प्रतिनियतकालोत्पादाः यथा कोकिलारवादयः। केचित्प्रतिनियतनिमित्ताः यथा नवाम्बुदध्वानादिनिमित्ता बलाकागर्भादयः। केचित्प्रतिनियतक्रियाः यथा ब्राह्मणानां याजनादयः नेतरेषाम्। एवं केचित्प्रतिनियतफलाः यथा केचित्सुखिनः केचिद्दुःखिनः एवं य एव सुखिनस्त एव कदाचिद्दुःखिनः। सर्वमेतदाकस्मिकापरनाम्नि यादृच्छिकत्वे च स्वाभाविकत्वे चासर्वज्ञासर्वशक्तिकर्तृकत्वे च न घटते परिमितज्ञानशक्तिभिर्ग्रहलोकपालादिभिर्ज्ञातुं कर्तुं चाशक्यत्वात्। – भामती

Also, cf. किञ्चित्कार्यं...दृश्यन्त इति। – प्रदीप

Also, cf. प्रतिनियतानि...जीवकर्तृकत्वं वा न युक्तमिति भावः। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

[9] The above interpretation follows the *Bhāmatī*. But, according to *Ratnaprabhā* of Govindānanda and *Nyāyanirṇaya* of Ānandagirī the earlier description of *"pratiniyatadeśakālanimitta-kriyāphalāśrayasya"* indicates the omniscience (sarvajñatva) while the present one indicates the omnipotence (sarvaśaktimattva) of the Creator. Vide *Ratnaprabhā: "kāraṇasya sarvajñatvaṁ sambhāvayati – pratiniyateti"* and *"sarvaśaktitvaṁ sambhāvayati – manasā'pīti."*

[10] Cf. एकस्या अपि हि शरीररचनाया रूपं मनसा न शक्यं चिन्तयितुं कदाचित्, प्रागेव जगद्रचनायाः, किमङ्ग पुनः कर्तुमित्यर्थः। – भामती

One may observe and enjoy the beauty of the measured presentation of the points pertaining to the nature of Brahman as presented in the Bhāṣya: The first description *"nāmarūpābhyāṁ vyākṛtasya* – differentiated by name and form" is meant to deny the non-sentient entities being the Creator; the second description of *"anekakartṛbhoktṛsaṁyuktasya* – containing many agents and enjoyers" denies sentient but finite deities being the Creator; and the third *"pratiniyatadeśakālanimittakriyāphalāśrayasya* – the abode of well-defined places, times, causes, actions and fruits" is expressive of the omniscience and omnipotence of the Creator. The fourth one *"manasā api acintyaracanārūpasya* – the nature of whose design is inconceivable even by the mind" goes on to confirm unequivocally this omniscience and omnipotence of the Creator.

6. of this very world whence ensues the conglomerate of the birth, the sustenance and the destruction, that omniscient and omnipotent cause – 'That is Brahman'. This is the complementary part of the aphoristic statement so as to complete its sense: After describing the world by four descriptions which go to show that the Creator of the world has to be omniscient (sarvajña) and omnipotent (sarvaśakti), the Bhāṣya says that such a world as this cannot but have a cause that is omniscient and omnipotent.That omniscient and omnipotent cause whence ensues the conglomerate of the birth, the sustenance and destruction of the above-described world is Brahman.

By thus defining Brahman through its imagined incidental causality of the world, taṭastha-lakṣaṇa establishes the nature of Brahman, the Creator, to be omniscient (sarvajña) and omnipotent (sarvaśakti), which nature in turn is indicative of the real nature (svarūpa) of Brahman – that is non-dual (advitīyatva), of the nature of pure Existence and Consciousness (satyacidātmatva) and unsurpassed Bliss (atiśayasukhatva), for this nature of omniscience (sarvajñatva) and omnipotence (sarvaśaktimattva) is utterly non-dependent (svatantra) on anything whatsoever.[11]

[11] Cf. कल्पितकारणत्वेन सजातीयप्रधानादेर्विजातीयाच्च कार्याद् ब्रह्मव्यवच्छेदकतया जगद्धेतुत्वे तटस्थलक्षणे स्थिते ब्रह्मणः स्वरूपलक्षणं विवक्षन् विशिनष्टि सर्वज्ञादिति। अद्वितीयत्वं सत्यचिदात्मत्वं स्वतन्त्रतया निरतिशयसुखत्वं च विशेषणाभ्यां विवक्षितम्। – न्यायनिर्णय

The etymology of the word 'Sūtra' (aphorism) signifies "an utterance of a portion, suggestive of the whole."[12] In this aphorism, *"janmādyasya yataḥ,"* the word 'yataḥ' is a part of an Upaniṣadic tract and thereby suggestive of the entire Upaniṣadic tract *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante."*[13] In the same vein, this aphorism of the Janmādyadhikaraṇa, *"janmādyasya yataḥ,"* mentions only a part of the sentence that defines Brahman, and leaves to us the onus of completing the rest of the sentence. Therefore, the Bhāṣya completes the aphorism by supplying the complementing part of the sentence, *"tad brahma* – That is Brahman," so as to complete the entire sentence-sense (vākyārtha).[14] In fact, this expression *"tad brahma"* constitutes the complementary part of the Upaniṣadic tract (*Tai.U.*3.1) that defines Brahman as being the cause of the world.[15]

[12] एकदेशः सूत्र्यते इति सूत्रम् एकदेशेन अवयविनः सूचनात् सूत्रम्।

[13] That is, the first six sections of the third chapter of the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad*. Refer to Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Section 3 D, n.2, fn.16.

[14] Cf. सूत्रवाक्यं पूरयति तद्ब्रह्मेति वाक्यशेषः। – भामती

[15] *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante, yena jātāni jīvanti yatprayantyabhisamviśanti. tad vijijñāsasva. tad brahma* – That whence verily these beings are born; that by which, these that are born, live; and that to which, when departing, these return; that you should seek to know – that is Brahman."

5

[भावविकारविचारभाष्यम्]

अन्येषामपि भावविकाराणां त्रिष्वेवान्तर्भाव इति जन्मस्थितिनाशानामिह ग्रहणम्। यास्कपरिपठितानां तु "जायते अस्ति" इत्यादीनां ग्रहणे तेषां जगतः स्थितिकाले सम्भाव्यमानत्वाद्, मूलकारणाद् उत्पत्तिस्थितिनाशाः जगतो न गृहीताः स्युः इत्याशङ्क्येत। तन्मा [१]शङ्कि, इति [२]या उत्पत्तिः [३]ब्रह्मणः कारणात्, तत्रैव स्थितिः प्रलयश्च, [४]त एव गृह्यन्ते।

5 A

[BHĀVAVIKĀRAVICĀRABHĀṢYAM]

anyeṣāmapi bhāvavikārāṇāṁ triṣvevāntarbhāva iti janmasthitināśānāmiha grahaṇam. yāskaparipaṭhitānāṁ tu "jāyate asti" ityādīnāṁ grahaṇe teṣāṁ jagataḥ sthitikāle sambhāvyamānatvād, mūlakāraṇād utpattisthitināśāḥ jagato na gṛhītāḥ syuḥ ityāśaṅkyeta. tanmā śaṅki, iti yā utpattiḥ brahmaṇaḥ kāraṇāt, tatraiva sthitiḥ pralayaśca, ta eva gṛhyante.

5 B

अन्येषाम् *anyeṣām* – of all other; अपि *api* – also; भावविकाराणाम् *bhāvavikārāṇām* – modifications of being; त्रिषु एव *triṣu eva* – in these three themselves; अन्तर्भावः *antarbhāvaḥ* – inclusion; इति *iti* – hence; जन्मस्थितिनाशानाम् *janmasthitināśānām* – of the birth, of the sustenance and of the destruction; इह *iha* – here; ग्रहणम् *grahaṇam* – mention is made; यास्कपरिपठितानाम् *yāskaparipaṭhitānām* – cited by Yāska; तु *tu* – but; जायते *jāyate* – is born; अस्ति *asti* – exists; इत्यादीनाम् *ityādīnām* – and so on; ग्रहणे *grahaṇe* – if it were to be taken; तेषाम् *teṣām* – of them; जगतः *jagataḥ* – of the world; स्थितिकाले *sthitikāle* – during the period of existence; सम्भाव्यमानत्वात् *sambhāvyamānatvāt* – since they occur; मूलकारणात् *mūlakāraṇāt* – from the primal cause; उत्पत्तिस्थितिनाशाः *utpattisthitināśāḥ* – the birth, the

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[१] Tel, ASS शङ्किष्ट

[२] Could the orginal reading have been यतः instead of या?

[३] AA, ASS, NSP (I & II), CSS, KKK, SES ब्रह्मणः तत्रैव

[४] Tel, ASS ते गृह्यन्ते

sustenance and the destruction; जगतः *jagataḥ* – of the world; न गृहीताः स्युः *na gṛhītāḥ syuḥ* – would not be apprehended; इति *iti* – thus; आशङ्क्येत *āśaṅkyeta* – it could be doubted; तत् *tat* – in that way; मा शङ्कि *mā śaṅki* – one should not entertain a doubt; इति *iti* – thus; या उत्पत्तिः *yā utpattiḥ* – that birth; ब्रह्मणः *brahmaṇaḥ* – from Brahman; कारणात् *kāraṇāt* – from the cause; तत्र एव *tatra eva* – there itself; स्थितिः *sthitiḥ* – sustenance; प्रलयः *pralayaḥ* – dissolution; च *ca* – also; ते *te* – those; एव *eva* – alone; गृह्यन्ते *gṛhyante* – are to be apprehended

5 C

[COMMENTARY DELIBERATING ON THE MODIFICATIONS OF BEING[1]]

Since all other modifications are included in these three themselves, here mention is made of the birth, the sustenance and the destruction.[2] But, if the modifications of being cited by Yāska – "is born, exists and so on" – were to be taken here, since these modifications occur during the period of existence of the world – the birth, the sustenance and the destruction of the world from its primal cause would not be apprehended: thus it may be doubted! Lest one should doubt so,[3] the birth is verily from Brahman, the cause, there itself is its sustenance and also is its dissolution. These alone are apprehended in the aphorism.[4]

5 D

1. Commentary deliberating on the modifications of being: The term 'bhāvavikāra', which has been used for the first time by Yāska in his *Nirukta*, needs explanation. The constituent word 'bhāva' of the compound 'bhāvavikāra' is interpreted to be the meaning of a verbal root by the commentators on the *Nirukta*,[1] Pāṇini's Grammar[2] and Vākyapadīya.

However, Ācārya Śaṅkara uses the term 'bhāvavikāra' in the sense of the 'modifications of being' or 'modification of the existent things' because the very structure of the aphorism bears out this fact. The pronominal term 'asya' refers to the visible world and the three modifications of janma (birth), sthiti

[1] Cf. देहो जायते-अस्ति-वर्द्धते-विपरिणमते-अपक्षीयते-नश्यति। – निरुक्तनिघण्टु (१.१.३)

[2] Cf. षड्भावविकारा इति ह स्माह भगवान् वार्ष्यायणिः जायते अस्ति परिणमते वर्धते अपक्षीयते विनश्यति इति। – व्याकरणमहाभाष्य (१.३.१)

(sustenance) and laya (dissolution) evidently refer to this visible existent entity known as the world. So, it is not pertinent to construe the compound 'bhāvavikāra' as meaning the modifications of 'to be' or 'to become'[3] in the present context of the Janmādi-sūtra *"janmādyasya yataḥ."* The commentaries on *Śaṅkara-bhāṣya* namely *Bhāṣya-ratnaprabhā, Nyāyanirṇaya, Vedāntakalpataru-parimala* unequivocally interpret the compound word 'bhāvavikāra' to mean the 'modifications of being' alone.[4]

2. Since all other modifications are included in these three themselves, here mention is made of the birth, the sustenance and the destruction: It has been declared that the birth, the sustenance and the destruction of the world, that is the three bhāvavikāras, out of the six enumerated in Yāska's *Nirukta,*[5] ensue from Brahman, the cause. Now arises a question: Then what about the remaining three bhāvavikāras of the world enumerated by Yāska – transformation (vipariṇāma), growth (vṛddhi) and decay (apakṣaya)? Do these take place for the world from something other than Brahman?

It is this question that the Ācārya answers in the statement: *"anyeṣāmapi bhāvavikārāṇāṁ triṣvevāntarbhāva iti janmasthitināśānāmiha grahaṇam* – Since all other modifications are included in these three itself, here mention is made of the birth, the sustenance and the destruction." Herein, we observe that the Ācārya follows the very same technique adopted by Yāska, the Niruktakāra. In the context of the ṣaḍbhāvavikāras, Yāska states that though the bhāvavikāras are beyond number yet they could be included in the comprehensive list of six, the very ṣaḍbhāvavikāras. Taking this lead, the Bhāṣyakāra simply points out that these three bhāvavikāras – that is the birth (janma), the sustenance (sthiti) and the dissolution (nāśa) – are comprehensive enough to include within themselves all the remaining three

[3] Monier Williams has given in his Sanskrit dictionary the meaning of 'bhāvavikāra' as modification of 'to be' or 'to become'.

[4] Cf. यास्कादयः स्वकाले हेमादीनां विकारषड्कं दृष्ट्वा पठितवन्त इति। – कल्पतरुपरिमल
Also, cf. वस्तुनो वृत्तं जनित्वा, स्थित्वा, लीयत इति स्वभावः, जन्मना लब्धात्मकस्य स्थित्यादियोगात्। अतो नानादेः संसारस्यादिर्जन्म, किन्तु प्रतिवस्तु तस्यादित्वमिति, तदपेक्षं श्रुतिसूत्रयोस्तदादित्वमित्यर्थः। – न्यायनिर्णय

[5] The ṣaḍbhāvavikāras enumerated by Yāska in his *Nirukta* are as follows: janma (birth), asti (existence), vṛddhi (growth), vipariṇāma (modification), kṣaya (decay) and vināśa (death). Vide *"deho jāyate-asti-varddhate-vipariṇamate-apakṣīyate-naśyati."* (*Nirukta-nighaṇṭu,* 1.1.1)

bhāvavikāras, that is transformation (vipariṇāma), growth (vṛddhi) and decay (apakṣaya).

Though the Bhāṣyakāra does not explain how these three bhāvavikāras, could be included among the three bhāvavikāras of the birth (janma), the sustenance (sthiti) and the dissolution (nāśa), which he has specified as the meaning of the compound word 'janmādi', the glossators on the Bhāṣya have thrown ample light on this point. They explain that since transformation (vipariṇāma) and growth (vṛddhi) are only various forms of birth they get included in janma, and decay (apakṣaya) gets incorporated within nāśa or bhaṅga (destruction) as it is in a way nothing but a form of destruction.[6]

3. But, if the modifications of being cited by Yāska – "is born, exists and so on" – were to be taken here, since these modifications occur during the period of existence of the world – the birth, the sustenance and the destruction of the world from its primal cause would not be apprehended: thus it may be doubted! A question could be posed: By taking recourse to the grammatical technique of the 'tadguṇa-saṁvijñāna-bahuvrīhi',[7] the Ācārya has explained the expression 'janmādi' of the aphorism, "*janmādyasya yataḥ,*" in such a way that it yields the three bhāvavikāras of the birth, the sustenance and the destruction – "*janmasthitibhaṅgaṁ samāsārthaḥ.*" However, making use of the same technique, the Ācārya could have as well explained the compound word 'janmādi' to mean all the six bhāvavikāras enumerated by Yāska, the Niruktācārya, by stating that the compound word 'janmādi' means 'janmasthitipariṇāmavṛddhyapakṣayabhaṅgaṁ samāsārthaḥ'. Such a broad-based interpretation could also enjoy the high authority of Yāska's *Nirukta*, which is the venerated source for the Vedic exegesis.

Further, as the *Nirukta* affirms, the hexad of the bhāvavikāras could comprise within itself all the possible manifestations or forms of being

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[6] Cf. वृद्धिस्तावदवयवोपचयः। तेनाल्पावयवादवयविनो द्वितन्तुकादेरन्य एव महान्पटो जायत इति जन्मैव वृद्धिः। परिणामोऽपि त्रिविधः धर्मलक्षणावस्थालक्षणः उत्पत्तिरेव। धर्मिणो हि हाटकादेर्धर्मलक्षणः परिणामः कटकमुकुटादिः तस्योत्पत्तिः। एवं कटकादेरपि प्रत्युत्पन्नत्वादिलक्षणः लक्षणपरिणाम उत्पत्तिः। एवमवस्थापरिणामो नवपुराणत्वादिरुत्पत्तिः। अपक्षयस्तु अवयवहासो नाश एव। तस्माज्जन्मादिषु यथास्वमन्तर्भावाद्दूच्चादयः पृथङ्नोक्ता इत्यर्थः। – भामती

Also, cf. वृद्धिपरिणामयोर्जन्मनि, अपक्षयस्य नाशेऽन्तर्भाव इति भावः। – रत्नप्रभा

[7] Vide Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Section 3 D, n.1 for elaboration on tadguṇa-saṁvijñāna-bahuvrīhi.

(bhāvavikārān sarvān api). As a result, the aphorism, if interpreted in this suggested manner, could establish that whatever 'bhāvavikāra' comes into existence in the world, all ensue from Brahman alone, the cause of the world.

It is this serious objection of the Pūrvapakṣin that the Ācārya answers in the Bhāṣya sentence under deliberation. Before we proceed further, we may take cognisance of the fact that in Yāskā's *Nirukta*, it is only a certain earlier author and teacher, Vārṣyāyaṇi, who figures as the advocate of the ṣaḍbhāvavikāra doctrine. Again, in Patañjali's *Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya* too, the same author, Vāṛsyāyaṇi, is mentioned with reverence as the upholder of the ṣaḍbhāvavikāra doctrine.[8] Therefore, we have to understand that the appellation 'Yāska' in *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* is obviously in the sense of 'Yāska's *Nirukta*', that cites the theory of the ṣaḍbhāvavikāras of Vāṛsyāyaṇi.

Interpreting the Sūtra *"janmādyasya yataḥ"* in the light of *Nirukta's* ṣaḍbhāvavikāra thesis would not lead us to the definition of Brahman for the context in which the doctrine of ṣaḍbhāvavikāras is discussed in the *Nirukta* is not that of the causality of the world as deliberated in the Sūtra *"janmādyasya yataḥ"* but that of enumerating the modifications that entail for objects made of the five elements, that is the 'bhautika-padārthas'. Hence the *Nirukta* theory of the ṣaḍbhāvavikāras pertaining to the context of bhautika-padārthas does not suit the present context of the Sūtra *"janmādyasya yataḥ"* that is entirely meant to meet the demand for arriving at the definition of Brahman.[9]

Indeed, the doctrine of ṣaḍbhāvavikāras is intended to classify and organise into a system, all the multifarious modifications that belong to the bhautika-padārthas of the universe of today, that is the world that has already come to existence and continues to be vibrant with various activities since beginningless time. Therefore, the birth, the existence and the dissolution of the universe as such seem to fall far beyond the purview of the context of the ṣaḍbhāvavikāra doctrine. If the present Janmādi-sūtra *"janmādyasya yataḥ"* were to be based on, and to be explained in the light of, the context of such a *Nirukta* doctrine, then it would not serve the purpose of defining

[8] षड्भावविकारा इति ह स्माह भगवान् वार्ष्यायणिः जायते अस्ति परिणमते वर्धते अपक्षीयते विनश्यति इति। – व्याकरणमहाभाष्य (१.३.१)

[9] Vide *"brahma jijñāsitavyam ityuktam. kiṁlakṣaṇaṁ punaḥ tad brahma ityata āha bhagavān sūtrakāraḥ."* (Janmādyadhikaraṇa-bhāṣya, Section 1)

Brahman at all and hence would certainly not help the seeker comprehend Brahman as the prime cause of the birth, the sustenance and the dissolution of the universe. This being the case, if the ṣaḍbhāvavikāras of the *Nirukta* were to be presented as the denotation of 'janmādi' in the Sūtra "*janmādyasya yataḥ*," it is likely to confound the seeker as to whether this Janmādi-sūtra pertains to defining the five elements by deliberating on their causal nature in producing the objects of the world even though they themselves have sprung forth from Brahman.

Therefore, the Sūtra "*janmādyasya yataḥ*" needs to be rightly based on such passages like the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad* (3.1) that pertain to the birth, the sustenance and the dissolution of the entire world, including that of the five elements, from Brahman. This Scriptural passage occurs exactly in the context of defining Brahman as the material-cum-efficient cause (abhinna-nimittopādāna-kāraṇa) of the entire world.[10]

Though in this *Taittirīya* passage only three bhāvavikāras of the world – that is the birth, the existence and the destruction – have been mentioned yet, as discussed earlier these three could very well include within themselves all other remaining manifestations of existent beings – vṛddhi (growth), vipariṇāma (modification) and kṣaya (decay) also. Thus, the elucidation of the aphorism given by the Bhāṣyakāra based on the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad* is quite appropriate, and is exactly to the point.

Further, we are studying the *Brahma-sūtra* and as the Ācārya himself declares a little later these Sūtras are exclusively meant to elucidate and

[10] Cf. अथैते, वृद्ध्यादयो न जन्मादिष्वन्तर्भवन्ति तथाप्युत्पत्तिस्थितिभङ्गमेवोपादातव्यम्। तथा सति हि तत्प्रतिपादके "यतो वा इमानि भूतानि" इति वेदवाक्ये बुद्धिस्थीकृते जगन्मूलकारणं ब्रह्म लक्षितं भवति। अन्यथा तु जायते अस्ति वर्धते इत्यादीनां ग्रहणे तत्प्रतिपादकं नैरुक्तवाक्यं बुद्धौ भवेत्, तच्च न मूलकारणप्रतिपादनपरं महासर्गादूर्ध्वं स्थितिकालेऽपि तद्वाक्योदितानां जन्मादीनां भावविकाराणामुपपत्तेः इति शङ्कानिराकरणार्थं वेदोक्तोत्पत्तिस्थितिभङ्गग्रहणमित्याह यास्कपरिपठितानां तु इति। – भामती

Also, cf. यास्कमुनिः किल महाभूतानामुत्पन्नानां स्थितिकाले भौतिकेषु प्रत्यक्षेण जन्मादिषड्भमुपलभ्य निरुक्तवाक्यं चकार, तन्मूलीकृत्य जन्मादिषड्भकारणत्वं लक्षणं सूत्रार्थं इति ग्रहणे सूत्रकृता ब्रह्मलक्षणं न सङ्गृहीतम् किन्तु महाभूतानां लक्षणमुक्तमिति शङ्का स्यात्, सा मा भूदिति ये श्रुत्युक्ता जन्मादयस्त एव गृह्यन्ते इत्यर्थः। यदि निरुक्तस्याऽपि श्रुतिर्मूलमिति महाभूतजन्मादिकमर्थः तर्हि सा श्रुतिरेव सूत्रस्य मूलमस्तु किमन्तर्गडुना निरुक्तेनेति भावः। यदि जगतो ब्रह्मातिरिक्तं कारणं स्यात् तदा ब्रह्मलक्षणस्य तत्राऽतिव्याप्त्यादिदोषः स्याद् अतस्तन्निरासाय लक्षणसूत्रेण ब्रह्म विना जगज्जन्मादिकं न सम्भवति कारणान्तरासम्भवादिति युक्तिः सूत्रिता। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. यास्कवचनस्य हि पौरुषेयस्य मूलं तदीयं प्रत्यक्षमेव वक्तव्यम्। तच्च महाभूतसृष्ट्युत्तरकालं भौतिकानां षड्भावविकारगोचरं ततस्तन्मूलत्वे सूत्रस्य भूतषड्भकं ब्रह्मेति लक्षितं स्यादिति तस्माच्छ्रुतिसिद्धाविशेषितजन्माद्युपादानेन लक्षणसूत्रं प्रवृत्तमित्यर्थः। – प्रकटार्थविवरण

discuss only what the Upaniṣads teach and not what *Nirukta* or any other authority, however great it may be, teaches. All this lies at the heart of this assertion of the Bhāṣya that we have discussed.

4. the birth verily from Brahman, the cause, there itself is its sustenance and also is its dissolution. These alone are apprehended in the aphorism: This sentence is meant to remove some wrong notions that could arise from the erroneous understanding of the definition of Brahman that is voiced in the aphorism *"janmādyasya yataḥ."* These possible wrong notions are explained below:

(1) One may feel that the Sūtra has given three independent, full-fledged and complete definitions of Brahman here: the first definition, being the causality of the birth of the world, the second definition being the causality of the sustenance of the world and the third definition being the causality of destruction of the world.

(2) One may be inclined to conceive that Brahman is only the material cause of the world just as the clay is the material cause (upādāna-kāraṇa) of the pot but with respect to the efficient cause (nimitta-kāraṇa) of the world it should be something else other than Brahman, just as the potter who is different from the clay, the material cause, is the efficient cause of the pot.

(3) Again, let some entity other than Brahman be the cause of the sustenance of the world, just as the housewife is with regard to the pot by causing its maintenance by meticulously taking care of it. Also, let yet another entity be the cause of the destruction of the world, just as a child, which is other than the mother, could be the cause of the destruction of the pot by its carelessness.

All these wrong notions are dispelled by the above-mentioned statement of the Bhāṣya. It asserts that the aphorism gives only one and not three independent definitions of Brahman. Indeed, Brahman is the single locus or substratum in which the world takes its birth, in which it exists and, finally, into which it gets dissolved too.

The potter creates the pot thereby becoming its nimitta-kāraṇa (efficient cause of the pot). Distinct from the potter is the clay which is the material cause (upādāna-kāraṇa) of the pot which alone sustains (sthiti-kāraṇa) the

pot and into which alone the pot finally gets dissolved (laya-kāraṇa). But this kind of difference of nimitta-kāraṇa and upādāna-kāraṇa does not exist in the case of the causality of the world. Brahman alone, the Bhāṣya statement avers, is both efficient cause and the material of the world.

If Brahman were defined as merely the cause of the origination (janma-kāraṇa) of the world, then Brahman would be merely defined as nimitta-kāraṇa (efficient cause) of the world. If Brahman was described as the sthiti-kāraṇa and laya-kāraṇa alone, bereft of being the janma-kāraṇa, Brahman would just be only the upādāna-kāraṇa. The present Bhāṣya statement clarifies the intent of the Sūtra *"janmādyasya yataḥ"* by stating that Brahman is both the nimitta-kāraṇa and the upādāna-kāraṇa. In other words, a single causality with regard to the birth, the sustenance and the destruction of the world is the definition of Brahman, offered in the aphorism.[11] This unique causality, technically called 'abhinna-nimittopādāna-kāraṇatva' (a single causality of the efficient-cum-material cause) with reference to the universe is the attributive definition (dharma-lakṣaṇa) of Īśvara and constitutes the definition *per accidens* (taṭastha-lakṣaṇa) of the 'non-dual' Brahman of the Advaita-vedānta and paves the way for the intrinsic-nature definition (svarūpa-lakṣaṇa) of Brahman.[12]

What follows as a corollary from the above is this: The concept consisting in single causality of the efficient-cum-material cause is the core of the Janmādi-sūtra and the same does not come within the scope of the *Nirukta* thesis of ṣaḍbhāvavikāras. Hence, one should be vigilant and avoid the ṣaḍbhāvavikāras of the *Nirukta* while interpreting the aphorism *"janmādyasya yataḥ."*

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[11] Cf. नन्वेवमपि उत्पत्तिमात्रं सूच्यतां तन्नान्तरीयकतया तु स्थितिभङ्गं गम्यत इत्यत आह योत्पत्तिर्ब्रह्मणः कारणाद् इति। त्रिभिरस्योपादानत्वं सूच्यते उत्पत्तिमात्रं तु निमित्तकारणसाधारणमिति नोपादानत्वं सूचयेत् तदिदमुक्तं तत्रैव इति। – भामती
Also, cf. एवमप्युत्पत्तिरेव सूच्यतां तन्नान्तरीयकतया तत्स्थितिभङ्गं ज्ञास्यत इत्यत आह योत्पत्तिरित्यादि। उत्पत्तिमात्रं निमित्तकारणादपि सम्भवति ततस्त्रिभिरस्योपादानत्वं सूच्यते अनुपादाने स्थितिलयासम्भवादिति भावः। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

[12] Vide Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Section 1 D concluding portion and Section 4 D, n.6.

6

[लक्षणघटकयुक्तिः]

न यथोक्तविशेषणस्य जगतः यथोक्तविशेषणम् ईश्वरं मुक्त्वा, अन्यतः प्रधानाद् अचेतनाद्, [१]अणुभ्यो वा, अभावाद्वा, संसारिणो वा उत्पत्त्यादि सम्भावयितुं शक्यम्। न च स्वभावतः[1], विशिष्टदेशकालनिमित्तानाम् इह उपादानात्। एतदेव अनुमानं संसारिव्यतिरिक्तेश्वरास्तित्वादिसाधनं [२]मन्यन्ते ईश्वरकारणवादिनः।

6 A

[LAKṢAṆAGHAṬAKAYUKTIḤ]

na yathoktaviśeṣaṇasya jagataḥ yathoktaviśeṣaṇam īśvaraṁ muktvā, anyataḥ pradhānād acetanād, aṇubhyo vā, abhāvādvā, saṁsāriṇo vā utpattyādi sambhāvayituṁ śakyam. na ca svabhāvataḥ, viśiṣṭadeśakālanimittānām iha upādānāt. etadeva anumānaṁ saṁsārivyatirikteśvarāstitvādisādhanaṁ manyante īśvarakāraṇavādinaḥ.

6 B

न *na* – it is not; यथोक्तविशेषणस्य *yathoktaviśeṣaṇasya* – possessing the above-mentioned qualities; जगतः *jagataḥ* – of the world; यथोक्तविशेषणम् *yathoktaviśeṣaṇam* – possessing the above-described qualities; ईश्वरम् *īśvaram* – the Īśvara; मुक्त्वा *muktvā* – other than; अन्यतः *anyataḥ* – from anything else; प्रधानात् *pradhānāt* – from the Pradhāna; अचेतनात् *acetanāt* – the non-sentient; अणुभ्यः वा *aṇubhyaḥ vā* – or from the Atoms; अभावाद् वा *abhāvād vā* – or from the Non-being; संसारिणः वा *saṁsāriṇaḥ vā* – or from the transmigrating one; उत्पत्त्यादि *utpattyādi* – birth and so on; सम्भावयितुम् *sambhāvayitum* – to postulate; शक्यम् *śakyaṁ* – possible; न च *na ca* – nor can; स्वभावतः *svabhāvataḥ* – of its own accord; विशिष्टदेशकालनिमित्तानाम् *viśiṣṭadeśakālanimittānām* – of specific places, times, and means; इह *iha* – here; उपादानात् *upādānāt* – because of the acceptance; एतद् एव *etad eva* – this itself;

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[१] NSP (I & II), AA, CSS, KKK, SES अणुभ्यः अभावात् संसारिणो वा

[२] Tel ईश्वरकारणवादिनो मन्यन्ते। VV, AL मन्यन्ते ईश्वरकारणिनः

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[1] जगतः उत्पत्त्यादि सम्भावयितुं न शक्यम् इति अन्वयः। – रत्नप्रभा

अनुमानम् *anumānam* – as syllogism; संसारिव्यतिरिक्तेश्वरास्तित्वादिसाधनम् *saṁsāri-vyatirikteśvarāstitvādisādhanam* – capable of establishing the existence and so on of Īśvara, distinct from the transmigratory being; मन्यन्ते *manyante* – regard; ईश्वरकारणवादिनः *īśvarakāraṇavādinaḥ* – those who hold Īśvara as the cause

6 C

[ARGUMENT CONTAINED IN THE DEFINITION]

It is not possible to postulate the birth and so on of the world possessing the above-mentioned qualities, from anything other than Īśvara of the above-described qualities – neither from the Pradhāna, the insentient, nor from the Atoms, nor from the Non-being,[1] nor from the transmigrating one.[2] Nor can it come about of its own accord because of the acceptance of specific places, times and means here (for the production of results).[3] Those who maintain that Īśvara is the (efficient) cause (alone) of the world regard the above argument itself as the syllogism capable of establishing the existence and so on of Īśvara, distinct from the transmigrating being.[4]

6 D

1. It is not possible to postulate the birth and so on of the world possessing the above-mentioned qualities, from anything other than Īśvara of the above-described qualities – neither from the Pradhāna, the insentient,[2] nor from the Atoms, nor from the Non-being: In Section 4, we saw the Ācārya describing the world with four meaningful epithets, thereby establishing Īśvara,[3] the sentient being that is all-knowing (sarvajña) and all-powerful (sarvaśakti), to be the cause of the world and thus implicitly rejecting the

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[2] The Bhāṣyakāra has juxtaposed the qualifier 'acetanāt' between 'pradhānāt' and 'aṇubhyaḥ' thereby enabling 'acetanāt' to qualify both 'pradhānāt' and 'aṇubhyaḥ' by means of the 'dehalīdīpanyāya', that is the maxim (nyāya) of the lamp (dīpa) placed over the threshold (dehalī). To explain: Just as the lamp hanging over the threshold of a house, because of its unique position, serves to light the rooms on both sides, so too the term 'acetanāt' (insentient) serves to qualify both 'pradhānāt' and 'aṇubhyaḥ'.

[3] The term 'Īśvara' is intended to signify here the sentient primal efficient-cum-material cause of the world.

world's causality from non-sentient factors like the Pradhāna,[4] Atoms,[5] Time, Non-being and so on.[6] We observe that this very same idea, which the Ācārya has presented in the last section, has been explicitly reiterated in the present section.

2. nor from the transmigrating one: Having rejected the well-known theories of the non-sentient entities being the source of the world, the Bhāṣyakāra presently sets aside the theory of a sentient source other than Brahman, namely, the saṁsārin (jīva, the transmigrating self) such as the deities (Agni, Vāyu, etc.) as being the source of the world. The Ācārya states that just as the non-sentient entities, like the Pradhāna and the Atoms cannot be the cause of the world, the transmigratory self too cannot be even though it is sentient in nature. Because it is transmigratory, it cannot be omniscient and omnipotent, possessing which nature alone can the transmigratory self be posited as the source of the world of the description seen in Section 4 of the present Janmādyadhikaraṇa.

At this juncture, a question is bound to arise: The word 'saṁsārin' is indicative of the individual self. The Upaniṣadic declarations such as *"tat tvam asi* – That thou art" present the individual self as being non-different from Brahman. As a result of this identity between the individual self and Brahman, when Brahman is recognised as the cause of the world, the individual self too, it goes without saying, becomes the cause of the world. That being the case, how can one logically deny the individual self being the causal factor of the world?

It is true that the conclusion of the Upaniṣads is that the individual self is not different from the supreme Brahman. But, we should bear in mind the important fact that Brahman is pure sentience or consciousness

[4] The Sāṅkhya philosophers postulate Pradhāna which is non-sentient as the material cause of the world.

[5] 'Aṇu', translated as 'atoms', are considered to be material cause of the world by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers.

[6] Cf. नामरूपाभ्यां व्याकृतस्येत्यादीनां चतुर्णां जगद्विशेषणानां व्याख्यानावसरे प्रधानशून्ययोः संसारिणश्च निरासो दर्शितः। परमाणूनामचेतनानां स्वतः प्रवृत्त्ययोगाद् जीवादन्यस्य ज्ञानशून्यत्वनियमेनाऽनुमानात् सर्वज्ञेश्वरासिद्धौ तेषां प्रेरकाभावाद् जगदारम्भकत्वासम्भव इति भावः। – रत्नप्रभा

(śuddha-caitanya) having no attribute whatsoever (Nirguṇa-brahman). Īśvara too is the same sentience but conditioned (upahita) by the adjuncts such as omnipotence (sarvaśakti) and omniscience (sarvajña). The jīva is also basically the same pure sentience but is conditioned by (upahita) or delimited (avacchinna) by limited knowledge (kiñcijjñatva) and a very restricted potence (alpaśakti). The jīva is identical with Brahman only as far as its pure sentience aspect (śuddha-caitanyarūpeṇa) is concerned but its above-mentioned limiting attributes (paricchinnena jaivena rūpeṇa) are not identical with those of Brahman. Similarly, Īśvara and jīva are one as pure sentience but they are different as sentience conditioned by their respective contrary limiting attributes.[7] Again, just as jīva as pure sentience is one with Brahman so, too, is Īśvara identical with Brahman. Yet, as being endowed with the attributes of omniscience and omnipotence and of the consequential creatorship with regard to the world (jagat-kartṛtva), Īśvara is not identical with Brahman. It is because of this difference between Īśvara and Brahman that the creatorship of the world becomes the distinguishing attribute (vyāvartaka-lakṣaṇa) of Īśvara and thus the definition *per accidens* (taṭastha-lakṣaṇa) of Brahman.

The *Pañcapādikā* specifically identifies the 'saṁsārī', mentioned in the Bhāṣya, with 'Hiraṇyagarbha'.[8] Hiraṇyagarbha is the first born being having attributes such as omniscience, omnipotence and the creatorship of the world but all these are through the grace of the supreme Īśvara (Parameśvara or Maheśvara). The Sāṅkhya and Yoga systems identify Hiraṇyagarbha with Kapila, the founder of the Sāṅkhya school of philosophy, who is again identified with an avatāra or incarnation of Viṣṇu of the same name.[9]

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[7] This is just as the golden bracelet and necklace are one as gold but are different as ornaments with differentiating forms and names.

[8] Cf. संसारिणः हिरण्यगर्भात्। – पञ्चपादिका

[9] Vide the *Yoga-tattvavaiśāradī* (1.25) of Vācaspati-miśra: *"kapilo nāma viṣṇoravatāraviśeṣaḥ prasiddhaḥ svayambhūrhiraṇyagarbhastasyāpi sāṅkhyayogaprāptirvede śrūyate, sa eveśvara ādividvān kapilo viṣṇu svayambhūriti bhāvaḥ."*

In the *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* we observe that the Ācārya identifies this Hiraṇyagarbha with Prajāpati, whose body is all the three worlds put together (trailokya-śarīra) and describes Him to be the great Lord (Īśvara) through the grace of supreme Īśvara (parameśvarānugṛhīta) and who is the totality of all organs (sarva-karaṇātman) of all individual selves and as being subject to birth and dissolution. Also, the Ācārya refutes the tradition of identifying the Sāṅkhya Kapila with the omniscient first born Hiraṇyagarbha.[10]

This Hiraṇyagarbha is also in the realm of creation. He owes all His great might and knowledge to the grace of the supreme Īśvara. Hence, being within the ambit of the created, Hiraṇyagarbha too belongs to the world-category (jagat-koṭi) and hence He cannot be the *de facto* and *de jure* Creator of the world.

3. Nor can it come about of its own accord because of the acceptance of specific places, times and means here (for the production of results): In other words, the creation of the world cannot be accidental or without any external cause. The term 'svabhāva' here in the Bhāṣya statement signifies the non-requirement of any other external cause.[11] This Svabhāva-vāda, which is rank materialism,[12] denies the existence of any over-ruling cause like Īśvara and goes on to deny even the existence of the 'Śārīraka', that is 'the indweller of the physical body', the individual self. According to this school, all things are born, exist and perish of their own accord without any reason or any causal factor involved in their origination, sustenance or destruction. This idea, which they hold for the objects of the world, they extend to the world also and go on to assert that there is no cause behind the world either. Totally causeless is thus the creation of the world according to the Svabhāva-vāda.

[10] Vide *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* (1.2.23): *śrutismṛtyośca trailokyaśarīrasya prajāpaterjanmādi nirdiśyamānamupalabhāmahe—"hiraṇyagarbhaḥ samavartatāgre bhūtasya jātaḥ patireka āsīt. sa dādhāra pṛthivīṁ dyāmutemāṁ kasmai devāya haviṣā vidhema" (Ṛk-saṁhita, 10.121.1) iti. samavartatetyajāyatetyarthaḥ. tathā "sa vai śarīrī prathamaḥ sa vai puruṣa ucyate. ādikartā sa bhūtānāṁ brahmāgre samavartata" iti ca. vikārapuruṣasyāpi sarvabhūtāntarātmatvaṁ sambhavati prāṇātmanā sarvabhūtānāmadhyātmamavasthānāt. asmin pakṣe "puruṣa evedaṁ viśvaṁ karma" ityādisarvarūpopanyāsaḥ parameśvarapratipattiheturiti vyākhyeyam.* Also refer to *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya*, 1.3.13, 1.3.30 and 2.1.1.

[11] Cf. स्वभावो नाम अन्यानपेक्षा। – पञ्चपादिका

[12] Cf. स्वभावादेव विचित्रं जगदिति लोकायतः। – रत्नप्रभा

The Ācārya's refutation of this Svabhāva-vāda is as follows: Whatever is born in this world is never observed to be self-born. All effects are invariably found to take birth, or to exist, or to perish depending upon specific factors like suitable or unsuitable locality, conducive or adverse time, favourable or unfavourable climate and so on and so forth. If this is so for each of the objects of the world, the world too as such must have necessarily some cause other than itself for its origination, existence and destruction thus making the Svabhāva-vāda logically untenable.

Ratnaprabhā, the commentary on the Bhāṣya by Govindānanda, elaborates this concept of 'svabhāva' when it queries and analyses it: What does the term 'svabhāva' signify? Does it consist in being the cause of itself or does it signify the state of not requiring any cause for itself? The first conception of svabhāva does not hold good as it suffers from the defect of ātmāśraya.[13] The second conception is also not tenable as the effect does not come into existence without the aid of causes. We observe in our day-to-day life that those who have a desire for certain results take recourse to specific places, time and means for the specific result to be effected. In case it is still insisted that the absence of dependence on causes constitutes svabhāva, then those agriculturalists who have a longing to obtain food grains would not feel prompted to look for a specific piece of land, for the rainy season and the requisite seeds. Thus the *Ratnaprabhā* argues that the Svabhāvakāraṇa-vāda is utterly erroneous.[14]

4. Those who maintain that Īśvara is the (efficient) cause (alone) of the world regard the above argument itself as the syllogism capable of establishing the existence and so on[15] of Īśvara, distinct from the transmigrating being: When the topic of brahma-jijñāsā (desire to know Brahman) was introduced

[13] 'Ātmāśraya-doṣa' is one of the logical fallacies and can be translated as the defect of self-dependence. To explain with an example, if the defining attribute of 'one's knowledge' is dependent on 'one's knowledge', then this constitutes the logical fallacy of self-dependence (ātmāśraya).

[14] Cf. किं स्वयमेव स्वस्य हेतुरिति स्वभावः, उत कारणानपेक्षत्वम्। नाऽऽद्यः, आत्माश्रयात्। न द्वितीयः, इत्याह—विशिष्टेति। विशिष्टानि असाधारणानि देशकालनिमित्तानि तेषां कार्यार्थिभिरुपादीयमानत्वात् कार्यस्य कारणानपेक्षत्वं न युक्तमित्यर्थः। अनपेक्षत्वे धान्यार्थिनां भूविशेषे वर्षादिकाले बीजादिनिमित्ते च प्रवृत्तिर्न स्यादिति भावः। – रत्नप्रभा

[15] Cf. सर्वज्ञत्वम् आदिशब्दार्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

in the first Sūtra, *"athāto brahmajijñāsā,"* it led to the need for a definition of Brahman. Hence, the second aphorism, *"janmādyasya yataḥ,"* proceeded to define Brahman basing itself on the Upaniṣadic definition (lakṣaṇa) of it. It is to be noted that the function of the definition is merely to distinguish the defined one (lakṣya) from the rest (alakṣya) and that the definition (lakṣaṇa) by itself does not establish the actual existence of the entity that is defined.

On the basis of the existence of the effect, that is the observed world, one can certainly offer a proposition that there must be a single external cause or many causes for this world of names and forms.[16] But doubts do arise as to whether the cause of this world should be sentient or non-sentient, whether the cause should be one or many and so on. And only if the cause is decided to be one, and that too sentient, then alone it would follow as a corollary that this single sentient cause of the universe must be omniscient (sarvajña) and omnipotent (sarvaśakti).

When such many-pronged doubts arise, a careful investigator is expected to examine and analyse from various angles the feasibility and the pros and cons of each of these varied and divergent options and eliminate them one by one by his logical reasoning. Finally, the astute investigator would reach a postulation, a working hypothesis, favouring just one option of the many, which postulation awaits to be confirmed subsequently by an accepted pramāṇa (means of right knowledge).[17] It is thus evident that a postulation (sambhāvanā) first of all needs to be backed by a good logical argument (yukti). It is such an essential yukti (reasoning or syllogism) for arriving at the postulation that is stated by the Bhāṣyakāra, an adept in the subtle art of logical investigation in this sentence: *"na yathoktaviśeṣaṇasya jagataḥ yathoktaviśeṣaṇam īśvaraṁ muktvā, anyataḥ pradhānād acetanād, aṇubhyo vā, abhāvādvā, saṁsāriṇo vā utpattyādi sambhāvayituṁ śakyam. na ca svabhāvataḥ, viśiṣṭadeśakālanimittānām iha upādānāt."*

This yukti (reasoning) built by the Vedāntin in favour of the proposition or postulation of a single cause is mistaken by the Īśvarakāraṇa-vādins as

[16] Cf. पूर्वोक्तसर्वज्ञत्वादिविशेषणकम् ईश्वरं मुक्त्वा जगत उत्पत्त्यादिकं न सम्भवतीति भाष्येण कर्तारं विना कार्यं नास्तीति व्यतिरेक उक्तः। तेन यत् कार्यं, तत्सकर्तृकमिति व्याप्तिर्ज्ञायते। – रत्नप्रभा

[17] Cf. तदनेन प्रबन्धेन प्रतिज्ञाविषयस्य ब्रह्मस्वरूपस्य लक्षणद्वारेण सम्भावनोक्ता। तत्र प्रमाणं वक्तव्यम्। – भामती

an inference which they allege to be independently capable of establishing, without the aid of Scripture, the existence of Īśvara and His nature of omniscience, omnipotence and so on. This is the idea contained in the present statement of the Bhāṣya.[18] As to how their view is faulty, the Bhāṣya gives incisive arguments in the sequel.

Whom does the Ācārya refer to by the term 'Īśvarakāraṇavādinaḥ'? As the context suggests, the term signifies those who maintain that Īśvara is merely the efficient cause of the world.[19] The traditional commentators identify these philosophers with Vaiśeṣikas and the like (vaiśeṣikādayaḥ).[20] The Bhāṣya of the Māheśvara-pāśupatādhikaraṇa of the *Brahma-sūtra*, also known as 'Patyadhikaraṇa' (2.2.37-41), also speaks of the Māheśvara-Pāśupatas as being the foremost of the Īśvarakāraṇa-vādins and describes the Vaiśeṣikas to be mere adapters of the above Īśvarakāraṇa-vāda of the Māheśvaras by modifying it a little to suit their own doctrine of Atomism. Also, Bāṇa-bhaṭṭa (CE 600-650) in his well-known *Harṣacarita* refers to these Īśvarakāraṇa-vādins and mentions them quite separately from the Vaiśeṣikas. Therefore it is highly probable that by 'Īśvarakāraṇavādinaḥ', the Ācārya here means the Māheśvara-Pāśupatas as well as the philosophies of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school and such other schools of thought which have posited Īśvara as merely the efficient cause of the world. Though the *Vaśeṣika-sūtras* do not mention Īśvara, the later Vaśeṣikas have accepted the existence of Īśvara in their philosophical theses.

[18] Cf. एवेदेव व्याप्तिज्ञानं जगति पक्षे कर्तारं साधयत् सर्वज्ञेश्वरं साधयति, किं श्रुत्येति तार्किकाणां भ्रान्तिमुपन्यस्यति—एतदेवेति। एतदेव —अनुमानमेव साधनं न श्रुतिः इति मन्यन्ते इति योजना। – रत्नप्रभा

[19] ईश्वरस्य जगन्निमित्तकारणत्वमात्रवादिनः।

[20] Cf. ईश्वरकारणिनः ईश्वरमेव कारणं मन्यमाना वैशेषिकादयः। – प्रदीप
Also, cf. ईश्वरकारणिनः कणादप्रभृतयो मन्यन्ते। – पञ्चपादिका

7

[आक्षेपभाष्यम्]

ननु इहापि तदेव उपन्यस्तं जन्मादिसूत्रे।

7 A

[ĀKṢEPABHĀṢYAM]

nanu ihāpi tadeva upanyastaṁ janmādisūtre.

7 B

ननु *nanu* – is not; इह अपि *iha api* – here too; तद् एव *tad eva* – that same thing; उपन्यस्तम् *upanyastam* – has been presented; जन्मादिसूत्रे *janmādisūtre* – in the aphorism "Brahman is that whence that which begins with the birth of this world ensues"

7 C

[COMMENTARY RAISING THE OBJECTION]

Is not, here too, that same thing has been presented in the aphorism, "Brahman is that whence that which begins with the birth of this world ensues."

7 D

This Bhāṣya statement is the encapsulation of the serious objection of the Īśvarakāraṇa-vādins, who seek to absolutely deny the conclusion that the Vedāntin has stated in the last section.[1] In this sentence, the expression 'ihāpi' (here too) is meant to signify 'in the *Brahma-sūtra* also', that is 'in the *Janmādi-sūtra*'. The expression 'tadeva' (that same thing) denotes 'inference alone'. By 'eva' (alone) is excluded the Upaniṣadic passages such as *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni,"* which the Vedāntin decrees to be the sole authority in establishing Īśvara as the source of the world.[2]

[1] This query could as well be that of a sincere student who has raised this doubt based on the statement made by the Bhāṣyakāra in the last section.

[2] Cf. इह ब्रह्ममीमांसायाम्। जन्मादिसूत्रे "जन्माद्यस्य यतः" इति सूत्रे। अपिशब्दस्यानेनान्वयाद् जन्मादिसूत्रेऽपीत्यर्थः।

This is the idea contained in the Pūrvapakṣin's objection: Since the Sūtra itself brings forward the inference that establishes Īśvara as the cause of the world (Īśvarānumāna), the Bhāṣya has the bounden duty of elucidating that very inference contained in the Sūtra. It is this duty that has been discharged in the last sentence of the Bhāṣya: *"na yathoktaviśeṣaṇasya jagataḥ yathoktaviśeṣaṇam īśvaraṁ muktvā, anyataḥ pradhānād acetanād, aṇubhyo vā, abhāvādvā, saṁsāriṇo vā utpattyādi sambhāvayituṁ śakyam* – It is not possible to postulate the birth and so on of the world possessing the above-mentioned qualities, from anything other than Īśvara of the above-described qualities – neither from the Pradhāna, the insentient, nor from the Atoms, nor from the Non-being." When considered this way, the Īśvarakāraṇa-vādins do not seem to be wrong in assessing the above-quoted sentence of the Bhāṣya of the earlier section as an enunciation of the Īśvarānumāna itself.[3]

According to the Pūrvapakṣin, the Īśvarakāraṇa-vādin, it is futile to argue that the Janmādi-sūtra is wholly based on the Upaniṣadic passages, such as (*Tai.U.*3.1) *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante,"* which declare Īśvara to be the sole cause of the world based on the idea that the Scripture is the sole authority for establishing the existence of Īśvara as the source of the universe. It has been accepted by all philosophers that Scripture carries independent and absolute validity only on matters that fall beyond the purview of perception and inference. Hence, on matters like (*Tai.Saṁ.*7.4.18.2) *"agniḥ himasya bheṣajam* – the fire is the remedy for cold," the Scripture is not held as an authority or means of knowledge (pramāṇa) but only as a restatement (anuvāda) of what has already been well-established by other means of knowledge like perception, inference and so on.

In just the same way, Īśvara being the source of the universe is also well-established by inference, without the aid of any Scripture. Here too, the Scriptural passages such as *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante"* are to be viewed only as an anuvāda (restatement) of what has already been established

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तदेव संसारिव्यतिरिक्तेश्वरसाधनमनुमानमेव। तथा च नाद्वैतसिद्धिरिति निगूढो भावः। – प्रदीप

Also, cf. तदेव अस्मदभिप्रेतं श्रुतिनिरपेक्षं ब्रह्मविषयमनुमानमित्यर्थः। – वार्तिक

[3] Cf. ननु इदमयुक्तं श्रुतेरनुमानान्तर्भावमभिप्रेत्य भवदीयसूत्रकृता अनुमानस्य एव उपन्यस्तत्वादिति वैशेषिकः शङ्कते— नन्विति। – रत्नप्रभा

by inference.[4] In other words, the Īśvarānumāna, that is the inferential knowledge of Īśvara being the cause of the world, that is suggested by the Īśvarakāraṇa-vādins, is a 'svārthānumāna' (inference for oneself) and being a restatement, the Scriptural passages like *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni"* could be accommodated merely as 'parārthānumāna' (an inferential construct for explaining the inferential knowledge for others).[5] Consequently, the Janmādi-sūtra may also be treated as the parārthānumāna alone.[6] This is the idea of the Pūrvapakṣin's objection presented in this section.

However, the ultimate aim of the Pūrvapakṣin is to forestall the Vedāntin's move in the next Sūtra, wherein he will establish that the Scripture is the sole source of knowledge (pramāṇa) about Brahman–Īśvara being the cause of the world.

[4] Cf. अनुमानसिद्धार्थानुवादकत्वादित्याह। – पञ्चपादिकाविवरण

[5] According to the Logicians, inference is of two kinds: (1) svārthānumāna and (2) parārthānumāna. The first one is intended for oneself while the second one is meant for convincing others. Svārthānumāna enables one's own inferential knowledge while parārthānumāna, induces another person to have a similar inferential knowledge. It is the parārthānumāna that is employed by the disputants in the philosophical argument (vāda) in order to win over the other to his own point of view. For achieving this purpose, parārthānumāna employs all the five syllogistic limbs (pañca-nyāyāvayavāḥ) by which process the other disputant becomes convinced of the invariable concomitance (avyabhicāriṇī vyāpti) between the probans (hetu) and probandum (sādhya). The parārthānumāna is itself often called 'anumāna' (inference) since the same is the sure and direct means for inferential knowledge. For further details on svārthānumāna and parārthānumāna one may refer to the anumāna section of Annambhaṭṭa's *Tarkasaṅgrahaḥ* and his auto-commentary (svopajña) *Dīpikā*.

[6] Cf. जन्मादिसूत्रलक्षितान्यपि वाक्यानि "यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते" इत्यादीनि परार्थानुमानवाक्यसमानि दृश्यन्त इति वदन्तः। नन्विहापि तदेवोपन्यस्तमिति। – पञ्चपादिका

8

[निराकरणभाष्यम्]

न, [1]वेदान्तवाक्यकुसुमग्रथनार्थत्वात् सूत्राणाम्। वेदान्तवाक्यानि हि सूत्रैः उदाहृत्य विचार्यन्ते। [2]वाक्यार्थविचारणाध्यवसाननिर्वृत्ता हि ब्रह्मावगतिः, न अनुमानादि-प्रमाणान्तरनिर्वृत्ता।

8 A

[NIRĀKARAṆABHĀṢYAM]

na, vedāntavākyakusumagrathanārthatvāt sūtrāṇām. vedāntavākyāni hi sūtraiḥ udāhṛtya vicāryante. vākyārthavicāraṇādhyavasānanirvṛttā hi brahmāvagatiḥ, na anumānādipramāṇāntaranirvṛttā.

8 B

न *na* – no; वेदान्तवाक्यकुसुमग्रथनार्थत्वात् *vedāntavākyakusumagrathanārthatvāt* – because of the purpose of stringing together the flowers of the Upaniṣadic passages; सूत्राणाम् *sūtrāṇām* – of the aphorisms; वेदान्तवाक्यानि *vedāntavākyāni* – the Upaniṣadic passages; हि *hi* – indeed; सूत्रैः *sūtraiḥ* – by the aphorisms; उदाहृत्य *udāhṛtya* – having cited; विचार्यन्ते *vicāryante* – are inquired into; वाक्यार्थ-विचारणाध्यवसाननिर्वृत्ता *vākyārthavicāraṇādhyavasānanirvṛttā* – is accomplished consequent to the determination of the purport of the passages through an inquiry into them; हि *hi* – indeed; ब्रह्मावगतिः *brahmāvagatiḥ* – the Realisation of Brahman; न *na* – not; अनुमानादिप्रमाणान्तरनिर्वृत्ता *anumānādipramāṇāntaranirvṛttā* – accomplished as a result of inference and other means of knowledge

8 C

[THE COMMENTARY REFUTING THE OBJECTION]

No; because the aphorisms have the purpose of stringing together the flowers of the Upaniṣadic passages. In reality, it is the Upaniṣadic passages alone that are cited and inquired into by the aphorisms.[1] This is

[1] AA (fn.), CSS वेदान्तवाक्यग्रथनार्थत्वात्

[2] पञ्चपादिकाभिमतो पाठः—वाक्यतात्पर्याध्यवसाननिर्वृत्ता

so because the Realisation of Brahman is indeed accomplished consequent to the determination of the purport of the passages through an inquiry into them and not accomplished as a result of inference and other means of knowledge.[2]

8 D

1. No; because the aphorisms have the purpose of stringing together the flowers of the Upaniṣadic passages. In reality, it is the Upaniṣadic passages alone that are cited and inquired into by the aphorisms: The Ācārya's answer here to the Pūrvapakṣin's objection presented in the last section[1] consists of three sentences. Of these three sentences, the first one *"vedāntavākyakusumagrathanārthatvāt sūtrāṇām* – Because the aphorisms have the purpose of stringing together the flowers of the Upaniṣadic passages" is in the form of a 'saṅgrahavākya', that is a summary statement. The idea encapsulated in the saṅgrahavākya is expanded in the second sentence: *"vedāntavākyāni hi sūtraiḥ udāhṛtya vicāryante* – In reality, it is the Upaniṣadic passages alone that are cited and inquired into by the aphorisms." The third sentence[2] *"vākyārtha-vicāraṇādhyavasāna-nirvṛttā hi brahmāvagatiḥ, na anumānādipramāṇāntaranirvṛttā* – This is so because the Realisation of Brahman is indeed accomplished consequent to the determination of the purport of the passages through an inquiry into them and not accomplished as a result of inference and other means of knowledge" substantiates the idea that has been explained in the second statement.[3]

The plural expressions 'sūtrāṇām' (of the aphorisms) and 'sūtraiḥ' (by the aphorisms) are meant to suggest that all the aphorisms of the *Brahma-sūtra* have the sole purpose of discussing the purport of the Upaniṣadic passages. Hence, the present Sūtra cannot be an exception to this general rule and therefore it cannot discuss a syllogism or any inferential reasoning.

[1] Vide Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Section 7.

[2] This is explained in detail in n.2.

[3] Cf. वेदान्तवाक्यानां ग्रथनम् एकवाक्यता, सैवार्थो येषां तानि, वेदान्तवाक्यग्रथनार्थानि, तद्भावः, तत्त्वं, तस्मादित्यर्थः। सङ्ग्रहवाक्यं विभजते वेदान्तवाक्यानि हि सूत्रैरुदाहृत्य विचार्यन्त इति। ननु ब्रह्मजिज्ञासूनां सूत्रोपात्तन्यायेन ब्रह्मविचार एव युक्तः, न वेदान्तवाक्यविचार इति, नेत्याह—वाक्यार्थविचारणाध्यवसाननिर्वृत्ता हि ब्रह्मावगतिः, नानुमानादिप्रमाणान्तरनिर्वृत्तेति। – वार्तिक

The term 'yataḥ' (from which), occurring in the aphorism as well as in the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad* passage *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante,"* which forms the basis of the aphorism may appear to present an inference indicating the source of the world. But the Upaniṣadic sentence does so only by depending on its own inherent authority as Scripture (śrutitvena), that is the verbal authority (śabda-pramāṇatvena), and not by appropriating or assuming the extraneous authority of inference (na anumāna-pramāṇatvena).

As an independent means of knowledge, verbal testimony, through the Upaniṣadic passage *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni,"* gives rise to an inference-like verbal cognition (anumitisadṛśa-śābdabodha) of Īśvara–Brahman, that is different from the transmigratory self (saṁsārin), as being the source of the world. It is true that inference too, as an independent means of valid cognition (anumāna-pramāṇatvena), generates an inferential cognition (anumiti) about Īśvara being the source of the world. Yet, there is a discernible difference between these two cognitions.

To explain: The above-mentioned anumiti, that is the inferential cognition that has been produced by a full-fledged anumāna-pramāṇa, becomes an end in itself (paryavasita-jñāna). Therefore, this cognition does not become a means of another inferential experience. On the other hand, the above-mentioned verbal cognition (śābdabodha) is born from the intermediary verbal authority (avāntara-vākya), consisting of the passage *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante yena jātāni jīvanti. yatprayantyabhisaṁviśanti. tadvijijñāsasva. tad brahma."* Hence this verbal cognition of Brahman being the cause of the world is not an end in itself but is only an avāntara-vākyārthabodha, that is an intermediary verbal cognition. To explain: The sentence *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante...tad brahma"* is only intended to be an elucidation of tatpadārtha of the Mahāvākya *"tat tvam asi* – That thou art." Therefore, the verbal cognition of Brahman being the cause of the world is only an intermediary verbal cognition (avāntara-vākyārthabodha) and has its culmination and fruition only in the final verbal cognition (śabdabodha) of the identity of the inner self with Brahman that is to be born as a result of the logical ascertainment of the whole purport of that Mahāvākya.

The aim of the Upaniṣads and the Vedānta-darśana is not merely to impart the knowledge of Brahman as being the source of the world because such a knowledge could be garnered by other means of knowledge (pramāṇa) such as inference, as rightly claimed by the Logicians. The sole aim of the Upaniṣads is this: to impart the knowledge of Īśvara–Brahman, the connotation of 'tat' (tatpadārtha) as the source of the world and by that means, that is through this definition of Brahman by taṭastha-lakṣaṇa (definition *per accidens*), to lead the seeker to the knowledge of the intrinsic-nature of Brahman through its svarūpa-lakṣaṇa of (*Tai.U.*2.1) *"satyaṁ jñānamanantaṁ brahma* – Brahman is Existence, Consciousness and Infinity" and thus to enable the Realisation of the identity of self with Brahman (brahmātmaikya-bodhaḥ or pratyagabhinna-brahmāvagatiḥ), which alone is the sole purpose of the Mahāvākyas.[4]

This unique Knowledge (Brahmāvagati), an immediate experience (Aparokṣānubhūti), cannot arise from any means of knowledge other than that of the Upaniṣads. Hence the Ācārya's assertion: *"vedāntavākyāni hi sūtraiḥ udāhṛtya vicāryante* – In reality, it is the Upaniṣadic passages alone that are cited and inquired into by the aphorisms." It is the Upaniṣadic passages alone that are cited and discussed in the present Janmādi-sūtra as well as in all the other aphorisms of the *Brahma-sūtra.*

But, the Logicians are obviously of the view that the word 'yataḥ' in the Sūtra *"janmādyasya yataḥ"* is suggestive (pratīka) only of the four sentences of the first anuvāka of the Bhṛguvallī, the third chapter of the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad*: *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante yena jātāni jīvanti. yatprayantyabhisaṁviśanti. tadvijijñāsasva. tad brahma."* Hence they construe that the Sūtra indicates the Īśvarānumāna alone. But this is a faulty premise. The word 'yataḥ' in the Sūtra, the Vedāntin avers, is meant to suggest the entire tract which starts from *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante"* and ends with *"saiṣā bhārgavī vāruṇī vidyā,"* that is from the first anuvāka to the sixth anuvāka of the Bhṛguvallī. In other words 'yataḥ' of the Sūtra stands (pratīka) for the entire 'Bhārgavī Vāruṇī Vidyā', that is the knowledge of the Self's identity with Brahman

[4] Vide *"brahmātmaikyapratipattaye sarve vedāntā ārabhyante."* (*Adhyāsa-bhāṣya*, Section 15 D, n.7)

that is taught by Varuṇa to his son Bhṛgu. This Vidyā (Knowledge), as the Upaniṣad itself delcares, is well-grounded in the highest Space, that is Brahman, the supreme Bliss which admits of no duality.[5]

It is a well-known fact that the Īśvarānumāna of the opponent has nothing to do with this Bhārgavī Vāruṇī Vidyā of the Upaniṣads which delineates the knowledge of the self's identity with Brahman. Conversely, it is also an evident fact that the Sūtra is not concerned with Īśvarānumāna that is constructed by Īśvarakāraṇa-vādins, the opponents, since the Sūtra's sole purpose is to explain the Upaniṣadic thought of jīvabrahmaikya. Hence the Ācārya's bold assertion: *"vedāntasūtrakusumagrathanārthatvāt sūtrāṇām."*[6]

2. This is so because the Realisation of Brahman is accomplished consequent to the determination of the purport[7] of the passages through inquiry into them and it is not accomplished as a result of inference and other means of knowledge: This sentence substantiates the previous statement of the Bhāṣya: *"vedāntavākyāni hi sūtraiḥ udāhṛtya vicāryante* – In reality, it is the Upaniṣadic passages alone that are cited and inquired into by the aphorisms." We have seen that the aim of the Upaniṣads and the *Brahma-sūtra* is to impart knowledge of the Self as being not distinct from Brahman and not merely to teach us the knowledge of Brahman–Īśvara being the creator of the world for such a knowledge can be arrived at even from inferential logic.[8]

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[5] Vide *"saiṣā bhārgavī vāruṇī vidyā parame vyoman pratiṣṭhitā"* (*Tai.U.*3.6) and the *Śaṅkara-bhāṣya* thereon: *"parame ānande advaite pratiṣṭhitā."*

[6] Cf. सत्यं यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते इत्यादिवाक्यानि संसारिव्यतिरिक्तेश्वरास्तित्वसाधनमनुमानं चैकार्थान्येव। परन्त्वियान् विशेषः यद् अनुमानमिदं वैशेषिकाणां पर्यवसितबोधजनकं, यतो वेत्यादिवाक्यन्तु न पर्यवसितबोधजनकम्। इदं हि अवान्तरवाक्यमेव न प्रधानवाक्यम्। तथा चापर्यवसितबोधकालिकीं दशां यतो वेत्यादिवाक्यजातस्य गृहीत्वाऽनुमानसाम्यं विवक्षितं, नतु स्वप्रधानवाक्यैकवाक्यतादशां गृहीत्वाऽपि। तदाहि यतो वेत्यादिवाक्यं स्थूलारुन्धतीन्याये प्रथममियमरुन्धतीति वाक्यमिवाविवक्षितार्थमेव भवतीति तटस्थलक्षणपरमेव। तथा चानुमानस्य तटस्थलक्षणस्य च संसारिव्यतिरिक्तेश्वरसाधनत्वमात्रेण कथमद्वैतसिद्धिः। अद्वितीयं हि ब्रह्म कारणवाक्यप्रतिपाद्यमिति नायमद्वैतसिद्धान्तः। कारणवाक्यमुखेन तत्पदार्थोपस्थापनपूर्वकं प्रत्यगभिन्नब्रह्मस्वरूपबोधकवेदान्तवाक्यसमधिगम्यं ह्यद्वैततत्त्वमद्वैतिनो मन्यन्ते। सति चैवमवान्तरतात्पर्यविषयेऽर्थे वैशेषिकादिभिः साम्येऽपि महातात्पर्यविषयेणार्थेन तैरसाम्यात्, प्रत्युत विरोधाच्च, न वैशेषिकानुमानमेवात्र सूत्रकारेण जिज्ञास्यब्रह्मोपस्थापकतया विवक्षितं किन्तु भृगुवल्लीप्रकरणं सर्वमपीति वक्ष्यमाणं मनसि निधाय वेदान्तवाक्यमूलकमेव सूत्रं वेदान्तवाक्यानि च वक्ष्यमाणान्यभिन्ननिमित्तोपादानं प्रत्यगभिन्नं ब्रह्मैव प्रतिपादयन्तीति न पूर्वोक्तायाः शङ्काया अवसर इत्याशयेनाह वेदान्तवाक्यग्रथनार्थत्वादिति। – प्रदीप

[7] Cf. अध्यवसानं तात्पर्यनिश्चयः। – रत्नप्रभा

[8] Cf. एतदुक्तं भवति—अनुमानमात्रात् कारणसद्भावमात्रं सिध्यति, नतु सत्यज्ञानादिलक्षणं ब्रह्म, न च कारणस्यैकत्वम्। तदवगतिश्चेह विवक्षिता नागमं विना सिध्यतीति। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

It is on this ground that the next Sūtra *"śāstrayonitvāt"* proclaims that the source of the Knowledge of the identity between Brahman and the Self (brahmātmaikya-jñānam) is the Upaniṣads alone. The Upaniṣads themselves unequivocally declare that they alone are the sole means to attain the Knowledge of self's identity with Brahman by statements such as (*Bṛ.U.*3.9.26 & *Mu.U.*2.2.3 respectively) *"taṁ tvaupaniṣadaṁ puruṣaṁ pṛcchāmi* – I ask you about that Puruṣa who is taught in the Upaniṣads alone" and *"dhanurgṛhītvā aupaniṣadaṁ mahāstraṁ śaraṁ hyupāsāniśitaṁ sandadhīta...lakṣyaṁ tadevākṣaraṁ viddhi* – One needs to realise (strike at) that imperishable Self, the goal, by means of the mighty Upaniṣad (the bow) with intellect (the arrow) sharpened by deep contemplation (i.e. manana)."

In the previous Jijñāsā-sūtra *"athāto brahmajijñāsā"* itself, it was explained that what is desired to be known is only the Brahman as being not distinct from the self.[9] Therefore, it is only logical to conclude that the present Janmādi-sūtra too, which is in between the Jijñāsā-sūtra and Śāstrayonitva-sūtra, must be defining that very Brahman alone which is not different from the Self and hence which can and must be known from the Scripture alone. Such a Brahman that is one with the self is not inferable, but has to be realised (draṣṭavya or sākṣātkartavya). And it would be certainly a contradiction to state that the Brahman which is to be only realised is to be inferred for Realisation is immediate and direct (aparokṣa), whereas the knowledge gained by inference is mediate that is indirect (parokṣa). This Realisation of Brahman arises, as the Ācārya explains, only when the seeker ascertains, leaving no room for any doubt, the ultimate purport (tātparya) of the Upaniṣadic declarations like *"tat tvam asi* – That thou art." And, in this Realisation, there is no room for inference.[10]

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[9] Vide Jijñāsādhikaraṇa, Section 20 D, n.6.

[10] Cf. अयं भावः—यदि जगत्कारणस्वरूपमात्रमेव वेदान्तवाक्यप्रतिपाद्यं, न तदतिरिक्तस्वरूपबोधने वेदान्तानां तात्पर्यं, तर्हि वेदान्तवाक्यमात्रमूलतावादोऽप्रयोजनः, यदि तु वेदान्तवाक्यानि स्वरूपान्तरमेव पारमार्थिकं ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपादयन्ति, तर्हि तु जिज्ञास्यं ब्रह्मानुमानगम्यमेवेत्यस्य वादस्य वेदान्तवाक्यविरुद्धत्वान्नात्रानुमानोपक्षेपो विकल्पसहः। वस्तुस्थितिस्तु—जिज्ञास्यं ब्रह्म नानुमानगम्यम्। व्यक्तीकरिष्यते चेदमुपरिष्टात्। केवलं तत्त्वमसीतिमहावाक्यजन्य एव हि ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारो मोक्षस्य साधनम्। न चानुमानजन्यः साक्षात्कारः। तथा च न जिज्ञास्यं ब्रह्मानुमानमूलकमत्रोपक्षेप्तुमर्हतीति भावः। ब्रह्मावगतिः ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारः। तथा च साक्षात्कर्तव्यं ब्रह्मानुमेयमिति विरुद्धमिति भावः। तदेवाह नानुमानादिप्रमाणान्तरनिर्वृत्तेति। – प्रदीप

It is only natural at this juncture to pose the query: Why should the Sūtrakāra present a definition of Brahman in the Sūtra, *"janmādyasya yataḥ,"* with 'yataḥ' indicating an inference of Brahman as the cause of the universe? One answer to this question has already been given: The word 'yataḥ' in the Sūtra is intended not to indicate any inference but only to suggest (pratīka) the passages of the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad* that detail the entire Bhārgavī Vāruṇī Vidyā. An alternative second answer can also be suggested: Even if one accepts the hypothesis of inference being suggested in the present Janmādi-sūtra, since the first Jijñāsā-sūtra suggests that what is desired to be known by the seeker is none but Brahman as being identical with the self, and because the third Śāstrayonitva-sūtra declares that the source of knowledge of this Brahman is Scripture alone, therefore the present Janmādi-sūtra, which is juxtaposed between the first Jijñāsā-sūtra and the third Śāstrayonitva-sūtra, is not expected to say anything that is not in tune with the preceding and succeeding Sūtras. Therefore, we have to conclude that by suggesting in the present Sūtra an inference of Īśvara as being the cause of the world and thereby stating a definition of Brahman by the definition *per accidens* (taṭastha-lakṣaṇa), the Sūtrakāra obviously indicates that inference (anumāna) can yield only a taṭastha-lakṣaṇa (definition *per accidens*) of Brahman and that inference is ineffective independently by itself to grant us the svarūpa-lakṣaṇa of Brahman (intrinsic-nature definition) which alone is desired to be known, and which nature being not different from the self (pratyagabhinnaṁ brahma), only the Scripture can provide us this svarūpa-lakṣaṇa of Brahman.[11]

[11] The creatorship of the world is the distinguishing definition (vyāvartaka-lakṣaṇa) of Īśvara and it is a definition *per accidens* (taṭastha-lakṣaṇa) of Brahman. Existence (satyam), Consciousness (jñānam), Infinity (anantam), Bliss (ānandam) and non-difference from self (pratyagabhinnam) are the svarūpa-lakṣaṇa of Brahman that is desired to be known and these are to be known from Upaniṣadic statements like *"satyaṁ jñānamanantaṁ brahma"* (*Tai.U.*2.1), *"ayam ātmā brahma"* (*Mā.U.*2) and so on.

[वेदान्तदर्शने तर्कस्य स्थानपरीक्षाभाष्यम्]

[1]सत्सु च वेदान्तवाक्येषु जगतो जन्मादिकारणवादिषु तदर्थग्रहणदार्ढ्याय अनुमानमपि वेदान्तवाक्याविरोधि प्रमाणं भवद् न निवार्यते, [2]श्रुत्यैव च सहायत्वेन तर्कस्य अभ्युपेतत्वात्। तथा हि – "श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यः" (बृ.उ.२.४.५) इति श्रुतिः, "पण्डितो मेधावी गन्धारानेव उपसम्पद्येत एवमेव इह आचार्यवान् पुरुषो वेद" (छा.उ.६.१४.२) इति च पुरुषबुद्धिसाहाय्यम् आत्मनो दर्शयति।

9 A

[VEDĀNTADARŚANE TARKASYA STHĀNAPARĪKṢĀBHĀṢYAM]

satsu ca vedāntavākyeṣu jagato janmādikāraṇavādiṣu tadarthagrahaṇadārḍhyāya anumānamapi vedāntavākyāvirodhi pramāṇaṁ bhavad na nivāryate, śrutyaiva ca sahāyatvena tarkasya abhyupetatvāt. tathā hi – "śrotavyo mantavyaḥ" (Bṛ.U.2.4.5) iti śrutiḥ, "paṇḍito medhāvī gandhārāneva upasampadyeta evameva iha ācāryavān puruṣo veda" (Chā.U.6.14.2) iti ca puruṣabuddhisāhāyyam ātmano darśayati.

9 B

सत्सु *satsu* – while there are; च *ca* – however; वेदान्तवाक्येषु *vedāntavākyeṣu* – Upaniṣadic passages; जगतः *jagataḥ* – of the world; जन्मादिकारणवादिषु *janmādikāraṇavādiṣu* – advocating the cause of origination and so on; तदर्थग्रहणदार्ढ्याय *tadarthagrahaṇadārḍhyāya* – for the strengthening of the comprehension of what is ascertained as their purport; अनुमानम् अपि *anumānam api* – inference also; वेदान्तवाक्याविरोधि *vedāntavākyāvirodhi* – such as is not opposed to the Upaniṣadic passages; प्रमाणम् *pramāṇam* – means of knowledge; भवत् *bhavat* – becomes; न निवार्यते *na nivāryate* – is not rejected; श्रुत्या एव च *śrutyā eva ca* – by the Scripture itself; सहायत्वेन *sahāyatvena* – as an auxiliary; तर्कस्य *tarkasya* – of logic; अभ्युपेतत्वात् *abhyupetatvāt* – because it has been accepted; तथा हि *tathā hi* – for example; श्रोतव्यः *śrotavyaḥ* – it is to be heard; मन्तव्यः *mantavyaḥ* – to be reflected upon; इति *iti* – thus; श्रुतिः *śrutiḥ* – Scriptural text; पण्डितः *paṇḍitaḥ* – being informed; मेधावी *medhāvī* – being able to judge; गन्धारान् *gandhārān* – the

[1] Tel सत्सु वेदान्तवाक्येषु

[2] वार्तिकाभिमतो पाठः—श्रुत्यैव तर्कस्याभ्युपेतत्वात्; AA (fn.) श्रुत्यैव च तर्कस्य। Tel., ASS, AA (fn.)

Gandhāra country; उपसम्पद्येत एव *upasampadyeta eva* – would surely reach; एवम् एव *evam eva* – in the same manner; इह *iha* – here; आचार्यवान् *ācāryavān* – one who has a Teacher; पुरुषः *puruṣaḥ* – a person; वेद् *veda* – knows; इति च *iti ca* – and thus; पुरुषबुद्धिसाहाय्यम् *puruṣabuddhisāhāyyam* – human reasoning as an aid; आत्मनः *ātmanaḥ* – for themselves; दर्शयति *darśayati* – show

9 C

[THE COMMENTARY DETERMINING THE PLACE OF REASON IN VEDĀNTA-DARŚANA]

While, however, there are Upaniṣadic passages primarily advocating Brahman as the cause of the origination and so on of the world, in that very context for the strengthening of the comprehension of what is ascertained as their purport,[1] inference too, such as what is not opposed to the Upaniṣadic passages becomes the means for knowledge[2] and is not rejected because logic has been accepted by the Scripture itself as an auxiliary.[3] For example, the Scriptural passages (*Bṛ.U.*2.4.5 & *Chā.U.*6.14.2 resepctively),[4] "It is to be heard, to be reflected upon,"[5] and "as a man, having been informed and being able to judge for himself, would surely reach the Gandhāra country, in the same manner, here also, a person who has a Teacher knows the Self" indicate that human reasoning is an aid for themselves (i.e. the Scriptures).[6]

9 D

1. While, however, there are Upaniṣadic passages primarily advocating Brahman as the cause of the origination and so on of the world, in that very context for the strengthening of the comprehension of what is ascertained as their purport: In Section 8, it has been emphasised that the *Brahma-sūtras* are not meant to discuss any inferential logic but are only intended to analyse the purport of the Upaniṣadic passages. But an impartial analysis of the structure of the *Brahma-sūtras* reveals that the Sūtrakāra gives a high regard to inferential logic. In fact, of all the Sūtra literature of the various schools of Indian philosophy, it is the Vedānta aphorisms of Bādarāyaṇa, the *Brahma-sūtra*, that are most logical in their form and content. Almost all the Sūtras here are conspicuous with their ablative case-endings indicating

reason (hetu-pañcamī). The structure of the Sūtras is that of a 'hetu-vākya', that is the sentence citing the probans of the parārthānumāna[1] syllogism of the Naiyāyikas. The force and thrust of each one of the Sūtras are exactly those of the inferential logic (anumāna) that has been nurtured and refined by the Naiyāyikas. Hence, it is hardly convincing when the Bhāṣyakāra states that the Sūtrakāra rejects inferential logic as a means for accomplishing the Realisation of Brahman, the aim of the Vedānta-darśana.

In this context, it may also be noted that immediately after introducing brahma-jijñāsā (desire to know Brahman) in the first Sūtra, *"athāto brahmajijñāsā,"* the Sūtrakāra cites an inference to suggest a definition of Brahman as being the source of the world and then alone does he proceed to declare that Scripture is the source of this knowledge of Brahman. This itself is a sure indication that in the *Brahma-sūtra* the Sūtrakāra places inferential logic over and above the Scripture.

It is for answering questions like these, in this section, that the Ācārya lays down the crucial Vedāntic norm defining the sphere of the functioning of the inferential logic and reasoning in the Vedānta-darśana. There are Upaniṣadic passages explicating the following doctrines: (1) Brahman is the source of the world.[2] (2) The immutable Existence itself created the world.[3] (3) Space (ākāśa) is the creator of the universe that is full of name and forms.[4] (4) This individual self is the Brahman itself[5] and so on. Even the most intelligent and devoted student of the Upaniṣads would find it difficult to grasp entirely the ideas of these Upaniṣadic passages and appreciate logically their spirit and significance since the human mind down the ages engrossed in worldly affairs gets clouded with innumerable doubts. This confusion becomes further confounded when the intellect is stormed by a multitude of rival doctrines. In such a situation, the seekers are in need of the assistance

[1] Refer to Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Section 7 D, n.1, fn.5.

[2] Vide Upaniṣadic statements like (*Mu.U.*2.1.3) *"etasmājjāyate prāṇo manaḥ sarvendriyāṇi ca. kham vāyurjyotirāpaḥ pṛthivī viśvasya dhāriṇī."*

[3] Vide the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad,* Sixth Chapter, beginning with the statement *"sadeva somyedamagra āsīt."*

[4] Cf. आकाशो वै नामरूपयोर्निर्वहिता ते यदन्तरा तद्ब्रह्म। – छान्दोग्योपनिषद् (८.१४.१)

[5] Vide the Mahāvākyas such as *"ayam ātmā brahma."*

that logical reasoning alone can provide so that the doubts are dispelled and the seeker steers clear of the influence of contrary and rival doctrines in order that he may truly comprehend the Upaniṣadic teachings in their entirety and gain the right perspective and become intellectually convinced of the truth and the rationale of the thoughts presented in the Upaniṣadic passages that has been revealed to him by his revered teacher and which he has gained from his own perusal of the sacred Scripture. This process of cogitating, understanding and appreciating the Scriptural doctrines and their significance intellectually by using logic and reasoning is termed 'manana' (reflection). Logic and reasoning (that is tarka, yukti or anumāna) are necessary instruments in this process of manana and the students of Vedānta may make use of them with great advantage for understanding the Upaniṣadic teachings they have learnt from the Master.

Indeed, the form, the content, and the force of the *Brahma-sūtra* are those of the probans (hetu) of the parārthānumāna (syllogism) of the Naiyāyikas. But this feature need not be taken to proclaim the superiority of inferential logic. Rather, being based exclusively on Upaniṣadic passages, the aphoristic sentences having the above feature clearly demonstrate how logic plays an important and rigorous role in the Vedānta-darśana and how it could reign victorious and supreme but only within the boundaries that are well-defined by the Scripture.

In the Bhāṣya passage under consideration, the expression *"satsu ca vedāntavākyeṣu jagato janmādikāraṇavādiṣu* – While, however, there are Upaniṣadic passages primarily advocating Brahman as the cause of the origination and so on of the world" is very significant. This expression suggests that the present Sūtra is no exception to the general norm that the *Brahma-sūtras* are meant to deal with the Upaniṣadic declarations alone. True, the word 'yataḥ' in the Janmādi-sūtra may suggest an Īśvarānumāna, that is an inference of Brahman–Īśvara as the source of the world; but, this inference is not meant to establish, independently of the Scripture, the existence of Brahman–Īśvara as the source of the world. In that case, this aphorism would stand contradicted and annulled by the very next Śāstrayonitva-sūtra that declares the Scripture as the only means for the knowledge of Brahman.

Therefore, it is certain that in the second aphorism, *"janmādyasya yataḥ,"* the Sūtrakāra suggests Īśvarānumāna as a means to comprehend only the taṭastha-lakṣaṇa of Brahman. This he does, since the knowledge of the taṭastha-lakṣaṇa is the first step to arrive at the svarūpa-lakṣaṇa of Brahman, expressed by such Upaniṣadic passages as (*Tai.U.*2.1 & *Mā.U.*2 respectively) *"satyaṁ jñānam anantaṁ brahma," "ayam ātmā brahma"* and so on. In fact it is only Brahman of the nature of Existence, Consciousness and Bliss, that is – Brahman as defined by its svarūpa-lakṣaṇa – and not the Brahman as defined by its taṭastha-lakṣaṇa that is identical with self and, indeed, it is this Brahman that is identical with the self as defined by its svarūpa-lakṣaṇa that is desired to be known (jijñāsyaṁ brahma).

2. inference too, such as what is not opposed to the Upaniṣadic passages becomes the means for knowledge: The purpose of inferential logic in the Vedānta-darśana has already been specified as consisting in the strengthening of one's understanding of the Scriptural teaching during the process of the Vedāntic student's reflection (manana) thereby becoming an indispensable aid in the Vedāntic pursuit. On the other hand, if logic is allowed to go astray or counter to the Upaniṣadic teaching, then it ceases to be a means of knowledge.

The idea is this: The Scripture is the means of knowledge of paramount significance on matters of dharma and Brahman just as the sense organs are the undisputed and authoritative means for perceptual cognition of entities like pot, fire and so on that are objects of perception. An inferential logic cannot be an authentic means of valid cognition if it contradicts the Scriptural teachings pertaining to dharma and Brahman just as the Scriptural teaching ceases to be authentic if it were to go counter to the sense organs and try to establish that 'fire is not hot' (agniranuṣṇaḥ). In fact, even the Naiyāyikas, the proverbial advocates of the supremacy of inferential logic, emphasise that the logic should follow perception and Scripture and that logic would be fallacious if it were to contradict perception (pratyakṣa) or the Scripture (āgama) in their respective exclusive fields.[6]

[6] Cf. प्रत्यक्षागमाश्रितम् अनुमानं, सा अन्वीक्षा, प्रत्यक्षागमाभ्याम् ईक्षितस्य अनु ईक्षणम् अन्वीक्षा, तया प्रवर्तते इति आन्वीक्षिकी न्यायविद्या...यत्पुनरनुमानं प्रत्यक्षागमविरुद्धं न्यायाभासः सः। – वात्स्यायनकृतन्यायभाष्य (१.१.१)

From the above discussion it is evident that Īśvarānumāna – that is the inferential knowledge that Īśvara, omniscient and omnipotent, is the cause of the world – of the Īśvarakāraṇa-vādins is not found contradicting the Upaniṣadic doctrine of Īśvara as being the source of the world. As a result, one must be delighted to have two independent means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa), that is inferential logic as well as Scripture, each one independent of the other, that could establish the existence of Īśvara as the cause of the universe. This being the case, why should the Vedāntin summarily set aside the Īśvarānumāna in the analysis of the Janmādi-sūtra? The Ācārya is strongly of the view that it is by far better to accept the existence of Īśvara as the cause of the world primarily on the basis of the Scripture as an independent authority. He will be explaining the reason in the sequel in this very Janmādyadhikaraṇa that this path of Scripture is quite safe and free from the difficulties that could be encountered when recourse is taken to mere inferential logic.

Also, in the *Māheśvara-pāśupatādhikaraṇa* (also called *Patyadhikaraṇa*, 2.2.37-41) occurring in the second chapter of the *Brahma-sūtra*, the Ācārya details this point further by exposing the impossibility of the hypothesis of establishing the existence of Īśvara as the source of the world by Īśvarānumāna alone.[7]

[7] The theory that Īśvara is the efficient cause (nimitta-kāraṇa) alone of the world, which can be derived by Īśvarānumāna, lacks tenability on the basis of the following incongruences: (1) The Upaniṣadic declaration "by virtue of the Knowledge of Brahman everything else becomes known" is controverted. Such a Knowledge is possible only when Brahman is accepted as the efficient-cum-material cause (abhinna-nimittopādāna-kāraṇa) of the universe. Vide the Ācārya's comments on the *Brahma-sūtra* (2.2.37) *"patyurasāmañjasyāt"*: *"'prakṛtiśca pratijñādṛṣṭāntānuparodhāt', 'abhidhyopadeśācca'* (*Brahma-sūtra*, 1.4.23-24) *ityatra prakṛtibhāvenādhiṣṭhātṛbhāvena cobhayasvabhāvasyeśvarasya svayamevācāryeṇa pratiṣṭhāpitatvāt."* (2) The view of Īśvara being the nimitta-kāraṇa alone of the world incurs the undesirable contingency of Īśvara becoming subject to rāga (likes) and dveṣa (dislikes) and consequently liable to be divested of the status of being Īśvara as any activity emanates only because of one's own interest. Vide the Bhāṣya statements: *"kiṁ punarasāmañjasyam? hīnamadhyamottamabhāvena hi prāṇibhedān vidadhata īśvarasya rāgadveṣādidoṣaprasakterasmadādivadanīśvaratvaṁ prasajyeta"* and also *"svārthaprayukta eva ca sarvo janaḥ parārthe'pi pravartata ityevamapyasāmañjasyaṁ, svārthavattvād īśvarasyānīśvaratvaprasaṅgāt"* on the *Brahma-sūtra* (2.2.37) *"patyurasāmañjasyāt."* (3) If at all Īśvara is considered to control puruṣa and pradhāna that have been postulated by the Sāṅkhyans, then the relation of Īśvara with puruṣa and pradhāna cannot logically be conceived as puruṣa and pradhāna are both all-pervading and impartite. The relation of

3. is not rejected because logic has been accepted by the Scripture itself as an auxiliary: The Ācārya has carefully worded his statement that inferential logic is "not rejected" (*"na nivāryate"*). He does state that logic 'must be made use of' (prayoktavya) by the seekers for rightly comprehending the ultimate purport of the Upaniṣadic teachings for it is likely that there could be extraordinary personalities like Vāmadeva and Śuka of the Upaniṣadic and Paurāṇic fame, who did not need any inferential logic for understanding or realising the oneness of the Self with Brahman, the material-cum-efficient cause of the world taught in the Upaniṣads. However, if a seeker of average intelligence needs the assistance of logic in his inquiry for clearing his doubts and misunderstandings and for arriving at the correct purport of the Upaniṣadic passages, he need not shy away from making use of that powerful tool because the Scriptures themselves sanction it. In this context it is of advantage to recall an earlier significant statement of the Ācārya: *"tasmād brahmajijñāsopanyāsamukhena vedāntavākyamīmāṁsā tadavirodhitarkopakaraṇā niḥśreyasaprayojanā prastūyate* – Consequently, an inquiry into the Upaniṣadic enunciations is commenced by the Sūtrakāra, by way of introducing the presentation with the 'desire to know Brahman', which inquiry is accompanied by logical argumentation not hostile to it and which has Liberation as its aim."[8]

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conjunction (saṁyoga) is possible only when the relata (sambandhin) have parts and are also limited. But according to the Sāṅkhyans both puruṣa and pradhāna are impartite and all-pervading. Other relations like samavāya are also not possible. Vide the Bhāṣya statements on the *Brahma-sūtra* (2.2.38) *"sambandhānupapatteśca"*: *"na hi pradhānapuruṣavyatirikta īśvaro'ntareṇa sambandhaṁ pradhānapuruṣayorīśitā. na tāvat saṁyogalakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ sambhavati, pradhānapuruṣeśvarāṇāṁ sarvagatatvānniravayavatvācca."* (4) The postulation of such an Īśvara as mentioned above (vide point 3) would render Īśvara himself bereft of omniscience and eternality. Further, pradhāna and puruṣa would also be subject to impermanence as their being limited renders both of them impermanent. To explain: If Īśvara were to know all the puruṣas, then the number of puruṣas would become limited. And, if Īśvara were not to know all the puruṣas then Īśvara's omniscience is compromised. Refer to the Bhāṣya on the Sūtra (2.2.41) *"antavattvamasarvajñatā vā"*: *"tatra sarvajñeneśvareṇa pradhānasya puruṣāṇāmātmanaśceyattā paricchidyeta vā, na vā paricchidyeta. ubhayathāpi doṣo'nuṣakta eva."* Arguments such as these render untenable the theory derived from Īśvarānumāna that Īśvara is the efficient cause alone, and not the material cause. For further details on the above arguments refer to the *Śāṅkara-bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtras* (2.2.37-41).

[8] Vide Jijñāsādhikaraṇa-bhāṣya, Section 23.

4. For example, the Scriptural passages: The Ācārya cites these Scriptural passages for two purposes: Firstly, to dismiss the wrong notion among a section of Vedāntins that he is giving undue importance to logic on matters concerned with Brahman, which, like dharma, according to these philosophers, is the subject matter of Scripture alone. Secondly, the Ācārya seeks to set aside the criticism of other schools of philosophy that the Vedānta-darśana is nothing but a bundle of dogmas disallowing logical inquiry into the study of the Upaniṣadic teachings.

5. "It is to be heard, to be reflected upon": This well-known *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* (2.4.5) passage is cited by the Ācārya to establish by illustration the importance of logic in the Vedānta inquiry. In this passage, the disciple is advised that for realising the Self, the Self needs to be learnt from the Preceptor and thereafter one needs to, with the aid of logic, reflect upon the teachings of the Self that have been learnt from the Master. It is this reflection on what has been learnt from the Master that is termed 'manana' in the Vedāntic literature.[9] In this passage, the expression 'mantavyaḥ' stipulates that 'manana' or logical analysis on the subject of the Self ought to be undertaken.[10]

6. "as a man, having been informed and being able to judge for himself, would surely reach the Gandhāra country, in the same manner, here also, a person who has a Teacher knows the Self" (*Chā.U.*6.14.2) indicate that human reasoning is an aid for themselves (i.e. the Scriptures):[11] This is the second Scriptural passage cited by the Bhāṣyakāra to point out the Upaniṣadic sanction for logic in the Vedāntic inquiry. This sentence is a part of the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad* passage wherein the Upaniṣad cites an allegory (rūpaka-kalpanā) of an intelligent man, who is a native of Gandhāra country (present day Afghanistan) whom the thieves have abducted and then blindfolding, and after tying his hands with ropes, they abandon him in a thick forest far

[9] Cf. शब्दाविरोधिन्या तदुपजीविन्या च युक्त्या विवेचनं मननम्। युक्तिश्च अर्थापत्तिरनुमानं वा। – भामती

[10] Cf. "मन्तव्यः" (बृ.उ.२.४.५) इति श्रुतार्थस्तर्केण सम्भावनीय इत्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. "श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यः" इति श्रुत्या यथा श्रवणं ब्रह्मावगतिहेतुरनूद्यते, तथा मननस्यापि सिद्धवदनूद्यमानत्वात्। – पञ्चपादिका

Also, cf. मननशब्दाभिधेययुक्त्यनुसन्धानं विदधती श्रुतिरेव तर्कापेक्षां दर्शयतीत्याह—श्रोतव्य इति। – प्रकटार्थविवरण

[11] Cf. आत्मनः—श्रुतेः इत्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

away from his homeland. The poor man runs hither and thither in the forest crying piteously for help. At last a passer-by taking pity upon him, removes his blindfold and the bonds from his hands and comforts him. Thereafter, he shows him the correct direction towards his home country of Gandhāra. Having thus learnt the direction from that kindhearted traveller, the man proceeds in the direction that has been indicated to him; this he does also by making use of his own reasoning and judgement and making inquiries on the way. Finally, he reaches the Gandhāra country.

The *Chāndogya-upaniṣad* has by this allegory (rūpaka-kalpanā) of the Gandhāra-native's returning home illustrated how a spiritual seeker lost in the forest of saṁsāra, because of the bandits of ignorance, desire and action (avidyā-kāma-karma), learns from the good-hearted Preceptor about the way to realise the Upaniṣadic truth of oneness of Self and how he too must make use of his own reasoning and logic in order to come to realise his self as being identical with the supreme Brahman (pratyagabhinnaṁ brahma).[12]

Thus we observe that the Upaniṣad itself stresses the need for both: a Preceptor for gaining the teaching (śravaṇa) and for a methodical logical inquiry (manana) that is based on the Preceptor's teaching for the pursuit of Self-realisation.[13]

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[12] Cf. मन्दबुद्धिश्चेद् असम्भाव्यमानतया श्रुतिं हित्वा अन्यदेव जिज्ञासते। ततः पुरुषकौशलमपि श्रुत्याऽवगतिसिद्धयेऽपेक्ष्यत इति भावः। – प्रकटार्थविवरण

[13] Cf. तस्करैर्गन्धारदेशेभ्यः पिहितनेत्रं पुरुषमानीय वने अतिजने विसृष्टं स्ववृत्तान्तकथनपूर्वकं क्रोशन्तमुपलक्ष्य नेत्रपिधानदूरीकरणपूर्वकं 'अस्यां दिशि गन्धाराः' इति साधुना कृतोपदेशं तदुपदिष्टदिशं पुरस्कृत्य गच्छन्तं प्रकृत्य आप्तातं पण्डितो मेधावीति वाक्यं, यथा प्रकृतः पुरुषः उपदेशस्य सम्यग्गृहीतत्वात् पण्डितः तत्र ऊहापोहसमर्थत्वाद् मेधावी गन्धारदेशान् प्राप्नोति एवमेवेह आचार्यवान् पुरुषो लब्धाचार्योपदेशः तदुक्तार्थपरिष्कारकुशलश्च यो भवति स एवात्मतत्त्वं वेदेति प्रतिपादयत्, पूर्वोक्तस्य मेधावित्वस्य एवंशब्देन परामर्शाद् आत्मतत्त्वापरोक्ष्ये युक्तिमभ्यनुजानाति। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

Also, cf. यथा—कश्चिद् गन्धारदेशेभ्यः चौरैः अन्यत्र अरण्ये बद्धनेत्र एव त्यक्तः केनचिद् मुक्तबन्धस्तदुक्तमार्गग्रहणसमर्थः पण्डितः स्वयं तर्ककुशलो मेधावी स्वदेशानेव प्राप्नुयाद्, एवमेव इह अविद्याकामादिभिः स्वरूपानन्दात् प्रच्याव्य अस्मिन्नरण्ये संसारे क्षिप्तः केनचिद् दयापरवशेन आचार्येण 'नाऽसि त्वं संसारी' किन्तु "तत्त्वमसि" (छा.उ.६.८.७) इत्युपदिष्टस्वरूपः स्वयं तर्ककुशलश्चेत् स्वरूपं जानीयाद् नाऽन्यथेति श्रुतिः स्वस्य पुरुषमतिरूपतर्कापेक्षां दर्शयति इत्याह—पण्डित इति। – रत्नप्रभा

10

[धर्मब्रह्मजिज्ञासयोः प्रमाणभेदोपन्यासभाष्यम्]

न धर्मजिज्ञासायाम्[1] इव श्रुत्यादयः एव प्रमाणं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाम्[2]। किन्तु श्रुत्यादयः अनुभवादयश्च यथासम्भवम् इह प्रमाणम्, अनुभवावसानत्वाद् भूतवस्तुविषयत्वात् च [१]ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य। कर्तव्ये हि विषये न अनुभवापेक्षा अस्ति इति श्रुत्यादीनाम् एव प्रामाण्यं स्यात्, [२]पुरुषाधीनात्मलाभत्वात् च कर्तव्यस्य[3]।

10 A

[DHARMABRAHMAJIJÑĀSAYOḤ PRAMĀṆABHEDOPANYĀSABHĀṢYAM]

na dharmajijñāsāyām iva śrutyādayaḥ eva pramāṇaṁ brahmajijñāsāyām. kintu śrutyādayaḥ anubhavādayaśca yathāsambhavam iha pramāṇam, anubhavāvasānatvād bhūtavastuviṣayatvāt ca brahmajñānasya. kartavye hi viṣaye na anubhavāpekṣā asti iti śrutyādīnām eva prāmāṇyaṁ syāt, puruṣādhīnātmalābhatvāt ca kartavyasya.

10 B

न *na* – not; धर्मजिज्ञासायाम् इव *dharmajijñāsāyām iva* – as in the case of the desire to know dharma; श्रुत्यादयः *śrutyādayaḥ* – Scripture etc.; एव *eva* – alone; प्रमाणम् *pramāṇam* – the means of knowledge; ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाम् *brahmajijñāsāyām* – in the case of the desire to know Brahman; किन्तु *kintu* – on the contrary; श्रुत्यादयः *śrutyādayaḥ* – Scripture etc.; अनुभवादयः *anubhavādayaḥ* – experience etc.; च *ca* – also; यथासम्भवम् *yathāsambhavam* – as and when applicable; इह *iha* – here; प्रमाणम् *pramāṇam* – means of knowledge; अनुभवावसानत्वात् *anubhavāvasānatvāt* – since it culminates in immediate experience; भूतवस्तुविषयत्वात् *bhūtavastuviṣayatvāt* – since it has an existing entity as its content; च *ca* – and also; ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य *brahmajñānasya* – of the knowledge of Brahman; कर्तव्ये *kartavye* – with respect

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[१] *Bhāmatī*, ASS, AA (fn.), CSS ब्रह्मविज्ञानस्य

[२] AA (fn.) पुरुषाधीनात्मलाभात्

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[1] धर्मजिज्ञासायां सत्याम् इत्यर्थः।

[2] ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायां सत्याम् इत्यर्थः।

[3] पुरुषकृत्यधीनः आत्मलाभः उत्पत्तिर्यस्य तद्भावाच्च धर्मे श्रुत्यादीनामेव प्रामाण्यमित्यन्वयः। – रत्नप्रभा

to that which needs to be accomplished; हि *hi* – indeed; विषये *viṣaye* – with regard to the object; न अस्ति *na asti* – there is no; अनुभवापेक्षा *anubhavāpekṣā* – dependence on experience; इति *iti* – hence; श्रुत्यादीनाम् *śrutyādīnām* – of the Scripture etc.; एव *eva* – exclusively; प्रामाण्यम् *prāmāṇyam* – as authority; स्यात् *syāt* – should be; पुरुषाधीनात्मलाभत्वात् *puruṣādhīnātmalābhatvāt* – because its accomplishment depends on a person; च *ca* – also; कर्तव्यस्य *kartavyasya* – of what ought to be accomplished

10 C

[DELINEATING THE DIFFERENCE IN PRAMĀṆAS BETWEEN DHARMAJIJÑĀSĀ AND BRAHMAJIJÑĀSĀ]

The Scripture etc. are not the only means of knowledge in the case of the desire to know Brahman, just as it is in the case of the desire to know dharma.[1] On the contrary, the Scripture etc. and also experience etc., as and when applicable, constitute here the means of knowledge since the knowledge of Brahman culminates in the immediate Experience of Brahman, and also because this knowledge has an existing entity as its content.[2] Indeed, since there is no dependence on experience with respect to what is to be accomplished, the Scripture etc. alone are considered as authority;[3] it is also so because what needs to be accomplished is dependent on the person even for its own coming into existence.[4]

10 D

1. The Scripture etc. are not the only means of knowledge in the case of the desire to know Brahman, just as it is in the case of the desire to know dharma: In the last section, we have seen that the Ācārya has given logic (tarka) a respectable status of being a necessary aid for the inquiry into the purport of the Upaniṣadic teachings. He has thus refuted the criticism that the Vedānta-darśana is dogmatic and that it does not have any place for logic in its philosophical system.

However, this answer does lead the traditional Vedists, the Mīmāṁsakas, to raise an objection. In the inquiry of dharma, the Śruti (Scripture) and the

Smṛti (Traditional Code) have been accepted by all persons grounded in the tradition (śiṣṭa) as the only source of knowledge for dharma and no credence is given to logic, which is inherently based on the human intellect. Manu, the greatest of the Smṛti-kartas (authors of Smṛtis), clearly lays down the rule prohibiting an all-out logical inquiry (mīmāṁsā) into what is taught by the Śrutis and Smṛtis.[4] Also in the *Brahma-sūtra* itself, the very next Sūtra specifically declares that Scripture alone is the source of the knowledge about Brahman. This declaration naturally means that logic is excluded as the source of the knowledge of Brahman. Thus, being taught exclusively by Scripture, both dharma and Brahman are on a par with each another and hence they do not admit the use of logic. This being the established fact, the above-cited Scriptures allowing logic in the case of brahma-jijñāsā may have to be construed as eulogistic statements (arthavāda) meant merely to praise the Knowledge of Brahman.[5]

The present section contains a convincing reply to the above question of the traditional Vedist.[6] In the earlier Jijñāsādhikaraṇa (vide Section 7) the Ācārya has drawn our attention to a fundamental factor that differentiates dharma and Brahman, even though both of them happen to be the exclusive purports of the Scripture. The Bhāṣyakāra had stated that dharma, the object of dharma-jijñāsā, is yet to come into existence at the moment when it is desired to be known. So also, it has yet to come into existence even while it is being taught by the Scripture. This has to be naturally so because dharma, for its very existence, depends on the activity of the person. On the other hand, Brahman, the object of brahma-jijñāsā, even though is like dharma – in the aspect of being revealed by the Scripture alone – yet, Brahman being ever existent (nityasiddha-vastu), it does not depend on any activity whatsoever of the person for coming into existence.[7] Basing himself

[4] Cf. श्रुतिस्तु वेदो विज्ञेयो धर्मशास्त्रं तु वै स्मृतिः। ते सर्वार्थेष्वमीमांस्ये ताभ्यां धर्मो हि निर्बभौ॥ – मनुस्मृति (२.१०)

[5] Cf. अपूर्वत्वेन प्रमाणान्तरागोचरत्वाद्धर्मस्य, एवं ब्रह्माप्यपूर्वत्वाविशेषेण तैरेव जिज्ञास्यताम्। न तत्र पुरुषबुद्धिलक्षणमननाद्यपेक्षा, मननादिश्रुतेश्च ब्रह्मज्ञानस्तुतिमात्रपरत्वेनाप्युपपत्तेरित्याशङ्क्य, धर्मब्रह्मणोर्भूतत्वाभूतत्वकृतविशेषेण तज्जिज्ञासयोरपि वैषम्यादुपपद्येते तदपेक्षानपेक्षे इत्युपपादयति—न धर्मजिज्ञासायामिवेत्यादिना। – वार्तिक

[6] Cf. यथा धर्मे न पुरुषबुद्धिसाहाय्यम्, एवं ब्रह्मण्यपि कस्मान्न भवतीत्यत आह—न धर्मजिज्ञासायामिव इति। – भामती

[7] Vide *"bhavyaśca dharmo jijñāsyo na jñānakāle asti, puruṣavyāpāratantratvāt. iha tu bhūtaṁ brahma jijñāsyaṁ, nityanirvṛttatvād, na puruṣavyāpāranirvṛttam."* (Jijñāsādhikaraṇa-bhāṣya, Section 7)

on this well-established distinguishing feature of dharma and Brahman, the Ācārya answers the question that has been posed by the traditional Vedist, the Mīmāṁsakas.

Dharma, such as the Vedic rite of Jyotiṣṭoma, is not existent when it is taught as its coming into existence is dependent on the activity of the person who has to perform it. Basing themselves on this unique feature of dharma, the great Mīmāṁsā teachers like Jaimini and Śabara-svāmin declare that since dharma does not exist prior to its actual performance, and because perception (pratyakṣa) is the product of the sense-contact with an already existing object, perception cannot be the means for the knowledge (pramāṇa) of dharma; so also, inference (anumāna), analogy (upamāna), presumption (arthāpatti) and the non-cognition (anupalabdhi)[8] cannot be the means of knowledge of dharma, because these means of knowledge (pramāṇa) have perception as their pre-requisite (pratyakṣapūrvakatvāt). Hence, Scripture is the sole means for comprehending dharma.[9] Therefore, it stands to reason that in the case of dharma-jijñāsā, one has to depend exclusively on the authority of the Scripture (vedaprāmāṇya) for one's knowledge of dharma.[10]

The above assertion does not preclude the indirect contribution of perception, inference and so on to the knowledge of dharma with regard to the accessories (aṅgas) of dharma such as ghee, rice and so on that are required in the performance of the sacrificial rite. Also, the assertion that Scripture alone is the source of the knowledge of dharma does not stand in the way of applying various norms and logical principles (nyāyas) of the Pūrvamīmāṁsā-darśana to decide varied aspects of dharma. Therefore, by stating that Scripture alone is the authority in the case of dharma what is meant is that perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna) and the other

[8] The term 'anupalabdhi' is also referred to in the ancient treatises as 'abhāva' (negation), that is 'upalambhābhāva' (absence of cognition).

[9] Vide *"satsamprayoge puruṣasya indriyāṇāṁ buddhijanma, tat pratyakṣam animittam, vidyamānopalambhanatvāt"* (*Pūrvamīmāṁsā-sūtra* 1.1.4) and the *Śābara-bhāṣya* thereon: *"sati tu indriyārthasambandhe puruṣasya buddhiḥ jāyate, tat pratyakṣaṁ; bhaviṣyaṁśca eṣaḥ arthaḥ dharmaḥ na jñānakāle asti sataścaitad upalambhanaṁ, na asataḥ tataḥ pratyakṣam animittam... pratyakṣapūrvakatvāt ca anumānopamānārthāpattyabhāvānāmapi akāraṇatvam iti."*

[10] Cf. धर्मे तु नित्यपरोक्षे साध्ये साक्षात्कारस्याऽनपेक्षितत्वादसम्भवाच्च श्रुत्या निर्णयमात्रमनुष्ठानाय अपेक्षितम्। – रत्नप्रभा

means of knowledge (pramāṇa) cannot be the direct and primary means of cognition of dharma.[11]

But Manu's prohibition of logic does not also mean a total taboo on reasoning. It actually intends to advise us that on the subject of dharma, the Śruti (Scripture) and the Smṛti (Code of Law) are the only available primary means of knowledge and hence the authenticity and utility of such fundamental authorities should not be subjected to any hostile logic, lest it should lead to the collapse of dharma and law. Only Scripture-friendly reasoning (śrutyanukūlaḥ tarkaḥ) is welcome. Manu himself emphasises the necessity of such reasoning to understand clearly the nature and details of dharma that one has learnt from the Scripture.[12] Thus, we see that the highly valued Vaidika-darśana, termed 'Pūrva-mīmāṁsā', became entirely devoted to the inquiry into the various aspects of dharma by employing one thousand principles or nyāyas (sahasrādhikaraṇa) for the complete comprehension of dharma.

While concluding the analysis on the present statement of the Bhāṣya, we should also take into consideration that while the Scripture enjoins us to practise dharma by injunctions such as *"dharmaṁ cara," "jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta"* and so on, the very injunctions themselves recognise that the dharma which they enjoin is non-existent at the very time of their upadeśa (enunciation) and that it has to be brought into existence only by performing it. On the other hand, when the Scripture teaches us that Ātman needs to be seen through statements such as *"ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ"* (*Bṛ.U.*2.4.5), it admits, in principle, that the Brahman–Ātman is already in existence, which fact the Ācārya takes up for analysis in the sequel.[13]

2. On the contrary, the Scripture etc. and also experience etc. as and when applicable, constitute here the means of knowledge since the knowledge of Brahman culminates in the immediate Experience of Brahman, and

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[11] Cf. यद्यपि धर्मजिज्ञासायामपि सामग्र्यां प्रत्यक्षादीनां व्यापारः तथापि साक्षान्नास्ति। ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायां तु साक्षादनुभवादीनां सम्भवोऽनुभवार्था च ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा। – भामती

[12] Cf. आर्षं धर्मोपदेशं च वेदशास्त्राविरोधिना। यस्तर्केणानुसन्धत्ते स धर्मं वेद नेतरः॥ – मनुस्मृति (१२.१०६)

[13] Vide Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Section 12.

also because this knowledge has an existing entity as its content: We have seen that dharma is not existent at the time when it is desired to be known, nor when it is taught by the Scripture, nor even when it is understood. As a result, perception (pratyakṣa) and other means of knowledge (pramāṇa) like inference (anumāna), analogy (upamāna) and so on have no role to play when one is desirous of knowing dharma. Consequently, the only means or source of the knowledge of dharma is the Scripture.[14]

With regard to existing entities, besides the Scripture, perception could also be a means of knowledge. And, if perception (pratyakṣa) happens to have an entry, then the retinue of other means of knowledge like inference, analogy and so on would also ensue since all these basically depend on perception. Hence, the Ācārya declares that, unlike dharma-jijñāsā, in the present context of brahma-jijñāsā, since Brahman is an existent entity, the Scripture etc. (śrutyādayaḥ) as well as direct realisation etc. (anubhavādayaḥ), that is even the other means of knowledge (pramāṇa) like anumāna and so on, constitute the pramāṇa (means of knowledge) for the Realisation of Brahman.

In the present Bhāṣya sentence, there are two important expressions that require elaboration: *"śrutyādayaḥ"* (Scripture etc.) and *"anubhavādayaḥ"* (experience etc.).

According to the *Bhāmatī*, the expression *"śrutyādayaḥ"* signifies Śruti (Scripture), Itihāsa (Epics), Purāṇa (Legend) and Smṛti (Traditional Codes). All these constitute the means of knowledge of dharma and Brahman.[15] The *Pañcapādikā* and its sub-commentaries (like the *Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa*) explain the word 'śrutyādayaḥ' in the technical sense in which the Mīmāṁsakas employ it, and thus 'śrutyādayaḥ' comes to mean the six factors known collectively as 'aṅgatā-bodhaka-pramāṇa', that is the 'factors deciding the

[14] It should be so since the Veda alone has the power of teaching us about things of the past, of the present and of the future and things that are subtle, hidden or distant and so on. Vide *"codanā hi bhūtaṁ, bhavantaṁ, bhaviṣyantaṁ, sūkṣmaṁ viprakṛṣṭam, ityevañjātīyakamarthaṁ śaknoti avagamayitum."* (*Śābara-bhāṣya*, 1.1.2)

[15] Cf. श्रुत्यादय इति श्रुतीतिहासपुराणस्मृतयः प्रमाणम्। – भामती

accessorial relations'. These six are: (1) śruti (the direct statement), (2) liṅga (potency of word), (3) vākya (syntactical relation), (4) prakaraṇa (context), (5) sthāna (place of occurrence) and (6) samākhyā (name).[16] These six means are extensively made use of in both the Dharma- and Brahma-mīmāṁsās for comprehending correctly the aṅgāṅgibhāva (i.e. the accessorial relation of the subsidiaries with the main act of dharma) and for logically interpreting the complex Scriptural texts on dharma and Brahman. Hence, these six are viewed as the means of knowledge of dharma and Brahman.[17]

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[16] Cf. श्रुतिः पदान्तरनिरपेक्षः शब्दः। आदिशब्देन लिङ्गवाक्यादयः शब्दप्रकारा गृह्यन्ते। – पञ्चपादिका

Also, cf. श्रुतिः पदान्तरनिरपेक्षः शब्दः। लिङ्गं श्रुतस्यार्थस्यार्थान्तरेणाविनाभावः। अनेकपदसामर्थ्यं वाक्यम्। वाक्यद्वया-सामर्थ्यमारभ्याधीतविषयं प्रकरणम्। क्रमवर्तिनां पदार्थानां क्रमवर्तिभिः पदार्थैर्यथाक्रमं सम्बन्धः स्थानम्। सञ्ज्ञासामान्यं समाख्या। – पञ्चपादिकाविवरण

Also, cf. श्रुत्यादयः इत्यादिग्रहणेन लिङ्गवाक्यप्रकरणस्थानसमाख्या गृह्यन्ते। श्रुतिः पदान्तरनिरपेक्षः शब्दः। लिङ्गं श्रुतस्यार्थान्तराविनाभावः। अन्यान्याकाङ्क्षासन्निधियोग्यतावन्ति पदानि वाक्यम्। वाक्यद्वयसामर्थ्यमारभ्याधीतविषयं प्रकरणम्। क्रमवर्तिनां पदार्थानां क्रमवर्तिभिः पदार्थैर्यथाक्रमं सम्बन्धः स्थानम्। सञ्ज्ञासाम्यं समाख्या। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

[17] 'Viniyogovidhi', which is one of the four kinds of vidhi (injunctive statement), determines the connection of a subsidiary (aṅga) with the principal (aṅgī) through the six means of determination (pramāṇa). These six pramāṇas as mentioned above are: (1) śruti (direct statement), (2) liṅga (the power of word), (3) vākya (connected utterance – samabhivyāhāra), (4) prakaraṇa (context), (5) sthāna (commonness of place, or position or order) and (6) samākhyā (name or a word understood in its literal sense). The following is a brief explanation of these six pramāṇas:

(1) Śruti: This is a direct Scriptural statement which independently indicates the relation of a subsidiary (aṅga) with the principal rite (aṅgī). The Vedic sentence *"vrīhibhiryajeta"* illustrates the case of śruti since the instrumental case-ending in the term 'vrīhibhiḥ' indicates directly that rice-grains (vrīhi) are the means with which the sacrificial rite is to be performed. Consequently rice-grains become subservient (aṅga) to the sacrificial rite (aṅgī).

(2) Liṅga: The liṅga-pramāṇa consists in the conventional meaning of a word, which meaning is expressed by the denotative power of words (abhidhā-śakti). Kumārila-bhaṭṭa explains this in his *Tantravārtika* when he says: *"sāmarthyaṁ sarvaśabdānāṁ liṅgamityabhidhīyate* – It is the potency of all words, which is described as liṅga." To illustrate: The sentence, *"barhirdevasadanaṁ dāmi* – I cut the grass, the seat of the gods." The power of the word 'dāmi' (I cut) shows that this Mantra is to be used while cutting. Further, the word 'barhis' primarily denotes 'kuśa-grass' by means of liṅga, that is the 'convention' or the 'denotative faculty', although 'barhis' does connote other types of grass also. It is the denotation of 'barhis' which indicates the cutting of kuśa-grass alone and not the other kinds of grass. As such this Mantra becomes subservient (aṅga) to the act of cutting the kuśa-grass (aṅgī).

(3) Vākya: This is a syntactically connected utterance. *"Samabhivyāharo vākyam* – Vākya consists in pronouncing two words together." Vākya determines the relation of subsidiary (aṅga) with the principal (aṅgī) even in the absence of case-endings such as the accusative which denotes the thing to be accomplished, or instrumental which denotes the means to

accomplish the rite and so on. To illustrate: *"yasya parṇamayī juhurbhavati na sa pāpaṁ ślokaṁ śṛṇoti* – whose ladle is made of parṇa-wood, he hears no evil report about himself (i.e. he becomes famous)." Here, from the connected utterance of being-made-of-parṇa-wood and ladle (juhū), the being-made-of-parṇa-wood (parṇatā) becomes subservient (aṅga) to the ladle (juhū), the principal (aṅgī).

(4) Prakaraṇa: Translated as 'context', this consists in mutual expectany (paraspārāpekṣā). Prakaraṇa as the means for determination (pramāṇa) can be illustrated in the case of the Prayāja-yāgas (fore-sacrifices) and Darśapūrṇamāsa-yāga. When two sentences are found to be complementing each other, they constitute 'prakaraṇa'. The sentence beginning with *"samidho yajati"* without mentioning the fruit, lays down the five prayājas (fore-sacrifices). On hearing this, the expectancy as to what is that which is going to be the fruit accomplished by the Prayāja-yāgas (fore-sacrifices) such as the Samidh-sacrifice. The injunctive sentence *"darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṁ svargakāmo yajeta"* gives the sense that heaven (svarga) is to be attained by Darśapūrṇamāsa sacrifice. In this case, the expectancy as to how exactly one may perform the Darśapūrṇamāsa-yāga for attaining heaven remains unsatisfied by any term in the above-mentioned injunctive sentence *"darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṁ svargakāmo yajeta."* It is evident that these two sentences, one beginning with *"samidho yajati"* and the other *"darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṁ svargakāmo yajeta"* are mutually expectant. The sentence *"samidho yajati"* requires a fruit (phalākāṅkṣā) which is supplied by *"darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṁ svargakāmo yajeta"* by indicating that the fruit of Samidh-yāga is svarga (heaven). In the same way the injunctive sentence *"darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṁ svargakāmo yajeta"* requires how exactly (itikartavyatākāṅkṣā) the Darśapūrṇamāsa sacrifice is to be performed so that heaven may be attained. That very expectancy is fulfilled by the sentences mentioning the Prayāja-yāgas (fore-sacrifices) beginning with the statement *"samidho yajati"* which when performed become subservient (aṅga) to the principal sacrifices (aṅgī) of Darśapūrṇamāsa-yāga. In this way the mutual expectancy of the two sentences constitutes 'prakaraṇa' and helps us to determine the principal rite (aṅgī) and the subsidiary rite (aṅga).

(5) Sthāna: This is the fifth pramāṇa, and means 'commonness of place, position or order'. 'Sthāna' becomes the means to determine when two things are found together in a common place and on that basis become related to each other as principal (aṅgī) and subordinate (aṅga). In the *Maitrāyaṇī-saṁhitā*, two sacrificial rites, one in honour of both Indra and Agni and the other in honour of Vaiśvānara are enjoined respectively by the sentences *"aindrāgnamekādaśakapālaṁ nirvapet* – One should offer the puroḍāśa (cake) prepared in eleven potsherds in honour of Indra and Agni" and *"vaiśvānaraṁ dvādaśakapālaṁ nirvapet* – One should offer the puroḍāśa (cake) prepared in twelve potsherds in honour of Vaiśvānara." Later on, in the same Saṁhitā, two pairs of anuvākyā (Mantras for involving the deities) and yājyā (Mantras offering oblations) occur. One pair commences with *"indrāgnī rocanā divaḥ* – Indra and Agni are illuminators of heaven" and the other with *"vaiśvānaro'jījanat* – Vaiśvānara created" in the same order. Here, the question arises which pair of Mantras is subordinate to which rite. From 'sthāna', that is the 'commonness of place, position or order', we thus determine that the first pair of anuvākyā- and yājyā-mantras becomes subservient (aṅga) to the first enjoined sacrificial rite (aṅgī) and the pair of anuvākyā- and yājyā-mantras mentioned second becomes subordinate to the sacrificial rite enjoined second.

'Anubhava' is the other word in the Bhāṣya, occurring in the expression *"anubhavādayaḥ"* (experience etc.) that needs a detailed explanation. The word 'anubhava' is usually rendered as 'experience', a kind of cognition (jñāna). In fact, the Indian philosophical tradition recognises two kinds of cognition, namely 'smṛti' (recollection) and 'anubhava' (experience). Under the second category come all experiences – the perceptual (pratyakṣa), inferential (anumiti), analogical (upamiti), presumption (arthāpatti) and non-cognitional (anupalabdhi) cognitions.

In the present Bhāṣya section, the word 'anubhava' occurs twice: first in *"anubhavādayaśca yathāsambhavam iha pramāṇam* – experience etc. as and when applicable, constitute here the means of knowledge" and thereafter in *"anubhavāvasānatvāt* – since it culminates in the direct experience." The tenor of these sentences reveals that the term 'anubhava' in the first sentence is meant to denote a means of knowledge (pramāṇa), while in the second expression it signifies the Realisation (avagati) resulting from the first 'anubhava', which has been given the status of the means of knowledge (pramāṇa). It is certain that the first 'anubhava' is not used in the broad sense of the term whereby it can include all the varied experiences mentioned above such as perceptional (pratyakṣa), inferential (anumiti), analogical (upamiti) and so on, for if it were so the word 'ādayaḥ' (etc.) in the expression *"anubhavādayaḥ"* would be meaningless and also because pramāṇas such as perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna) and so on are not the means of knowledge with regard to the second 'anubhava', occurring in the expression *"anubhavāvasānatvāt,"* which is, in fact, the direct Realisation (Sākṣātkāra or Brahmānubhūti) of the identity of the self with Brahman.

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(6) Samākhyā: This is the last of the six pramāṇas which determines the relation of the subordinate (aṅga) to the principal (aṅgī). 'Samākhyā' actually means 'a word understood in its literal sense in accordance with its grammatical derivation'. This literal sense of a word serves to indicate the relation of the principal sacrificial act and the subordinate one. Let us take the Vedic expression *"hotuścamasaḥ* – The cup from which the Hotṛ drinks the Soma juice." It denotes two things: the Hotṛ (sacrificial priest) and his drinking from the cup (camasa-pātra). Out of these, drinking, being an action, is naturally the principal and Hotṛ in that way by samākhyā becomes subservient (aṅga) to the act of drinking (aṅgī).

For more details of these six pramāṇas one may make a perusal of the *Arthasaṅgraha* of Laugākṣi-bhāskara.

Therefore, the first 'anubhava', which is spoken of as pramāṇa (means of knowledge), will have to be taken in the sense of the cognition of Self gained by the seeker from his śravaṇa, that is listening to the Scriptures from his Guru and imbibing their purport. This cognition or seeing or experience (anubhava) is a modification or operation of the internal organ (antaḥkaraṇavṛtti).[18] Indeed, this intellectual operation is a direct cognition (sākṣātkāra) arising from the words of the Guru and the Śāstra and is the direct means for Realisation as it enables the aspirant (sādhaka) to attain the final goal of realising the identity of Brahman and Ātman (brahmātmaikya-prāpti), the supreme Bliss, uncontaminated by any misery and is the supreme goal of the Vedāntic inquiry.[19] This final Realisation is an immmediate experience (Aparokṣānubhūti) of the identity of the self and Brahman and it is that in the expression *"anubhavāvasānatvāt"* wherein we see the word 'anubhava' occurring that is voiced for the second time in the Bhāṣya.

Thus, 'anubhavādayaḥ' (experience etc.) in *"anubhavādayaśca yathāsambhavam iha pramāṇam* – experience etc. as and when applicable, constitute here the means of knowledge" stands for the cognitive experience (anubhava – darśana) that one attains from the Teacher (darśana) as well as the seeker's repeated efforts at manana and nididhyāsana referred to by 'ādayaḥ' (i.e. etcetera) while the term 'anubhava' (experience) in *"anubhavāvasānatvāt* – since it culminates in the direct experience" refers to the direct Realisation (Aparokṣānubhuti), the final Experience of the identity of the self with Brahman (Brahmātmaikya) which alone puts an end to saṁsāra. The above explanation of the Bhāṣya is based on *Bhāmatī.*

Ratnaprabhā and *Nyāyanirṇaya* give a slightly different explanation. The term 'anubhava' in the expression *"anubhavādayaśca yathāsambhavam iha pramāṇam,"* according to Govindānanda, the author of *Ratnaprabhā,* refers to the Experience of the Wise, the 'vidvadanubhūti', and by 'ādayaḥ' (etcetera)

[18] Cf. अनुभवः अन्तःकरणवृत्तिभेदो ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारः, तस्याविद्यानिवृत्तिद्वारेण ब्रह्मस्वरूपाविर्भावः प्रमाणफलम्। – भामती

[19] Cf. ब्रह्मानुभवः ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारः परमपुरुषार्थः निर्मृष्टनिखिलदुःखपरमानन्दरूपत्वात्। – भामती

is meant the means for the knowledge, the manana and nididhyāsana,[20] and the meaning of 'anubhava' in the expression *"anubhavāvasānatvāt,"* is just as explained in *Bhāmatī*, and stands for the final culminating Experience (Aparokṣānubhūti) of the identity of the self with Brahman which puts an end to the entire realm of saṁsāra.

◈

The expressions *"śrutyādayaḥ"* and *"anubhavādayaḥ"* can also be construed a little differently by comprehending the deeper significance of the Bhāṣya sentence of this section *"na dharmajijñāsāyām iva śrutyādayaḥ eva pramāṇaṁ brahmajijñāsāyām* – The Scripture etc. are not the only means of knowledge in the case of the desire to know Brahman, just as it is in the case of the desire to know dharma."

'Dharma-jijñāsā', the desire to know dharma, culminates in the correct performance of the Vedic rite (dharma), the content of dharma-jijñāsā. This performance is meant for attaining heaven and worldly prosperity (abhyudaya), both of which are viewed as a puruṣārtha (human goal). Here, the inquiry that precedes the performance of dharma, that is the Vedic rite, can only be into the Śruti (Veda) and the various Śrauta-sūtras.[21] These two – Śruti and Śrauta-sūtra – are what is comprehended by the Bhāṣya expression *"śrutyādayaḥ eva* – the Śruti etc. alone."

On the other hand, brahma-jijñāsā, the desire to know Brahman, culminates in the unhindered (apratibaddha) Realisation (cf. the Bhāṣya expression *"anubhavāvasānatvāt"*) of the identity of Brahman and Ātman and this Realisation of the oneness is the object of the brahma-jijñāsā[22] that is

[20] Cf. अनुभवः ब्रह्मसाक्षात्काराख्यो विद्वदनुभवः। आदिपदाद् मननिदिध्यासनयोर्ग्रहः। – रत्नप्रभा
Also, cf. अनुभवो ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारो विद्वदनुभवः। आदिपदमनुमानादिसङ्ग्रहार्थम्। – न्यायनिर्णय
One need not wonder at the absence of śravaṇa in the meaning given for the word 'ādi' (etc.) in the Bhāṣya expression *"anubhavādayaḥ."* Śravaṇa is included in the expression *"śrutyādayaḥ"* itself and hence manana and nididhyāsana alone are intended by the word 'ādi' in the expression *"anubhavādayaḥ."*

[21] The aphorisms which briefly expound the injunctions laid down in the Vedic Saṁhitās and brāhmaṇas for the performance of yāgas are termed 'Śrauta-sūtras'.

[22] Cf. धर्मजिज्ञासा हि स्वर्गादिरूपपुरुषार्थसिद्ध्यर्थं स्वप्रमेयानुष्ठानावसाना। ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा तु मोक्षरूपपुरुषार्थावसानाय स्वप्रमेयस्य ब्रह्मणः अप्रतिबद्धसाक्षात्कारपर्यवसाना। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

referred to in the above-quoted Bhāṣya statement and is meant for attaining the puruṣārtha (human goal) of Liberation (Mokṣa), the freedom from the realm of saṁsāra.

In order to gain this unhindered Realisation of the identity of Brahman and Ātman, the aspirant has to pass necessarily through the stage of manana, that is the logical inquiry into the passages of the Śruti (Scripture) and Smṛti (traditional code), which are referred to by the expression *"śrutyādayaḥ,"* and also into one's varied experiences, which are referred to by the expression *"anubhavādayaḥ,"* which comprises of many experiences of joy and sorrow due to the mutual superimposition of self and non-self, the observation of the life-pattern of the Men of Realisation and the experience of their teachings and so on, all of which are gained through perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna) and other means of knowledge (pramāṇa) as well as the recollection of the past experiences (smṛti). Here, by the term 'ādayaḥ' (etcetera) in the expression *"anubhavādayaḥ,"* is included recollection (smṛti). In case the aspirant fails to pass through the stage of manana of the above description, the attainment of the Realisation of the identity of Brahman and Ātman, the content of the brahma-jijñāsā, would be hampered (pratibaddha).

Thus, it is through manana (reflection) which one effects through the Śruti and Smṛti, declarations and enunciations that are referred to by the Bhāṣya expression *"śrutyādayaḥ"*[23] and the manifold experiences (anubhava) and recollection (smṛti) that are referred to by the expression *"anubhavādayaśca."* These constitute the necessary means (pramāṇa) for giving rise to the direct Realisation (Sākṣātkāra or Brahmānubhūti) in the case of brahma-jijñāsā unlike the case of dharma-jijñāsā wherein the Śruti and the Śrauta-sūtras (śrutyādayaḥ) alone constitute the means with no requirement whatsoever for the above-mentioned *"anubhavādayaḥ."*[24]

Also, cf. *"avagatiparyantaṁ jñānaṁ sanvācyecchāyāḥ karma."* (Jijñāsādhikaraṇa-bhāṣya, Section 18)

[23] Cf. (फलजनकं हि ब्रह्मज्ञानं साक्षात्काररूपमेवेति) प्रत्यगभेदपक्षविरोधिशङ्कानां प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वासम्भवादिपराणां निरासार्थमनुमानाद्यपेक्षाऽपि वर्तते। अत एव "श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यः" इति मननविधिरुपपद्यते। – प्रदीप

[24] The following is an overview of various meanings of the Bhāṣya expressions *"śrutyādayaḥ"*

This Bhāṣya portion is significant as it recognises that in the process of Vedāntic reflection (manana), a Brahma-jijñāsu, that is the one who desires to know Brahman, may make use of all the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) in

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and *"anubhavādayaḥ"* as seen in various commentaries:

Interpretation	*Śrutyādayaḥ (Śruti etc.) in the context of dharma-jijñāsā and brahma-jijñāsā*	*Anubhavādayaḥ (anubhava etc.) in the context of brahma-jijñāsā*
Bhāmatī	Śruti, Itihāsa, Purāṇa & Smṛti	By 'anubhava' is meant a pramāṇa, a vṛtti having Brahman as its content, the 'brahma-sākṣātkāra', which arises during śravaṇa. By 'ādi' is meant other cognitions arising from anumāna, upamāna, arthāpatti & anupalabdhi.
Pañcapādikā	The six aṅgatā-bodhaka-pramāṇas: śruti, liṅga, vākya, prakaraṇa, sthāna & samākhyā	Does not explain this expression
Tattvadīpana	The six aṅgatā-bodhaka-pramāṇas: śruti, liṅga, vākya, prakaraṇa, sthāna & samākhyā	Does not explain this expression
Ratnaprabhā	The six aṅgatā-bodhaka-pramāṇas: śruti, liṅga, vākya, prakaraṇa, sthāna & samākhyā	By 'anubhava' is meant 'vidvadanubhava'. By 'ādi' is meant manana and nididhyāsana.
Bhāṣyabhāva-prakāśikā	Gives two optional meanings: 1. The six aṅgatā-bodhaka-pramāṇas: śruti, liṅga, vākya, prakaraṇa, sthāna & samākhyā 2. Śruti, Itihāsa, Purāṇa & Smṛti	By 'anubhava' is meant a pramāṇa, a vṛtti having Brahman as its content, the 'brahma-sākṣātkāra', which arises during śravaṇa. The text does not explain the word 'ādi'.
Nyāyanirṇaya	The six aṅgatā-bodhaka-pramāṇas: śruti, liṅga, vākya, prakaraṇa, sthāna & samākhyā	By 'anubhava' is meant 'vidvadanubhava'. By 'ādi' (etc.) is meant other cognitions arising from anumāna, upamāna, arthāpatti & anupalabdhi.
Vārtika	The six aṅgatā-bodhaka-pramāṇas: śruti, liṅga, vākya, prakaraṇa, sthāna & samākhyā	By 'anubhava' is meant direct experience (pratyakṣa). By 'ādi' is meant other cognitions arising from anumāna, upamāna, arthāpatti & anupalabdhi.
Prakaṭārtha-vivaraṇa	The six aṅgatā-bodhaka-pramāṇas: śruti, liṅga, vākya, prakaraṇa, sthāna & samākhyā	By 'anubhava' is meant 'vidvadanubhava'. By 'ādi' (etc.) is meant other cognitions arising from anumāna, upamāna, arthāpatti & anupalabdhi.
	Does not explain this expression	By 'anubhava' is meant 'sākṣātkāra'. The text does not explain the word 'ādi'.
Pradīpa	Does not explain this expression	Does not explain this expression
Other alternate meanings	1. Śruti & various Śrauta-sūtras (in the case of dharma-jijñāsā) 2. Śruti & various Smṛtis (traditional codes)	By 'anubhava' is meant reflection on the many experiences of joy and sorrow due to adhyāsa, observation of the life-pattern of the Men of Realisation, experience of their teachings, as well as the experiences gained by the pramāṇas – pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna, arthāpatti, & anupalabdhi. By 'ādi' is meant smṛti (recollection).

his inquiry. This allowance has become possible because of the indisputable fact of Brahman being an ever existing Reality (bhūta-vastu)[25] as evinced by the Bhāṣya expression: *"bhūtavastuviṣayatvāt."*[26]

We shall now investigate how a seeker can make use of all the six means of knowledge (ṣaṭ-pramāṇa) during his manana or logical reflection upon the knowledge of the self's identity with Brahman that he has grasped from the teachings of the Guru and the Śāstra. We have already seen how the direct experience (pratyakṣānubhava) constitutes the means of the Brahmānubhava, the final goal of his spiritual pursuit.[27]

The Scriptural passage *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante...tad brahma"* (*Tai.U.*3.1) suggests how one could make use of anumāna-pramāṇa (inference) for knowing Brahman as the source of the world. By making use of this kind of inference, a seeker of Liberation, like Bhṛgu–Vāruṇi, can arrive at the taṭastha-lakṣaṇa (definition *per accidens*) of Brahman, and thereafter proceed further and come to know from the Śruti the svarūpa-lakṣaṇa (intrinsic-nature definition) of Brahman. It is only basing themselves on the pattern of the above Upaniṣadic inference, that the Logicians have constructed their Īśvarānumāna, though claiming it to be their original contribution to philosophical thought.

The doctrine of identity of Brahman and the world, that is the identity between the cause and its effect, is taught by the Upaniṣad by taking recourse to the upamāna-pramāṇa (analogy) of the clay and earthen-wares, metal and metal-wares.[28]

[25] Cf. भूतं पुरुषेच्छानधीनम्। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

[26] Cf. तथा च ब्रह्म, प्रमाणान्तरापेक्षसाक्षात्कारविषयः, भूतवस्तुत्वाद्, घटादिवदिति सत्प्रतिपक्षानुमानबाधितं पूर्वोक्तं वेदार्थत्वेन ब्रह्मप्रमाणान्तराविषयत्वानुमानमिति भावः। – प्रदीप

[27] Vide *"anubhavādayaśca yathāsambhavam iha pramāṇam."*

[28] Vide *"yathā somyaikena mṛtpiṇḍena sarvaṁ mṛnmayaṁ vijñātaṁ syādvācārambhaṇaṁ vikāro nāmadheyaṁ mṛttiketyeva satyam. yathā somyaikena lohamaṇinā sarvaṁ lohamayaṁ vijñātaṁ syādvācārambhaṇaṁ vikāro nāmadheyaṁ lohamityeva satyam. yathā somyaikena nakhanikṛntanena sarvaṁ kārṣṇāyasaṁ vijñātaṁ syādvācārambhaṇaṁ vikāro nāmadheyaṁ kṛṣṇāyasamityeva satyamevaṁ somya sa ādeśo bhavatīti* – O pleasant one, as by knowing a lump of clay, all things made of clay become comprehended: All transformation has speech as its foundation and is thus verbal appellation alone. It is clay alone which is real. O pleasant one, as by knowing a lump of gold all things made of gold become comprehended: All transformation has

By means of śabda-pramāṇa (verbal testimony), such as the Upaniṣadic passages (*Chā.U.*6.8.7 & *Mā.U.*2 respectively) *"tat tvam asi," "ayam ātmā brahma"* and so on the seeker learns and realises the identity of Brahman and Ātman.

When from his revered Guru and Scripture, that is by śabda-pramāṇa (verbal testimony), the seeker learns about 'Brahmātmaikya', the identity between Brahman and Ātman, he finds this Scriptural teaching to be at variance with pratyakṣa-pramāṇa, that is his direct experience which accentuates the mutual difference between Brahman and his self. However, because of his total faith (śraddhā) in his Master and in the Scripture, he does not set aside their teachings but seeks to know the real purport and truth of the teachings that he has been graced with. Taking recourse to the arthāpatti-pramāṇa, that is presumption as the means of cognition, he presumes and decides that the perceptual difference between the omniscient Īśvara and the limited self is based on the empirical (laukika) means of knowledge alone and that this difference therefore is only vyāvahārika (empirical) and hence must be only illusory (ādhyāsika or kalpita) from the ultimate point of view (pāramārthika). On the other hand, the identity of Brahman and Ātman that is taught by the Scripture and the Guru is supersensory and remains uncomprehended by any means of knowledge other than śabda (Scripture) and is, therefore, the higher and transcendental truth (pāramārthika-satya). If not for this presumption (arthāpatti), there will be no satisfactory way to arrive at a resolution of the contradiction between the two means of knowledge in question – that is perception (pratyakṣa-pramāṇa) and Scripture (śabda-pramāṇa).

When the seeker is reflecting deeply (manana) on the Upaniṣadic doctrine of Brahman as the sole cause of the world (Brahmakāraṇa-vāda), he is confronted by many formidable rival views like the doctrine of the inert Pradhāna as the sole cause of the world (Pradhānakāraṇa-vāda), the doctrine

speech as its foundation and is thus verbal appellation alone. It is gold alone which is real. O pleasant one, as by knowing a nail-cutter all things made of iron become comprehended: All transformation has speech as its foundation and is thus verbal appellation alone. It is iron alone which is real. O pleasant one, thus is that teaching." (*Chāndogya-upaniṣad*, 6.1.4-6)

of Atoms as the ultimate material cause of the world (Paramāṇukāraṇa-vāda) of the Vaiśeṣikas and so on. The seeker should reject all these rival doctrines by means of anupalabdhi-pramāṇa (non-perception); in other words, he rejects all these rival and contradictory doctrines because in the Scripture he does not come across any reference to support these doctrines.

It is in view of all this, the Ācārya declares that in the context of brahma-jijñāsā, one may make use of, besides the Scripture, all other means of knowledge (pramāṇa), as and when the need arises and wherever they are applicable – *"yathāsambhavam."*

It may also be noted that in the context of brahma-jijñāsā, with reference to the Realisation of identity of the self with Brahman, both direct experience (pratyakṣānubhava or sākṣātkāra) and Scripture constitute the direct means of knowledge while the other four – anumāna (inference), upamāna (analogy), arthāpatti (presumption) and anupalabdhi (non-perception) – are only indirect means of cognition.[29] But in the context of dharma-jijñāsā, Scripture alone is the direct means, while all the other five means of knowledge (pramāṇa) are indirect means of knowledge.

3. Indeed, since there is no dependence on experience with respect to what is to be accomplished, the Scriptures etc. alone are considered as authority: The word 'anubhava' is generally rendered as 'experience'. If that sense is to be adhered to here, the present statement of the Ācārya is likely to be misunderstood for experience is always sought after accomplishing an action or in the creation of an object, even if it be an insignificant object of this world such as a pot or a cloth let alone the attainment of heaven and the other worlds.

We have already explained in this section (vide n.3) that 'anubhava' (experience) is meant to denote an individual's mental mode (antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti) corresponding to an object that is already in existence. When the Scripture enjoins that a sacrifice, like Jyotiṣṭoma, or a worldly act, like bringing a cow, needs to be accomplished, that particular sacrifice or thing

[29] Cf. श्रुत्यादीनामनुमानादीनां च शब्दशक्तितात्पर्यावधृतिद्वाराऽनुभवमुत्पाद्य ब्रह्मणि प्रामाण्यम्, अनुभवस्य साक्षादेव तदविद्याध्वंसित्वेनेति मत्वोक्तम्—यथासम्भवमिति। – न्यायनिर्णय

By means of śabda-pramāṇa (verbal testimony), such as the Upaniṣadic passages (*Chā.U.*6.8.7 & *Mā.U.*2 respectively) *"tat tvam asi," "ayam ātmā brahma"* and so on the seeker learns and realises the identity of Brahman and Ātman.

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cannot be the content of any experience, as these cannot be perceived by the mind at the moment of their enunciation. A Yājñika (one who is an adept in performing Vedic sacrifices) might have performed Jyotiṣṭoma, the sacrificial rite, more than once. But, when he is again desirous of performing the Jyotiṣṭoma, he does not presently have the perceptual experience (anubhava) of *that* rite which he is about to perform for the Jyotiṣṭoma rite has not yet been performed by him. However, he has only the recollection (smṛti) of past performance of the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice and possesses the Jyotiṣṭoma-saṁskāra, that is the mental impression (saṁskāra) generated by the performance of the rite, which alone has brought about the recollection (smṛti), all of which point to the Yājñika's skill and expertise in the sacrificial rite that is albeit yet to be commenced.

4. it is also so because what needs to be accomplished is dependent on the person even for its own coming into existence. The Bhāṣya has explained that there is no dependence on experience with respect to the rites that need to be accomplished. It must be so because only by its performance, dharma, the sacrifice, comes into existence and not before its performance. Actually, if it were already in existence, then there would be no necessity for its performance.[30] Indeed, no one finds it necessary to create and bring into existence a pot that is already existent!

[30] Cf. न त्वेवं धर्मज्ञानमनुभवावसानं, तदनुभवस्य स्वयमपुरुषार्थत्वात्, तदनुष्ठानसाध्यत्वात्पुरुषार्थस्य, अनुष्ठानस्य च विनाप्यनुभवं शाब्दज्ञानमात्रादेव सिद्धेः इत्याह—कर्तव्ये हि इत्यादिना। न चायं साक्षात्कारविषयतायोग्योऽपि, अवर्तमानत्वाद्, अवर्तमानश्चानवस्थितत्वादित्याह—पुरुषाधीन इति। – भामती

11

[धर्मप्रमाणविषये युक्तिः]

कर्तुम् अकर्तुम् [१]अन्यथा वा कर्तुं च शक्यं लौकिकं वैदिकं च कर्म। यथा अश्वेन गच्छति, पद्भ्याम्, अन्यथा वा, [२]न वा गच्छति इति। तथा "अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति" (मै.सं.४.७.६), "न अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति," "उदिते जुहोति," "अनुदिते जुहोति" इति विधिप्रतिषेधाश्च[1] अत्र अर्थवन्तः स्युः, विकल्पोत्सर्गापवादाश्च।

11 A

[DHARMAPRAMĀṆAVIṢAYE YUKTIḤ]

kartum akartum anyathā vā kartuṁ ca śakyaṁ laukikaṁ vaidikaṁ ca karma. yathā aśvena gacchati, padbhyām, anyathā vā, na vā gacchati iti. tathā "atirātre ṣoḍaśinaṁ gṛhṇāti" (Mai.Saṁ.4.7.6), "na atirātre ṣoḍaśinaṁ gṛhṇāti," "udite juhoti," "anudite juhoti" iti vidhipratiṣedhāśca atra arthavantaḥ syuḥ, vikalpotsargāpavādāśca.

11 B

कर्तुम् *kartum* – to perform; अकर्तुम् *akartum* – not to perform; अन्यथा वा *anyathā vā* – or in a different way; कर्तुम् *kartum* – to perform; च *ca* – and; शक्यम् *śakyam* – it is possible; लौकिकम् *laukikam* – worldly; वैदिकम् *vaidikam* – Scriptural; च *ca* – also; कर्म *karma* – action; यथा *yathā* – for example; अश्वेन *aśvena* – by horse; गच्छति *gacchati* – one goes; पद्भ्याम् *padbhyām* – on foot; अन्यथा वा *anyathā vā* – or otherwise; न वा गच्छति *na vā gacchati* – or one does not travel at all; इति *iti* – thus; तथा *tathā* – likewise; अतिरात्रे *atirātre* – in the Atirātra sacrifice; षोडशिनम् *ṣoḍaśinam* – the sixteenth cup; गृह्णाति *gṛhṇāti* – one should take up; अतिरात्रे *atirātre* – in the Atirātra sacrifice; षोडशिनम् *ṣoḍaśinam* – the sixteenth cup; न गृह्णाति *na gṛhṇāti* – one should not take up; उदिते *udite* – at sunrise; जुहोति *juhoti* – one should offer oblation; अनुदिते *anudite* – before sunrise; जुहोति *juhoti* – one should offer oblation; इति *iti* – thus; विधिप्रतिषेधाः *vidhipratiṣedhāḥ* – injunctions and prohibitions; च *ca* – also; अत्र *atra* – here; अर्थवन्तः स्युः *arthavantaḥ syuḥ* –

[१] AA (fn.) अन्यथा कर्तुम्

[२] Tel, ASS न गच्छति

[1] चो हेतौ। – भामती

would be purportful; विकल्पोत्सर्गापवादाः च *vikalpotsargāpavādāḥ ca* – and also options, general rules and exceptions

11 C

[LOGIC GOVERNING THE MEANS OF VALID COGNITION PERTAINING TO DHARMA]

It is possible to perform, or not to perform, or to perform in a different way, an act – worldly or Scriptural.[1] For example, one may go on horse-back, or on foot, or otherwise, or may not go at all.[2] Likewise, in the case of the Vedic rituals also, the Scripture itself orders, (*Mai.Saṁ*.4.7.6) "In the Atirātra sacrifice, one should take up the Sixteenth Cup," "In the Atirātra sacrifice, one should not take up the Sixteenth Cup," "One should offer the Agnihotra oblation at sunrise," "One should offer the Agnihotra oblation before sunrise."[3] In these cases injunctions and prohibitions would be purportful, as options or general rules and their exceptions.[4]

11 D

1. It is possible to perform, or not to perform, or to perform in a different way, an act – worldly or Scriptural: The present discussion started with two axiomatic statements that were presented in the last section:[2] (1) In the matter of dharma-jijñāsā, the means of knowledge are Scripture and the like (śrutyādayaḥ) and (2) in the matter of brahma-jijñāsā, both Scripture and the like (śrutyādayaḥ) and the direct perceptual experience and the like (anubhavādayaśca) are the means of knowledge (pramāṇa).

To substantiate the above first statement, it has been pointed out by the Bhāṣyakāra that being a thing to be accomplished, dharma, as an activity, has to depend for its existence on the person who undertakes the performance of the act of dharma. In the present section, the logical basis for this is provided.

In order to bring out this logical basis, the Ācārya analyses the basic nature of dharma as an activity. To begin with, he draws our attention to the fact that as endeavours to be accomplished, both the worldly (laukika) activity and Scripture-based dharma (vaidika) are alike in nature without

[2] Vide Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Section 10.

any pertinent differences between them. In both these cases, for instance, it is possible to perform, it is also possible not to perform, and again, it is also possible to perform in a different fashion or manner. A thing of such description cannot have an existence independent of its performer, for its very being is dependent and dictated by the person who gives birth to it, that is the one who performs the act.[3]

2. For example, one may go on horse-back, or on foot, or otherwise, or may not go at all: This sentence illustrates how one may perform a particular worldly activity (laukika), or may choose not to perform it, or may even perform it in an altogether different manner. *"Aśvena gacchati* – One may go on horse-back" and *"na vā gacchati* – One may not travel at all" illustrate how it is possible to perform a worldly act and also how one may choose not to perform it at all. *"Padbhyām anyathā vā gacchati*– (One goes) on foot or in a different way" exemplifies how the same act can be performed in a manner other than what has been indicated.

3. Likewise, in the case of the Vedic rituals also, the Scripture itself orders, (*Mai.Saṁ*.4.7.6) "In the Atirātra sacrifice, one should take up the Sixteenth Cup," "In the Atirātra sacrifice, one should not take up the Sixteenth Cup," "One should offer the Agnihotra oblation at sunrise," "One should offer the Agnihotra oblation before sunrise": Just as in the case of a worldly act (laukikaṁ karma), so too in the case of the Scriptural act (vaidikaṁ karma), a person has the choice of performing the act or not performing it.

To illustrate this fact, the Ācārya cites four Vedic sentences. Of them, the passages, *"atirātre ṣoḍaśinaṁ gṛhṇāti* – In the Atirātra sacrifice one should take up the Sixteenth Cup" and *"na atirātre ṣoḍaśinaṁ gṛhṇāti* – In the Atirātra sacrifice one should not take up the Sixteenth Cup,"[4] illustrate how one has a

[3] Cf. पुरुषाधीनत्वमेव लौकिकवैदिककार्याणामाह—कर्तुमकर्तुं इति। – भामती

[4] After the Soma-juice has been extracted from the Soma-latā, that is the Soma-creeper, it is collected in cups termed 'graha'. In the Veda, for the performance of Atirātra sacrifice, sixteen grahas are prescribed. Elsewhere, in the Veda, there is the prohibition about the use of the sixteenth graha during the Atirātra sacrifice. Thus, when there is a contradiction between two injunctive statements (vidhi), it is construed that there is an option (vikalpa) for the sacrificer in the Atirātra sacrifice as to whether to use the sixteenth graha or not.

choice with respect to performing a prescribed act in a particular fashion. So also, the other two examples given by the Ācārya: *"udite juhoti* – One should offer the Agnihotra oblation at sunrise," and *"anudite juhoti* – One should offer the Agnihotra oblation before sunrise" illustrate how it is possible to perform the act prescribed by the Scripture in alternate ways.[5]

While such a choice is indeed possible in the case of the Scripture-based dharma, just as it is in the case of worldly acts, there is no such choice in the case of the Knowledge of Brahman, for Brahman being an ever-existent entity (pariniṣṭhita- or bhūta-vastu) it cannot be effected by any action whatsoever.[6] Hence, it is only natural that the inquiry of dharma and Brahman are of a totally different nature.

4. In these cases injunctions and prohibitions would be purportful, as options or general rules and their exceptions: At this juncture, there arises a question: If a person has such enormous freedom to perform or not to perform and so on, are not then the very Scriptural injunctions (vidhi),[7] their prohibitions (pratiṣedha),[8] options (vikalpa)[9] as well as general rules (utsarga)[10] and their exceptions (apavāda)[11] entirely purposeless? Certainly not! The very existence of injunctions, prohibitions, general rules as well as exceptions is itself proof enough for establishing that a person does not enjoy

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[5] Cf. अत्रातिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति, नातिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णातीति वाक्यद्वित्वेन कर्तुमकर्तुं च वैदिकं कर्म शक्यमुदाहरति। उदिते जुहोति, अनुदिते जुहोति इति वाक्यद्वित्वेन कर्तुं शक्यमन्यथा वा कर्तुं शक्यमुदाहरति। – प्रदीप
Also, cf. कर्तुमकर्तुमित्यस्येदमुदाहरणमुक्तम्। कर्तुमन्यथा वा कर्तुमित्यस्योदाहरणमाह—उदित इति। – भामती

[6] Cf. यत्रावश्यकर्तव्यताऽवगता, तत्रान्यथाकरणस्यापि सति विधाववसरोऽस्ति, नत्वेवं ब्रह्मणि वर्तते, इति ब्रह्मधर्मवैलक्षण्यमर्थ-सिद्धमेवेति भावः। – प्रदीप

[7] *"Ajñātārthajñāpako vedabhāgo vidhiḥ* – The portion of the Veda that enjoins an act not known before by any other means of knowledge is 'vidhi' (injunction)." For example: *"jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta* – The one desirous of heaven should perform the Jyotiṣṭoma-yāga."

[8] *"Puruṣasya nivartakaṁ vākyaṁ pratiṣedhaḥ* – A sentence which stops a person from carrying out an act is termed 'pratiṣedha' or 'niṣedha' (prohibition)." For example: *"na surāṁ pibeta* – Drink not liquor."

[9] *"Avāntarabodhakaḥ śabdaḥ vikalpaḥ* – A sentence which informs about another alternative is termed 'vikalpa' (option)." For example: *"vrīhibhiryavairvā yajeta* – Perform the sacrifice by offering rice or barley-corn."

[10] *"Utsargaḥ sāmānyaśāstram* – A sentence which lays down a general instruction is 'utsarga' (general rule)." (For example see the subsequent paragraphs of the above n.4.)

[11] *"Bādhanasādhanaṁ apavādaḥ* – A sentence which restricts the application of a general rule is termed 'apavāda' (exception)." (For example see the subsequent paragraphs of the above n.4.)

complete freedom with regard to the dharma, the rites prescribed by the Scriptures.[12]

When we find a contradiction between vidhi (injunction) and pratiṣedha (prohibition), this contradiction is resolved by interpreting them as vikalpa (option), or utsarga (general rule) and its apavāda (exception). Such contrivances are possible with regard to things that are yet to be accomplished and are to be brought into existence in future. But when an entity is already in existence, such contrivances are out of place.

Illustrating this, the Ācārya has given examples from the Vedic corpus: "*Atirātre ṣoḍaśinaṁ gṛhṇāti* – In the Atirātra sacrifice, one should take up the Sixteenth Cup" is a vidhi (injunction)."*Na atirātre ṣoḍaśinaṁ gṛhṇāti* – In the Atirātra sacrifice one should not take up the Sixteenth Cup," is a pratiṣedha (prohibition).[13] "*Udite juhoti* – one should offer the Agnihotra oblation at sunrise," and "*anudite juhoti* – One should offer the Agnihotra oblation before sunrise" are vikalpas (options).[14] We may add an example for utsarga (general rule): "*mā hiṁsyāt sarvā bhūtāni* – One should not injure any creature." This utsarga (general rule) has an apavāda (exception) in "*agnīṣomīyaṁ paśumālabheta* – One should offer a goat to the deity Agnī-Ṣoma."

All these – injunctions (vidhi), prohibitions (pratiṣedha) and the rest – have a purpose in the course of action because they are concerned with an action that is yet to be accomplished. When an individual has the freedom of performing or not performing, the above injunctions (vidhi), prohibitions (pratiṣedha), general rules (utsarga) and exceptions (apavāda) have the definite purpose of permitting the person the freedom and also indicating that his freedom lies in choosing the manner of performance so that his action in no way violates the Vedic declaration and causes pāpa (sins).

In other words, in the context of karma- or dharma-jijñāsā, the notion that the performance of Atirātra with the Sixteenth Cup is the right thing to do,

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[12] Cf. पुरुषस्वातन्त्र्यात् कर्तव्ये विधिप्रतिषेधानामानर्थक्यम्, अतदधीनत्वात् पुरुषप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्योः इत्यत आह— विधिप्रतिषेधाश्चान्नार्थवन्तः स्युः। – भामती

[13] Cf. गृह्णातीति विधिः, न गृह्णातीति प्रतिषेधः। – भामती

[14] Cf. यस्माद् ग्रहणाग्रहणयोरुदितानुदितहोमयोश्च विरोधात् समुच्चयासम्भवे तुल्यबलतया च बाध्यबाधकभावाभावे सति अगत्या विकल्पः। – भामती

and the notion that the performance of Atirātra without the Sixteenth Cup is the right thing to do; and in the context of the Agnihotra, the notion that to offer Agnihotra oblation at sunrise is the right thing to do, and also the notion that to offer Agnihotra oblation before sunrise is the right thing to do – all these notions are equally valid and authentic. This is so because of the presence of injunctions (vidhi), prohibitions (pratiṣedha), options (vikalpa), general rules (utsarga), exceptions (apavāda) and so on prescribing one or the other action that is yet to come about. But such is not the case in the context of brahma-jijñāsā, for Brahman is already existent[15] – in fact, it is a 'nityasiddha-vastu', an ever existent entity. This truth, the Bhāṣya explains in the sequel.

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[15] Cf. एतदुक्तं भवति—विधिप्रतिषेधैरेव स तादृशो विषयोऽनागतोत्पाद्यरूप उपनीतः येन पुरुषस्य विधिनिषेधाधीनप्रवृत्ति-निवृत्त्योरपि स्वातन्त्र्यं भवतीति। भूते वस्तुनि तु नेयमस्ति विधा। – भामती

12

[ब्रह्मप्रमाणविषये युक्तिः]

न तु वस्तु "एवं," "नैवम्," "अस्ति," "नास्ति" इति वा विकल्प्यते[1]। विकल्पनास्तु पुरुषबुद्ध्यपेक्षाः। न तु वस्तुयाथात्म्यज्ञानं पुरुषबुद्ध्यपेक्षम्। किं तर्हि। वस्तुतन्त्रमेव[2] तत्। न हि स्थाणौ एकस्मिन् "स्थाणुर्वा, पुरुषः, अन्यो वा" इति तत्त्वज्ञानं भवति। तत्र "पुरुषः अन्यो वा" इति मिथ्याज्ञानम्। "स्थाणुरेव" इति तत्त्वज्ञानं, वस्तुतन्त्रत्वात्। एवं भूतवस्तुविषयाणां[3] प्रामाण्यं वस्तुतन्त्रम्। तत्रैवं सति[4] ब्रह्मज्ञानमपि वस्तुतन्त्रमेव भूतवस्तुविषयत्वात्[5]।

12 A

[BRAHMAPRAMĀṆAVIṢAYE YUKTIḤ]

na tu vastu "evaṁ," "naivam," "asti," "nāsti" iti vā vikalpyate. vikalpanāstu puruṣabuddhyapekṣāḥ. na tu vastuyāthātmyajñānaṁ puruṣabuddhyapekṣam. kiṁ tarhi. vastutantrameva tat. na hi sthāṇau ekasmin "sthāṇurvā, puruṣaḥ, anyo vā" iti tattvajñānaṁ bhavati. tatra "puruṣaḥ anyo vā" iti mithyājñānam. "sthāṇureva" iti tattvajñānaṁ, vastutantratvāt. evaṁ bhūtavastuviṣayāṇāṁ prāmāṇyaṁ vastutantram. tatraivaṁ sati brahmajñānamapi vastutantrameva bhūtavastuviṣayatvāt.

12 B

न तु *na tu* – but not; वस्तु *vastu* – an entity; एवम् *evam* – it is like this; न एवम् *na evam* – it is not like this; अस्ति *asti* – is; न अस्ति *na asti* – is not; इति *iti* – as such; वा *vā* – or; विकल्प्यते *vikalpyate* – admits of options; विकल्पनाः *vikalpanāḥ* – options; तु *tu* – in fact; पुरुषबुद्ध्यपेक्षाः *puruṣabuddhyapekṣāḥ* – are dependent on human intellect; न तु *na tu* – not at all; वस्तुयाथात्म्यज्ञानम् *vastuyāthātmyajñānam* – the knowledge of the real nature of an existing entity; पुरुषबुद्ध्यपेक्षम् *puruṣabuddhyapekṣam* –

[1] वस्तु "एवं, नैवम्" इति न विकल्प्यते च वस्तु "अस्ति, नास्ति" इति वा न विकल्प्यते इति योजना।– प्रदीप

[2] पुरुषतन्त्रत्वं निषेद्धुमेवकारः, न मानाधीनत्वं निषिध्यते। – न्यायनिर्णय

[3] भूतवस्तूनि एव विषयाः येषां तेषां ज्ञानानामित्यर्थः।

[4] तत्र कर्मब्रह्मज्ञानयोः। एवं सति कर्म पुरुषतन्त्रं, भूतवस्तुज्ञानं तु वस्तुतन्त्रमिति स्थिते सति। – प्रदीप

[5] परमार्थवस्त्ववगाहित्वादित्यर्थः। – न्यायनिर्णय

is dependent on human intellect; किं तर्हि *kiṁ tarhi* – what then?; वस्तुतन्त्रम् एव *vastutantram eva* – is dependent on the entity itself; तत् *tat* – that; न *na* – not; हि *hi* – certainly; एकस्मिन् स्थाणौ *ekasmin sthāṇau* – with reference to a particular post; स्थाणुः वा *sthāṇuḥ vā* – this is either post; पुरुषः *puruṣaḥ* – (or) a person; अन्यः वा *anyaḥ vā* – or something else; इति *iti* – this; तत्त्वज्ञानम् *tattvajñānam* – valid cognition; भवति *bhavati* – is; तत्र *tatra* – there; पुरुषः *puruṣaḥ* – this is a person; अन्यः वा *anyaḥ vā* – or something else; इति *iti* – this; मिथ्याज्ञानम् *mithyājñānam* – false cognition; स्थाणुः एव *sthāṇuḥ eva* – this is nothing but a post; इति *iti* – this; तत्त्वज्ञानम् *tattvajñānam* – is a valid cognition; वस्तुतन्त्रत्वात् *vastutantratvāt* – since it is dependent on the entity; एवम् *evam* – thus; भूतवस्तुविषयाणाम् *bhūtavastuviṣayāṇām* – of the cognitions that have existing entities for their contents; प्रामाण्यम् *prāmāṇyam* – the authenticity; वस्तुतन्त्रम् *vastutantram* – is dependent on the entity itself; तत्र *tatra* – there; एवं सति *evaṁ sati* – this being the case; ब्रह्मज्ञानम् अपि *brahmajñānam api* – the Knowledge of Brahman too; वस्तुतन्त्रम् एव *vastutantram eva* – is indeed dependent on the entity alone; भूतवस्तुविषयत्वात् *bhūtavastuviṣayatvāt* – because its content is an existing entity

12 C

[THE LOGIC ON THE MEANS OF VALID COGNITION PERTAINING TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF BRAHMAN]

However, an existing entity is not referred to in an optional manner, such as "It is like this," "It is not like this" or "It is," "It is not."[1] In fact, such options are dependent on human intellect alone. The knowledge of the real nature of an existing entity is not dependent on human intellect. What then? That is dependent on the entity itself. With reference to a particular post, the cognition, "this is a post, or a person, or something else," is certainly not a valid cognition. There, the cognition, "This is a person, or something else," is a false cognition. The cognition, "This is a post alone," is a valid cognition, since it is dependent on the entity. Thus, the authenticity of the cognitions that have existing entities as their contents, depends on the entity itself.[2] This being the case, the Knowledge of Brahman too is indeed dependent on the entity alone because its content is an existing entity.[3]

12 D

1. However, an existing entity is not referred to in an optional manner, such as "It is like this," "It is not like this" or "It is," "It is not": Having explained the logic that forms the basis for the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) in the context of dharma-jijñāsā, the Ācārya now analyses the logic that forms the basis for the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) in the context of brahma-jijñāsā.

It has been stated that dharma, that is the Vedic rite, constitutes the object of the various references of option such as vidhi (injunction), pratiṣedha (prohibition), vikalpa (option), utsarga (general rule) and apavāda (exception) and this factor is the indicator of the fact that even for its existence, dharma is dependent on the person who undertakes to perform it. But this contention is defective, argues the Pūrvapakṣin, because an accomplished or existing entity (siddha-vastu), like a post, also admits of such options as, "Is it a post, or a man, or something else?" – similar to what is observed in the case of dharma-jijñāsā.[6]

This objection is invalid for we have already observed that in the performance of a Vedic rite (dharma), like Atirātra sacrifice, though it is referable in such manners of option as *"atirātre ṣoḍaśinaṁ gṛhṇāti* – In the Atirātra sacrifice one should take up the Sixteenth Cup" and *"na atirātre ṣoḍaśinaṁ gṛhṇāti* – In the Atirātra sacrifice one should not take up the Sixteenth Cup" – both the above-mentioned options are valid cognitions (abādhita-pratīti). On the other hand, a 'vastu', that is an already existent entity, is not simultaneously referable in such an optional manner as "It is red," "It is not red," and so on. This is rightly so because both the alternatives cannot be valid cognitions. Indeed, only one of the alternatives can be valid and the other alternative has to be certainly erroneous.[7] This basic difference explains as to why for its existence, dharma is dependent on its performer, while Brahman, an already existent entity, is not dependent for its existence on the person.

[6] Cf. भूतेऽपि वस्तुनि विकल्पो दृष्टः, यथा स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वा इति। तत्कथं न वस्तु विकल्प्यते, इत्यत आह—विकल्पनास्तु इति। – भामती
Also, cf. ननु दृश्यन्ते वस्तुन्यपि विकल्पा इति, तत्राह—विकल्पना इति। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

[7] Cf. यदि सिद्धवस्तुज्ञानमपि साध्यज्ञानवत् पुरुषबुद्धिमपेक्ष्य जायेत, तदा सिद्धे विकल्पा यथार्थाः स्युः न सिद्धवस्तुज्ञानं पौरुषम्। किं तर्हि। प्रमाणवस्तुजन्यम्। तथा च वस्तुन एकरूपत्वादेकज्ञानमेव प्रमा, अन्ये विकल्पा अयथार्था एवेत्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

In this Bhāṣya-passage, the rejection of the alternatives by the expression *"na tu vastu "evam," "naivam,"...iti vā vikalpyate* – An existing entity is not referred to in an optional manner, such as "It is this," "It is not this," is meant to point out the impossibility of options pertaining to the 'prakāra', that is the mode or details, pertaining to the entity while the rejection of the alternatives in the Bhāṣya expression *"na tu vastu"..."asti," "nāsti" iti vā vikalpyate* – An existing entity is not referred to in an optional manner, such as..."It is," "It is not," states the impossibility of options with regard to the 'prakārin' itself, that is the entity itself, which alone possesses the modes and the details (prakāra).[8]

2. In fact, such options are dependent on human intellect alone. The knowledge of the real nature of an existing entity is not dependent on human intellect. What then? That is dependent on the entity itself. With reference to a particular post, the cognition, "this is a post, or a person, or something else," is certainly not a valid cognition. There, the cognition, "This is a person, or something else," is a false cognition. The cognition, "This is a post alone," is a valid cognition, since it is dependent on the entity. Thus, the authenticity of the cognitions that have existing entities as their contents, depends on the entity itself: In order to illustrate the untenability of the objection raised by the Pūrvapakṣin (vide n.1) the Ācārya explains the nature of the alternative references pertaining to the existing entity.

He explains the nature of the alternative references with an example. During the fading light of dusk, a person comes across what is really a post. But because he has not clearly comprehended it, he starts doubting whether the object he has apprehended is a post, or a person, or even a ghost. Indeed, an existing entity alone is being referred to in such optional modes by these multifarious alternatives. Yet, it must be admitted that all these options that pertain to the real entity, the post, are verily the imaginations of the human intellect and have no true reference to the post, the actual and true entity. Therefore, it is only common sense that all these optional references pertaining to one and the same entity must be of the nature of doubt (saṁśaya) or error

[8] Cf. न तु वस्त्वेवं नैवम् इति। तदनेन प्रकारविकल्पो निरस्तः। प्रकारिविकल्पं निषेधति—अस्ति नास्ति इति। – भामती

(viparyaya). Indeed, it is the very nature of error to imagine an object that is not there by superimposing it on the substratum, in this case, the post.[9]

The optional references about the post – such as, "It is a man," "It is a ghost," and so on – are, therefore, only creations of human mind. Indeed, these erroneous cognitions arise without depending on real man or the real ghost existing actually outside but are projected by the mind itself. This projection of the false (mithyā) occurs due to the person's latent mental impression (saṁskāra) of a man or a ghost, which impression has been activated by the individual's perception of some common features of a man or a ghost in the substratum, the post, which alone is actual and true, unlike the man or the ghost which is just a mental projection. Hence, these cognitional options, such as "whether it is a man or a ghost," have no true basis on reality. Only the cognition, "This is a post alone," is a valid cognition as it is dependent on the reality, the post, and is not at all based on the person's fancies and mental imaginations.[10]

Of course, every cognition – whether valid or erroneous – is a modification of human intellect (antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti). Yet, in the case of doubt, error, hallucination, dream and so on, the mental modification is generated by the mental impressions (saṁskāra), and hence are not based on fact or reality. Their contents, that is the man, the ghost and so on, as explained above, are mere mental images, created by the earlier saṁskāras or impressions in the intellect, but in the case of valid cognitions, the mental modifications (antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti) depend on the actual objects, those that are not imaginary, but are real existing objects, such as a post in the present case.[11] This is the difference between a valid cognition and a false mental projection, though both are similar in being antaḥkaraṇa-vṛttis.[12]

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[9] This phenomenon is what is termed 'adhyāsa' and has been defined in the Bhāṣya as, *"adhyāso nāma atasmin tadbuddhiḥ."* Refer to *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya,* Section 14.

[10] Cf. पुरुषबुद्धिः अन्तःकरणं, तदपेक्षा विकल्पनाः संशयविपर्यासाः। सवासनमनोमात्रयोनयो वा यथा स्वप्ने, सवासनेन्द्रिय-मनोयोनयो वा यथा स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वा इति स्थाणौ संशयः, पुरुष एव इति च विपर्यासः, अन्यशब्देन वस्तुतः स्थाणोरन्यस्य पुरुषस्याभिधानात्। न तु पुरुषतत्त्वं वा स्थाणुतत्त्वं वापेक्षन्ते, समानधर्मधर्मिदर्शनमात्राधीनजन्मत्वात्। तस्मादयथावस्तवो विकल्पना न वस्तु विकल्पयन्ति वा अन्यथयन्ति वेत्यर्थः। – भामती

[11] Cf. तत्त्वज्ञानं तु न बुद्धितन्त्रं, किं तु वस्तुतन्त्रम्। – भामती

[12] Cf. ननु—दृश्यन्ते वस्तुन्यपि विकल्पाः—आत्मा अस्ति वा न वा स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वेत्यादिरूपा इत्याशङ्क्य, बाढं दृश्यन्ते

The following conclusion emerges: In the context of dharma-jijñāsā, the inherent nature of the dharma allows Scripture alone, that is only śabda-pramāṇa (verbal testimony), as the means of knowledge. On the other hand, in the context of brahma-jijñāsā, Brahman – it being a real and existing entity – permits Scripture (śabda-pramāṇa) as well as direct experience (pratyakṣānubhava) as the means of knowledge.[13]

3. This being the case, the Knowledge of Brahman too is indeed dependent on the entity alone because its content is an existing entity: *Pañcapādikā* captures the essence of the Bhāṣya thoughts of these Sections 10, 11 and 12. Dharma, that is enjoined by the Scripture, and which ought to be performed, is of the nature of being yet unaccomplished, that is it has not yet come into being. Thus, not having come into existence, though waiting to be accomplished by the actual performance, it cannot be an object of direct experience. As a result, there can be no desire for the sākṣādanubhava (direct realisation) of dharma. This is the status and position of dharma and its knowledge with regard to dharma-jijñāsā.[14]

But in the context of brahma-jijñāsā, the situation is radically different. Here, the entity, Brahman–Ātman, is taught to be directly realised, for this entity is an already existing entity and an accomplished fact. Indeed, this Brahman–Ātman is alone found to be already the object of the immediate illusory cognition (pratyakṣa-viparyaya) that takes many forms like, "I see," "I am happy," "I am miserable" and so on. These cognitions mistakenly cognise the attributes of the inert objects, the upādhis (conditionings), such as body, senses, mind, intellect and so on, as those of the Self, the subject, which is of the nature of pure Consciousness. It is these wrong notions that lead a man to saṁsāra (realm of transmigration) and bring about the consequent unending misery. The rise of these notions that are based on ignorance

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विकल्पा वस्तुन्यपि, परन्तु न ते विधितन्त्राः, किन्तु सवासनबुद्धितन्त्राः, इति विधितन्त्रविकल्पविषयत्वेनैव धर्मवैलक्षण्यसाधनान्न दोष इत्याह—विकल्पनास्त्वति। संशयविपर्यासादिरूपास्तु। पुरुषबुद्धिः सवासनमन्तःकरणम्। तथा चैतेषां विकल्पानां प्रमाणानधीनानां न प्रमात्वं, यतो न वस्तुतत्त्वमपेक्षन्त इमे विकल्पा इति भावः। – प्रदीप

[13] Cf. तस्मात् श्रुत्यादयः अनुभवादयश्च यथासम्भवमिह ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायां प्रमाणम् इति निगमनवाक्यशेषः।

[14] In fact, 'dharma-jijñāsā' is 'dharmānuṣṭhāna-jijñāsā,' that is the desire to know the method of performance to bring dharma into existence.

cannot be averted and will not cease until and unless there is a direct valid Experience of the pure Ātman–Brahman. Therefore, Self-knowledge is taught by the Scripture as something to be realised as is evident in statements of the Upaniṣads such as (*Bṛ.U.*2.4.5) *"ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ* – The Self ought to be realised." Hence, in the context of brahma-jijñāsā, the desire to directly realise (Sākṣādanubhava) Brahman–Ātman is indeed not only valid but a must too.

The above analysis leads us to this conclusion: The karma-kāṇḍa of the Veda enjoins the dharma (Vedic rites) to be accomplished while the jñāna-kāṇḍa (Upaniṣads or Vedānta) of the Veda seeks to enable us to clearly realise an already existing entity (Brahman–Ātman). Even though these two kāṇḍas (sections) are alike as far as their inherent validity (pramāṇatva-sāmya) in their respective fields of dharma and Brahman is concerned, yet the method and technique of the exposition of the jñāna-kāṇḍa (Upaniṣads or Vedānta) vastly differ from those of the karma-kāṇḍa. It has to be so, for otherwise Brahman too would be reduced to the status of an act to be accomplished and like a Vedic rite, it would also become subject to vidhi (injunctions), pratiṣedha (prohibitions), vikalpa (options), utsarga (general rules), apavāda (exceptions) and so on. It would be totally inappropriate and unjustifiable to posit such a status with regard to an existing and already established entity and this would amount to complete negation of the very basic nature itself (niḥsvabhāvatva-prasaṅgāt) of an existing entity.[15]

Also, with regard to an existing entity, as discussed before, the optional notions, like *"sthāṇurvā puruṣaḥ anyo vā* – whether it is a post or man or something else" are not valid cognitions.[16] On the other hand, with regard to karma, the alternative notions are indeed valid cognitions.[17] It could be added here that the knowledge of dharma (dharma-jñāna or karma-jñāna),

[15] Cf. नहि कर्तव्यसिद्धार्थनिश्चयोः प्रमाणत्वसाम्यादवबोधनप्रकारेऽपि साम्यम्। यदि स्यात्, पुरुषेच्छावशनिष्पाद्यत्वमपि स्यात्। ततो विधिप्रतिषेधविकल्पसमुच्चयोत्सर्गापवादबाधाभ्युच्चयव्यवस्थितविकल्पादयोऽपि प्रसज्येरन्। न वस्तुनि युक्तमेतद्, निःस्वभावत्वप्रसङ्गात्। – पञ्चपादिका

[16] Cf. तथाचैकस्मिन् वस्तुनि स्थाणुः पुरुषो वेति विकल्पः, न वैकल्पिकद्रव्यत्यागवत् सम्यग्ज्ञानं भवति स्थाणुरेवेति निश्चितैकार्थता परमार्थे। – पञ्चपादिका

[17] Refer to the portion, *"atirātre ṣoḍaśinaṁ gṛhṇāti," "na atirātre ṣoḍaśinaṁ gṛhṇāti,"* and so on in the Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Section 11.

that is yet to be accomplished, derives its validity only if it connects the dharma or karma, a Vedic rite that is yet to be accomplished, in some way with a 'vastu', that is a really existing entity, like the material (dravya), that is to be offered and the deity (devatā) associated with the sacrifice.[18]

[18] That is why we have injunctions such as, "*paśunā rudraṁ yajate* – One should offer a sacrificial animal to Rudra" while there can be no injunctions like, "*gaganapaṅkajaṁ vandhyāyāḥ putrāya dadyāt* – One should offer sky-lotus to the son of a barren woman!"

13

[वेदान्तवाक्यार्थविचारानर्थक्यशङ्काभाष्यम्]

ननु [1]भूतवस्तुविषयत्वे,[1] ब्रह्मणः प्रमाणान्तरविषयत्वमेव इति वेदान्तवाक्यविचारणा अनर्थिकैव प्राप्ता।

13 A

[VEDĀNTAVĀKYĀRTHAVICĀRĀNARTHAKYAŚAṄKĀBHĀṢYAM]

nanu bhūtavastuviṣayatve, brahmaṇaḥ pramāṇāntaraviṣayatvameva iti vedānta-vākyavicāraṇā anarthikaiva prāptā.

13 B

ननु *nanu* – but; भूतवस्तुविषयत्वे *bhūtavastuviṣayatve* – having the existing entity as an object; ब्रह्मणः *brahmaṇaḥ* – of Brahman; प्रमाणान्तरविषयत्वम् एव *pramāṇāntaraviṣayatvam eva* – certainly being the object of other means of knowledge; इति *iti* – hence; वेदान्तवाक्यविचारणा *vedāntavākyavicāraṇā* – the inquiry into the Vedāntic sentences; अनर्थिका एव *anarthikā eva* – certainly purposeless; प्राप्ता *prāptā* – it would follow

13 C

[COMMENTARY ON THE DOUBT ABOUT THE PURPOSELESSNESS OF THE INQUIRY INTO VEDĀNTIC SENTENCES]

But if the Vedāntic passages have an existing entity as their object, then Brahman certainly becomes the object of other means of knowledge. Hence, it would certainly follow that the inquiry into Vedāntic sentences is purposeless.

13 D

In the earlier sections,[2] it has been discussed that in the context of dharma-

[1] AA, NSP (I & II), CSS, KKK, SES भूतवस्तुत्वे

[1] भूतवस्तुविषयत्वे इति भूतानि वस्तूनि विषयाः येषां वेदान्तवाक्यानां तेषां भावः, तस्मिन् इति विग्रहः।

[2] Vide Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Sections 10, 11 and 12.

jijñāsā, the Scripture etc. (śrutyādayaḥ) alone can be the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) since dharma is something which is yet to be accomplished at the time of its jijñāsā (desire to know) as well as its mīmāṁsā (inquiry). However, in the context of brahma-jijñāsā, both Scripture etc. (śrutyādayaḥ) and direct experience etc. (anubhavādayaḥ) constitute the means of knowledge (pramāṇa), for here the subject matter (viṣaya) is an already existing and real entity (bhūta-vastu). This basic difference pertaining to their individual subjects (viṣaya) fundamentally distinguishes karma-kāṇḍa and the jñāna-kāṇḍa (Vedānta) from each other.

At this juncture, the Pūrvapakṣin raises an objection: If the Vedāntic sentences are meant to teach an already existing entity, then their viṣaya, that is their subject, must be comprehensible also by some means of knowledge (pramāṇa) other than Vedānta. Let us take for example an ordinary worldly sentence (laukika-vākya): "Paddy is growing aplenty in the Gangetic delta." This statement informs us about an existing substance (bhūta-vastu), that is 'the growing of paddy in abundance', which fact is already known through a means of knowledge (pramāṇa) other than this sentence (śabda-pramāṇa), obviously in this case by perception (pratyakṣa). Moreover, it is only common sense that sentences pertaining to existing things are constructed invariably after knowing those things through some other means of knowledge (arthaṁ buddhvā vākyaracanā).

All these factors point to the fact that the Vedāntic sentences that expound Brahman, which is an existing entity, as being the source of the world, must have already been established by some other means of knowledge (pramāṇa) such as inference (anumāna). In the context of the Knowledge of Brahman, we have to naturally rule out perception (pratyakṣa), because Brahman, the cause of the world, is devoid of colour, form, smell and so on which alone can be perceived by the senses and is, therefore, beyond the scope of pratyakṣa-pramāṇa (perception). Yet, every existing thing does become an object of reasoning and inference. Therefore, it must be accepted that the

Upaniṣads are merely the secondary or subsidiary means of knowledge in the context of brahma-jijñāsā. The primary means is Īśvarānumāna alone, that is inference of Brahman as being the source of the world.[3]

The Pūrvapakṣin claims that it is for this inference (anumāna), the probans (hetu) has been presented in the Janmādi-sūtra, *"janmādyasya yataḥ* – Brahman is that whence that which begins with the birth of this world ensues." When thus inference (anumāna) becomes the primary means of knowledge of Brahman and not the Vedāntic sentences, Īśvarānumāna alone needs to be studied and investigated to gain the Knowledge of Brahman. Indeed, when the primary means does the job well of revealing Brahman, is there any need to study the secondary means consisting of the Upaniṣads? Certainly not, indeed the Upaniṣads serve no purpose at all![4]

The reasons adduced above, says the Pūrvapakṣin, explain why in the Janmādi-sūtra, the Sūtrakāra himself indicates merely an inference to establish Brahman as the source of the world without referring to the Upaniṣads. The expression "yataḥ" used in the aphorism signifies "from which Brahman" and is not to be construed as a suggestion (pratīka) for any Vedāntic passage, such as the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad* (3.1), *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante, yena jātāni jīvanti yatprayantyabhisaṁviśanti. tad vijijñāsasva. tad brahma* – That whence verily these beings are born; that by which, these that are born, live; and that to which, when departing, these return; that you should seek to know – that is Brahman," as the Upaniṣads are only a secondary source for the knowledge of Brahman. Hence, it is only an empty claim of the Vedāntin that the *Brahma-sūtras* are intended to string together the Upaniṣadic passages and present a garland of the Vedāntic teachings.[5]

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[3] Cf. अनुमानेनैव ब्रह्मस्वरूपस्य निर्णीतत्वादिति शेषः। वेदान्तानामनुवादमात्रत्वं, न स्वतः प्रामाण्यमिति निष्कर्षः। – प्रदीप

[4] Cf. अयमभिप्रायः—भूतत्वाद् युक्तेरपि चेदनुप्रवेशः, तथा सति किं वेदवाक्यैर्विचारितैः यथाहुरीश्वरकारणिनः, तथा भवतु पूर्वसूत्रेण प्रतिज्ञानिर्देशोऽनेन च हेत्वभिधानमिति। – पञ्चपादिका

Also, cf. प्रमाणान्तरविषयत्वमेव प्राप्तमिति कृत्वा प्रमाणान्तरस्यैव विचारप्राप्ताविति शेषः। – रत्नप्रभा

[5] Refer to the Bhāṣya statement (Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Sections 8): *"vedāntavākyakusuma-grathanārthatvāt sūtrāṇām. vedāntavākyāni hi sūtraiḥ udāhṛtya vicāryante."*

Thus, this becomes the Pūrvapakṣin's conclusion: The inquiry into the Upaniṣads serves no real purpose. Therefore, one must rather concentrate on and pay attention to Īśvarānumāna alone. This then is the contention of the Pūrvapakṣin when he raises the present objection.[6]

[6] Cf. यत्किल भूतार्थं वाक्यं तत्प्रमाणान्तरगोचरार्थतयानुवादकं दृष्टं, यथा—नद्यास्तीरे फलानि सन्तीति। तथा च वेदान्ताः। तस्माद् भूतार्थतया प्रमाणान्तरदृष्टमेवार्थमनुवदेयुः। उक्तं च ब्रह्मणि जगज्जन्मादिहेतुकमनुमानं प्रमाणान्तरम्। एवं च मौलिकं तदेव परीक्षणीयं, न तु वेदान्तवाक्यानि तदधीनसत्यत्वानीति कथं वेदान्तवाक्यग्रथनार्थता सूत्राणामित्यर्थः। – भामती

Also, cf. ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य भूतवस्तुविषयत्वात् स्वविषयसम्भावनार्थमस्ति प्रमाणान्तरापेक्षा। तथा च श्रुत्यर्थावधारणानुकूलतयैव सूत्रकारेण जन्मादिसूत्रे न्यायः सूत्रितः, न स्वातन्त्र्येण ब्रह्मविषयप्रमाणतयेत्यभिप्रायः। एवमाशयमविद्वान् श्रुतत्वेन ब्रह्मणः प्रमाणान्तरविषयत्वमभिहितमिति भ्रान्तो व्याघातमाशङ्कते—नन्विति। – वार्तिक

Also, cf. इदानीं ब्रह्मणि प्रमाणान्तरप्रवेशे जन्मादिसूत्रमनुमानोपन्यासार्थमित्यनुमतमिति शङ्कते—नन्विति। सिद्धत्वाद् ब्रह्मणो धर्मवैजात्येऽपि मानान्तरगम्यतेत्यनुमानादिविचारं हित्वा वाक्यमात्रविचारोऽयुक्तः, ब्रह्मण्युभयप्रवेशाविशेषात्। अतः सूत्राणां वेदान्तवाक्यग्रथनार्थत्वमसिद्धमित्यर्थः।– न्यायनिर्णय

14

[आशङ्कानिराकरणभाष्यम्]

न, [1]इन्द्रियाविषयत्वेन सम्बन्धाग्रहणात्। स्वभावतो [2]विषयविषयाणि इन्द्रियाणि, न ब्रह्मविषयाणि। सति हि इन्द्रियविषयत्वे ब्रह्मणः इदं ब्रह्मणा सम्बद्धं कार्यम् इति गृह्येत। कार्यमात्रम् [3]एव तु गृह्यमाणं किं ब्रह्मणा सम्बद्धं किम् अन्येन केनचिद्वा सम्बद्धम् इति न शक्यं निश्चेतुम्। तस्माद् जन्मादिसूत्रं न अनुमानोपन्यासार्थम्। किं तर्हि, वेदान्तवाक्यप्रदर्शनार्थम्।

14 A

[ĀŚAṄKĀNIRĀKARAṆABHĀṢYAM]

na, indriyāviṣayatvena sambandhāgrahaṇāt. svabhāvato viṣayaviṣayāṇi indriyāṇi, na brahmaviṣayāṇi. sati hi indriyaviṣayatve brahmaṇaḥ idaṁ brahmaṇā sambaddhaṁ kāryam iti gṛhyeta. kāryamātram eva tu gṛhyamāṇaṁ kiṁ brahmaṇā sambaddhaṁ kim anyena kenacidvā sambaddham iti na śakyaṁ niścetum. tasmād janmādisūtraṁ na anumānopanyāsārtham. kiṁ tarhi, vedāntavākyapradarśanārtham.

14 B

न *na* – no; इन्द्रियाविषयत्वेन *indriyāviṣayatvena* – because of not being the object of sense organs; सम्बन्धाग्रहणात् *sambandhāgrahaṇāt* – since the relation is not comprehended; स्वभावतः *svabhāvataḥ* – by nature; विषयविषयाणि *viṣayaviṣayāṇi* – have external things as their objects; इन्द्रियाणि *indriyāṇi* – sense organs; न *na* – not; ब्रह्मविषयाणि *brahmaviṣayāṇi* – have Brahman as their object; सति हि *sati hi* – only if; इन्द्रियविषयत्वे ब्रह्मणः *indriyaviṣayatve brahmaṇaḥ* – Brahman were the object of sense organs; इदम् *idam* – this; ब्रह्मणा *brahmaṇā* – with Brahman; सम्बद्धम् *sambaddham* – is related; कार्यम् *kāryam* – the effect; इति *iti* – in this way; गृह्येत *gṛhyeta* – could be comprehended; कार्यमात्रम् एव *kāryamātram eva* – the mere effect alone; तु *tu* – but; गृह्यमाणम् *gṛhyamāṇam* – being the object of

[1] Tel, ASS इन्द्रियाविषयत्वे
[2] Tel, ASS बहिर्विषयविषयाणि
[3] Tel, ASS एव गृह्यमाणम्

comprehension; किम् *kim* – whether; ब्रह्मणा *brahmaṇā* – with Brahman; सम्बद्धम् *sambaddham* – it is related; किम् *kim* – whether; अन्येन केनचित् *anyena kenacit* – with something else; वा *vā* – or; सम्बद्धम् *sambaddham* – it is related; इति *iti* – thus; न शक्यम् *na śakyam* – not possible; निश्चेतुम् *niścetum* – to ascertain; तस्मात् *tasmāt* – therefore; जन्मादिसूत्रम् *janmādisūtram* – the aphorism "that which begins with birth"; न *na* – not; अनुमानोपन्यासार्थम् *anumānopanyāsārtham* – has the purpose of suggesting a syllogism; किं तर्हि *kiṁ tarhi* – what then; वेदान्तवाक्यप्रदर्शनार्थम् *vedāntavākyapradarśanārtham* – it has the purpose of expounding the Vedāntic passages

14 C

[COMMENTARY DISPELLING THE DOUBT]

This is not so as the relation is not comprehended because of Brahman not being an object of the senses.[1] By nature, sense organs have external things alone as their objects and do not have Brahman as their object. Only if Brahman were the object of sense organs, then alone could it be comprehended that this world, the effect, is related with Brahman. But, when the mere effect, that is the world, alone is the object of comprehension, it is not possible to ascertain whether this world, the effect, is related to Brahman or whether it is related to something else.[2] Therefore, the aphorism, "that which begins with birth," does not have the purpose of suggesting a syllogism to infer Brahman. What then? It has the purpose of expounding the Vedāntic passages.[3]

14 D

1. This is not so as the relation is not comprehended because of Brahman not being an object of the senses: This is the answer to the point raised by Logicians, in the last section.[1] As the point at issue pertains to the Logicians (Naiyāyika), the Ācārya analyses this in a logical manner. The technical intricacies contained in the reply may be understood by the illustrations given in the sequel.

[1] Vide Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Section 12.

We infer fire, the sādhya or probandum, on the hill by means of the smoke that we perceive on the same hill (parvato vahnimān, dhūmāt). We should note that this inference is possible because we have earlier closely observed the relation of invariable concomitance (sāhacarya-niyama) that prevails between the smoke, the hetu or probans, and the fire, the sādhya or probandum, which relation we have taken note of in numerous instances like the kitchen, the blacksmith's workshop and so on. This invariable relation in the form of concomitance of the hetu (probans) with sādhya (probandum) is technically designated as 'vyāpti' or 'invariable concomitance' by the Logicians. This relation we come to know only because both the smoke and the fire and their relation of togetherness (sāhacarya) are comprehended by the senses (indriya-viṣaya).

Similarly, by taking the pot's being a product (kāryatva) as hetu, the probans, we can infer the potter, the sādhya or probandum, as being the cause of the pot. This syllogism has become possible since both the production of pot and the existence of potter and their mutual relation are objects of the perceptual cognition, generated by the sense organs.

In the present context, the Logician would prefer to establish Brahman as the cause of the world by virtue of a syllogistic proposition. However, the Ācārya points out averring that such a syllogism is not possible, because of the non-availability of the causal apparatus (kāraṇa-sāmagrī) of such a syllogism.[2] We do observe the world to be a product or effect (kārya) like any other effect.[3] The effect is invariably related to its cause, for example, the smoke has invariable concomitance with fire and the pot, being an effect, is invariably related to the potter. But, the invariable concomitance between the world (product) and its cause Brahman is not an object of perceptual cognition.[4]

The reason is not far to seek: Brahman is identical with the inner Self (pratyag-ātman), and this Self is always the seer and knower and never becomes an object of the senses. The senses are by nature externally oriented

[2] Cf. निर्विशेषं हि ब्रह्म साध्यहेतुसम्बन्धाद्यभावान्नानुमानगम्यं वेदान्तगम्यमात्मतत्त्वमिति नशब्देन विवक्ष्यते। – प्रदीप

[3] All that which is constituted of parts is a product similar to a pot. The form of the intended syllogism is: yadyat sāvayavaṁ tattat kāryaṁ, yathā ghaṭaḥ.

[4] Cf. ब्रह्मण इन्द्रियाग्राह्यत्वात् प्रत्यक्षेण व्याप्तिग्रहायोगाद् न प्रमाणान्तरविषयत्वमित्यर्थः। इदं कार्यं, ब्रह्मजम्—इति व्याप्तिप्रत्यक्षं ब्रह्मणोऽतीन्द्रियत्वाद् न सम्भवतीत्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

and hence they do not help in comprehending the inner Self. Because of this chasm between the imperceptible Brahman–Ātman and the world, an object of perceptual cognition, it is not possible to comprehend the relation of invariable concomitance of the world with Brahman, the concomitance that has to be known to make the syllogism that is put forward by the Logician, a viable proposition.

The Logicians undoubtedly have a different syllogism to infer entities that are beyond the reach of the senses. This inferential proposition is technically termed 'sāmānyato dṛṣṭānumāna'.[5] This is an inference by analogy. For

[5] The Logicians subscribe to three kinds of syllogism:
(1) Pūrvavadanumāna: An inferential proposition by which an effect is inferred from a cause is termed 'pūrvavat'. This is illustrated by the inference of the incidence of rain at a distant place on the basis on the perception of a cluster of dense clouds in the sky there.
(2) Śeṣavadanumāna: When a cause is inferred from the effect then it is termed 'śeṣavatanumāna'. That it had rained heavily upstream as inferred from the swift current of water in a river exemplifies the instance of śeṣavat syllogism.
(3) Sāmānyato dṛṣṭānumāna: Here, it is the inference of a certain entity or fact that is beyond the reach of the senses. Such an inference is based on an analogy (upamāna). To explain: The position of the sun in a place different from an earlier one leads to the inference of its imperceptible movement just as Caitra's movement is inferred when he is seen at a different place from his home where he was seen earlier. When such an analogy forms the basis (udāharaṇa) of the syllogism, it is termed 'sāmānyato dṛṣṭānumāna'. And, this the Logicians invoke to infer an imperceptible entity, the probandum (sādhya).
Vide "*pūrvavaditi—yatra kāraṇena kāryamanumīyate yathā meghonnatyā bhaviṣyati vṛṣṭiriti, śeṣavat tad yatra kāryeṇa kāraṇamanumīyate—pūrvodakaviparītamudakaṁ nadyāḥ pūrṇatvaṁ śīghratvaṁ ca dṛṣṭvā srotaso'numīyate bhūtā vṛṣṭiriti. sāmānyato dṛṣṭaṁ vrajyāpūrvakamanyatra dṛṣṭasyānyatra darśanamiti. tathā cādityasya tasmādastyaprataykṣāpyādityasya vrajyeti.*" (*Vidvattoṣiṇī* on *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī* of Vācaspati-miśra)

It will be of added advantage to study what the Nyāya-bhāṣyakāra, Vātsyāyana, has explained about sāmānyato dṛṣṭānumāna while commenting upon the *Nyāya-sūtra* (1.1.5): "*sāmānyato dṛṣṭaṁ nāma yatrā'pratyakṣe liṅgaliṅginoḥ sambandhe kenacidarthena liṅgasya sāmānyād apratyakṣo liṅgī gamyate.*" This statement means that in the sāmānyato dṛṣṭa syllogism, the relation of the probans (liṅga or hetu or sādhana) with the probandum (liṅgī or sādhya) is not perceptually cognised. But the probans (liṅga or hetu) itself on the analogy of a means that is perceived as being related to its effect, helps one infer the imperceptible probandum (sādhya). The inference of the visual sense organ (cakṣurindriya), from visual perception (cākṣuṣa-pratyakṣa) illustrates this instance. To explain: In the case of cutting wood, we observe the particular means in the form of an axe. But in the case of visual cognition (cākṣuṣa-pratyakṣa), we do not

example, the movement of the sun is not observable. Yet, using the sun's noticeable change of position as the probans (hetu), one could infer the sun's movement, the probandum (sādhya) which is not perceived. Such an inference of the sun's movement is made possible by drawing the analogy of the change of Caitra's position being known to be the result of his movement.[6]

By making use of this technique of 'sāmānyato dṛṣṭānumāna' and by the analogy of the pot and the potter, a product and its cause, the Logician tries to infer Īśvara as the cause of the world, the product.[7] However, this does not serve any purpose[8] for such a syllogism based on the given analogy could as well be used to infer the inert Pradhāna, the ultimate causal material, which the Sāṅkhyans, who do not subscribe to view of Īśvara, believe to be the ultimate cause of the world. Even if one tries to make use of the inference based on the analogy of the pot and its sentient creator, the potter,[9] one could infer, on that analogy the cause of the world to be a human being alone and not the omniscient Īśvara. The reason is that prior to the present inferential proposition one has never come across any instance of a product connected with the omniscient Creator.

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observe the means as being the senses in particular though we are able to infer its existence by reason of the general comprehension of means (karaṇatva-sāmānya) because of such instances (upamāna) as the cutting of wood by an axe where one has already comprehended the concomitance of the means, that is the axe, in effecting the result, that is cutting the wood. This general comprehension of the means (karaṇatva-sāmānya) is what is termed 'sāmānyato dṛṣṭa' and is derived from an analogy (upamāna). And, when this 'sāmānyato dṛṣṭa' is used to construct a syllogism (anumāna), then such a syllogism is termed 'sāmānyato dṛṣṭānumāna'.

[6] The inferential proposition in this context is formed as follows: "bhānuḥ gatimān, ekadā ekatra dṛṣṭasyāsya anyadā aparatra darśanāt. yo yaḥ ekatra ekadā dṛṣṭaḥ san aparatra anyadā dṛśyate, sa gatimān jñātaḥ, yathā prātaḥ svagṛhe dṛṣṭaḥ caitraḥ, madhyāhne nadītīre dṛśyamāno gatimān jñātaḥ. evameva ekatra dṛṣṭasyānyatra darśanād, bhānurgatimāniti niścīyate iti."

[7] The intended syllogistic proposition is: "jagat kartṛjanyaṁ, kāryatvāt. yadyat kāryaṁ tat tat kartṛjanyaṁ dṛṣṭaṁ, yathā ghaṭādikaṁ kāryaṁ kartṛjanyam. tasmāt kāryabhūtaṁ sad jagadapi kartṛjanyam. sa ca kartā īśvara iti."

[8] Cf. यथा च सामान्यतो दृष्टमप्यनुमानं ब्रह्मणि न प्रवर्तते। – भामती

Also, cf. सामान्यतो दृष्टमपि न प्रमाणमतीन्द्रिये ब्रह्मणि। – पञ्चपादिका

[9] The form of the intended syllogism is: "jagat cetanakartṛjanyaṁ, kāryatvāt. yadyat kāryaṁ tat tat cetanakartṛkaṁ dṛṣṭaṁ, yathā ghaṭādikāryaṁ cetanakulālakartṛkam. tathā cedaṁ jagat kāryaṁ cetanakartṛjanyam. sa ca cetano jagatkartā īśvara ityabhyupagamyate."

Even the creation of this world of unfathomable nature could point, at best, to an extraordinary human being as its cause. Moreover, the ordinary product like a pot is created by a potter alone. But extraordinary products like the temples, palaces, dams, bridges, cities and so on are the creations of a large number of intelligent artisans. So, on this analogy of an extraordinary creation, one could infer only a huge number of highly intelligent human beings as the operative cause of this extraordinary world.

Thus, in spite of these repeated attempts, and even the application of the extraordinary 'sāmānyato dṛṣṭānumāna', inference (anumāna) miserably fails to establish the existence of a single omniscient and omnipotent Īśvara as the cause of this world. Moreover, the Scriptural passages like, *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante"* (*Tai.U.*3.1) and the Janmādi-sūtra, which is based on this Upaniṣadic passage alone, clearly indicate that Brahman–Īśvara is the efficient-cum-material (abhinna-nimittopādāna) cause of the world. Therefore, inference cannot convince us about Brahman being the efficient-cum-material cause of the world.

It is no use arguing that the Scripture too cannot teach such a causality of Īśvara with reference to the world, since the same is not confirmed by any other means of cognition, such as perception, inference, analogy and so on. It is of advantage in this context that the Logicians should bear in mind an important point that each means of knowledge (pramāṇa)[10] has its own exclusive field of objects – *"svasvaviṣayaparāṇi pramāṇāni."* For example, the ear, the eyes and so on have their respective exclusive objects like sound, colour and the like. The fact that the eyes do not testify to the existence of sound does not in any way affect the authority or the viability of the ear as the means for the valid cognition of sound.[11]

[10] The six means of knowledge (pramāṇa) are: pratyakṣa (perception), anumāna (inference), upamāna (analogy), śabda (verbal authority), arthāpatti (presumption) and anupalabdhi (non-cognition).

[11] This assertion does not deny the fact that these means of knowledge do converge on certain common fields (pramāṇa-samavāya or 'conglomerate of the means of knowledge'). For example, things like pot and cloth are the objects of both the visual and the tactile senses. Fire is well-known as an object of perception, inference and so on. Moreover, the concern here is only with the pramāṇas (means of valid cognition) and not 'pramāṇābhāsas' (fallacious means of cognition) like that of "surabhiḥ candanam – the sandal, that is being seen, is fragrant."

Likewise dharma, Brahman, the creation and dissolution of the world and such matters are the exclusive spheres governed by the verbal authority (śabda-pramāṇa), that is the Scripture. Therefore, what the Scripture teaches about these subjects is to be taken as authentic and the authenticity of what the Scripture instructs is in no way affected by the non-confirmation of its subjects by other means of knowledge (pramāṇa) like analogy, inference, perception and so on. Moreover, one should not lose sight of the fact that on the authority of the Scripture alone, we accept the efficacy of dharma (performance of sacrifice etc.), the undesirablility of adharma (killing creatures and the like), the existence of merit and demerit (puṇya & pāpa), heaven and hell (svarga & naraka) and so on, even though the existence of these subjects is not authenticated by other means of knowledge.

Therefore, it is certain that to define Brahman as the source of the world, the Sūtrakāra depends exclusively on the unflinching authority of Scripture and not on the infirm grounds of inference. This is essentially the idea the present section of the Bhāṣya seeks to convey.

2. By nature, sense organs have external things alone as their objects and do not have Brahman as their object. Only if Brahman were the object of sense organs, then alone could it be comprehended that this world, the effect, is related with Brahman.[12] But, when the mere effect, that is the world, alone is the object of comprehension, it is not possible to ascertain whether this world, the effect, is related to Brahman or whether it is related to something else: This Bhāṣya sentence is indicative of the well-known Upaniṣadic passage (*Ka.U.*2.1.1), *"parāñci khāni vyatṛṇat svayambhūḥ tasmāt parāṅ paśyati nāntarātman* – The Creator forcibly made the senses outward going. Hence by nature one is extrovert and seeks not the inner Self." Being suggestive of this Upaniṣadic passage, the Bhāṣya instructs that it is only Brahman that is identical with the Self (pratyagabhinnaṁ brahma) that is desired to be known (jijñāsya), and this Brahman–Ātman cannot be known as the source of the world by means of inference.[13]

[12] Cf. इन्द्रियाणि प्रपञ्चमात्रं गृह्णन्ति, न तत्कारणम्। – पञ्चपादिका

[13] Cf. अनेन—पराञ्चि खानि व्यतृणत् स्वयम्भूस्तस्मात्पराङ् पश्यति नान्तरात्मन्निति वाक्यमुपस्थाप्यते। ततश्च ज्ञेयं ब्रह्म प्रत्यगभिन्नमित्यपि सूच्यते, इति न प्रत्यगभिन्नं ब्रह्म जगत्कारणतयाऽनुमानगम्यं भवतीति भावः। – प्रदीप

3. Therefore, the aphorism, "that which begins with birth," does not have the purpose of suggesting a syllogism to infer Brahman. What then? It has the purpose of expounding the Vedāntic passages: Brahman is taught in the Upaniṣads in two modes. Firstly, Brahman with attributes (saguṇaṁ brahma), which is also termed 'Īśvara', and which is possessed of such attributes as omniscience and omnipotence. This Brahman constitutes only the intermediary purpose of the Vedāntas – *"vedāntānām avāntaratātparyaviṣayaḥ."* Secondly, the Upaniṣads also impart instruction about Brahman having no distinguishing attributes (nirviśeṣaṁ nirguṇaṁ brahma), which Brahman is identical with the Self (pratyagabhinnaṁ brahma). It is this Brahman that constitutes the main and ultimate purport of the Upaniṣadic teachings – *"vedāntānāṁ mukhyatātparyaviṣayaḥ."*

The Upaniṣads commence by teaching the Saguṇa-brahman and by doing so they help the seeker embark on the path ultimately leading to the Realisation of the 'Nirviśeṣa-pratyagabhinna-brahma'.[14] It has been already observed that it is this attributeless Brahman that is being desired to be known (jijñāsyaṁ brahma).[15] Since, this attributeless Brahman that is identical with the Self and which is the ultimate purport of the Upaniṣads (Vedānta) cannot come within the ambit of a syllogism, the Ācārya has purposefully chosen the Upaniṣadic passage alone as the basis of this definition of Brahman.[16]

Even if it be inferred that the world has a cause, it cannot be definitely known without the help of Scriptures that the cause is Brahman. It is therefore essential that the Scripture should primarily be deliberated upon so as to determine that Brahman is the source of the world. So far as the syllogistic proposition (anumāna) is concerned, it is to be considered – though not primarily – to corroborate the possibility of Scriptural signification that Brahman is the cause of this world. This is the intended meaning of

[14] Cf. वेदान्तवाक्यानि हि कारणस्वरूपमनूद्य तस्यैव निर्विशेषस्वरूपत्वबोधनार्थमेव प्रवृत्तानि, न तु कारणस्वरूपमात्रबोधनेन निराकाङ्क्षाणि। तत्तु स्वरूपं नानुमानप्रमाणस्य प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणस्य वा कथमपि विषयः। तद्यदि वाच्यार्थप्रतीतिमात्रमनुमानमूलमभिप्रेयते, तर्हि तु नेयमनिष्टापत्तिः, यतस्तत्र न मुख्यं तात्पर्यमर्थवादानामिव वाच्यार्थेषु। – प्रदीप

[15] Vide Jijñāsādhikaraṇa, Section 20, n.6.

[16] Cf. ब्रह्म द्विविधम्—सगुणं, यद्वेदान्तवाक्यावान्तरतात्पर्यविषयः, निर्विशेषं, यदु वेदान्तवाक्यमुख्यतात्पर्यविषयः। सगुणोपस्थापनद्वारा निर्गुणपर्यवसायित्वाद् निर्विशेषांशे चानुमानप्रसराद् नानुमानमूलानि सर्वाणि वेदान्तवाक्यानि, जन्माद्यस्य यतः इति सूत्रं वेति। इदमेवाभिप्रेत्याह—तस्माज्जन्मादिसूत्रमिति। यस्माद् नानुमानगम्यं मुख्यं ब्रह्मैवात्र जिज्ञास्यमुपक्षेप्यं, तस्मात्। – प्रदीप

the Ācārya's statement when he concludes stating that the aphorism (*"janmādyasya yataḥ"*) is not purported to present a syllogistic formulation but to expound the Upaniṣadic passage.[17]

A superficial reading of the following two tracts of the Bhāṣya pertaining to the Janmādyadhikaraṇa would create a doubt as to whether the Bhāṣya contradicts itself: (1) *"satsu ca vedāntavākyeṣu jagato janmādikāraṇavādiṣu tadarthagrahaṇadārḍhyāya anumānamapi vedāntavākyāvirodhi pramāṇaṁ bhavad, na nivāryate* – While, however, there are Upaniṣadic passages primarily advocating Brahman as the cause of the origination and so on of the world, in that very context for the strengthening of the comprehension of what is ascertained as their purport, inference too, such as what is not opposed to the Upaniṣadic passages, becomes the means for knowledge and is not rejected."[18] (2) *"indriyāviṣayatvena sambandhāgrahaṇāt. svabhāvato viṣayaviṣayāṇi indriyāṇi, na brahmaviṣayāṇi. sati hi indriyaviṣayatve brahmaṇaḥ idaṁ brahmaṇā sambaddhaṁ kāryam iti gṛhyeta. kāryamātram eva tu gṛhyamāṇaṁ kiṁ brahmaṇā sambaddhaṁ kim anyena kenacidvā sambaddham iti na śakyaṁ niścetum. tasmād janmādisūtraṁ na anumānopanyāsārtham* – This is not so as the relation is not comprehended because of Brahman not being an object of the senses. By nature, sense organs have external things alone as their objects and do not have Brahman as their object. Only if Brahman were the object of sense organs, then alone could it be comprehended that this world, the effect, is related with Brahman. But, when the mere effect, that is the world, alone is the object of comprehension, it is not possible to ascertain whether this world, the effect, is related to Brahman or whether it is related to something else. Therefore, the aphorism, "that which begins with birth," does not have the purpose of suggesting a syllogism to infer Brahman."[19]

[17] Cf. कारणसिद्धावपि कारणस्य ब्रह्मत्वं श्रुतिं विना ज्ञातुमशक्यमित्याह—कार्यमात्रमिति। सम्बद्धं कृतं यस्मात् श्रुतिमन्तरेण जगत्कारणं ब्रह्मेति निश्चयालाभः तस्मात् तल्लाभाय श्रुतिरेव प्रधान्येन विचारणीया। अनुमानं तूपादानत्वादिसामान्यद्वारा मृदादिवद् ब्रह्मणः स्वकार्यात्मकत्वादिश्रौतार्थसम्भावनार्थं गुणतया विचार्यमित्युपसंहरति तस्मादिति। – रत्नप्रभा

[18] Vide Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Section 9.

[19] Vide Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Section 14.

In the first cited Bhāṣya passage, we observe that the Bhāṣyakāra has accepted that logic does help in inferring Brahman–Īśvara as the cause of the world while in the Bhāṣya passage cited next there is a very clear rejection of the idea that inference can help one establish Brahman's causality of the world.

Anantakrishna Shastri in his commentary *Pradīpa* helps us resolve this seeming dissonance between the Bhāṣya passages. He states the fact that the earth etc. and sprout etc. (kṣityaṅkurādika) that have not been created by the jīva, yet because of the reason that they come within the category of the created helps us to infer that these must have been created by some conscious agent. In the absence of the jīva being that conscious agent, we can legitimately conclude that their causality lies in Īśvara for only that which is omniscient and omnipotent can be considered to be the Creator of this whole world.[20]

It is worth noticing that anumāna (inference) can only help us to infer the omniscient and omnipotent Īśvara as being the cause of the world; but, it can in no way help us comprehend that Īśvara–Brahman is the efficient-cum-material cause (abhinna-nimittopādāna-kāraṇa) of the world or that Reality is one with this inner Self which fact is the final purport of the Scripture for indeed it is by realising this identity that one becomes free from the realm of saṁsāra.[21]

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[20] This thought is also evinced in the Bhāṣya passage: *"na yathoktaviśeṣaṇasya jagataḥ yathoktaviśeṣaṇam īśvaraṁ muktvā, anyataḥ pradhānād acetanād, aṇubhyo vā, abhāvādvā, saṁsāriṇo vā utpattyādi sambhāvayituṁ śakyam* – It is not possible to postulate the birth and so on of the world possessing the above-mentioned qualities, from anything other than Īśvara of the above-described qualities – neither from the Pradhāna, the insentient, nor from the Atoms, nor from the Non-being." (Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Section 6)

[21] It is the Scripture alone which establishes that Īśvara–Brahman is the abhinna-nimittopādāna-kāraṇa by repeatedly emphasising that by the Knowledge of Brahman, one comes to know everything else. The fact of knowing all by merely knowing the one Brahman is possible only if Brahman is the material cause of the entire created world. One may refer to the various illustrations given in the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad* (6.1.4-6) pertaining to clay, gold and iron and their respective products, the clay-utensils, the gold ornaments and the iron-instruments. Also, it is the Scripture that declares the identity of Brahman with the inner Self through Mahāvākyas such as *"tat tvam asi," "ayam ātmā brahma"* and so on.

Hence, the Ācārya's exposition that one can make use of inference (anumāna) aided by logical arguments that are not antagonistic to Scripture to infer Brahman–Īśvara as the cause of the world does not at all suffer any contradiction.[22]

[22] Cf. अनेन भाष्यसन्दर्भेण संसारिव्यतिरिक्तस्यापीश्वरस्य कारणत्वं नानुमानगम्यमिति न विवक्ष्यते, यतो जीवाद्यजन्यं क्षित्यङ्कुरादिकं सकर्तृकं कार्यत्वादित्यनुमानेन सगुणेश्वरसाधनेन व्याप्तिग्रहादिसम्भव इति। तथा च भाष्यकाराणां वेदान्ताविरोधितर्केणेश्वरानुमान-साधनं न पूर्वापरविरुद्धम्। – प्रदीप

15

[सूत्रविषयवाक्यनिर्णायकभाष्यम्]

किं [1]पुनस्तद्वेदान्तवाक्यं यत् सूत्रेण इह लिलक्षयिषितम्। "भृगुर्वै वारुणिः। वरुणं पितरमुपससार। अधीहि[1] भगवो [2]ब्रह्मेति।" इत्युपक्रम्य आह – "यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते। येन जातानि जीवन्ति। यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति। तद्विजिज्ञासस्व। तद् ब्रह्म" (तै.उ.३.१) इति। तस्य च निर्णायकवाक्यम् "आनन्दाद्ध्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते। आनन्देन जातानि जीवन्ति। आनन्दं प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति इति" (तै.उ.३.६)। अन्यानि अपि एवञ्जातीयकानि वाक्यानि [3]नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभाव-सर्वज्ञस्वरूपकारणविषयाणि उदाहर्तव्यानि॥

15 A

[SŪTRAVIṢAYAVĀKYANIRṆĀYAKABHĀṢYAM]

kiṁ punastadvedāntavākyaṁ yat sūtreṇa iha lilakṣayiṣitam. "bhṛgurvai vāruṇiḥ. varuṇaṁ pitaramupasasāra. adhīhi bhagavo brahmeti." ityupakramya āha – "yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante. yena jātāni jīvanti. yatprayantyabhisaṁviśanti. tadvijijñāsasva. tad brahma" (Tai.U.3.1) iti. tasya ca nirṇāyakavākyam "ānandāddhyeva khalvimāni bhūtāni jāyante. ānandena jātāni jīvanti. ānandaṁ prayantyabhisaṁviśanti iti" (Tai.U.3.6). anyāni api evañjātīyakāni vākyāni nitya-śuddhabuddhamuktasvabhāvasarvajñasvarūpakāraṇaviṣayāṇi udāhartavyāni.

15 B

किं पुनः *kiṁ punaḥ* – what then; तत् *tat* – that; वेदान्तवाक्यम् *vedāntavākyam* – Upaniṣadic passage; यत् *yat* – which; सूत्रेण *sūtreṇa* – by the aphorism; इह *iha* – here; लिलक्षयिषितम् *lilakṣayiṣitam* – is intended to be indicated; भृगुः *bhṛguḥ* – Bhṛgu; वै *vai* – well-known; वारुणिः *vāruṇiḥ* – son of Varuṇa; वरुणम् *varuṇam* – to Varuṇa; पितरम् *pitaram* – the father; उपससार *upasasāra* – approached; अधीहि *adhīhi* – teach; भगवः *bhagavaḥ* – Venerable Sir; ब्रह्म *brahma* – Brahman; इति *iti* – thus;

[1] पञ्चपादिकाभिमतः पाठः—वेदवाक्यम्।

[2] Tel ब्रह्म इत्युपक्रम्य

[3] ASS (fn.) नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तसर्वज्ञस्वरूपकारणविषयाणि

[1] अधीहि स्मारय उपदिशेत्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

इति उपक्रम्य *iti upakramya* – commencing thus; आह *āha* – said; यतः *yataḥ* – whence; वै *vai* – verily; इमानि *imāni* – these; भूतानि *bhūtāni* – beings; जायन्ते *jāyante* – are born; येन *yena* – by which; जातानि *jātāni* – these that are born; जीवन्ति *jīvanti* – they live; यत् *yat* – that to which; प्रयन्ति *prayanti* – departing; अभिसंविशन्ति *abhisaṁviśanti* – they return to; तत् *tat* – that; विजिज्ञासस्व *vijijñāsasva* – you should seek to know; तत् *tat* – that; ब्रह्म *brahma* – Brahman; इति *iti* – in this way; तस्य च *tasya ca* – of this alone; निर्णायकवाक्यम् *nirṇāyakavākyam* – the determinative statement; आनन्दात् *ānandāt* – from Bliss; हि *hi* – indeed एव *eva* – alone; खलु *khalu* – indeed; इमानि *imāni* – these; भूतानि *bhūtāni* – beings; जायन्ते *jāyante* – are born; आनन्देन *ānandena* – by Bliss; जातानि *jātāni* – being born; जीवन्ति *jīvanti* – they live; आनन्दम् *ānandam* – into Bliss; प्रयन्ति *prayanti* – departing; अभिसंविशन्ति *abhisaṁviśanti* – they return to; इति *iti* – thus; अन्यानि *anyāni* – other; अपि *api* – also; एवञ्जातीयकानि *evañjātīyakāni* – of this nature; वाक्यानि *vākyāni* – statements; नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावसर्वज्ञस्वरूपकारणविषयाणि *nityaśuddhabuddhamuktasvabhāvasarvajñasvarūpakāraṇaviṣayāṇi* – of which the subject is the Cause which is omniscient in character and is by nature eternally pure, conscious and free; उदाहर्तव्यानि *udāhartavyāni* – are to be cited as examples

15 C

[THE COMMENTARY DETERMINING THE SCRIPTURAL PASSAGE THAT IS THE SUBJECT OF THE APHORISM]

What then is that Upaniṣadic passage that is intended to be indicated by the aphorism here?[1] The intended passage is as follows: "Bhṛgu, the well-known son of Varuṇa, approached his father and said, "Teach me Brahman, Venerable Sir." Commencing thus, the Upaniṣad said, "That whence verily these beings are born; that by which, these that are born, live; and that to which, when departing, these return; that you should seek to know – that is Brahman."[2] Of this passage, the determinative statement is:[3] "Indeed from Bliss alone these beings are born; being born, by Bliss alone they live; and when departing, into Bliss they enter."[4] Other Scriptural statements, of this nature, of which the subject is the Cause, which is omniscient in character and is by nature, eternally pure, conscious and free are to be cited as examples.[5]

15 D

1. What then is that Upaniṣadic passage that is intended to be indicated by the aphorism here? Though the present section may appear to be plain and simple, it is imbued with subtle Vedāntic content. It has been shown in the earlier section that the ultimate purpose of the aphorism, *"janmādyasya yataḥ* – Brahman is that whence that which begins with the birth of this world ensues," is to expound the Upaniṣadic message that instructs us about the 'Nirviśeṣa-brahman', which is Brahman with no distinguishing attributes or properties, which Brahman is one with the inner Self (pratyagātman). It has been indicated in the first aphorism itself that it is this Brahman alone that is desired to be realised by the seeker.[2]

At this juncture, it seems quite natural to question: What is the Upaniṣadic passage which is intended by the aphorism as the subject of inquiry?[3] The question looks naive, but, the Pūrvapakṣin does have an ulterior motive in raising this question and discomforting the Siddhāntin. While explaining the meaning of the words (padārtha) of the aphorism[4] and again while elucidating the sentence meaning (vākyārtha) of the aphorism,[5] the Bhāṣyakāra had indicated that the Scripture intended by the present aphorism is, *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante. tad brahma* – That whence verily these beings are born. That is Brahman." It is evident that the Brahman that is described here as the source of the world is only Brahman with attributes, that is 'Īśvara' or 'Saguṇa-brahman', which alone is endowed with attributes such as omniscience (sarvajñatva) and omnipotence (sarveśvaratva). This being the case, how can the Siddhāntin assert that the ultimate purport of the aphorism is the attributeless Brahman – nirguṇaṁ nirviśeṣaṁ brahma? This is the vehement objection raised by the Pūrvapakṣin.[6]

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[2] Vide Jijñāsādhikaraṇa, Section 20, n.6.

[3] Cf. एतत्सूत्रस्य विषयवाक्यं पृच्छति—किं पुनरिति। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. ननु यस्य विषयसम्भावनार्थं न्यायप्रदर्शनद्वारा ग्रथनमनेन सूत्रेण क्रियते, किं पुनस्तद् वेदान्तवाक्यम्। इति पृच्छति—किं पुनरिति। – वार्तिक

Also, cf. बहुत्वाद्वेदान्तानामेतदधिकरणविषयबुभुत्सया पृच्छति—किं पुनरिति। – न्यायनिर्णय

[4] Vide Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Section 3.

[5] Vide Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Section 4.

[6] Cf. ननु—श्रुतिनिर्देशस्तावत्—यतो वा इमानि जायन्ते इति भाष्ये प्रकृतविषयवाक्यं यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते, येन जातानि

2. The intended passage is as follows: "Bhṛgu, the well-known son of Varuṇa, approached his father and said, "Teach me Brahman, Venerable Sir." Commencing thus, the Upaniṣad said, "That whence verily these beings are born; that by which, these that are born, live; and that to which, when departing, these return;[7] that you should seek to know – that is Brahman": It is true that on the earlier two occasions,[8] as pointed out by the opponent, the abridged passage, *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante. tad brahma* – That whence verily these beings are born. That is Brahman," alone was taken into consideration, since that much sufficed to meet the need and the requirement of the context. But this does not in any way mean that the ultimate purport (parama-tātparya) of the aphorism is based only on this much of that one short passage of a particular section occurring in the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad* for that would fail to meet the need of the student who is desirous of realising Brahman as being identical with the Self (pratyagabhinnaṁ brahma).

Therefore, the Ācārya presently cites in this section the entire Scriptural passage, dealing with the Bhārgavī Vāruṇī Vidyā, which forms the basis of the ultimate purport of the aphorism. This is a long passage of which the earlier quoted portion by the Bhāṣya, *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante. tad brahma,"* constitutes just a mere fraction.

It will be of added advantage to undertake an analysis of the general context of the cited Upaniṣadic tract as well as the Upaniṣadic text itself so that we can understand better and appreciate the Ācārya's thoughts.

This passage occurs in the first part (anuvāka) of the third chapter of the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad*, titled the 'Bhṛguvallī'. The passage cited commences with (*Tai.U.*3.1), *"bhṛgurvai vāruṇiḥ,"* and concludes with (*Tai.U.*3.6),

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जीवन्ति, यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति इति वाक्यजातमिति ज्ञापितम्। तत्र च सगुणमेव बोध्यत इति भवतामपि मतम्। सति चैवं कथं जन्मादिसूत्रं निर्विशेषब्रह्मपर्यन्ताभिप्रायम्। इति गूढाभिप्रायः शङ्कते—किं पुनस्तदु वेदान्तवाक्यमिति। – प्रदीप

[7] Cf. श्रुतिश्च यतो वा इति जन्म दर्शयति, येन जातानि जीवन्ति इति जीवनं स्थितिं, यत्प्रयन्ति—इति तत्रैव लयम्। – भामती

[8] Refer to the Bhāṣya statements, *"śrutinirdeśastāvad yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante iti"* and *"tad brahma iti vākyaśeṣaḥ,"* in Section 3 and 4 respectively of the Janmādyadhikaraṇa.

"saiṣā bhārgavī vāruṇī vidyā parame vyoman pratiṣṭhitā."[9] The manner in which the Ācārya cites the Upaniṣadic text indicates that the passage by itself falls into two clear-cut sections.

The first section (*Tai.U.*3.1), *"bhṛgurvai vāruṇiḥ. varuṇaṁ pitaramupasasāra. adhīhi bhagavo brahmeti* – Bhṛgu, the well-known son of Varuṇa, approached his father and said, 'Teach me Brahman, Venerable Sir,'" tells us how Vāruṇī Bhṛgu approached his father Varuṇa and requested him to teach the knowledge of Brahman. Thus, the first section depicts Bhṛgu as a brahma-jijñāsu, an ardent aspirant with a burning desire to realise Brahman (brahma-jijñāsā). We can observe that the context of the Bhārgavī Vāruṇī Vidyā is aptly pertinent to the first Jijñāsā-sūtra itself.[10] Yet, the Ācārya cites this passage only in the context of the second Janmādi-sūtra for he wishes us to take note of the essential background that brahma-jijñāsā provides for the definition of Brahman stated in the Janmādi-sūtra.

The second section of the very same Bhṛguvallī passage (*Tai.U.*3.1), *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante. yena jātāni jīvanti. yatprayantyabhisaṁviśanti. tadvijijñāsasva. tad brahma,"* indicates in retrospect the context for the present

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[9] The following is the entire Bhārgavī Vāruṇī Vidyā:

भृगुर्वै वारुणिः। वरुणं पितरमुपससार। अधीहि भगवो ब्रह्मेति। तस्मा एतत्प्रोवाच। अन्नं प्राणं चक्षुः श्रोत्रं मनो वाचमिति। तꣳ होवाच। यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते। येन जातानि जीवन्ति। यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति। तद्विजिज्ञासस्व। तद् ब्रह्मेति। स तपोऽतप्यत। स तपस्तप्त्वा॥ १॥ इति प्रथमोऽनुवाकः॥

अन्नं ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात्। अन्नाद्ध्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते। अन्नेन जातानि जीवन्ति। अन्नं प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्तीति। तद्विज्ञाय। पुनरेव वरुणं पितरमुपससार। अधीहि भगवो ब्रह्मेति। तꣳ होवाच। तपसा ब्रह्म विजिज्ञासस्व। तपो ब्रह्मेति। स तपोऽतप्यत। स तपस्तप्त्वा॥ १॥ इति द्वितीयोऽनुवाकः॥

प्राणो ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात्। प्राणाद्ध्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते। प्राणेन जातानि जीवन्ति। प्राणं प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्तीति। तद्विज्ञाय। पुनरेव वरुणं पितरमुपससार। अधीहि भगवो ब्रह्मेति। तꣳ होवाच। तपसा ब्रह्म विजिज्ञासस्व। तपो ब्रह्मेति। स तपोऽतप्यत। स तपस्तप्त्वा॥ १॥ इति तृतीयोऽनुवाकः॥

मनो ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात्। मनसो ह्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते। मनसा जातानि जीवन्ति। मनः प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्तीति। तद्विज्ञाय। पुनरेव वरुणं पितरमुपससार। अधीहि भगवो ब्रह्मेति। तꣳ होवाच। तपसा ब्रह्म विजिज्ञासस्व। तपो ब्रह्मेति। स तपोऽतप्यत। स तपस्तप्त्वा॥ १॥ इति चतुर्थोऽनुवाकः॥

विज्ञानं ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात्। विज्ञानाद्ध्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते। विज्ञानेन जातानि जीवन्ति। विज्ञानं प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्तीति। तद्विज्ञाय। पुनरेव वरुणं पितरमुपससार। अधीहि भगवो ब्रह्मेति। तꣳ होवाच। तपसा ब्रह्म विजिज्ञासस्व। तपो ब्रह्मेति। स तपोऽतप्यत। स तपस्तप्त्वा॥ १॥ इति पञ्चमोऽनुवाकः॥

आनन्दो ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात्। आनन्दाद्ध्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते। आनन्देन जातानि जीवन्ति। आनन्दं प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्तीति। सैषा भार्गवी वारुणी विद्या। परमे व्योमन्प्रतिष्ठिता। स य एवं वेद प्रतितिष्ठति। अन्नवानन्नादो भवति। महान्भवति प्रजया पशुभिर्ब्रह्मवर्चसेन। महान् कीर्त्या॥ १॥ इति षष्ठोऽनुवाकः॥

[10] Cf. भृगुर्वै वारुणिः इति अथशब्दोपात्तन्यायेन प्रथमसूत्रस्य उदाहरणम्। – पञ्चपादिका

Janmādi-sūtra.[11] To explain: Bhṛgu's brahma-jijñāsā (desire to know Brahman) reveals the fact that Bhṛgu must have got some idea about Brahman and about the great benefit that such a Knowledge of Brahman confers. From where could Bhṛgu have got this inkling? In the Jijñāsādhikaraṇa,[12] we had seen that brahma-jijñāsā could arise in the students of the Veda too during their svādhyāya (Vedic study) when they come to know of Upaniṣadic declarations such as *"brahmavidāpnoti param* – The knower of Brahman attains the Supreme." They then waken to the fact that the supreme goal (parama-puruṣārtha) ensues from the Realisation of Brahman alone.

This sentence, *"brahmavidāpnoti param,"* is indeed the grand opening statement of Brahmavallī, also known as Brahmānandavallī, which is the second Chapter of the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad* that just precedes the Bhṛguvallī, the third Chapter. Therefore, it is certain that it is this Brahmavallī statement[13] that has given rise to Bhṛgu's brahma-jijñāsā.[14] Also, this opening statement of the Brahmavallī, *"brahmavidāpnoti param,"* is immediately followed by an enunciation of the svarūpa-lakṣaṇa (intrinsic-nature definition) of Brahman: *"satyaṁ jñānamanantaṁ brahma* – Brahman is Reality, Consciousness, Infinite."[15] Bhṛgu thus had also come to know of the above definition of Brahman. But he could not clearly grasp this definition of Brahman for immediately after this definition, the Brahmavallī has this to teach: "From that Brahman, that is this Ātman, the individual self, are born in order, the

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[11] Cf. यतो वा इमानि भूतानि इत्यादि जन्मादिसूत्रस्य उदाहरणम्। – पञ्चपादिका

[12] Vide Jijñāsādhikaraṇa, Section 10.

[13] The Ācārya assesses the statement (*Tai.U.*2.1), *"brahmavidāpnoti param,"* as an aphorism condensing the purport of the entire second chapter of the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad*: *"brahmavidāpnoti param iti vākyaṁ sūtrabhūtaṁ, sarvasya vallyarthasya."*

[14] In the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad*, we find two similar instances: The learned Nārada had heard that the knower of the Self crosses over all sorrow. Hence, he developed a burning desire to know the Self and approached the sage Sanatkumāra and requested him to teach the knowledge of Brahman (*Chā.U.*7.1.1-3). Similarly, Indra and Virocana came to know that the knower of the Self becomes free from all evils and attains all worlds. They too developed brahma-jijñāsā and approached Prajāpati to gain Self-knowledge (*Chā.U.*8.7.1).

[15] In this definition, the term *"anantaṁ"* obviously stands for *'anantaṁ ānandaṁ* – Infinite Bliss'. Cf. *"vijñānamānandaṁ brahma"* (*Bṛ.U.*3.9.28). The svarūpa-lakṣaṇa of Brahman given in the Brahmavallī can be considered as the basis for the later Vedāntic description *"saccidānandasvarūpaṁ brahma"* and *"saccidānandasvarūpaḥ ātmā."*

Space, the Air, the Fire, the Water, the Earth, the Vegetation, the Food and the Person.[16] This confounding statement of the infinite Brahman being one with the inner self along with the declaration that it is from this Brahman that is identical with the Ātman that the whole world has sprung must have further fanned the flames of the already burning brahma-jijñāsā in Bhṛgu.

Thus, the first section of the Bhṛguvallī passage (*Tai.U.*3.1), *"bhṛgurvai vāruṇiḥ. varuṇaṁ pitaramupasasāra. adhīhi bhagavo brahmeti* – Bhṛgu, the well-known son of Varuṇa, approached his father and said, 'Teach me Brahman, Venerable Sir,'" that contains ample indications for the factors that have led to Bhṛgu's brahma-jijñāsā sets up the required context for the Bhṛguvallī's second section that begins with *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni."* This second section contains the Bhārgavī Vāruṇī Vidyā as well as the basic contours of the Janmādi-sūtra, for the Janmādi-sūtra is based on the Bhārgavī Vāruṇī Vidyā.

In this second section of the Bhṛguvallī, commencing with *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante"* and containing the Bhārgavī Vāruṇī Vidyā proper, Varuṇa, the Preceptor teaches Bhṛgu the definition of Brahman. This definition of Brahman is indeed what has been stated before in the Brahmavallī as being identical with the self and also as being the efficient-cum-material cause (abhinna-nimittopādāna-kāraṇa) of the world. This fact of Brahman being the abhinna-nimittopādāna-kāraṇa of the world – the Guru Varuṇa points out particularly to Bhṛgu because he could see Bhṛgu doubting as to how Brahman, which has been presented as being identical with the Ātman, could become the source of Space, Air, Fire, Water, Earth and the world also as a whole.

The Guru, although he instructs exactly that very thought which was presented in the Brahmavallī, presents to Bhṛgu a defintion of Brahman, that is logical no doubt, but which has to be grasped by reflective cogitation (vicāra) alone. The Guru's vision is that by intelligently making use of the

[16] Vide *"tasmādvā etasmādātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ. ākāśādvāyuḥ. vāyoragniḥ. agnerāpaḥ. adbhyaḥ pṛthivī. pṛthivyā oṣadhayaḥ. oṣadhībhyo'nnam. ānnāt puruṣaḥ (Tai.U.*2.1)." Also, vide the *Śaṅkara-bhāṣya* statements on this *Taittirīya-upaniṣad* Mantra: *"tasmādvā etasmādātmana iti brahmaṇyevātmaśabdaprayogād vediturātmaiva brahma,"* and *"yacca satyaṁ jñānamanantamiti lakṣitaṁ, tasmādetasmād brahmaṇaḥ ātmanaḥ ātmaśabdavācyād ātmā ya hi tat sarvasya "tat satyam sa ātmā" (Chā.U.*6.8-16) *iti śrutyantarāt."*

methodology of logical contemplation that he has provided, Bhṛgu, will come to realise the Truth taught in the Brahmavallī, that is Brahman, the efficient-cum-material cause as being one with the Ātman, the Self.

This is Varuṇa's teaching to Bhṛgu (*Tai.U.*3.1): *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante. yena jātāni jīvanti. yatprayantyabhisaṁviśanti. tadvijijñāsasva. tad brahma* – That whence verily these beings are born; that by which, these that are born, live; and that to which, when departing, these return; that you should seek to know – that is Brahman." Having received from the Preceptor the above instruction on Brahman, Bhṛgu started observing a protracted process of 'tapas', which in this context means here a 'contemplative logical analysis[17] imbued with penance'.[18] By this process of contemplation on the Teacher's instruction, Bhṛgu comprehended the food ('anna', i.e. the five elements), the vital breath ('prāṇa'), the internal organ ('manas'), i.e. the faculty of will and knowledge ('vijñāna', i.e. the faculty of determination and perseverance)[19] – each one of these, one after another, in the order of their occurrence as Brahman, the cause of the world. Bhṛgu reported his findings to Varuṇa, his father and Guru, and everytime he came to the conclusion that anna is Brahman, or prāṇa is Brahman, or manas is Brahman, or vijñāna is Brahman – on all these occasions he was instructed by Varuṇa to further continue the tapas for he had not yet discovered the ultimate Truth. Bhṛgu finally realised that the definition given by his father Varuṇa (*Tai.U.*3.1), *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante. yena jātāni jīvanti. yatprayantyabhisaṁviśanti. tadvijijñāsasva. tad brahma,"* points at the source of the world, that is Brahman, as nothing but Ānanda, the pure Bliss, which is the very Self that is lodged in the cave of one's heart. This section of the Bhṛguvallī then concludes with an appropriate note: This is the Bhārgavī Vāruṇī Vidyā, the Truth found and practised by

[17] Logical analysis is a well-known means to arrive at the truth and spirit of the teachings of the Vedānta and the Preceptor. Vide *"anvayavyatirekādicintanaṁ vā tapo bhaved ahaṁ brahmāsmīti vākyārthabodhāyālamidaṁ yataḥ."* (Sureśvarācārya's *Taittirīya-vārtika,* 3.1.19)

[18] Manu recommends penance (tapas) as the best aid in attaining that which is impossible to achieve otherwise. Vide *"yaddustaraṁ durāpaṁ yad durgaṁ yacca suduṣkaraṁ sarvaṁ ca tapasā sādhyaṁ tapo hi duratikramam."* (*Manusmṛti,* 11.238)

[19] 'Anna' here stands for the Virāt. Prāṇa, manas and vijñāna are collectively the Hiraṇyagarbha. These terms are rendered in the light of the Ācārya's *Taittirīya-bhāṣya.*

Bhṛgu, and taught by Varuṇa and this Vidyā is established in the supreme Space, that is in Ānanda, the Bliss, the Non-dual: *"saiṣā bhārgavī vāruṇī vidyā parame vyoman pratiṣṭhitā."*[20]

The above analysis of the Scriptural passage, the very passage cited by the Ācārya, indicates this: (1) The teacher Varuṇa had given his disciple Bhṛgu a definition of Brahman about which Bhṛgu had already gained some amount of information in the Brahmavallī. (2) The methodology of contemplative logical inquiry suggested in the definition given to him by his Guru, induced Bhṛgu to conduct tapas – a series of contemplative logical analyses. (3) By that tapas, the disciple was able to directly realise what he had earlier in theory comprehended from the Brahmavallī, albeit with an element of doubt as to how Brahman that is identical with the Ātman could ever be the cause of the world.

In other words, this analysis of the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad* Vallis reveals that the Brahmavallī contains the theoretical part of Brahma-vidyā, a theory that expounds that Brahman is identical with the Ātman and is also the efficient-cum-material cause (abhinna-nimittopādāna-kāraṇa) of the world while the Bhṛguvallī expounds the practical part of enabling one to actually realise that Brahman, the efficient-cum-material cause of the world (abhinna-nimittopādāna-kāraṇa) as being, indeed, identical with the Ātman.

As discussed already, the fact of Brahman, the Ānanda, that is identical with the Self, as being the Source, that is the efficient-cum-material cause of the world, cannot be established by inference. Hence, it is certain that the Sūtrakāra had based the Janmādi-sūtra on the entire Upaniṣadic tract pertaining to the Bhārgavī Vāruṇī Vidyā. Again, the above detailed study of the subject also reveals that the Ācārya's manner of elucidating the aphorism on the basis of the entire text pertaining to the Bhārgavī Vāruṇī Vidyā is quite appropriate and reflects the spirit of the Sūtra very well.[21]

[20] Vide the *Śaṅkara-bhāṣya* on this portion of *Taittirīya-upaniṣad: "parame vyoman, parame ānande advaite pratiṣṭhitā."*

[21] The points discussed in the present Janmādisūtra-bhāṣya are taken up for further detailed exposition by the Bhāṣyakāra in the Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa (*B.S.*1.4.23-27).

We have seen how Bhṛgu had received from his Guru a definition of Brahman that was steeped in logic. Basing himself on that definition, Bhṛgu had conducted protracted logical analysis that was imbued with penance so that he could realise Brahman. He made, in all, five attempts to comprehend the Truth. In the first four attempts, the mere application of logic had only led him to err. He had concluded that each of four factors – anna, prāṇa, manas, and vijñāna – was worthy of being Brahman, the source of the world. Why did he commit such an error?

The obvious reason is that by perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna) and by other means of knowledge (pramāṇa) one can only comprehend the relation of the world, the effect, with causes such as the anna, prāṇa, manas, and vijñāna, albeit each later one, a deeper cause than the former one, but one cannot by perception (pratyakṣa) or even by means of logic (anumāna), however subtle it may be, come to ascertain whether this effect, that is the world, is connected, by a relation such as that of the cause and effect relation, with Brahman or whether it is connected with something else.[22]

However, in his fifth and final attempt, Bhṛgu succeeded in rightly comprehending Ānanda, the Blissful-Self as Brahman, the cause of the world. Indeed, his deep contemplative reflection that was imbued with tapas had purified his mind enabling him to view the definition of Brahman that he received from his Guru (*Tai.U.*3.1), *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante. yena jātāni jīvanti. yatprayantyabhisaṁviśanti. tadvijijñāsasva. tad brahma* – That whence verily these beings are born; that by which, these that are born, live; and that to which, when departing, these return; that you should seek to know – that is Brahman," from a different angle and viewpoint. All the while his understanding had been that Brahman is that which the above-cited logical definition points out as the source of the world; hence, his repeated failure. He comes to discover the nature of Brahman, the efficient-cum-material cause of the world, as being one with the inner Self, only when his understanding of the definition transformed into that which the logic, given to him by his

[22] Hence the Bhāṣyakāra's statement in the earlier section: *"kāryameva (jagadeva) gṛhyamāṇaṁ kiṁ brahmaṇā sambaddhaṁ, kimanyena kenacidvā sambaddham iti na śakyaṁ niścetum."* (Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Section 14)

Guru, merely indicates as the probable and possible cause of the world,[23] that verily is what the Brahmavallī teaches as *"satyaṁ jñānamanantaṁ brahma"* and as *"tasmād vā etasmādātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ."*

This explains why in the definition of Brahman given by the Preceptor Varuṇa, the first three units (1) *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante,"* (2) *"yena jātāni jīvanti"* and (3) *"yatprayantyabhisaṁviśanti"* indicating the probable cause of the world, figure as uddeśya (subject) and the conclusion, *"(tad) brahma,"* figures as the last unit, that is as vidheya (predicate).[24] Now as a result of his transformed view of the definition brought about by his deep contemplative inquiry imbued with tapas, Bhṛgu was able to conclude that the source of the world, Brahman, is Ānanda, the Bliss itself that is the very Self that shines at the core of one's personality. He had obviously realised that this Ānanda is that Brahman about which the Brahmavallī had given the svarūpa-lakṣaṇa as *"satyaṁ jñānamanantaṁ brahma,"* and later on went to describe this as being identical with the Self and as being the source of the Space, Air and the rest and the whole world.

3. Of this passage, the determinative statement is: As we saw above, Bhṛgu could not come to a conclusion as to whether the effect, the world that is comprehended, is related with Brahman or the Pradhāna (proposed by Sāṅkhyans) or the Aṇu (proposed by the Logicians) or with something else. The reason for his plight was that he was depending on logic alone and hence could not be sure about the actual causal relation of the world with Brahman.[25] But thanks to his repeatedly continued tapas, he could re-assess the definition and this enabled him to determine that the cause of the world that is indicated by logic is verily the Ānanda (Bliss), the Brahman that was taught in the Brahmavallī as being of the nature of Satyam (Existence),

[23] 'Probable and possible' because the necessary relation of invariable concomitance (vyāpti) of the cause, Brahman, and the effect, the world, is not known, and therefore, inference indicates a causality that is probable and not exactly as it is.

[24] Cf. The Bhāṣya passage: *"asya jagato nāmarūpābhyāṁ vyākṛtasya, anekakartṛbhoktṛsaṁyuktasya, pratiniyatadeśakālanimittakriyāphalāśrayasya manasā api acintyaracanārūpasya janmasthitibhaṅgaṁ yataḥ sarvajñāt sarvaśakteḥ kāraṇād bhavati tad brahma iti vākyaśeṣaḥ"* (Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Section 4). Here too, *"tad brahma"* figures as predicate.

[25] Cf. अत्र च प्रधानादिविषयत्वसंशये निर्णयवाक्यम्—आनन्दाद्येव इति। – भामती

Jñānam (Consciousness), and Anantam (Infinite) and as being identical with the Self (Ātman).

4. "Indeed from Bliss alone these beings are born; being born, by Bliss alone they live; and when departing, into Bliss they enter": From the Bhṛguvallī's narration, we learn this: After each of his first four attempts, Bhṛgu thought it is wise to approach the Preceptor and report to him the findings of his investigation, obviously for his approval. But each time Varuṇa, the Guru, directed Bhṛgu to further continue his tapas. Evidently, Varuṇa did not approve of the conclusion arrived at by Bhṛgu which fact only prodded Bhṛgu to further contemplate thus enabling him to discover the ultimate Truth. In his fifth and last attempt, Bhṛgu realised that the cause of the world is none but Ānanda-Brahman, which, as the Brahmavallī had taught him, is the very inner Self. Thereafter, the Upaniṣad does not depict Bhṛgu as approaching Varuṇa, his Preceptor, for verifying whether his finding is true or otherwise. Here, the evident suggestion is that Bhṛgu had realised the Truth, the supreme Reality and there was no necessity for him to get it confirmed for the Scripture itself declares that all doubts are dispelled of their own accord at the dawn of Realisation (*Mu.U.*2.2.9): "*chidyante sarvasaṁśayāḥ...tasmin dṛṣṭe parāvare* – All doubts are cut asunder... the very moment the supreme Self constituted of the higher and the lower is realised."

At this juncture, a question is bound to rise: What is desired to be known is the attributeless Brahman alone, that is one with the inner Self – 'Nirviśeṣa-pratyagabhinna-brahma'. But the Upaniṣadic passage (*Tai.U.3.1*), "*yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante. yena jātāni jīvanti. yatprayantyabhisaṁviśanti. tadvijijñāsasva. tad brahma,*" defines Brahman as the efficient-cum-material cause of the world. This definition indeed is merely of the Saguṇa-brahman, that is Īśvara possessed of attributes such as omniscience and omnipotence. The Upaniṣads also abound in passages attesting the creatorship of Īśvara, the Saguṇa-brahman, and explicate His nature of omniscience, His wish to

become many, and the fact that it is He alone who has created the entire world.[26] Thus, the attributeless Brahman, the one that is desired to be known (jijñāsya), yet remains undefined by the Janmādi-sūtra as well as by the Bhārgavī Vāruṇī Vidyā tract of the Upaniṣad.

Of course, the term 'Ānanda' of the Bhārgavī Vāruṇī Vidyā passage is to be taken as 'nirviśeṣaṁ brahma' and as indicative of *"satyaṁ jñānamanantaṁ brahma,"* the svarūpa-lakṣaṇa (intrinsic-nature definition) of Brahman given in the Brahmavallī. But this Brahman, the Sat-Cid-Ānanda, is not the cause of the world. This being the case, how does one comprehend the veracity of the Upaniṣadic declaration (*Tai.U.*3.6): *"ānandāddhyeva khalvimāni bhūtāni jāyante, ānandena jātāni jīvanti, ānandaṁ prayantyabhisaṁviśantīti* – From Ānanda alone these beings are born; it is Ānanda by which, these that are born, live; and, it is into Ānanda that when departing, these return"? Is there not a palpable contradiction?

The following is the reply to this well-founded query: The Vedāntin accepts the entire corpus of the Upaniṣadic teachings as an authority on matters pertaining to Brahman, Ātman, the creation of the world, the means for realising the Reality and so on. His endeavour, therefore, is to understand the entire Upaniṣadic teaching in such a manner that there are no contradictions amongst the Upaniṣadic statements.

Within the corpus of the Upaniṣadic teachings, there are many passages that expound that the supreme Brahman is changeless (kūṭastha). The following are a few statements that corroborate this fact (*Ka.U.*2.1.11 & *Bṛ.U.*4.3.15 respectively): *"neha nānāsti kiñcana, mṛtyoḥ sa mṛtyumāpnoti ya iha nāneva paśyati* – It admits no plurality; he dies over and again who perceives plurality here," *"asaṅgo hyayaṁ puruṣaḥ* – This Self remains ever unconnected with all things," and so on. It is certain that this attributeless Sat-Cid-Ānanda, the Kūṭastha-asaṅga-brahman cannot in any way be the

[26] Vide *"yaḥ sarvajñaḥ sarvavid yasya jñānamayaṁ tapaḥ, tasmād etad brahma nāma rūpamannaṁ ca jāyate* – He is the all-knowing and the all-wise. His tapas is wisdom, from Him was born this Brahmā (Hiraṇyagarbha), the names, the forms, and food (i.e. the Earth)," (*Mu.U.*1.1.9) *"so'kāmayata bahu syāṁ prajāyeyeti...idaṁ sarvamasṛjata* – He, the Īśvara, desired, "let me become many"...He created all this," (*Tai.U.*2.6) *"tan mano'kuruta* – He created the mind." (*Bṛ.U.*1.2.1)

cause of the world. Therefore, the plain meaning of this sentence (*Tai.U.*3.6), *"ānandāddhyeva khalvimāni bhūtāni jāyante, ānandena jātāni jīvanti, ānandaṁ prayantyabhisaṁviśantīti* – From Ānanda alone these beings are born, it is Ānanda by which, these that are born, live; and it is into Ānanda that when departing, these return," that the pure attributeless Brahman, the Ānanda, is the cause of the world cannot be its actual intended sense and hence this sentence-sense (vākyārtha) has to be only apparent.

What then can be the actual sense of this statement? This subtle point can be explained with an example. When a person mistakes a rope for a snake (rajju-sarpa-bhrama), the rope, the substratum remains totally unconnected (asaṅga) with the superimposed snake.[27] Yet, the superimposed snake has that very rope in conjunction with the ignorance of the erring person as its material cause; that is to say, the snake is born from the rope occasioned by the perceiving person's ignorance and continues to exist, because of the rope. Finally, it gets absorbed in the rope itself, so to say, when the ignorance of the rope (rajju-ajñāna) ends on the cognition of the rope.[28] On realising the rope as the rope, the person comes to his senses, and avers that the snake is indeed the rope itself: *"yaḥ sarpaḥ sa iyaṁ rajjuḥ."*

In such sentences, we note that the person identifies the sublated snake with the substrate rope even while he is fully aware of their non-identity – indeed, one is false and the other real. The true spirit of his declaration, *"yaḥ sarpaḥ sa iyaṁ rajjuḥ* – That which I had imagined to be a snake is this rope itself," when we analyse is that it denotes the incompatibility of the rope–serpent identity. In the philosophical context, such usages are termed 'bādhāyāṁ sāmānādhikaraṇyam'. This technical expression is rendered as: 'The superimposed object being sublated becomes identified with the substrate'.

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[27] Vide *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya*, Section 9: *"tatraivaṁ sati yatra yadadhyāsaḥ, tatkṛtena doṣeṇa guṇena vā aṇumātreṇāpi sa na sambadhyate* – Such being the case, where there is superimposition of an entity on a substratum, the latter remains absolutely unassociated with the bad or good property brought about by that superimposed entity."

[28] Cf. एतदुक्तं भवति—यथा रज्वज्ञानसहितरज्जूपादाना धारा रज्वां सत्यामस्ति रज्वामेव च लीयते, एवमविद्यासहितब्रह्मोपादानं जगद् ब्रह्मण्येवास्ति तत्रैव च लीयत इति सिद्धम्। – भामती

The sentence, *"ānandāddhyeva khalvimāni bhūtāni jāyante,"* belongs to the category of 'bādhāyāṁ sāmānādhikaraṇyam'. To explain: Realising the attributeless Ānanda-Brahman, the svarūpa-lakṣaṇa of which is *"satyaṁ jñānamanantaṁ brahma,"* Bhṛgu declares, *"ānandāddhyeva khalvimāni bhūtāni jāyante, ānandena jātāni jīvanti, ānandaṁ prayantyabhisaṁviśantīti,"* indicating the unfeasibility of the non-dual Ānanda-Brahman being the actual cause of the world but apparently It alone is the cause of the world. The Upaniṣads have often taken recourse to this technique of 'bādhāyāṁ sāmānādhikaraṇyam' while describing the non-dual, changeless nature of Brahman. Some of the well-known instances are (*Chā.U.*3.14.1, *Bṛ.U.*2.4.6, *Tai.U.*3.10.5 respectively in order) *"sarvaṁ khalvidaṁ brahma* – All this is Brahman itself," *"imāni bhūtāni sarvaṁ yadayamātmā* – All these beings and all this are this Self," *"aham annam aham annādaḥ* – I am food; I am the food-eater" and so on.[29]

In the light of the above discussions on the Janmādi-sūtra, *"janmādyasya yataḥ* – Brahman is that whence that which begins with the birth of this world ensues," it is clear that the Sūtrakāra has chosen the entire Upaniṣadic passage of the Bhārgavī Vāruṇī Vidyā as the 'viṣaya-vākya' (statement containing the subject-matter) of the present Sūtra. On this basis, we may conclude the following:

(1) 'Jagat-kāraṇatva', that is the causality of the creation, sustenance and dissolution of the world, constitutes the svarūpa-lakṣaṇa (intrinsic-nature definition) of Īśvara, the Saguṇa-brahman.

(2) This jagat-kāraṇatva serves as taṭastha-lakṣaṇa (definition *per accidens*) of the Nirguṇa-brahman, that is the attributeless Brahman which is identical with the Self, of which the svarūpa-lakṣaṇa (intrinsic-nature definition), *"satyaṁ jñānamanantaṁ brahma,"* has been given in the Brahmavallī of the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad*.[30]

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[29] The concept of 'bādhāyāṁ sāmānādhikaraṇyam' is at the very heart of the 'Vivarta-vāda' (the doctrine of appearance) and 'Satkāraṇa-vāda' (the doctrine of cause alone being real) both of which are vital doctrines in Advaita-vedānta. The Ācārya himself discusses many intricate points pertaining to this doctrine at different places in the *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya*, particularly in the Ārambhaṇādhikaraṇa (2.1.14-20).

[30] Cf. ब्रह्मणो जगद्धेतुत्वानुवादेन स्वरूपनिर्णायकमानन्दत्वविधायि वाक्यम्। ततः सत्यादिवाक्याच्च स्वप्रकाशानतिशयानन्दलक्षणं

(3) The ultimate aim of the Janmādi-sūtra is to suggest that the Ānanda Brahman of the above-mentioned svarūpa-lakṣaṇa is itself the vivarta-upādāna-kāraṇa (substratum) of the phenomenal world just as the rope is itself the vivarta-upādāna-kāraṇa of the illusory snake based on the principle of 'bādhāyāṁ samānādhikaraṇyam'.[31]

Indeed, if the Sūtrakāra had intended to exclusively give the svarūpa-lakṣaṇa of the Saguṇa-brahman, that is Īśvara, alone, he would have chosen for the purpose of illustration other Scriptural passages such as (*Mu.U.*1.1.9) *"yaḥ sarvajñaḥ sarvavit"* that are quite specific on that point.

The Bhāṣya has ably established all these concepts in the present section by comprehending the Sūtrakāra's definition of Brahman in the Janmādi-sūtra both in letter and spirit. Therefore, the criticism that the Bhāṣya does not reflect the purport of the aphorism as opined by the other schools of Vedānta like the Dvaita school stands completely rejected.[32]

5. Other Scriptural statements, of this nature, of which the subject is the Cause, which is omniscient in character and is by nature, eternally pure, conscious and free are to be cited as examples: Some of the Scriptural passages that come under this category are:

(1) The *Chāndogya* tract (6.2.1-3) commencing with, *"sadeva somyedamagra āsīdekamevādvitīyam* – In the beginning, this world was one Being that is without a second," "*...tadaikṣata bahu syāṁ prajāyeyeti tattejo'sṛjata* – It thought, 'Let me become many. Let me generate'. So it gave birth to fire...," and concluding with *"aitadātmyamidaṁ sarvaṁ, tat satyaṁ, sa ātmā, tat tvam asi* – All the universe has this for its Self. This is real. This is the Self. That thou art."

(2) The *Muṇḍaka-upaniṣad* tract (1.1.6) that commencing with, *"yattadadreśyam-agrāhyamagotramavarṇamacakṣuḥśrotraṁ tadapāṇipādaṁ, nityaṁ vibhuṁ sarvagataṁ susūkṣmaṁ tadavyayaṁ yad bhūtayoniṁ paripaśyanti dhīrāḥ* – This is invisible, ungraspable, pedigreeless, colourless, eyeless, earless, armless,

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ब्रह्मेति निर्णेतुं शक्यमित्यर्थः। – न्यायनिर्णय

[31] Cf. जन्मादिसूत्र-तद्विचारणीयश्रुतिवाक्यानामवान्तरतात्पर्यमादायैव जगत्कारणत्वव्यवस्थापनेन निर्विशेषस्य कारणत्वानुमान-गम्यत्वादीनामनङ्गीकाराद्, जगज्जन्मादीनां बाधितत्वं पर्यवसानतो वाक्यान्तरगम्यमेवात्र विवक्ष्यते। – प्रदीप

[32] For the objections of the Dvaita school of Vedānta one may refer to the *Pradīpa* commentary on the Bhāṣya.

footless, eternal, omnipresent, all pervading, very subtle, unchanging. The wise see this as the source of beings" and concluding with (*Mu.U.*1.1.9) "*yaḥ sarvajñaḥ sarvavid yasya jñānamayaṁ tapaḥ tasmādetad brahma nāma rūpamannaṁ ca jāyate* – This omniscient and the all-wise is the one whose tapas consists of knowledge. From Him are born Brahman (Saguṇa-brahman, the Hiraṇyagarbha), the name, the form and also food (the earth)."

The *Taittirīya* passage quoted by the Ācārya as well as all the above-cited Upaniṣadic tracts and other such numerous Upaniṣadic passages similar to the above[33] form a class by themselves, for taking recourse to the well-known methodology of 'bādhāyāṁ sāmānādhikaraṇyam', these passages describe the very Nirguṇa-pratyagabhinna-brahman as apparently being Saguṇa-brahman and thus being the source of the world. Therefore, the ultimate purport of these statements is the changeless (kūṭastha), attributeless (nirguṇa), Existence-Consciousness-Infinite-Bliss Brahman (satyaṁ jñānam anantam ānandaṁ brahman), that is identical with the Self (pratyag-abhinna).[34]

It is the Knowledge of this Brahman that paves the way for Liberation.[35]

[33] Cf. 'यः सर्वज्ञः' (मु.उ.१.१.९), 'तस्मादेतद् ब्रह्म नामरूपमन्नं च जायते' (मु.उ.१.१.९), 'विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म' (बृ.उ.३.९.२८) इत्यादिशाखान्तरीयवाक्यानि अपि अस्य विषय इत्याह—अन्यान्यपीति। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. तैत्तिरीयश्रुताविव श्रुत्यन्तरेऽपि ब्रह्मणो लक्षणद्वयवादीनि वाक्यानि 'यः सर्वज्ञः सर्वविद्', 'विज्ञानमानन्दम्' इत्यादीनि सन्ति, तान्यपीहोदाहरणत्वेन द्रष्टव्यानीत्याह—अन्यान्यपीति। – न्यायनिर्णय

[34] Cf. सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदिति तदैक्षतेत्यादिना कारणं सर्वज्ञादिरूपमुपक्षिप्य एकमेवाद्वितीयमिति द्वितीयनिषेधद्वारा प्रत्यगभिन्नस्वरूपचैतन्य एव पर्यवस्यति। अथ परा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यते यत्तदद्रेश्यमग्राह्यमगोत्रमवर्णमचक्षुःश्रोत्रं तदपाणिपादं नित्यं विभुं सुसूक्ष्मं तदव्ययं यद्भूतयोनिं परिपश्यन्ति धीरा इति वाक्यं भूतयोनिमनूद्याद्रेश्यत्वाद्युपन्यासेन यः सर्वज्ञः सर्वविदिति वाक्यमपि तद्वाक्यघटकभूतयोनिस्वरूपोपस्थापनद्वारा न सगुणमात्रपर्यवसायि, किन्तु निर्विशेषपर्यवसाय्येवेति गमयति। – प्रदीप

Also, cf. एवञ्च यद् जगज्जन्मस्थितिलयकारणं, तदानन्दस्वरूपं ब्रह्मेति स्वरूपलक्षणपरतयाऽपि जन्मादिसूत्रं योजितमिति द्रष्टव्यम्। – ऋजुप्रकाशिका

[35] Cf. तदेवं सर्वासु शाखासु लक्षणद्वयवाक्यानि जिज्ञास्ये ब्रह्मणि समन्वितानि तद्धिया मुक्तिरिति सिद्धम्। – रत्नप्रभा

Janmādyadhikaraṇaracanā – Structure of Janmādyadhikaraṇa

An adhikaraṇa or topical section is constituted of five aspects.[1] We shall presently see all these five aspects pertaining to Janmādyadhikaraṇa:

(1) Viṣaya or Subject: The Upaniṣadic passages taken for deliberation here are *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante..."* and others that present Brahman as the source of the world.

(2) Saṁśaya or Doubt: Whether the causality pertaining to the birth, existence and dissolution of the world, described in the above passage, can be or cannot be the definition of the Nirviśeṣa-brahman (attributeless Brahman) that is desired to be known.

(3) Pūrvapakṣa or Prima Facie View: The said causality of birth etc. (janmādi) of the world is an attribute of the Saviśeṣa-brahman (Īśvara or Brahman with attributes) and, therefore, it cannot be a defintion of the Nirviśeṣa-brahman, the attributeless Brahman, that is desired to be known. Consequently, the nature of Brahman remains undefined by the Scripture. And, no inquiry about such an undefined entity is possible. For this reason, the inquiry into Śāstra, that proposes to undertake the deliberation into Brahman, cannot be and need not be undertaken. Again, since the real nature of Brahman is itself unknown, the Realisation of Brahman and the Liberation that ensues from the Realisation are also impossible.

(4) Siddhānta or the Established View: The said causality of Brahman with regard to the world can be the definition *per accidens* (taṭastha-lakṣaṇa) of Brahman. And, this definition points to *"satyaṁ jñānam anantam," "ānandaṁ brahma"* and so on which are the svarūpa-lakṣaṇa (intrinsic-nature definition) of attributeless Brahman (Nirviśeṣa-brahman) that is desired to be known. Therefore, the definition of Brahman is indeed possible and the nature of Brahman can certainly be ascertained. Hence, there is no impediment in commencing the study and the inquiry of the Śāstra as it does help the seeker ascertain the nature of Brahman as being identical with the inner Self

[1] For a discussion on the term 'adhikaraṇa', refer to Jijñāsādhikaraṇa, Section 1 D.

(pratyagabhinna-brahman) which in turn becomes the means for Liberation.

(5) Saṅgati or Connectedness: The present topic is well-connected with the previous topic on jijñāsā (desire to know) by 'ākṣepa-saṅgati'. The other saṅgatis, like śāstra-, adhyāya- and pāda-saṅgatis follow of their own accord.[2]

[2] For a discussion on these various saṅgatis refer to Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Section 1 D, n.2.

Janmādyadhikaraṇasāra – Essence of Janmādyadhikaraṇa

The following two verses of the *Vaiyāsika-nyāyamālā* (13 & 14) present in a nutshell the philosophical issues discussed in the Janmādyadhikaraṇa:

लक्षणं ब्रह्मणो नास्ति किं वाऽस्ति नहि विद्यते।
जन्मादेरन्यनिष्ठत्वात् सत्यादेश्चाप्रसिद्धितः॥
ब्रह्मनिष्ठं कारणत्वं स्याल्लक्ष्म स्रग्भुजङ्गवत्।
लौकिकान्येव सत्यादीन्यखण्डं लक्षयन्ति हि॥

lakṣaṇaṁ brahmaṇo nāsti kiṁ vā'sti nahi vidyate,
janmāderanyaniṣṭhatvāt satyādeścāprasiddhitaḥ.
brahmaniṣṭhaṁ kāraṇatvaṁ syāllakṣma sragbhujaṅgavat,
laukikānyeva satyādīnyakhaṇḍaṁ lakṣayanti hi.

A brief exposition of these two verses would be a great help in comprehending the topics discussed in the Bhāṣya of the Ācārya.

The Pūrvapakṣin claims that there is no definition of Brahman in the Scripture. He further queries: Can there ever be a definition of Brahman? The Pūrvapakṣin also opines that there cannot be any defining characteristic of Brahman in the form of birth etc. (janmādi) of the world as these do not inhere in the Nirviśeṣa-brahman (attributeless Brahman) that is sought to be defined for indeed the property or attribute of one cannot become the defining characteristic of another. Here, birth etc. (janmādi) indeed belong to the world and therefore how can they ever become the defining attribute of Brahman? The impossibility of a definition of Brahman is all the more so since the import of terms 'satyam' (Truth), 'jñānam' (Knowledge) and 'anantam' (Infinity) are not well-known (prasiddha) in the world and consequently these unknown concepts cannot be used to define Brahman.[1] Thus far is the position of the Pūrvapakṣin.

The Siddhāntin dismisses the tenability of Pūrvapakṣin's objection and explains that even though the birth etc. (janmādi) of the world do not inhere in Brahman, yet their causality can be attributed to Brahman. In this way, birth etc. (janmādi) can be effectively used to indicate Brahman.

[1] It is the nature of a definition to indicate the unknown in terms of the known alone.

Moreover, even an illusory superimposed object (adhyasta) can become a defining property (lakṣaṇa) of the substratum (adhiṣṭhāna). To explain with an illustration: In the case of garland–snake illusion – wherein one mistakes a garland for a snake – the snake does serve as the identifying mark (lakṣaṇa or lakṣma) of the garland, the substrate.[2] Likewise, the birth etc. of world can be made to play the role of a defining characteristic of Brahman. Further, the words Truth (satyam), Knowledge (jñānam) and Infinity (anantam) that are known in the world do indicate the impartite Brahman, albeit indirectly, through lakṣaṇā-vṛtti.[3]

[2] The garland can certainly be defined as that which is the substrate of the snake. Thus the illusory snake becomes the identifying mark (lakṣaṇa) for the substrate garland.

[3] The function of the word signifying a referent that is different from its primary signification (mukhyārtha) on account of some incompatibility (mānāntaravirodha) but related to its primary signification (mukhyārtha) is termed 'lakṣaṇā-vṛtti'. Vide *"mānāntaravirodhe tu mukhyārthasya parigrahe, mukhyārthenāvinābhūte pratītirlakṣaṇocyate."* (*Vākyavṛtti*, 47)

॥ इति जन्माद्यधिकरणं समाप्तम् ॥

iti janmādyadhikaraṇaṁ samāptam

Thus Concludes the Topical Section:
Conglomerate Beginning with Birth.

॥ शास्त्रयोनित्वाधिकरणम् ॥

Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇam

Topical Section:
Scripture Being the Sourced/Source

॥ प्रथमवर्णकम् ॥

Prathamavarṇakam

First Explanation:
Scripture Being the Sourced

Section 1

[अवतरणिकाभाष्यम्]

जगत्कारणत्वप्रदर्शनेन सर्वज्ञं ब्रह्म इति उपक्षिप्तम्[1]। तदेव द्रढयन् आह—

1 A

[AVATARAṆIKĀBHĀṢYAM]

jagatkāraṇatvapradarśanena sarvajñaṁ brahma iti upakṣiptam. tadeva draḍhayan āha—

1 B

जगत्कारणत्वप्रदर्शनेन *jagatkāraṇatvapradarśanena* – through the exposition of causality pertaining to the world; सर्वज्ञम् *sarvajñam* – omniscient; ब्रह्म *brahma* – Brahman; इति *iti* – thus; उपक्षिप्तम् *upakṣiptam* – has been indicated; तद् एव *tad eva* – that itself; द्रढयन् *draḍhayan* – strengthening; आह *āha* – says

1 C

[PREFATORIAL COMMENTARY]

The fact that Brahman is omniscient has been indicated through the exposition of Its causality pertaining to the world. Strengthening that very point, the Sūtrakāra says—

1 D

The first Sūtra, *"athāto brahmajijñāsā* – Then, therefore, the desire to know Brahman," introduces the desire to know (jijñāsā) the 'Nirviśeṣa-pratyagabhinna-brahma', that is the attributeless Brahman identical with the inner Self.

The second Sūtra, *"janmādyasya yataḥ* – Brahman is that whence that which begins with the birth of this world ensues," offers a twofold definition of Brahman: (1) The first definition of Brahman offered is that of Brahman being the efficient-cum-material cause (abhinna-nimittopādāna-kāraṇa) of the world. This is the svarūpa-lakṣaṇa (intrinsic nature definition)

[1] उपक्षिप्तम् अर्थात् प्रतिज्ञातम्।

of 'Saviśeṣa-brahman,' that is Īśvara, the Brahman with attributes. This definition that states that Brahman is the cause of the world (jagat-kāraṇa) also becomes the 'taṭastha-lakṣaṇa' (definition *per accidens*) of the 'Nirviśeṣa-brahman', that is the Brahman devoid of attributes. (2) The second definition offered by the Janmādi-sūtra is the svarūpa-lakṣaṇa of the attributeless Brahman (Nirviśeṣa-brahman) as *"ānandaṁ brahma"* and *"satyaṁ jñānamanantaṁ brahma."*

In this way, by offering two definitions on Brahman that are not mutually compatible in a single Sūtra, the Sūtrakāra emphasises an important point pertaining to the Vedāntic methodology. As the attributeless Brahman, the pure Consciousness (caitanya-svarūpamātra) that is indicated in the above-mentioned second definition, is made the object (viṣaya) or definiendum (lakṣya) of the first definition that defines Brahman as the source of the world (jagat-kāraṇa), it becomes indicative of the Vedāntic methodology of deliberate superimposition and subsequent negation (adhyāropāpavāda-prakriyā). To explain: The efficient-cum-material causality (abhinna-nimittopādānatva) with regard to the world, is first deliberately attributed to Brahman (adhyāropa) and the same is subsequently negated (apavāda) thus enabling the seeker to realise the attributeless Brahman (Nirviśeṣa-brahman).

The above-mentioned fact of the application of the adhyāropāpavāda methodology in the Janmādi-sūtra will also answer the following question that may rise in the student's mind: If the first Sūtra establishes the context as being that of Brahman with no attributes (nirviśeṣa-brahma-prakaraṇa) – as this alone is the jijñāsya (desired to be known) – what is the necessity for the Sūtrakāra in the second Janmādi-sūtra to offer first a definition of Brahman with attributes (Saviśeṣa-brahman)?

The answer is this: The seeker, when he commences his Vedāntic inquiry, being firmly rooted in the empirical standpoint (vyāvahārika-dṛṣṭi), the

Scripture and the Guru have to point out to him that the cause of the world (jagatkāraṇa) is Brahman thereby lifting his mind from the world of objects to Brahman. It is the Nirviśeṣa-brahman (attributeless Brahman) that the Upaniṣads ultimately seek to lead the seeker to and it is for this purpose alone that the Scripture deliberately superimposes the world and its causality (jagat-kāraṇatva) on the Nirviśeṣa-brahman. But, this deliberate superimposition on the Nirviśeṣa-brahman is only done to reveal the Nirviśeṣa-brahman. In the illustration of rope–snake illusion, the rope is indicated as the substratum (cause) of the snake only to lift the deluded person's mind from the frightening snake to the harmless rope. And, upon the realisation of the rope, the observer himself avers: *"yaḥ sarpaḥ sa iyaṁ rajjuḥ* – That which I had imagined to be a snake is this rope itself."

In just the same manner, the Janmādi-sūtra intends to convey the fact that the Brahman with attributes (Saviśeṣa-brahman), that is Īśvara, is the cause of the world. But, only initially. Later, it is shown that this Saviśeṣa-brahman is itself the Nirviśeṣa-brahman thereby revealing to the aspirant the Nirviśeṣa-brahman, that is the Brahman without attributes. Thus, by deliberately superimposing the property of jagat-kāraṇatva (causality of the world) on the Nirviśeṣa-brahman and thereafter denying both the world (jagat) and the consequent causality of the world (jagat-kāraṇatva) which were deliberately superimposed on Brahman, the true nature of Brahman as being one and non-dual (ekam advitīyam) is revealed by Vedānta.

It will be clear from the above discussion that this deliberate superimposition of jagat-kāraṇatva (causality of the world) on Brahman is for the purpose of the Vedāntic instruction (upadeśa) alone. It is by this process of adhyāropa (deliberate superimposition) and apavāda (subsequent negation) that the falsity of the world is established and the pure Nirviśeṣa-brahman, the non-dual Principle, is revealed.[2] If not for this method of

[2] Cf. अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासेति जिज्ञास्यतया प्रतिज्ञातं निर्विशेषं ब्रह्म जन्माद्यस्य यतः इति सूत्रेण जगत्कारणद्वारोपक्षिप्तम्। जगत्कारणं हि ब्रह्मोपाधिभूतमायाया विलये चैतन्यस्वरूपमात्रं तदैव भविष्यति, यदि सर्वज्ञं तत्। उपाधितः सर्वज्ञानाश्रयत्वं, स्वरूपतस्तु चैतन्यमात्रमिति। यद्यपि निर्विशेषब्रह्मविचारे न सविशेषसर्वज्ञत्वस्पष्टीकरणं साक्षादुपयुक्तं, तथाऽपि पूर्वोक्त-प्रकारेणाध्यारोपापवादाभ्यां वस्तुतत्त्वनिर्णये तदुपयुक्तमेवेति भावः। – प्रदीप

deliberate superimposition and subsequent negation (adhyāropāpavāda-prakriyā) the student will find it difficult to arrive at the non-dual Nirviśeṣa-brahman.[3] The adhyāropāpavāda-prakriyā is the methodology adopted by Vedānta to gradually guide the seeker from the known world to the unknown pure Nirviśeṣa-brahman.

Thus, though the context is that of the attributeless Brahman (nirviśeṣa-brahma), there is the necessity for first defining Brahman as the cause of the world, in a saviśeṣa manner, and then later to deny that very causality of the world in the attributeless Brahman (Nirviśeṣa-brahman).[4]

As discussed earlier in the Janmādi-sūtra, "*janmādyasya yataḥ*," the definition of the Brahman with attributes (saviśeṣa-brahma) boils down to this: "Brahman is the efficient-cum-material cause of the world." Thus, Brahman is described in the Janmādi-sūtra as the creator of the world. When an entity – such as a potter – is presented as the creator of a product – like a pot – it is indirectly established that the creator has the knowledge of that which he has created. By this analogy, the definition of Brahman as the Creator of the entire world should itself suggest indirectly an inference that establishes the attribute of omniscience (sarvajñatva) in Brahman for the very reason that Brahman has created all (sarva).[5]

The Ācārya avers that this fact of the omniscience of Brahman indicated in the Janmādi-sūtra is further strengthened and thus confirmed by the

[3] This teaching methodology of Advaita-vedānta is delineated in this traditional verse: "*adhyāropāpavādābhyāṁ niṣprapañcaṁ prapañcyate, śiṣyāṇāṁ bodhasiddhyarthaṁ tattvajñaiḥ kalpitaḥ kramaḥ* – It is by the methodology of deliberate superimposition and the subsequent negation that Brahman, which is inherently free of the world, is expounded. This methodology has been evolved by the knowers of the Truth in order that the disciples may also comprehend the Knowledge of the Reality." We observe this technique of adhyāropa-apavāda aptly demonstrated in the Upaniṣads too when they describe the Self as (*Bṛ.U.*3.9.26) "*sa eṣa neti neti ātmā* – This Self is that which has been described as 'not this' (gross), 'not this' (subtle)."

[4] It may be noted that the very term 'nirviśeṣa' itself signifies an entity in which the viśeṣa or attribute – obviously superimposed – is denied.

[5] The intended anumāna-prayoga (syllogism) is: brahma sarvajñaṁ, sarvakartṛtvād, yo yatkartā, sa tajjñaḥ, yathā ghaṭakartā kulālaḥ ghaṭajñaḥ.

Śāstrayonitva-sūtra, *"śāstrayonitvāt,"* which presents a syllogism that Brahman is omniscient because It has authored the all-knowing Scripture.[6]

In contrast, *Pradīpa* imparts distinct nuances to the Janmādi- and Śāstrayonitva-sūtras. The author opines that only Brahman's knowledge of the material cause (upādāna-kāraṇa) is conveyed by the Janmādi-sūtra and the act of strengthening (dṛḍhī-karaṇa) consists in signifying Brahman's knowledge of entities that are yet to come into existence[7] which fact is established by the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra. Brahman is described in this aphorism as the source of the Śāstra that is omniscient. Since the Śāstra is described as being omniscient, it is understood that it is also the knower of entities that are yet to come into existence.[8] And Brahman being the 'yoni' or kāraṇa (creator) of such a Śāstra, it is evident that Brahman possesses the knowledge also of entities that are yet to come into being.

We shall see in detail, in the sequel, as to how the Bhāṣyakāra develops and establishes the inference presented by the Sūtrakāra in the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra.

ॐ

[6] Cf. वृत्तानुवादेन सङ्गतिं वदन् उत्तरसूत्रमवतारयति—जगदिति। चेतनस्य ब्रह्मणो जगत्कारणत्वोक्त्या सर्वज्ञत्वमर्थात् प्रतिज्ञातं सूत्रकृता, चेतनसृष्टेर्ज्ञानपूर्वकत्वात्। तथा च ब्रह्म सर्वज्ञं, सर्वकारणत्वाद्, यो यत्कर्ता स तज्ज्ञः, यथा कुलाल इति स्थितं, तदेवार्थिकं सर्वज्ञत्वं प्रधानादिनिरासाय वेदकर्तृत्वहेतुना द्रढयन् आहेत्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. सूत्रान्तरमवतारयितुं पूर्वसूत्रसङ्गतिमाह—जगत्कारणत्वप्रदर्शनेन इति। न केवलं जगद्योनित्वादस्य भगवतः सर्वज्ञता, शास्त्रयोनित्वादपि बोद्धव्या। – भामती

Also, cf. न केवलं जगत्कर्तृत्वाद् ब्रह्मणः सर्वज्ञत्वं, किन्तु शास्त्रयोनित्वादपीति द्रढीक्रियते सर्वज्ञत्वं युक्त्यन्तरेणेत्यर्थः। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

[7] Cf. द्रढयन् द्रढीकुर्वन्। जगत्कारणत्वेन केवलं तत्तदुपादानगोचरज्ञानवत्त्वमात्रं बोधितं भवति भाविपदार्थगोचरं तु ज्ञानं न साधितं स्यादिति शास्त्रयोनित्वसूत्रेण तस्यापि साधनाद् द्रढीकरणमिति भावः। – प्रदीप

[8] Cf. चोदना हि भूतं, भवन्तं, भविष्यन्तं, सूक्ष्मं विप्रकृष्टम्, इत्येवञ्जातीयकमर्थं शक्नोति अवगमयितुम्। – शाबरभाष्य (१.१.२)

2

[सूत्रम्]

शास्त्रयोनित्वात्। (१.१.३)

2 A

[SŪTRAM]

śāstrayonitvāt. (1.1.3)

2 B

शास्त्रयोनित्वात् *śāstrayonitvāt* – Because of Its being the source of the Scripture. (And) because of the Scripture being the means for the Knowledge of Brahman

2 C

[APHORISM]

From Its being the source of the Scripture. (And) because the Scripture is the means for the Knowledge of Brahman.

2 D

The present adhikaraṇa (topical section), termed Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa, consists of a single aphorism. This aphorism again consists of one single compound word 'śāstrayonitvāt'. This word may be taken either as a Tatpuruṣa compound or as a Bahuvrīhi compound.[1]

Accordingly, the term 'śāstrayonitvāt' can be dissolved in two alternate ways: (1) When taken to be a Tatpuruṣa compound, its string (vigraha) is: *śāstrasya yoniḥ śāstrayoniḥ, tasya bhāvaḥ śāstrayonitvaṁ, tasmāt, śāstrayonitvāt.* The meaning then is: Because of Brahman being the source of the Scripture. (2) When viewed as Bahuvrīhi compound, the string (vigraha) would then be: *śāstraṁ yoniḥ, kāraṇaṁ, pramāṇaṁ yasya saḥ śāstrayoniḥ, tasya bhāvaḥ*

[1] For a detailed explanation of these grammatical terms refer to Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Section 3 D, n.1.

śāstrayonitvaṁ, tasmāt śāstrayonitvāt. The meaning here is: Because the Scripture is the means for the knowledge of Brahman.

Taking into account this salient fact of the Sūtra yielding two valid meanings, the Ācārya elucidates the aphorism too in both these ways and points out the deeper and inner significances of each of these expositions.

The objection as to how a single Sūtra can have such varied meanings does not hold water. Indeed, the term 'Sūtra' itself is defined as that which consists of minimal words (svalpākṣara), enshrines in itself the essence of the entire subject (sāravat), is free of ambiguity (asandigdha), bereft of unnecessary words (astobha) and erroneous terms (anavadya) and which gives scope to multiple valid meanings (viśvatomukha). Hence, having more than one valid meaning only adds to the beauty of this Sūtra.[2]

ॐ

[2] Cf. कथं पुनरेकस्य सूत्रस्यार्थद्वयम्। सूत्रत्वादेव। तथा च पौराणिकाः—अल्पाक्षरमसन्दिग्धं सारवद्विश्वतोमुखम्। अस्तोभमनवद्यं च सूत्रं सूत्रविदो विदुः॥ इति। विश्वतोमुखमिति नानार्थतामाह। अतोऽलङ्कार एव सूत्राणां यदनेकार्थता नाम। – पञ्चपादिका

3

[प्रथमवर्णकभाष्यम्]

महतः ऋग्वेदादेः शास्त्रस्य[1] अनेकविद्यास्थानोपबृंहितस्य प्रदीपवत्[2] सर्वार्थावद्योतिनः सर्वज्ञकल्पस्य योनिः कारणं ब्रह्म।

3 A

[PRATHAMAVARṆAKABHĀṢYAM]

mahataḥ ṛgvedādeḥ śāstrasya anekavidyāsthānopabṛṁhitasya pradīpavat sarvārthāvadyotinaḥ sarvajñakalpasya yoniḥ kāraṇaṁ brahma.

3 B

महतः *mahataḥ* – of the great; ऋग्वेदादेः *ṛgvedādeḥ* – comprising the *Ṛg-veda* etc.; शास्त्रस्य *śāstrasya* – of the Scripture; अनेकविद्यास्थानोपबृंहितस्य *anekavidyāsthānopabṛṁhitasya* – supplemented by innumerable branches of knowledge; प्रदीपवत् *pradīpavat* – like an effulgent lamp; सर्वार्थावद्योतिनः *sarvārthāvadyotinaḥ* – which illumines all things; सर्वज्ञकल्पस्य *sarvajñakalpasya* – which is omniscient as it were; योनिः *yoniḥ* – source; कारणम् *kāraṇam* – cause; ब्रह्म *brahma* – Brahman

3 C

[THE COMMENTARY ELUCIDATING THE FIRST EXPLANATION][1]

Brahman is the source, that is the cause,[2] of the great body of the Scripture comprising the *Ṛg-veda* etc.[3] supplemented by innumerable branches of knowledge,[4] which, like an effulgent lamp, illumines all things[5] and which is omniscient as it were.[6]

3 D

1. The commentary elucidating the first explanation: The Ācārya presently

[1] हितशासनत्वात् शास्त्रम्। शास्त्रशब्दः शब्दमात्रोपलक्षणार्थः इति मत्त्वा आह। – रत्नप्रभा
शिष्याणां शासनात् शास्त्रम्। – भामती

[2] प्रकृष्टो दीपः प्रदीपः।

takes the Sūtra, *"śāstrayonitvāt,"* as a Tatpuruṣa compound and offers the first explanation of the Sūtra.[3]

2. Brahman is the source, that is the cause: Brahman, being the material (upādāna-kāraṇa) and efficient cause (nimitta-kāraṇa) of *Ṛg-veda* etc.,[4] is omniscient in the real sense of the term. This fact, the Bhāṣyakāra explains and proves in the sequel.

3. of the great body of the Scripture comprising the *Ṛg-veda* etc.: Not only does Brahman's causality of this gigantically varied universe, as described in the Janmādi-sūtra, prove Its omniscience, but Brahman's authorship of the great corpus of sacred literature, the Scripture, comprising the *Ṛg-veda* etc., also strengthens the fact of Brahman's omniscience. The greatness (mahattva) of the Scriptures such as the *Ṛg-veda* lies in their teaching the pupils (śiṣya) the Great Truth, Brahman, along with the ways of performing all obligatory duties (nitya-karma), occasion-prompted duties (naimittika-karma) and desire-prompted sacrificial rites (kāmya-karma) that are prescribed for all the four castes (cāturvarṇya) and all the four states of life (cāturāśramya) from impregnation (niṣeka) to obsequies (śmaśāna) and all the other activities one performs from dawn to dusk. It is the vastness of these topical contents (mahāviṣayatva) which imparts greatness to the corpus of the Scripture such as *Ṛg-veda*.[5]

This greatness can also be conceived in terms of the volume of the Scripture (granthataḥ), their purport (arthataḥ) as well as the extent of elaborate expositional texts consisting of the Purāṇas, Nyāya (Logic), Mīmāṁsā (Hermeneutical Principles), Dharma-śāstra (Codes of Conduct), Śikṣā (Phonetics), Kalpa (Rules of Sacrificial Performance), Vyākaraṇa (Grammar), Nirukta (Etymology), Chandas (Prosody) and Jyotiṣa (Astrology) which throw ample light on the intricacies of the corpus of the Scripture comprising *Ṛg-veda* etc.[6]

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[3] Refer to Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa, Section 2, for the two possible explanations (varṇaka) of the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra.

[4] Cf. योनिः उपादानं कर्तृ च। – रत्नप्रभा

[5] Cf. चातुर्वर्ण्यस्य चातुराश्रम्यस्य च यथायथं निषेकादिश्मशानान्तासु ब्राह्ममुहूर्तोपकमप्रदोषपरिसमापनीयासु नित्यनैमित्तिककाम्यकर्मपद्धतिषु च ब्रह्मतत्त्वे च शिष्याणां शासनात् शास्त्रमृग्वेदादिः अत एव महाविषयत्वाद् महत्। – भामती

[6] Cf. तत्र ग्रन्थतोऽर्थतश्च महत्त्वं, हितशासनात् शास्त्रत्वम्। शास्त्रशब्दः शब्दमात्रोपलक्षणार्थ इति मत्वा आह—अनेकेति।

4. supplemented by innumerable branches of knowledge: The *Yājñavalkya-smṛti* (1.3) enumerates the fourteen branches of knowledge:[7] (1) Purāṇa, (2) Nyāya, (3) Mīmāṁsā, (4) Dharma-śāstra, (5-8) Four Vedas (*Ṛg-, Yajur-, Sāma-* and *Atharva-veda*) and (9-14) Six Vedāṅgas (subsidiaries of the Vedas).[8] The *Brahmapurāṇa* adds to this list (15) Vedānta (Philosophy), and (16) Daṇḍa-vidyā (Political Science)[9] while the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* further adds (17) Āyur-veda (Science of Medicine), (18) Dhanur-veda (Science of Weapons) and (19) Gāndharva (Musicology) to this list.[10] The Ācārya refers to these branches of knowledge (vidyāsthāna) in the expression 'anekavidyāsthāna-upabṛṁhitasya'.[11]

5. which, like an effulgent lamp, illumines all things: The expression *"pradīpavat sarvārthāvadyotinaḥ"* means that the corpus comprising *Ṛg-veda* etc. illumines all things like an effulgent lamp leaving nothing that can lead to incomprehension (anavabodha) and confusion (aspaṣṭabodha). In other

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पुराणन्यायमीमांसाधर्मशास्त्राणि शिक्षाकल्पव्याकरणनिरुक्तच्छन्दोज्योतिषाणि षडङ्गानि इति दश विद्यास्थानानि वेदार्थज्ञानहेतवः, तैरुपकृतस्य इत्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. महत इति ग्रन्थतोऽर्थतश्च महत्त्वं विवक्षितं निरतिशयसार्वज्ञ्योपपादनाय। ग्रन्थतो महत्त्वविवरणम्—ऋग्वेदादेरिति। अर्थतो महत्त्वं विवृणोति—अनेकेति।– ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

[7] पुराणन्यायमीमांसाधर्मशास्त्राङ्गमिश्रिताः। वेदाः स्थानानि विद्यानां धर्मस्य च चतुर्दश॥ – याज्ञवल्क्यस्मृति (१.३)

पुराणं ब्रह्मादि। न्यायः सतर्कः। मीमांसा वेदवाक्यविचारः। धर्मशास्त्रं मन्वादिस्मृतिः। अङ्गैः षड्भिर्व्याकरणादिभिः सहिताश्चत्वारो वेदा ऋग्वेदादयः। एतानि चतुर्दश ज्ञानानां निमित्तानि, धर्मस्य च ज्ञानद्वारेण। – अपरार्कभाष्य, याज्ञवल्क्यस्मृति (१.३)

[8] The six Vedāṅgas are: (1) Śikṣā (Phonetics – the science of articulation and pronunciation), (2) Vyākaraṇa (Grammar), (3) Chandas (Prosody), (4) Nirukta (Etymology), (5) Jyotiṣa (Astrology) and (6) Kalpa (Science of Ritual). Vide *"śikṣā vyākaraṇaṁ chando niruktaṁ jyotiṣaṁ tathā, kalpaśceti ṣaḍaṅgāni vedasyāhurmanīṣiṇaḥ."*

[9] एवं चतुर्दशैतानि विद्यास्थानानि सन्त्यथ। वेदान्तः पञ्चदशकं विद्या षोडशिका भवेत्॥ – ब्रह्मपुराण

यद्वेदान्तविद्ययोर्ग्रहणं तन्मोक्षसाधनविद्यास्थानाभिप्रायम्...। वेदान्तः शारीरकम्। विद्या बृहदारण्यकादिरहस्यम्। – अपरार्कभाष्य, याज्ञवल्क्यस्मृति (१.३)

[10] अङ्गानि वेदाश्चत्वारो मीमांसा न्यायविस्तरः। पुराणं धर्मशास्त्रं च विद्या एताश्चतुर्दश॥ आयुर्वेदो धनुर्वेदो गान्धर्वश्चेति ते त्रयः। अर्थशास्त्रं चतुर्थं च विद्या अष्टादशैव ताः॥ – विष्णुपुराण

[11] Cf. अर्थतो महत्त्वं विवृणोति—अनेकेति। पुराणन्यायमीमांसाधर्मशास्त्राङ्गमिश्रिताः। वेदाः स्थानानि विद्यानां धर्मस्य च चतुर्दश इत्येवमनेकेत्यर्थः। शिक्षा कल्पो व्याकरणं निरुक्तं छन्दो ज्योतिषमिति षडङ्गानि। उपबृंहणीयाश्चत्वारो वेदाः। तत्र पुराणानि, सृष्ट्यादिप्रतिपादकवाक्यानि परकृतिपुराकल्परूपानार्थवादांश्च प्राधान्येनोपबृंहयन्ति। प्रसङ्गाद्द्वैतभागं कर्मभागं चोपबृंहयन्ति। न्यायशास्त्रं तु प्रमाणप्रमेयलक्षणनिरूपणेन पदार्थान् विविच्य ज्ञापयदुपबृंहयति। पूर्वोत्तरमीमांसे तु तात्पर्यनिर्णयद्वारा उपयुक्ते। धर्मशास्त्रं तु श्रुतमनुमितं वा विधिभागं उपबृंहयति। शिक्षा तु स्थानकरणादिनिरूपणपरा स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्य इतिविध्यर्थमुपबृंहयति। कल्पस्तु प्रयोगनिरूपणार्थं उपयुक्तः। व्याकरणं तु अस्मिन्नर्थे इदं पदं साधीति पदार्थान् व्याकरोति। निरुक्तं तु तेषु तेषु पदेषु यौगिकमर्थं प्रतिपादयति। छन्दश्शास्त्रं तु वेदगतान् गायत्र्यादिशब्दान् लक्षणमुखेन विशदयति। ज्योतिषं तु पौर्णमास्यां पौर्णमास्यां यजेत अमावास्यायाममावास्यया यजेत इत्यादिनोपात्तं कालविशेषं व्यवस्थापयति। तथा च तत्तदेकदेशव्याख्यानाय बहवो महर्षयः पुराणादिनिबन्धनप्रणेतारो यत्र प्रवृत्ताः तस्य महार्थत्वं व्यक्तमेवेति भावः। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

words a good comprehension of the Scripture comprising *Ṛg-veda* etc. equips one with commendable clarity about all that is worth knowing.[12]

6. and which is omniscient as it were: The word 'sarvajñakalpa' consists of two parts: the substantive 'sarvajña' (omniscient), and the affix 'kalpa' meaning 'slightly less' or 'almost complete' (*"īṣadasamāptau"*).[13] In the Bhāṣya passage under consideration, this word is added as an adjective to the Scripture. Just as the knowledge of Īśvara extends to all things so, too, the subject matter taught by the Śāstra extends to all things.[14] There is no subject or field of knowledge that is not touched by the Ṛg-vedādi-śāstras which are supplemented by the various Vidyāsthānas. Yet, because the Scripture lacks sentience, it falls a little short of perfection, so to say, in the matter of omniscience.[15]

Pradīpa interprets the term 'sarvajñakalpa' in the following manner: Brahman being the indwelling Consciousness (antaryāmin) and all-pervasive Existence, It knows the entities that are at present, also those that are yet to come into existence directly like a cowrie that is placed within one's palm. But the Veda, being essentially insentient, cannot know these entities in the manner Brahman knows. As such, the omniscience of the Veda thus falls a little short of being perfect.[16]

ॐ

[12] Cf. सर्वमर्थजातं सर्वथावबोधयन् नानवबोधको नाप्यस्पष्टबोधक इत्यर्थः। – भामती

Also, cf. प्रदीपवदिति। अनेन स्पष्टज्ञानजनकत्वं विवक्षितम्। तथा च न सन्देहाज्ञानविपर्यासजनकतया वेदस्याप्रामाण्यमिति। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

[13] This word is derived according to the Pāṇini grammar rule (5.3.67): *"īṣadasamāptau kalpabdeśyadeśīyarah."*

[14] Cf. सर्वमर्थजातं सर्वथावबोधयन् नानवबोधको नाप्यस्पष्टबोधक इत्यर्थः। अत एव सर्वज्ञकल्पस्य सर्वज्ञसदृशस्य। सर्वज्ञस्य हि ज्ञानं सर्वविषयं शास्त्रस्याप्यभिधानं सर्वविषयमिति सादृश्यम्। – भामती

[15] Cf. सर्वार्थप्रकाशनशक्तिमत्त्वेऽपि अचेतनत्वात् सर्वज्ञकल्पत्वम्। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. कल्पप्रत्ययप्रयोगो भाष्ये बोद्धृत्वाभावादीषदपरिसमाप्त्या। – पञ्चपादिका

Also, cf. तत्सदृशस्येति यावत्। सादृश्यं च सर्वज्ञज्ञानस्य सर्वविषयत्ववदुक्तेरपि शास्त्रीयायास्तथात्वम्। कल्पप्रत्ययोऽचेतनत्वात्। – न्यायनिर्णय

[16] Cf. सर्वज्ञकल्पस्य वेदेषु पुराणादिषु च विद्यास्थानेष्वनुक्तमिदानीन्तनं भावि च हस्तगतवराटिकमेव किञ्चिद् वेदेन न बोध्यत इति किञ्चिदूनं सर्वज्ञत्वं वेदस्येति भावः। – प्रदीप

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[वर्णकसिद्धार्थविवरणभाष्यम्]

न हि ईदृशस्य शास्त्रस्य ऋग्वेदादिलक्षणस्य सर्वज्ञगुणान्वितस्य सर्वज्ञाद् अन्यतः सम्भवः अस्ति। यद्यद्विस्तरार्थं[1] शास्त्रं यस्मात् पुरुषविशेषात् सम्भवति, यथा व्याकरणादि पाणिन्यादेः ज्ञेयैकदेशार्थमपि, स ततोऽपि अधिकतरविज्ञान इति[2] प्रसिद्धं लोके। किमु वक्तव्यम् [१]अनेकशाखाभेदभिन्नस्य, देवतिर्यङ्मनुष्यवर्णाश्रमादिप्रविभाग-हेतोः ऋग्वेदाद्याख्यस्य, [२]सर्वज्ञानाकरस्य [३]अयत्नेनैव लीलान्यायेन पुरुषनिःश्वासवद् यस्माद् महतो भूताद् योनेः सम्भवः – "अस्य महतो भूतस्य निःश्वसितमेतद् [४]यदृग्वेदः (बृ.उ.४.५.११)" इत्यादिश्रुतेः तस्य महतो भूतस्य[3] [५]निरतिशयं सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वशक्तिमत्त्वं च इति[4]।

4 A

[VARṆAKASIDDHĀRTHAVIVARAṆABHĀṢYAM]

na hi īdṛśasya śāstrasya ṛgvedādilakṣaṇasya sarvajñaguṇānvitasya sarvajñād anyataḥ sambhavaḥ asti. yadyadvistarārtham śāstram yasmāt puruṣaviśeṣāt sambhavati, yathā vyākaraṇādi pāṇinyādeḥ jñeyaikadeśārthamapi, sa tato'pi adhikataravijñāna iti prasiddham loke. kimu vaktavyam anekaśākhābheda-bhinnasya, devatiryaṅmanuṣya varṇāśramādipravibhāgahetoḥ ṛgvedādyākhyasya, sarvajñānākarasya ayatnenaiva līlānyāyena puruṣaniḥśvāsavad yasmād mahato

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[१] AA (fn.) अनेक...भिन्नस्य तस्य देव...हेतोः

[२] *Vārtika*, AA (fn.) -ज्ञानाकारस्य

[३] रत्नप्रभाभिमतः पाठः – अप्रत्यत्नेनैव

[४] Tel यदृग्वेदो यजुर्वेदः सामवेद इत्यादिश्रुतेः

[५] AA (fn.) निरतिशयसर्वज्ञत्वम्

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[1] विस्तरः शब्दाधिक्यम्। – रत्नप्रभा

[2] यद्यद्विस्तरार्थं शास्त्रं यस्मात् पुरुषविशेषात् सम्भवति स पुरुषविशेषः ततोऽपि शास्त्राद् अधिकतरविज्ञानः इति योजना। – भामती

[3] किमु वक्तव्यं तस्य महतो भूतस्य इति सम्बन्धः।

[4] वेदस्य यस्माद् महतो भूताद् योनेः सम्भवः, तस्य महतो भूतस्य ब्रह्मणो निरतिशयं सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वशक्तित्वं च किमु वक्तव्यमिति योजना। – भामती

अत्रैषा योजना–यद्यत् शास्त्रं यस्माद् आप्तात् सम्भवति स ततः शास्त्रादधिकार्थज्ञान इति प्रसिद्धं, यथा शब्दसाधुत्वादिः ज्ञेयैकदेशोऽर्थो यस्य तदपि व्याकरणादि पाणिन्यादेरधिकार्थज्ञात् सम्भवति। यद्यल्पार्थमपि शास्त्रमधिकार्थज्ञात् सम्भवति तदा अस्य महतः इत्या दिश्रुतेर्यस्मान्महतोऽपरिच्छिन्नाद् भूतात् सत्याद् योनेः सकाशाद् अनेकशाखेत्यादिविशिष्टस्य वेदस्य पुरुषनिश्वासवद् अप्रयत्नेनैव सम्भवः, तस्य सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वशक्तिमत्त्वं च इति किमु वक्तव्यमिति। – रत्नप्रभा

bhūtād yoneḥ sambhavaḥ – "asya mahato bhūtasya niḥśvasitametad yadṛgvedaḥ" (Bṛ.U.4.5.11) ityādiśruteḥ tasya mahato bhūtasya niratiśayaṁ sarvajñatvaṁ sarvaśaktimattvaṁ ca iti.

4 B

न *na* – not; हि *hi* – indeed; ईदृशस्य *īdṛśasya* – of such; शास्त्रस्य *śāstrasya* – of the Scripture; ऋग्वेदादिलक्षणस्य *ṛgvedādilakṣaṇasya* – of that which comprises the *Ṛg-veda* etc.; सर्वज्ञगुणान्वितस्य *sarvajñaguṇānvitasya* – of that which is endowed with the quality of omniscience; सर्वज्ञात् *sarvajñāt* – except the omniscient Being; अन्यतः *anyataḥ* – from other; सम्भवः *sambhavaḥ* – origination; अस्ति *asti* – is; यद् यत् *yad yat* – whatever; विस्तरार्थम् *vistarārtham* – with an extensive theme; शास्त्रम् *śāstram* – treatise; यस्मात् पुरुषविशेषात् *yasmāt puruṣaviśeṣāt* – from a particular person; सम्भवति *sambhavati* – originates; यथा *yathā* – for instance; व्याकरणादि *vyākaraṇādi* – the Grammar etc.; पाणिन्यादेः *pāṇinyādeḥ* – from Pāṇini etc.; ज्ञेयैकदेशार्थम् अपि *jñeyaikadeśārtham api* – even though its content is only a part of what is to be known; सः *saḥ* – that person; ततः अपि *tataḥ api* – than that; अधिकतरविज्ञानः *adhikataravijñānaḥ* – possesses much more extensive knowledge; इति *iti* – in this way; प्रसिद्धम् *prasiddham* – well-known; लोके *loke* – in the world; किम् उ वक्तव्यम् *kim u vaktavyam* – is it necessary to state; अनेकशाखाभेदभिन्नस्य *anekaśākhābhedabhinnasya* – of that which is differentiated into various branches; देवतिर्यङ्मनुष्यवर्णाश्रमादिप्रविभागहेतोः *devatiryaṅmanuṣyavarṇāśramādi-pravibhāgahetoḥ* – of that which is the cause of such distinctions as gods, animals, men, castes and stages of life; ऋग्वेदाद्याख्यस्य *ṛgvedādyākhyasya* – of that which is termed the '*Ṛg-veda*' etc.; सर्वज्ञानाकरस्य *sarvajñānākarasya* – of that which is a repository of all knowledge; अयत्नेन एव *ayatnena eva* – with no effort whatsoever; लीलान्यायेन *līlānyāyena* – in sport as it were; पुरुषनिःश्वासवत् *puruṣaniḥśvāsavat* – like the breath of a person; यस्मात् *yasmāt* – from which; महतः भूतात् *mahataḥ bhūtāt* – from great Being; योनेः *yoneḥ* – from the source; सम्भवः *sambhavaḥ* – origination; अस्य *asya* – of this; महतः भूतस्य *mahataḥ bhūtasya* – of the great Being; निःश्वसितम् *niḥśvasitam* – the breath; एतत् *etat* – this; यत् *yat* – which; ऋग्वेदः *ṛgvedaḥ* – the *Ṛg-veda*; इत्यादिश्रुतेः *ityādiśruteḥ* – from such Scriptural passages; तस्य *tasya* – of that; महतः भूतस्य *mahataḥ bhūtasya* – great

Being; निरतिशयम् *niratiśayam* – unexcelled; सर्वज्ञत्वम् *sarvajñatvam* – omniscience; सर्वशक्तिमत्त्वं च *sarvaśaktimattvaṁ ca* – and omnipotence; इति *iti* – thus

4 C

[COMMENTARY DELINEATING THE POINT ARRIVED AT IN THE EXPLANATION]

Indeed, of such Scripture, comprising the *Ṛg-veda* etc., which is endowed with the quality of omniscience, the origin can be from nothing other than an omniscient Being.[1] In the world, it is well-known that[2] whatever treatise with an extensive theme originates from a particular person, for instance the Grammar etc. that have originated from Pāṇini etc., even though its content forms only a part of what is to be known,[3] that author possesses much more extensive knowledge than what is reflected in that treatise.[4] This being the case, is it even necessary to mention about the unsurpassed omniscience and omnipotence of that great Being, the source, from whom is the origination[5] of what is called the *Ṛg-veda* etc. – which is differentiated into various individual branches, which is the cause of the knowledge about the distinctions as gods, animals, men, castes, stages of life and so on, and which is the very ocean of all knowledge – with no effort whatsoever, in sport as it were, and like the breath of a person[6] – as evidenced from the Scriptural passage (*Bṛ.U.*4.5.11) "of that great Being, this is the breath, which is the *Ṛg-veda*!"[7]

4 D

1. Indeed, of such Scripture, comprising the *Ṛg-veda* etc., which is endowed with the quality of omniscience, the origin can be from nothing other than an omniscient Being: The quality of omniscience belongs to the omniscient and cannot pertain to something other than it. Basing himself on this fact, the Pūrvapakṣin queries: It is true that the Veda is omniscient. Even so, why should its source, that is Brahman, be omniscient?

The Siddhāntin replies to this question: Brahman is both the material and efficient cause of the Veda and, as such, without Brahman, that is the cause,

being omniscient, there is no way, Its effect, the Veda, can ever be omniscient. And, since the Veda is omniscient (sarvajñakalpa), it does therefore prove that Brahman is omniscient. The syllogistic proposition to this effect has already been demonstrated in the Janmādyadhikaraṇa.[5]

In case this conclusion incurs the contingence of ignorance (i.e. māyā or avidyā) also becoming omniscient because māyā is accepted by the Advaitin as the upādāna-kāraṇa (material cause) of the world, it can be warded off by pointing out that though māyā is considered as the upādāna-kāraṇa of the entire world, which world includes even the Veda, and is thus omniscient in a way (sarvajñakalpa), it cannot be termed omniscient in the true sense of the term for māyā (avidyā or ignorance) is not sentient *per se*.[6]

The commentary *Bhāmatī* delineates thus on the present section: In the earlier section of the Bhāṣya[7] it was stated that Brahman, the author of the Veda, has to be omniscient (sarvajña) because the Veda, its creation, is omniscient as it were (sarvajñakalpa). Such concomitance of the positives is termed 'anvaya-vyāpti'. After thus comparing the similarity of the omniscient Brahman's knowledge of all entities with that of the Veda's capacity to expound all, the vyatireka-vyāpti (concomitance of negatives) is now being presented to prove the same. In substance, this passage means that in the absence of Brahman's capacity to know all, the Veda cannot have the capacity to illumine all entities. Since the Veda enlightens us on everything, the material cause (upādāna-kāraṇa) of the Veda, that is Brahman, is consequently established to be omniscient (sarvajña) in the true sense of the term.[8]

2. In the world, it is well-known that: Here, by analogy and logic, the Ācārya substantiates the above conclusion.

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[5] Vide Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Section 6: *"na yathoktaviśeṣaṇasya jagataḥ yathoktaviśeṣaṇam īśvaraṁ muktvā, anyataḥ pradhānād acetanād, aṇubhyo vā, abhāvādvā, saṁsāriṇo vā utpattyādi sambhāvayituṁ śakyam. na ca svabhāvataḥ, viśiṣṭadeśakālanimittānām iha upādānāt. etadeva anumānaṁ saṁsāri-vyatirikteśvarāstitvādisādhanaṁ manyante īśvarakāraṇavādinaḥ."*

[6] Cf. ननु सर्वज्ञस्य यो गुणः सर्वार्थज्ञानशक्तिमत्त्वं वेदस्य तदन्वितत्वेऽपि तद्योनेः सर्वज्ञत्वं कुत इत्यत आह—नहीति। उपादाने तच्छक्तिं विना कार्ये तदयोगाद् वेदोपादानस्य सर्वज्ञत्वम्। अनुमानं तु पूर्वं दर्शितम्। न च अविद्यायाः तदापत्तिः, शक्तिमत्त्वेऽपि अचेतनत्वाद् इति भावः। – रत्नप्रभा

[7] Vide Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa, Section 3.

[8] Cf. तदेवमन्वयमुक्त्वा व्यतिरेकमाह—न हीदृशस्य इति। – भामती

3. whatever treatise with an extensive theme originates from a particular person, for instance the Grammar etc. that have originated from Pāṇini etc., even though its content forms only a part of what is to be known: The *Aṣṭādhyāyī* is a treatise on Sanskrit grammar authored by the renowned Indian grammarian Pāṇini. It is the greatest work on grammar and language that has ever been produced by a human being. Yet, it cannot be denied that the content of this treatise too is only a small part of many things one has to observe, learn and practise during one's lifetime. Again, even in its limited field of Sanskrit grammar, the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* cannot be considered to have presented all the ideas of its author Pāṇini, an intellectual genius and a master of the Sanskrit language, who must have known each and every minute and intricate detail of the language.[9]

In a manner, the Ācārya establishes here an indisputable general maxim that the knowledge of the author of a given treatise is more comprehensive than what is reflected in a treatise itself that he has authored.[10]

Also, the Ācārya's citation of Pāṇini and his work *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, as an example in the present context, reveals the high esteem in which he and the Indian elite of his times held the grammarian and his treatise.[11]

4. that author possesses much more extensive knowledge than what is reflected in that treatise: The general maxim, referred to above, is established here. These authors of surpassing intelligence and excellence do experience and would be certainly aware of distinct attributes and subtle nuances of many facts, both great and small pertaining to their field of knowledge as well as the many aspects of life. Yet, they cannot give expression to all of them exhaustively in their treatises. All of us experience clearly the subtle differences in sweetness of sugarcane, milk, jaggery and so on. But even the

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[9] Cf. पाणिनिना ज्ञातुं योग्येषु बहुषु केचनैव पाणिनिना स्वीये व्याकरणे सूत्रिताः, न तु सर्वं तदीयं ज्ञातमिति भावः। – प्रदीप

[10] Cf. तथा चाधिकार्थकं यत् शास्त्रं यस्मात् पुरुषविशेषाद् भवति, स पुरुषस्ततोऽप्यधिकतरार्थज्ञानवानिति सामान्यव्याप्तिः प्रदर्शिता भवति। – प्रदीप

Also, cf. वेदः स्वविषयादधिकार्थज्ञानवज्जन्यः, प्रमाणवाक्यत्वाद्, व्याकरणरामायणादिवद् इति अनुमानान्तरम्। तत्र व्याप्तिमाह— यद्यदिति। – रत्नप्रभा

[11] The Indian tradition considers the grammarians as the foremost among scholars. Vide *"prathame hi vidvāṁso vaiyākaraṇāḥ vyākaraṇamūlatvāt sarvavidyānām."* (*Dhvanyāloka*, Uddyota 1)

most gifted author and eloquent speaker amongst us cannot exactly describe in words these differences.[12]

Basing on this maxim arrived at with the help of the analogy, a syllogism on the omniscience of Brahman can be constructed as follows: Brahman possesses knowledge which is more extensive than the knowledge contained in the great body of the *Ṛg-veda* etc., the ocean of all knowledge, since It has produced the *Ṛg-veda* etc., for the person who produces a treatise possesses more extensive knowledge than the knowledge which the treatise presents, just as Pāṇini, Vyāsa, etc. had knowledge more extensive than what is found in their respective works, that is the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, the *Mahābhārata*, etc. Therefore, being the producer of the all-knowing *Ṛg-veda* etc., Brahman has to be omniscient par excellence.[13]

5. This being the case, is it even necessary to mention about the unsurpassed omniscience and omnipotence of that great Being, the source, from whom is the origination: As described above, the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* contains Sanskrit grammar, a subject matter that constitutes only a small fraction of what one should know, learn and practise in one's lifetime. It is to be noted that the author of *Aṣṭādhyāyī* is viewed to be omniscient (sarvajña) only in a comparative way (sātiśaya). On the other hand, the large body of the Scripture, namely the *Ṛg-veda* etc., is an ocean of all knowledge (sarvajñānākara) and is sarvajñakalpa (all-knowing as it were). There is actually no field of knowledge which is not touched upon by the Ṛgvedādi-śāstra. Therefore, it goes without saying that Brahman, the author of this great body of the Śāstra, is 'sarvajña' (omniscient) in the real and the full sense of the term. Here, the Ācārya argues this point by what is known as

[12] Cf. न हि ते ते असाधारणधर्मा अनुभूयमाना अपि शक्या वक्तुम्। न खलु इक्षुक्षीरगुडादीनां मधुररसभेदा अनुभूयमानाः शक्याः सरस्वत्याप्याख्यातुम्। – भामती

[13] The intended anumāna-prayoga is thus: brahma sarvajñānākarasarvajñakalpa-ṛgvedādiśāstraviṣayāpekṣayā adhikaviṣayajñānavat; tatpraṇetṛtvāt; yo yadgranthakartā sa tadgranthaviṣayāpekṣayā adhikaviṣayajñānavān; yathā aṣṭādhyāyīpraṇetā pāṇiniḥ, mahābhārata-kartā vyāsaśca svasvagranthaviṣayāpekṣayā adhikaviṣayajñānavantau. anenānumānena sarvajñakalpaśāstrayoniḥ brahma niratiśayasarvajñamiti siddhyati. This kind of inference that is constructed with the aid of an analogy is termed 'sāmānyato dṛṣṭānumāna'. For an explanation on sāmānyato dṛṣṭānumāna refer to Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Section 14 D, n.1, fn.5.

'kaimutika-nyāya', that is 'arguing a fortiori' which is nothing but arguing with yet another stronger reason than what was presented earlier.[14]

6. of what is called the *Ṛg-veda* etc. – which is differentiated into various individual branches, which is the cause of the knowledge about the distinctions as gods, animals, men, castes, stages of life and so on, and which is the very ocean of all knowledge[15] – with no effort whatsoever, in sport as it were, and like the breath of a person: This statement signifies that the *Ṛg-veda* etc., the Scripture, originated from this great Being (Brahman) as effortlessly or with no special effort[16] just as the breath emanates from a human being.[17] The commentators of the Bhāṣya state that the wording of the Bhāṣya in this section, which mentions that the *Ṛg-veda* etc. as being the breath (niḥśvasita) of the great Being (Brahman), is based on the description found in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* which tract the Ācārya himself will presently cite.

This entire passage is construed by Vācaspati-miśra, the author of *Bhāmatī*, as an upanaya-vākya (i.e. the penultimate member of the five-membered syllogism) and the concluding statement of the section: *"tasya mahato bhūtasya niratiśayaṁ sarvajñatvaṁ sarvaśaktimattvaṁ ca"* as constituting the nigamana.[18]

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[14] Cf. अधिकतरविज्ञानः सर्वज्ञकल्प इत्यर्थः। तथा च पाणिनेरेव सर्वज्ञकल्पत्वे ब्रह्मणः षडङ्गव्याकरणाद्युपबृंहितग्वेदादिकर्तुः सर्वज्ञत्वं कैमुतिकन्यायसिद्धमित्याह—किमु वक्तव्यमिति। – प्रदीप

[15] Cf. ग्रन्थतो महत्त्वमाह—अनेकशाखेति। अर्थतो महत्त्वमाह—देवतिर्यगादीति। अत एव ज्ञानाकरस्येत्युक्तम्। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

Also, cf. पूर्वोक्तं महत्त्वमेव हेतुनिर्देशेन विवृणोति—अनेकशाखाभेदेत्यादिना। प्रदीपवत्सर्वार्थावद्योतिनः। सर्वज्ञकल्पस्येत्यस्य विवरणम्—सर्वज्ञानाकरस्येति। – प्रदीप

Also, cf. महाविषयत्वेनोक्तं महत्त्वं व्यनक्ति—देवेति। आदिशब्देन वर्णाश्रमधर्मा गृह्यन्ते। – न्यायनिर्णय

Also, cf. मुख्यलक्षणादिद्वारेण सर्वावभासनसमर्थस्य महत्त्वद्योतनायानेकशाखेत्यादिविशेषणानि तन्महत्त्वेन तत्कारणस्य निरतिशयसर्वज्ञत्वं दर्शयितुम्। – प्रकटार्थविवरण

[16] Cf. अप्रयत्नेनैव इति। ईषत्प्रयत्नेन, यथा अलवणा यवागूः इति। – भामती

[17] Cf. निःश्वसितमिव निःश्वसितम्। यथा अप्रयत्नेनैव पुरुषनिःश्वासो भवति, एवं वा अरे। – बृहदारण्यकोपनिषच्छाङ्करभाष्य (२.४.१०)

[18] The entire five-membered syllogism is as follows:

(1) Pratijñā: Brahma sarvajñam – Brahman is omniscient.

(2) Hetu: Sarvajñakalpavedakartṛtvāt – Because Brahman is the author of the omniscient Veda.

(3) Udāharaṇa: *"Yadyadvistarārthaṁ śāstraṁ yasmāt puruṣaviśeṣāt sambhavati, yathā vyākaraṇādi pāṇinyādeḥ jñeyaikadeśārthamapi, sa tato'pi adhikataravijñānaḥ."* One who authors a treatise has more extensive knowledge than that which is contained in the treatise. For example: Pāṇini, Vyāsa and so on have more extensive knowledge than that what is contained in their respective treatises *Aṣṭādhyāyī, Mahābhārata* and so on.

(4) Upanaya: Sarvajñatvavyāpya-sarvajñakalpavedakartṛtvavad brahma – Brahman is possessed of the creatorship of the omniscient Veda (sarvajñakalpa-vedakartṛtvavat) which

The Bhāṣyakāra has given the analogy of authors such as Pāṇini and their

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is pervaded by omniscience (sarvajñatva-vyāpya). The following Bhāṣya statement in the upanaya-vākya is composed in a fortiori manner. *"kimu vaktavyam anekaśākhābhedabhinnasya, devatiryaṅmanuṣyavarṇāśramādipravibhāgahetoḥ ṛgvedādyākhyasya, sarvajñānākarasya ayatnenaiva līlānyāyena puruṣaniḥśvāsavad yasmād mahato bhūtād yoneḥ sambhavaḥ."* In this upanaya statement, the omniscience of Brahman (mahad-bhūta) is the probandum (sādhya) and the probans (hetu) is constituted by the whole Bhāṣya sentence presented in a fortiori manner: *"kimu vaktavyam anekaśākhābhedabhinnasya, devatiryaṅmanuṣyavarṇāśramādipravibhāgahetoḥ ṛgvedādyākhyasya, sarvajñānākarasya...yasmād mahato bhūtād yoneḥ sambhavaḥ."*

(5) Nigamana: The Bhāṣya statement *"tasya mahato bhūtasya niratiśayaṁ sarvajñatvaṁ śarvaśaktimattvaṁ ceti* – Therefore, Brahman (mahad-bhūta) has unexcelled omniscience (sarvajñatva) and omnipotence (sarvaśaktimattva)" is the nigamana.

In the context of the above-presented syllogism, it is worth taking note that this syllogism has been construed in two different ways to establish the omniscience of Brahman:

(1) Pakṣadharmatābalāt – By the force of the probans (hetu) existing in the subject (pakṣa): In the syllogistic proposition, *"brahma sarvajñaṁ sarvajñakalpavedakartṛtvāt* – Brahman is omniscient since It is the creator of the omniscient (sarvajñakalpa) Veda," Brahman is the pakṣa (subject). The omniscience of Brahman is the sādhya (probandum) and the creatorship of the omniscient Veda (sarvajñakalpa-vedakartṛtvāt) is the hetu (probans). On the force of the hetu (probans), that is the authorship of the Veda (vedakartṛtva) – which has the capacity of expounding gigantically multifarious entities and the principles of social organisations existing in the pakṣa (Brahman) – Brahman's omniscience (sarvajñatva), the sādhya (probandum), is established and all the more strengthened. This view, in a nutshell, is sought to be presented by the *Bhāṣyabhāvaprakāśikā* of Citsukhācārya in this expression: *"pakṣadharmatābalāt sarvajñatā sidhyati* – The omniscience of Brahman is established from the force of the probans existing in the pakṣa." Vide *"evaṁvidhasya vedasya yasmānmahato bhūtād yoneḥ sambhavaḥ tasya mahato bhūtasya brahmaṇo niratiśayaṁ sarvajñatvaṁ sarvaśaktitvaṁ ca kimu vaktavyamiti yojanāt pakṣadharmatābalāt śāstrakāraṇasya brahmaṇaḥ sarvajñatā sidhyatīti bhāvaḥ."* Also, vide *"śāstrahetorbrahmaṇaḥ sarvajñatā pakṣadharmatābalāditi vaktuṁ śāstrasya granthato mahattvamāha aneketi."* (*Nyāyanirṇaya*)

(2) Vyāptibalāt – By the force of concomitance: The other view, that is the upanaya (penultimate member of the five-membered syllogism) view, regarding Brahman's omniscience is attributed to *Bhāmatī*. This view relates to the establishment of omniscience of Brahman (sādhya or probandum) on the force of the vyāpti (concomitance) of the vedakartṛtva, the hetu (probans) and the omniscience of Brahman, the sādhya (probandum). This is expressed by *Bhāmatī* when it states succinctly: *"sopanayaṁ nigamanam āha* – The nigamana (conclusion) is presented along with the upanaya." In the Bhāsya passage, the upanaya-vākya that is referred to is this: *"anekaśākhābhedabhinnasya, devatiryaṅmanuṣyavarṇāśramādipravibhāgahetoḥ ṛgvedādyākhyasya, sarvajñānākarasya ayatnenaiva līlānyāyena puruṣaniḥśvāsavad yasmād mahato bhūtād yoneḥ sambhavaḥ."* The nigamana or concluding sentence is: *"tasya mahato bhūtasya niratiśayaṁ sarvajñatvaṁ śarvaśaktimattvaṁ ca."* Citsukhācārya in his *Bhāṣyabhāvaprakāśikā* refers to this view of *Bhāmatī* when he states: *"anye tu—anekaśākhābhedabhinnasya vedasyetyādi sambhavaḥ ityantamupanayaḥ tasyetyādi sarvaśaktitvaṁ cetyantaṁ nigamanamiti varṇayanti."*

treatises like the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* to establish the fact that just as Pāṇini would possess more extensive knowledge than what the treatise that he has authored would reflect, so too the great Being, Brahman, would certainly possess more extensive knowledge than what is taught in the Ṛgvedādi-śāstra.

But, there is indeed a world of difference between human authors such as Pāṇini and the supreme Lord, the Īśvara or the Saguṇa-brahman. To explain: Pāṇini, though exceptionally gifted with the power of intelligence and the capacity to articulate, must have taken pains to learn, to understand and to master many topics and nuances pertaining to the knowledge-domain of grammar, through other means of knowledge (pramāṇāntara) to author the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. Thus, it is evident that in the instances of human authors like Pāṇini, the prior attainment of knowledge pertaining to their fields of knowledge through an extraneous means of knowledge constitutes the necessary prerequisite for their authorship. Brahman, on the other hand, has produced the mammoth Scripture, *Ṛg-veda* etc., not by any prior effort of knowing the various aspects of the knowledge pertaining to the Scripture through an extraneous means of knowledge (pramāṇāntara) but rather effortlessly like how a person would breathe or wink effortlessly.[19] It is also to be noted that the knowledge of the Scripture which Brahman possesses, is itself considered to constitute His authorship of the Veda. This fact will become clear in the sequel.

The teacher of the Veda in the Vedapāṭhaśālā (Vedic school) has also doubtlessly a good grasp of the Veda. Yet, on that account, the teacher cannot be viewed as the author of the Veda! Indeed, there are striking differences between Vedapāṭhaśālā teacher's knowledge of the Vedas and that of the supremely omniscient Brahman. For attaining his knowledge of the Veda, the teacher in the Pāṭhāśālā had to depend on his own teacher from whom alone he had learnt the text. Also, he comes to know the meaning of the Veda by an effort specially directed for this purpose. On the other hand, the omniscient Brahman, with no effort at all, knows the Veda naturally with no dependence on anyone else. Again, since Brahman's wisdom is

[19] Cf. तत्र वेदस्य पौरुषेयत्वशङ्कानिरासार्थं श्रुतिस्थनिःश्वसितपदार्थमाह—अप्रयत्नेनेति। प्रमाणान्तरेण अर्थज्ञानप्रयासं विना निमेषादिन्यायेन इत्यर्थः। – रत्नप्रभा

unimpeded (anāvṛta-jñāna), Brahman also knows the meaning of the Veda simultaneously (saha) and also inevitably (avarjanīyatayā).[20]

In this manner, the Bhāṣya accommodates and accepts the view of the Indian orthodox tradition that declares the Veda as 'apauruṣeya' (not being a creation). If not understood this way, the description of Brahman as 'veda-kartṛ' (the creator of the Veda) would certainly go counter to the Indian orthodox tradition. The Advaitins maintain that for a treatise to be viewed as a creation (pauruṣeya), it would have to be produced by its author by dint of effort (prayatnena) by gaining the knowledge for authoring the treatise through another means of valid knowledge (pramāṇāntareṇa viṣayān buddhvā) and by depending on some one other than himself (pāratantryeṇa) for gaining it. But, the omniscient and omnipotent Brahman, does not require any effort for producing the Veda. In the context of the creation of the Veda, the independent and natural knowledge of the Veda of Brahman, by itself, constitutes the authorship of Brahman.[21]

8. as evidenced from the Scriptural passage (*Bṛ.U.*4.5.11) "of that great Being, this is the breath, which is the *Ṛg-veda*": The Upaniṣadic passage is cited here to establish that Brahman created the great body of the Scripture, the *Ṛg-veda* etc., as effortlessly as a person would breathe. This citation of the Ācārya is only the beginning part of the passage and serves as a pratīka (indicator) for the following entire tract of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* (4.5.11): *"asya mahato bhūtasya niḥśvasitametad yadṛgvedaḥ yajurvedaḥ*

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[20] Cf. अत्र अनुमानेन यः सर्वज्ञः (मु.उ.१.१.९) इति श्रुत्युक्तसर्वज्ञत्वदार्ढ्याय पाणिन्यादिवद् वेदकर्तरि अधिकार्थज्ञानसत्तामात्रं साध्यते, न तु अर्थज्ञानस्य वेदहेतुत्वं, निःश्वसितश्रुतिविरोधाद्, वेदज्ञानमात्रेण अध्येतृवद् वेदकर्तृत्वोपपत्तेश्च। इयान् विशेषः—अध्येता परापेक्षः ईश्वरस्तु स्वकृतवेदानुपूर्वी स्वयमेव स्मृत्वा तथैव कल्पादौ ब्रह्मादिषु आविर्भावयन् अनावृतज्ञानत्वात् तदर्थमपि अवर्जनीयतया जानातीति सर्वज्ञ इति अनवद्यम्। – रत्नप्रभा

Also, cf. इदमत्र केचिन्मन्यन्ते—यत् शास्त्रयोनित्वपदेनार्थमुपलभ्य रचयितृत्वरूपं प्रणेतृत्वं न विवक्ष्यते, वेदपौरुषेयत्वापातादु, अध्यापकवदुच्चारयितृत्वमात्रं तु प्रणेतृत्वं न सार्वज्ञसाधकम्, अप्रयोजकत्वात्। तावता हि महोपाध्यायसाम्यमेव स्याद् वस्तुतस्तु—शास्त्रयोनित्वं सार्वज्ञविरुद्धम्। न हि स्वव्यतिरिक्तोपदेश्यपुरुषगोचरभ्रमं भ्रान्तिसिद्धशरीरादिकं च विनोच्चारयितृत्वं सम्भवति, इति शास्त्रयोनित्वमसार्वज्ञहेतुरेव स्यादिति। अत्रेदमद्वैतिनो मन्यन्ते—वेदकर्तृत्वं हीदं सकलवेदार्थज्ञानपूर्वकं वक्रन्तराधीनानुपूर्व्यनपेक्ष-सकलवेदोच्चारयितृत्वमेव।...एतेन—अध्यापकेऽपि पूर्वसदृशानुपूर्वीरचयितृत्वसम्भवात्, स्वेच्छया वेदरचयितृत्वस्य ब्रह्मण्यप्यभावाद्, अध्यापकत्वादधिकस्य शास्त्रयोनित्वस्य तावताऽप्यसिद्धत्वेन सार्वज्ञसाधनासम्भवाद् महोपाध्यायेऽपि तत्तदर्थानुसन्धानपूर्वक-सजातीयोच्चारणापेक्षोच्चारयितृत्वसत्त्वादित्यादि—परास्तम्, अध्यापकमहोपाध्यायादीनां पूर्वोक्तरीत्या वक्रन्तराधीनानुपूर्वीरचयितृत्व-सत्त्वेऽपि तदनधीनतत्कर्तृत्वाभावेनादोषात्। – प्रदीप

[21] Cf. स्वातन्त्र्येण वेदज्ञानवत्त्वेनैव ब्रह्मणो वेदकर्तृत्वाभ्युपगमात्। – रत्नप्रभा

sāmavedo'tharvāṅgirasaḥ itihāsaḥ purāṇaṁ vidyā upaniṣadaḥ ślokāḥ sūtrāṇi anuvyākhyānāni vyākhyānāni, iṣṭaṁ hutam aśitaṁ pāyitam, ayaṁ ca lokaḥ paraśca lokaḥ, sarvāṇi ca bhūtāni, asyaiva etāni sarvāṇi niḥśvasitāni – Of this great Being is this the *Ṛg-veda*, the *Yajur-veda*, the *Sāma-veda*, the *Atharva-veda*, the Epic, the Legend, the Science, the Upaniṣads, the Verses, the Aphorisms, the Explanations, the Commentaries, the Sacrifice, the Oblation, the Food, the Drink, this World, the other World and all beings are all Its breath alone. They are all the breath of this supreme Self alone." The Ācārya cites this passage here to bring home the fact that the entire lore of the Scripture as well as the whole world along with all beings therein are created by Brahman as effortlessly as a man breathes.

The following facts are established by this *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* citation (4.5.11): (1) Brahman has effortlessly produced the great body of the Scripture, an ocean of knowledge, which fact goes to prove that Brahman possesses unsurpassed omniscience (niratiśaya-sarvajñatva). (2) With equal ease, Brahman has created the entire world along with all beings therein, which fact establishes that Brahman also possesses unsurpassed omnipotence (niratiśaya-sarvaśaktimattva). That the Ācārya wishes to bring out both these aspects – omniscience (sarvajñatva) as well as omnipotence (sarvaśaktimattva) of Brahman – is borne out by the manner in which the Ācārya concludes the present section of the Bhāṣya: "*tasya mahato bhūtasya niratiśayaṁ sarvajñatvaṁ sarvaśaktimattvaṁ ceti* – Unsurpassed are the omniscience and omnipotence of this great Being, Brahman."

By citing this *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* passage (4.5.11) as the viṣaya-vākya (Upaniṣadic passage for deliberation) for the Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa and by stating the above-mentioned conclusion, the Bhāṣyakāra avers the following: (1) The Śāstrayonitva-sūtra is meant to strengthen the aspect of sarvajñatva (omniscience) of Brahman that has been indirectly suggested by the previous Janmādi-sūtra. (2) In addition to this, the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra intends, by implication (upalakṣaṇa-vidhayā), to reinforce also the sarvaśaktimattva (omnipotence) of Brahman which fact also has been indirectly suggested by the previous Janmādi-sūtra itself.

This being the case, there is no necessity for a separate Sūtra to strengthen the fact of the omnipotence (sarvaśaktitva) of Brahman. That the exact viṣaya-vākya (Upaniṣadic passage for deliberation) of the Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa being the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* tract of 4.5.11 and not 2.4.10[22] needs certainly special attention for the critics of the Bhāṣya have mistakenly construed that the Bhāṣyakāra has cited *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* tract 2.4.10 as the viṣaya-vākya of the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra. This confusion has arisen because the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* passage 2.4.10 resembles the above-cited *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* passage 4.5.11 that describes the *Ṛg-veda, Sāma-veda* and so on as the breath of the great Being, Brahman. But in this *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* passage 2.4.10, there is no mention of the entire world and all beings also as being the breath of Brahman, that is the portion *"ayaṁ ca lokaḥ paraśca lokaḥ sarvāṇi ca bhūtāni"* of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* passage 4.5.11 is not there.

Without comprehending this fact of the viṣaya-vākya presented by the Bhāṣyakāra for the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra as being the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* passage 4.5.11, the critics have mistakenly imputed the charge that the Bhāṣyakāra's presentation of the purpose of the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra as strengthening the argument for establishing both the omniscience (sarvajñatva) and omnipotence (sarvaśaktimattva) as being erroneous. Indeed, if understood in the light of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* tract 2.4.10, as the critics of the Bhāṣyakāra have done, the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra does not confirm and strengthen the second aspect of omnipotence (sarvaśaktimattva) which fact also is equal in importance to that of the omniscience (sarvajñatva) of Brahman for both these aspects of omniscience and omnipotence have been indirectly suggested in the Janmādi-sūtra. But because the viṣaya-vākya for the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra is the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* passage 4.5.11 and not 2.4.10, the criticism of the Bhāṣya is false and baseless. For

[22] The section of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* tract 2.4.10 that pertains to the present discussion is as follows: *"asya mahato bhūtasya niḥśvasitametad yadṛgvedaḥ yajurvedaḥ sāmavedo'tharvāṅgirasaḥ itihāsaḥ purāṇaṁ vidyā upaniṣadaḥ ślokāḥ sūtrāṇi anuvyākhyānāni vyākhyānāni, asyaiva etāni niḥśvasitāni* – Of this great Being is this the *Ṛg-veda*, the *Yajur-veda*, the *Sāma-veda*, the *Atharva-veda*, the Epic, the Legend, the Science, the Upaniṣads, the Verses, the Aphorisms, the Explanations and the Commentaries – are all Its breath alone. They are all the breath of this supreme Self alone."

this reason, too, the argument of the critic that if the third aphorism were to strengthen the point of omniscience (sarvajñatva) of Brahman, then there would arise the necessity of another aphorism to strengthen the omnipotence (sarvaśaktimattva) of Brahman does not also hold any credibility.[23]

On the objection of the Veda losing its status of being beginningless (anādi) and eternal (nitya)[24] if it were to be created by Īśvara raised by the Pūrvapakṣin (i.e. the Mīmāṁsaka), the following points need to be noted for clarity and reconciliation: All sentences that we observe in the world are known to consist of words arranged in a sequence as desired by the agent. The Vedic text too comprises sentences that are constituted of words occurring in a sequence. Even if one gives assent to the eternity of the words (pada-nityatva) of the Veda, that is propounded by the Mīmāṁsakas, one will have to accept that the words constituting the Vedic sentences (vedavākya) are arranged in that particular sequence as occurring in the Veda by an agency, which agent can be none but Īśvara. But, the Advaitin avers that Īśvara never takes the liberty of altering the sequence of words, sentences, svaras (intonation) and so on of the Veda. Īśvara, the Saguṇa-brahman, that is the Consciousness conditioned by Māyā which is of inexplicable might (anirvacanīya-śaktika-māyopahita), is endowed with unexcelled omniscience and hence can never ever be without the knowledge of the Veda and therefore Īśvara can have no ignorance or any forgetfulness of the Veda. Also, Īśvara does not take the liberty of changing the sequence of the Vedic text from age to age (pratikalpa), lest such a change harm mankind. Rather, in every age, Īśvara reveals the Veda in exactly the same sequence in which He Himself had revealed it in every previous age.[25] In this sense, the Veda, in its present sequence, is beginningless (anādi) and eternal (nitya).

[23] One may refer to the *Parimala* and the *Pradīpa* commentaries for a further detailed discussion on these points.

[24] Vide the Vedic statement: "*tasmai nūnamabhidyave vācā virūpa nityayā* (*vṛṣṇe codasva suṣṭutim*) – O Virūpa! I satiate Him through the eternal words (of the Vedas)." (*Ṛ.Ve.*8.75.6)

[25] "*dhātā yathāpūrvamakalpayat* – The Lord created the worlds in the same manner as he had created in the earlier cycles." (*Mahānārāyaṇopaniṣad*, 6.3)

Also, there is no comparison between Īśvara and the mahopādhyāya (expert teacher) in the Vedapāṭhaśālā, for there are some very basic differences between the two. The latter knows and repeats the Vedic text in a particular way, sequence, intonation and so on which he has inherited from his teacher, who too, in his turn, had inherited the Veda in the same manner from his own teacher and thus the beginningless tradition (anādi adhyayana-paramparā) of the Vedic knowledge. But in the case of Īśvara, it is totally different, for He has not inherited the Veda from any individual. As stated before, in every age (pratikalpa), it is Īśvara Himself who reveals the Veda in exactly the same way and in the same sequence in which He Himself had revealed it in every earlier age (pūrvakalpa).[26]

Further, the Upaniṣadic description of the Veda being the breath of Brahman has an added significance. Just as for men breathing is spontaneous and coeval with their being so too is the Veda with regard to Brahman. Thus, being coeval with Brahman, the Veda too is without a beginning and is unalterably constant. In this way, the Siddhāntin maintains the authorship of Brahman with reference to the Veda (brahmaṇo vedakartṛtvam) even while ascribing to the traditional Mīmāṁsaka position of the beginninglessness (anāditva), eternity (nityatva) and uncreatedness (apauruṣeyatva) of the Veda.[27]

[26] Cf. तथा च गतकल्पीयं वेदं स्मृत्वोपदिशतीत्येतावतैवोपपत्तौ प्रमाणान्तरेणार्थमुपलभ्य वेदरचयितृत्वकल्पनानुपपत्तेरनेकविद्या-स्थानोपबृंहितगर्वेदादिकर्तृत्वं 'धाता यथा पूर्वमकल्पयद्' इति वचनानुसारेण तथैव सर्वव्यवस्थापकत्वं वा सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वशक्तिं च विना नोपपद्यत इति सर्वज्ञत्वमर्थसिद्धमेव। – प्रदीप

[27] Cf. येऽपि तावद् वर्णानां नित्यत्वमास्थिषत तैरपि पदवाक्यादीनामनित्यत्वमभ्युपेयम्। आनुपूर्वीभेदवन्तो हि वर्णाः पदम्। पदानि चानुपूर्वीभेदवन्ति वाक्यम्। व्यक्तिधर्मश्चानुपूर्वी न वर्णधर्मः, वर्णानां नित्यानां विभूनां च कालतो देशतो वा पौर्वापर्योयोगात्। व्यक्तिश्चानित्येति कथं तदुपगृहीतानां वर्णानां नित्यानामपि पदता नित्या। पदानित्यतया च वाक्यादीनामप्यनित्यता व्याख्याता। तस्माच्चृत्तानुकरणवत् पदाद्यनुकरणमपि। यथा हि यादृशं गात्रचलनादि नर्तकः करोति तादृशमेव शिक्ष्यमाणानुकरोति नर्तकी, न तु तदेव व्यनक्ति, एवं यादृशीमानुपूर्वीं वैदिकानां वर्णपदादीनां करोत्यध्यापयिता तादृशीमेवानुकरोति माणवकः, न तु तामेवोच्चारयति, आचार्यव्यक्तिभ्यो माणवकव्यक्तीनामन्यत्वात्। तस्मान्नित्यानित्यवर्णवादिनां न लौकिकवैदिकपदवाक्यादिपौरुषेयत्वे विवादः, केवलं वेदवाक्येषु पुरुषस्वातन्त्र्यास्वातन्त्र्ये विप्रतिपत्तिः। यथाहुः—यत्नतः प्रतिषेध्या नः पुरुषाणां स्वतन्त्रता इति। तत्र सृष्टिप्रलयमनिच्छन्तो जैमिनीया वेदाध्ययनं प्रत्यस्मादृशगुरुशिष्यपरम्परामविच्छिन्नामनादिमाचक्षते। वैयासिकं तु मतमनुवर्तमानाः श्रुतिस्मृतीतिहासादि-सिद्धसृष्टिप्रलयानुसारेण अनाद्यविद्योपधानलब्धसर्वशक्तिसर्वज्ञानस्यापि परमात्मनो नित्यस्य वेदानां योनेरपि न तेषु स्वातन्त्र्यं, पूर्वपूर्वसर्गानुसारेण तादृशानुपूर्वीविरचनाद्, यथा हि यागादिब्रह्महत्यादयोऽर्थानर्थहेतवो ब्रह्मविवर्ता अपि न सर्गान्तरे विपरियन्ति। न हि जातु क्वचित्सर्गे ब्रह्महत्यार्थहेतुरनर्थहेतुश्चाश्वमेधो भवति, अग्निर्वा क्लेदयति, आपो वा दहन्ति, तद्वत्। यथात्र सर्गे नियतानुपूर्व्यं वेदाध्ययनमभ्युदयनिःश्रेयसहेतुः, अन्यथा तदेव वाग्वज्रतयानर्थहेतुः, एवं सर्गान्तरेष्वपीति तदनुरोधात् सर्वज्ञोऽपि सर्वशक्तिरपि पूर्वपूर्वसर्गानुसारेण वेदान्विरचयन्न स्वतन्त्रः। पुरुषास्वातन्त्र्यमात्रं चापौरुषेयत्वं रोचयन्ते जैमिनीया अपि। तच्चास्माकमपि समानम्, अन्यत्राभिनिवेशात्। – भामती

It has been already mentioned that Īśvara knows the Veda and also its meaning simultaneously (saha) and inevitably (avarjanīyatayā). That He possesses this knowledge since eternity is itself considered to be His effortless and natural authorship. Thus, it is evident that Brahman has not created the Veda as an author of the world would pen a treatise by first coming to know the knowledge from some other source material through a means of cognition (pramāṇāntara) and later on compose it. If this were the case, then the Veda would become pauruṣeya (human creation). But such is definitely not the case. In this way, the Siddhāntin maintains that Brahman is the author of the Veda even while he asserts the 'nirapekṣa-prāmāṇya' of the Veda, that is the status of the Veda being an indisputable and independent authority of knowledge on non-worldly matters (alaukika-viṣaya) of dharma and Brahman.

The intent or purpose of the Pūrvapakṣin's view is to maintain that Brahman is not the author of the Veda and therefore cannot be omniscient. As against this, the purpose of the Siddhānta view is to establish that Brahman is the creator of the Veda and is thus possessed of unsurpassed omniscience. The Siddhāntin has established this view to strengthen the fact of the omniscience of Brahman that was indicated in the Janmādi-sūtra. The Siddhānta view has an additional intent (phala) of asserting by implication (upalakṣaṇa-vidhayā) the omnipotence (sarvaśaktimattva) of Brahman, which point has also been indicated in the Janmādi-sūtra.

But, why should the Sūtrakāra be concerned essentially with directly justifying the idea of the omniscience (sarvajñatva) of Brahman and give only secondary importance to the other aspect of omnipotence (sarvaśaktimattva) of Brahman by upholding it by merely through implication? Could he not reverse the order of importance of these two and give primary importance to the omnipotence of Brahman and secondary importance to Its omniscience? Are not both these points of omniscience and omnipotence of Brahman equally important since both of them are indicated by the Janmādi-sūtra?

To this question, there can be the following plausible answers: (1) If the Sūtrakāra were to reverse the order of importance of these two aspects of omniscience and omnipotence, he may perhaps have to construct an aphorism such as *"lokayonitvāt* – because He is true source of the worlds" or *"bhūtayonitvāt* – because He is the source of the beings." But that would be virtually a repetition of what has been already stated and established in the Janmādi-sūtra. In fact, an aphorism which reads as *"śāstrayonitvāt* – because He is the source of the Scripture" alone could admit the second interpretation (dvitīya-varṇaka) which establishes another vital point of the Vedānta-darśana – that is the Scripture alone is the primary source for the knowledge of Brahman (*"śāstrapramāṇakaṁ brahma"*). (2) Further, the Pūrvapakṣin, the Mīmāṁsaka, is essentially concerned with the fact of veda-apauruṣeyatva (Veda being uncreated) and hence his interest is only in raising an objection, on that basis, about the omniscience of Brahman. Hence, the Siddhāntin, the Sūtrakāra, has to give primary importance to the aspect of Brahman's omniscience (sarvajñatva) in order that he may satisfactorily answer the Pūrvapakṣin's objection. (3) Besides, as mentioned before, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* describes twice that the great body of the Ṛgvedādi-śāstra is the breath of the great Being, Brahman, implying thereby that it is an effortless creation, once in 2.4.10 and then for the second time in 4.5.11. And, it is only in the second instance that the Upaniṣad adds, that too at the end of the passage, a few words to the effect that the worlds and their beings are also the breath of Brahman. This feature itself is perhaps suggestive that the Scripture too attaches primary importance to the omniscience of Brahman which fact must have prompted the Sūtrakāra also to formulate the Sūtra in this fashion.

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Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇaracanā – Structure of Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa (Prathama-varṇaka – First Explanation)

The following is the construction of the Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa in the light of the first explanation (prathama-varṇaka):

(1) Viṣaya or Subject: The Upaniṣad passage taken for deliberation here is (*Bṛ.U.*4.5.11) *"asya mahato bhūtasya niḥśvasitametad yadṛgvedaḥ yajurvedaḥ sāmavedo'tharvāṅgirasaḥ itihāsaḥ purāṇaṁ vidyā upaniṣadaḥ ślokāḥ sūtrāṇi anuvyākhyānāni vyākhyānāni iṣṭaṁ hutam aśitaṁ pāyitam, ayaṁ ca lokaḥ paraśca lokaḥ sarvāṇi ca bhūtāni asyaiva etāni sarvāṇi niḥśvasitāni* – Of this great Being is this the *Ṛg-veda*, the *Yajur-veda*, the *Sāma-veda*, the *Atharva-veda*, the Epic, the Legend, the Science, the Upaniṣads, the Verses, the Aphorisms, the Explanations, the Commentaries, the Sacrifice, the Oblation, the Food, the Drink, this World, the other World and all beings are all Its breath alone. They are all the breath of this supreme Self alone."

(2) Saṁśaya or Doubt: The point of doubt here is whether the above passage establishes or not the creatorship of Brahman with regard to the Ṛgvedādi-śāstra. Only if Brahman is established to be the creator (i.e. the source) of the Veda, the omniscience of Brahman, that is pointed out in the Janmādyadhikaraṇa, can be strengthened.

(3) Pūrvapakṣa or Prima Facie View: The Śruti presents the Veda as beginningless and eternal (nitya) in statements such as (*Ṛ.Ve.*8.75.6) *"tasyai nūnamabhidyave vācā virūpa nityayā* – O Virūpa! I satiate Him through the eternal words (of the Vedas)." For the Veda to be eternal, it has to be uncreated; for, anything that is created (pauruṣeya) cannot be nitya (eternal). Also, if the Veda is a creation of Brahman, then it too would be similar in nature to the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, the renowned treatise on grammar authored by Pāṇini, and its authority would depend on the authority of some extraneous source material (mūlapramāṇa-sāpekṣā) basing on which Pāṇini had authored it.

If that were the case, the Veda would forego its well-recognised status of being an indisputable independent authority and means of valid knowledge (nirapekṣaṁ prāmāṇyam). This conclusion cannot be accepted by any āstika (i.e. believer in the authority of the Veda). Therefore, the above-cited Upaniṣadic passage does not intend to describe Brahman as the creator of the Veda; rather, it intends to merely state that Brahman knows the eternal Veda with great ease, that is with far greater ease than even the best among the expert teachers (mahopādhyāya) of the Veda. As a consequence, the above-cited Upaniṣad passage does not establish the authorship of Brahman with regard to the Veda which fact alone would have, in turn, established the omniscience of Brahman.

(4) Siddhānta or the Established View: The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* passage (4.5.11) clearly delineates the entire great body of the Śāstra, the *Ṛg-veda* etc., as being effortlessly created by Brahman. A passage of such clear and evident purport should not be understood in a figurative sense as explained by the Pūrvapakṣin but in the non-figurative actual sense that the Upaniṣad has presented. Taken thus, it can be asserted that because the Śāstra, comprising the *Ṛg-veda* etc., is the ocean of all knowledge and is omniscient (sarvajñakalpa), its author, Brahman, is, as a natural consequence, established to be endowed with unsurpassed omniscience (niratiśaya-sarvajñatva).[1]

(5) Saṅgati or Connectedness: The saṅgati that connects the present first Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa with the previous Janmādyadhikaraṇa, is 'samāna-viṣayakatva', that is 'having the same subject matter'. Besides this saṅgati, since the Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa arises to answer the ākṣepa (objection) raised by the Pūrvapakṣin against the conclusion of the omniscience

[1] Cf. तस्य महतो भूतस्येति वाक्यं विषयः। किमिदं वाक्यं वेदकर्तृत्वं ब्रह्मणो बोधयति न वा इति संशयः। वाचा विरूप नित्ययेति श्रुत्या वेदस्य नित्यत्वावगमाद् न वेदकर्तृत्वमनेन वाक्येन ब्रह्मणो बोधयितुं शक्यत इति पूर्वपक्षः। पूर्वपक्षप्रयोजनं निखिलजगत्कर्तृत्वेनेश्वरस्य सर्वज्ञत्वं बाधितमिति नेश्वरकर्तृत्वे यतो वेति वाक्यतात्पर्यमिति जीवकारणतायां प्रधानकारणतायां चैव वेदान्तानां पर्यवसानमिति नाद्वैतसिद्धिरिति। सिद्धान्तस्तु—अत एव च नित्यत्वमित्युपरितनेन सूत्रेण प्रावाहिकनित्यताबोधन एव वाचा विरूप नित्ययेति श्रुतेस्तात्पर्यव्यवस्थापनाद्, वाचा विरूप नित्ययेत्यस्य सामान्यतः प्रवृत्तस्य वर्णपदरूपशब्दविषयत्वेन सार्थक्ये वेदविषयत्वस्यापि कल्पने प्रमाणाभावाच्च तस्य निःश्वसितमिति विशिष्यग्वेदादिकर्तृत्वबोधकश्रुतिप्राबल्येन ब्रह्मणो वेदकर्तृत्वनिर्णय एवोचितः। सति चैवं वेदकर्तृत्वेन सर्वज्ञत्वादिसिद्धा जन्माद्यस्य यतः इति न जीवपरं प्रधानपरं वेति, न पूर्वोक्तप्रकारेणाद्वैतासिद्धिः। – प्रदीप

(sarvajñatva) of Brahman presented in the previous Janmādyadhikaraṇa, there is also the connectedness in the form of 'ākṣepa-saṅgati' between the Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa and Janmādyadhikaraṇa.[2]

[2] Cf. वेदस्य नित्यत्वाद् ब्रह्मणः सार्वहेतुता नास्ति इत्याक्षेपसङ्गत्या वेदहेतुत्वमुच्यते। अस्य महतो भूतस्य निःश्वसितमेतद्यदृग्वेदो यजुर्वेदः सामवेदोऽथर्वाङ्गिरसः (बृ.उ.४.५.११) इति वाक्यं विषयः। तत् किं वेदहेतुत्वेन ब्रह्मणः सर्वज्ञत्वं साधयति, उत न साधयति इति सन्देहः। तत्र व्याकरणादिवद् वेदस्य पौरुषेयत्वे मूलप्रमाणसापेक्षत्वेन अप्रामाण्यापातात् न साधयतीति पूर्वपक्षे जगद्धेतोश्चेतनत्वासिद्धिः फलम्। सिद्धान्ते तत्सिद्धिः। अस्य वेदान्तवाक्यस्य स्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्गस्य वेदकर्तरि समन्वयोक्तेः श्रुतिशास्त्राध्यायपादसङ्गतयः। एवमापादं श्रुत्यादिसङ्गतय ऊह्याः। वेदे हि सर्वार्थप्रकाशनशक्तिरुपलभ्यते सा तदुपादानब्रह्मगतशक्तिपूर्विका तद्वता वा प्रकाशनशक्तित्वात्, कार्यगतशक्तित्वाद् वा, प्रदीपशक्तिवद् इति वेदोपादानत्वेन ब्रह्मणः स्वसम्बद्धाशेषार्थप्रकाशनसामर्थ्यरूपं सर्वसाक्षित्वं सिद्ध्यति। यद्वा, यथा अध्येतारः पूर्वक्रमं ज्ञात्वा वेदं कुर्वन्ति, तथा विचित्रगुणमायासहायोऽनावृतानन्तस्वप्रकाशचिन्मात्रः परमेश्वरः स्वकृत-पूर्वकल्पीयक्रमसजातीयक्रमवन्तं वेदराशिं तदर्थान् च युगपद् जानन् एव करोतीति न वेदस्य पौरुषेयता। यत्र ह्यर्थज्ञानपूर्वकं वाक्यज्ञानं वाक्यसृष्टौ कारणं तत्र पौरुषेयता, अत्र च यौगपद्याद् न सा, अतो वेदकर्ता वेदमिव तदर्थमपि स्वसम्बद्धं नान्तरीयकतया जानातीति सर्वज्ञ इति सिद्धान्तयति—शास्त्रेति। – रत्नप्रभा

Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇasāra – Essence of Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa (Prathama-varṇaka – First Explanation)

Svāmī Vidyāraṇya, in his work *Vaiyāsika-nyāyamālā* (verses 15 & 16), presents succinctly the essence of the first explanation (prathama-varṇaka) pertaining to the Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa.

न कर्तृ ब्रह्म वेदस्य किं वा कर्तृ न कर्तृ तत्।
विरूप नित्यया वाचेत्येवं नित्यत्ववर्णनात्॥
कर्तृनिःश्वसिताद्युक्तेर्नित्यत्वं पूर्वसाम्यतः।
सर्वावभासिवेदस्य कर्तृत्वात्सर्वविद्भवेत्॥

na kartṛ brahma vedasya kiṁ vā kartṛ na kartṛ tat,
virūpa nityayā vācetyevaṁ nityatvavarṇanāt.
kartṛniḥśvasitādyukternityatvaṁ pūrvasāmyataḥ,
sarvāvabhāsivedasya kartṛtvātsarvavidbhavet.

The following is a brief explanation of these two verses: Brahman had been defined as the efficient-cum-material cause (abhinna-nimittopādāna-kāraṇa) of the world in the Janmādyadhikaraṇa. Being the Creator, Brahman possesses the knowledge of the whole creation and hence Brahman is omniscient (sarvajña). It is to strengthen this view that the Sūtrakāra has authored the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra.

The second ground for the composition of the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra refers to the Mīmāṁsaka's objection that the Veda being eternal (nitya) as is evident from the Vedic statement (*R.Ve.*8.75.6) *"tasyai nūnamabhidyave vācā virūpa nityayā* – O Virūpa! I satiate Him through the eternal words (of the Vedas)," Brahman, as such, cannot be the author of the Veda. This standpoint of the Mīmāṁsakas, is also being refuted by the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra.[1]

The Siddhāntin invokes the Upaniṣadic declaration (*Bṛ.U.*4.5.11) *"asya mahato bhūtasya niḥśvasitametad yadṛgvedaḥ yajurvedaḥ sāmavedo'tharvāṅgirasaḥ*

[1] चेतनस्य ब्रह्मणो जगत्कारणत्वोक्त्या सर्वज्ञत्वमर्थात् प्रतिज्ञातं सूत्रकृता, चेतनसृष्टेर्ज्ञानपूर्वकत्वात्। तथा च ब्रह्म सर्वज्ञं, सर्वकारणत्वाद्, यो यत्कर्ता स तज्ज्ञः, यथा कुलाल इति स्थितं, तदेवार्थिकं सर्वज्ञत्वं प्रधानादिनिरासाय, वेदकर्तृत्वहेतुना द्रढयन् आहेत्यर्थः। हेतुद्वयस्य एकार्थसाधनत्वाद् एकविषयत्वमवान्तरसङ्गतिः। यद्वा, वेदस्य नित्यत्वाद् ब्रह्मणः सर्वहेतुता नास्ति इत्याक्षेपसङ्गत्या वेदहेतुत्वमुच्यते।– रत्नप्रभा

itihāsaḥ purāṇaṁ vidyā upaniṣadaḥ ślokāḥ sūtrāṇi anuvyākhyānāni vyākhyānāni iṣṭaṁ hutam aśitaṁ pāyitam, ayaṁ ca lokaḥ paraśca lokaḥ sarvāṇi ca bhūtāni asyaiva etāni sarvāṇi niḥśvasitāni – Of this great Being is this the *Ṛg-veda*, the *Yajur-veda*, the *Sāma-veda*, the *Atharva-veda*, the Epic, the Legend, the Science, the Upaniṣads, the Verses, the Aphorisms, the Explanations, the Commentaries, the Sacrifice, the Oblation, the Food, the Drink, this World, the other World and all beings are all Its breath alone. They are all the breath of this supreme Self alone." From this Upaniṣadic passage it becomes clear that the Scripture, comprising the *Ṛg-veda* and so on, comes into existence from Brahman, as effortlessly as the breath is exhaled, thus establishing Brahman to be the source of the Veda.

Also, the Veda illumines all entities and it is therefore termed omniscient as it were (sarvajñakalpa) and being the author of the Veda, that is the repository of the knowledge of the whole multifarious world, Brahman is established to be omniscient (sarvajña).

In this way the Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa establishes that Brahman is sarvajña (omniscient).

The incompatibility of the view that the Veda is eternal (nitya) with the view that Brahman is the author of the Veda is reconciled in the following way: Ordinarily an author of a work gathers information from other sources (pramāṇāntara) and then invests effort to produce a treatise. This kind of authorship involves effort but Brahman's authorship of the Veda (vedakartṛtva) does not involve any such intervention. Its authorship consists in merely revealing the already existing Veda at the beginning of each creation (sarga) as well as Brahman's natural and complete knowledge of the Veda.[2]

[2] Vide *"dhātā yathāpūrvamakalpayat* – The Lord created the worlds in the same manner as he had created in the earlier cycles." (*Mahānārāyaṇopaniṣad*, 6.3)

॥ इति प्रथमवर्णकं समाप्तम्॥

iti prathamavarṇakaṁ samāptam

Thus Concludes the First Explanation:
Scripture Being the Sourced.

॥ द्वितीयवर्णकम् ॥

Dvitīyavarṇakam

Second Explanation:
Scripture Being the Source

5

[द्वितीयवर्णकभाष्यम्]

अथवा[1] यथोक्तम् ऋग्वेदादिशास्त्रं योनिः कारणं प्रमाणम् अस्य ब्रह्मणः [1]यथावत्स्वरूपाधिगमे। शास्त्रादेव प्रमाणाद् जगतो जन्मादिकारणं ब्रह्म अधिगम्यते इत्यभिप्रायः। [2]शास्त्रम् उदाहृतं पूर्वसूत्रे "यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते" (तै.उ.३.१) इत्यादि।

5 A

[DVITĪYAVARṆAKABHĀṢYAM]

athavā yathoktam ṛgvedādiśāstraṁ yoniḥ kāraṇaṁ pramāṇam asya brahmaṇaḥ yathāvatsvarūpādhigame. śāstrādeva pramāṇād jagato janmādikāraṇaṁ brahma adhigamyate ityabhiprāyaḥ. śāstram udāhṛtaṁ pūrvasūtre "yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante" (Tai.U.3.1) ityādi.

5 B

अथवा *athavā* – or else; यथोक्तम् *yathoktam* – as described above; ऋग्वेदादिशास्त्रम् *ṛgvedādiśāstram* – the corpus of the Scripture comprising the *Ṛg-veda* etc.; योनिः *yoniḥ* – source; कारणम् *kāraṇam* – the cause; प्रमाणम् *pramāṇam* – means of knowledge; अस्य ब्रह्मणः *asya brahmaṇaḥ* – of this Brahman; यथावत् *yathāvat* – rightly; स्वरूपाधिगमे *svarūpādhigame* – to comprehend the nature; शास्त्राद् एव *śāstrād eva* – through the Scripture alone; प्रमाणात् *pramāṇāt* – through the means of knowledge; जगतः *jagataḥ* – of the world; जन्मादिकारणम् *janmādikāraṇam* – the cause of birth etc., ब्रह्म *brahma* – Brahman; अधिगम्यते *adhigamyate* – is known; इति *iti* – this; अभिप्रायः *abhiprāyaḥ* – is the intended sense; शास्त्रम् *śāstram* – the Scripture; उदाहृतम् *udāhṛtam* – has been cited; पूर्वसूत्रे *pūrvasūtre* – in the preceding aphorism; यतः वै *yataḥ vai* – from which alone; इमानि *imāni* – these; भूतानि *bhūtāni* – beings; जायन्ते *jāyante* – are born; इत्यादि *ityādi* – commencing thus

[1] Tel -स्वरूपावगमे

[2] Tel, ASS तच्छास्त्रम्

[1] एवं शास्त्रकर्ता ईश्वर इत्यभिप्रायं सूत्रं व्याख्याय, शास्त्रैकगम्य ईश्वर इत्यभिप्रायेण सूत्रं व्याचष्टे—अथवेति। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

5 C

[COMMENTARY ON THE SECOND EXPLANATION]

Or else, we may explain the aphorism as[1] the corpus of the Scripture comprising the *Ṛg-veda* etc., as described above, is the source,[2] that is the cause or the means of knowledge to rightly comprehend the nature of this Brahman.[3] It is only through the Scripture, the means of knowledge, that Brahman is known to be the cause of birth etc. of the world – this is the intended sense.[4] The relevant passage of the Scripture (*Tai.U.*3.1), commencing with "That whence verily these beings are born etc." has been cited in the context of the preceding aphorism.[5]

5 D

1. Or else, we may explain the aphorism as: The second explanation (dvitīya-varṇaka) of the aphorism becomes necessary on the following grounds:
(1) In the Janmādyadhikaraṇa, the possibility of defining the nature of Brahman was questioned by the Pūrvapakṣin. Then, by offering the *per accidens* (taṭastha-lakṣaṇa) and the intrinsic-nature definitions (svarūpa-lakṣaṇa) of Brahman, the question was suitably answered. The first definition, that is the definition *per accidens,* defines Brahman as the cause of the world and thereby the omniscience (sarvajñatva) and omnipotence (sarvaśaktimattva) of Brahman was implied.

This brings forth an important point at issue. Certain philosophers, the Mīmāṁsakas, who owe allegiance to the Veda and its being of non-human origin (apauruṣeya), propound that the Veda being anādi (beginningless) and eternal (nitya) cannot be created by any agent, including Brahman. Thus, all the more a confirmation on the omniscience of Brahman is required which can be established by showing that the Vedas have their source in Brahman. This need is amply fulfilled by the first explanation (prathama-varṇaka) of the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra which explains that Brahman is the cause of the all-knowing Śāstra (Scripture) and is therefore omniscient (sarvajña). Once this is accomplished, a valid means (pramāṇa) for the existence of Brahman

of such attributes is a desideratum and this need is fulfilled by the second explanation (dvitīya-varṇaka) of the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra.[2]

(2) The Janmādyadhikaraṇa describes Brahman as the efficient-cum-material cause (abhinna-nimittopādāna-kāraṇa) of the world which fact implies the absolute omniscience (sarvajña) and also omnipotence (sarvaśaktimattva) of Brahman. And, the authenticity of the Janmādyadhikaraṇa mainly rests on the confirmation of these implications of omniscience (sarvajñatva) and omnipotence (sarvaśaktimattva). This is so because the Janmādyadhikaraṇa's 'adhikaraṇa-siddhānta' ('topical theme' or 'the view established of an adhikaraṇa') presents Brahman as the cause of the world which fact proves the contextually implied sub-topics of Brahman's omniscience (sarvajñatva) and omnipotence (sarvaśaktimattva). And, when these two are corroborated, they in turn affirm the Janmādyadhikaraṇa's adhikaraṇa-siddhānta of Brahman being the cause of the world.[3] To explain: The view that Brahman is the cause of the world's birth, sustenance and dissolution (janmādi) is established in Janmādyadhikaraṇa which view logically entails the implication that Brahman is both omniscient (sarvajña) and omnipotent (sarvaśakti). The omniscience and omnipotence of Brahman when established in turn substantiate that Brahman can justifiably be the cause of this world.

This first explanation of the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra throws light on the omniscience of Brahman which has already been established in the Janmādyadhikaraṇa. But then, the very adhikaraṇa-siddhānta of Janmādyadhikaraṇa renders the first explanation (prathama-varṇaka) of the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra irrelevant for it only repeats the omniscience of Brahman that has been already established by implication in the Janmādyadhikaraṇa.

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[2] Cf. सर्वज्ञत्वस्य पूर्वसूत्रेणैवाधिकरणसिद्धान्तन्यायेन सिद्धेरुक्तत्वात् प्रमाणप्रदर्शनपरमेवैतत् सूत्रम् इत्याह—अथवेति। – वार्तिक
Also, cf. ब्रह्मणो लक्षणानन्तरं प्रमाणजिज्ञासायां वर्णकान्तरमाह—अथवेति। – रत्नप्रभा
Also, cf. इदानीं जगद्धेतुत्वेन लक्षिते ब्रह्मणि मानविशेषचिन्तायै वर्णकान्तरमवतारयति—अथवेति। – न्यायनिर्णय
We come across a parallel in *Mīmāṁsā-darśana* wherein the first aphorism introduces dharma-jijñāsā and the second Sūtra offers definition of dharma and identifies the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) for dharma. Vide *"codanālakṣaṇo'rtho dharmaḥ itivad lakṣaṇapramāṇobhayasūcana-parametat sūtramityabhipretya varṇakāntaramāha—athavetyādinā."* (*Vārtika*)

[3] Cf. यस्य अर्थस्य सिद्धौ अन्ये अर्था अनुषज्यन्ते, न तैर्विना स अर्थः सिद्ध्यति, ते (आनुषङ्गिका) अर्थाः यदधिष्ठाना, सः अधिकरणसिद्धान्तः। – न्यायभाष्य (१.१.३०)

This is exactly the justificatory ground as to why the Ācārya offers the second explanation (dvitīya-varṇaka) of the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra so as to present a valid proof or means of knowledge (pramāṇa) for the existence of the omniscient and omnipotent Brahman.

This is endorsed by Govindānanda, the author of *Bhāṣyaratnaprabhā*, who opines that after the definition of Brahman has been finally determined by the second Janmādi-sūtra, the need for the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) of Brahman is logically entailed, which need is fulfilled by the second explanation (dvitīya-varṇaka) of the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra.[4] It is a universally acknowledged fact that the establishment of an entity entirely depends on both its definition (lakṣaṇa) and the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) to know it.[5]

(3) Later, in the very first chapter of the *Brahma-sūtra*, the aphorism *"ata eva ca nityatvam"* (1.3.29) lays down that the Veda is eternal (nitya). Here, in view of the eternity of the Veda, the Pūrvapakṣin's view that Brahman cannot author the Veda can legitimately be possible, which view paves the way for the Siddhānta view that Brahman is the author of the Veda and, as such, is omniscient. But, this also forms the gist of the first explanation (prathama-varṇaka) of Śāstrayonitva-sūtra and thus there is an obvious overlapping of the same concept of the Brahman's authorship of the Veda between the first explanation (prathama-varṇaka) of the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra and the *Brahma-sūtra* 1.3.29.

(4) However, it should not be lost sight of in the present context that the Brahman desired to be known is identical with the Self (jijñāsyaṁ pratyagabhinnaṁ brahma). Keeping this in view, the tenability of the definition of Brahman as the cause of the world presented in the Janmādi-sūtra can be sustained only when the principle of the deliberate superimposition and subsequent denial (the adhyāropa and apavāda methodology) is taken cognisance of. Hence, the purpose of the first explanation (prathama-varṇaka) of the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra cannot be more than that of reminding us of the

[4] Cf. अधुना ब्रह्मणो लक्षणानन्तरं प्रमाणजिज्ञासायां वर्णकान्तरमाह—अथवेति। – रत्नप्रभा

[5] लक्षणप्रमाणाभ्यां वस्तुसिद्धिः।

fact that both the Śāstra and its authorship (Śāstrakartṛtva) fall within the ambit of creation (kāryakoṭi), that is within the world (prapañcāntargata). The Scripture (Śāstra) and its authorship (Śāstrakartṛtva) of Brahman are therefore to be first superimposed and later on denied in the substratum, the Advaita-brahman. This view of deliberate superimposition (adhyāropa) and its consequent denial (apavāda) discounts the possibility of any room for the Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta views which form the subject matter of the first explanation (prathama-varṇaka) of Śāstrayonitva-sūtra.

In other words, both the views of Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta, that is Brahman is not the source of the Veda and Brahman is the source of the Veda respectively, are made on the assumption that the Śāstra and Śāstrakartṛtva are eternal and real like Brahman. But, this assumption goes against the fundamental doctrine of Advaita-brahman.[6]

For all the afore-mentioned reasons, the first explanation (prathama-varṇaka) appears not to accord that well with the context of the *Brahma-sūtra* and the essential Siddhānta (established view) of Advaita.[7] Besides, when the seeker has intellectually comprehended the essential nature of Brahman through the definition provided by the Janmādi-sūtra, he wants to be sure and hence seeks to know the absolute means of knowledge (pramāṇa) for the veracity of Brahman *per se* and not that of Brahman's omniscience.

All these facts justify the Ācārya's second explanation (dvitīya-varṇaka) of the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra wherein he construes the compound word 'śāstrayoni' as a Bahuvrīhi: *"śāstraṁ yoniḥ yasya* – That which has the Scripture as its means of knowledge."

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[6] The idea is this: If the Veda were to be viewed as real and eternal as Brahman, the Supreme, then there would be two ultimate realities: the Veda and Brahman. This proposition goes counter to the doctrine of Advaita-brahman that is identical with the Self. The later aphorism (*B.S.*1.3.29) *"ata eva ca nityatvam"* speaks merely of the empirical reality (vyāvahārika-sattā) of the Veda that is superimposed and denied in Brahman, the Supreme, the non-dual ultimate Reality.

[7] Cf. ननु जन्माद्यस्य यतः इति सूत्रे सर्वभूतकारणत्ववर्णनेन वेदकारणत्वमपि सूचितमेव। परन्तु—अत एव च नित्यत्वमिति सूत्रेण स्वरूपतो नित्यत्वमपि वेदस्य साधितं स्यादिति शङ्कावारणार्थं शास्त्रयोनित्वादिति शास्त्रस्यापि कार्यत्वं सिद्धवदनूद्यते, इति तन्महिम्ना वेदस्यापि कार्यकोटौ प्रवेशः सिद्ध्यतीति खलु प्रथमवर्णकेन विवक्षितम्। इदं च ज्ञेयस्य ब्रह्मणः प्रत्यगभेदविवक्षयैव गतार्थम्, अन्यथा हि वेदतत्कारणयोरुभयोरपि ब्रह्मवत्सत्यत्वापत्त्या नाद्वैतसिद्धिः, इति व्यर्थमिदं योजनमित्यस्वरसादाह—अथवेति। – प्रदीप

2. the corpus of the Scripture comprising the *Ṛg-veda* etc., as described above, is the source: While concluding the Janmādyadhikaraṇa, the Bhāṣya had specifically stated that the Scriptural passages that form the subject of discussion are those Upaniṣadic statements which describe Brahman as the cause of the world.[8] But, the Ācārya in the beginning of the first explanation (prathama-varṇaka) makes it clear by averring that the entire corpus of the Scripture comprising the *Ṛg-veda* etc. is the means of knowing (pramāṇa) Brahman.[9]

A question does arise at this juncture: How can the entire gamut of the Scripture be described to be a means of comprehending Brahman when the major portions of the Veda are liturgical (karma-kāṇḍa) and devoted to the sacrificial injunctions? The standpoint that the Scripture is a means of knowing Brahman can be salvaged by viewing that the liturgical portion (karma-kāṇḍa) of the Veda indirectly helps (paramparā-sādhana) the seeker comprehend the supreme Reality by purifying his mind (cittaśuddhi) through the selfless performance of the rites (niṣkāma-karma) which in turn enables him to undertake the practices of śravaṇa and manana. The upāsanā portion of the Veda too indirectly helps (paramparā-sādhana) the seeker in the process of nididhyāsana (meditation) by conferring upon the seeker the ability to concentrate (cittaikāgratā). Also, the passages on the Saguṇa-brahman (Brahman with attributes) equip the seeker with the ability to realise the Nirguṇa-brahman (attributeless Brahman) through the process of adhyāropa and apavāda (deliberate superimposition and the consequent denial). But, it cannot be denied that the passages on the Nirguṇa-brahman serve as the direct means (sākṣāt-sādhana) to realise the real nature of Brahman as being identical with Self (pratyag-abhinna-brahman).

All this is suggested by the Bhāṣyakāra when he states, "*ṛgvedādiśāstraṁ pramāṇaṁ brahmaṇaḥ yathāvat svarūpādhigame.*" This statement of the Bhāṣya derives authority from such Scriptural passages as the following (*Bṛ.U.*3.9.26,

[8] Vide "*anyāni api evañjātīyakāni vākyāni nityaśuddhabuddhamuktasvabhāvasarvajñasvarūpakāraṇa-viṣayāṇi udāhartavyāni.*" (Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Section 15)

[9] Refer to the expression "*pradīpavat sarvārthāvadyotinaḥ*" in Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa, Section 3 D, n.5.

*Ka.U.*1.2.15 & *Bṛ.U.*4.4.22 respectively in order): *"taṁ tvaupaniṣadaṁ puruṣaṁ pṛcchāmi* – I ask you of that Being who is known only from the Upaniṣads," *"sarve vedā yatpadamāmananti* – All the Vedas declare this Abode (Brahman)," and *"tametaṁ vedānuvacanena brahmaṇā vividiṣanti yajñena dānena tapasānāśakena* – The brāhmaṇas desire to know Brahman by the study of the Vedas, by sacrifice, by charity and by desireless penance."[10]

3. that is the cause or the means of knowledge to rightly comprehend the nature of this Brahman: The lexicons in general recognise the word 'yoni' as a synonym of the term 'kāraṇa' (source or cause) although it can also denote the female generative organ and water, meanings which obviously do not apply in the present context.[11]

In the Bahuvrīhi compound 'śāstra-yoni', the word 'yoni' is attributely used with the word 'Śāstra'. Hence in the compound 'śāstra-yoni', the Śāstra (Scripture) should be taken as the cause of Brahman. But would this not be an anomalous statement since Brahman has been already presented as the cause of the Śāstra in the foregoing explanation (prathama-varṇaka)? Is this not an obvious self-contradiction to present the other way round? It is this anomaly and contradiction that lead the Bhāṣyakāra to interpret the word 'yoni' as 'kāraṇa' (the cause), which again has to be understood as the cause or a means of knowledge (pramāṇa). Accordingly, the compound word 'śāstra-yoni' would appropriately convey this sense: The Śāstra is the means of the Knowledge of Brahman.[12]

We may take cognisance of an interesting parallel. The word 'hetu' is a synonym of 'kāraṇa' and signifies 'cause'. When we say *"vahniḥ dhūmahetuḥ* –

[10] Cf. सर्वे वेदा यत्पदमामनन्तीति सिद्धान्तव्यवस्थापनार्थमेवेदं सूत्रमित्यभिप्रायेण शास्त्रपदविवक्षितमाह—यथोक्तमृग्वेदादीति। कर्मवाक्यानां परम्परया श्रवणविधिशेषतया त्वम्पदार्थशेषतया वा, उपासनावाक्यानामपि चित्तैकाग्र्यादिसम्पादनेन निदिध्यासन-विधिशेषतया तत्पदार्थशेषतया वाऽन्वयात् सर्वेषां वेदवाक्यानां प्रत्यगभिन्ने ब्रह्मण्येव पर्यवसानम्। यथा च जीवपराणां कर्मकाण्डवाक्यानां देहातिरेकमात्रविवक्षया चरितार्थानामपि वस्तुगत्याऽऽनन्दादिरूपत्व एव तात्पर्यम्, एवं कारणवाक्यानामपि कल्पितकारणत्वादि-परित्यागेन चैतन्यस्वरूपमात्र एव पर्यवसानमित्यवान्तरतात्पर्यपराण्येव कर्मोपासनाविधयः सृष्टिवाक्यानि च। – प्रदीप

Also, cf. अत्र 'तं त्वौपनिषदं पुरुषं पृच्छामि' (बृ.उ.३.९.२६) 'नावेदविन्मनुते तं बृहन्तं' (शाट्यायनीयोपनिषद्, ४) इत्यादिशास्त्रं विषयः। – ब्रह्मविद्याभरण

[11] Vide *"yoniḥ kāraṇe bhagatoyayoḥ* – The word 'yoni' signifies 'cause' (kāraṇa), 'female organ of generation' (bhaga) and 'water' (toya)." (*Haimakośa*)

[12] Cf. योनिपदस्य कारणपरस्यापि शास्त्रपदसामानाधिकरण्येन बहुव्रीहिसमासाश्रयणे प्रमाणपरत्व एव पर्यवसानमिति सर्वसम्मतमिदम्। तथा च शास्त्रप्रमाणकं ब्रह्मेति चोदनालक्षण इत्यत्रैव सूत्रार्थ इत्याह—शास्त्रं योनिरिति। – प्रदीप

Fire is the cause of smoke," we mean to say that smoke leads to the knowledge of fire on the hill. To put it differently, the smoke is the 'jñāpaka-hetu', that is a means of the knowledge of the probandum and not the 'kāraka-hetu' or the 'generative means' like how the clay, potter and so on are the generative causes of a pot. It is in the former sense of 'jñāpaka-hetu' that the word 'yoni' has been used in the Bahuvrīhi compound 'śāstra-yoni'.[13]

But, why should the Sūtrakāra employ the word 'yoni', imbuing it with a special sense of 'jñāpaka-hetu', to denote 'kāraṇa', when such words as 'kāraṇa' and 'hetu' are there which by their very general sense means the 'cause'? He could have as well directly stated *"śāstrakāraṇatvāt"* or *"śāstrahetutvāt."* Indeed, these expressions too could be taken to be both the Tatpuruṣa and Bahuvrīhi type compounds.

The Sūtrakāra is justified in the choice of the word 'yoni' in the sense of cause ('kāraṇa' or 'hetu') for in the Upaniṣad itself we see such instances where the word 'yoni' is used in this sense of cause. One may refer to the expression 'indra-yoni' in the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad* (1.6) wherein the expression has been interpreted by the Ācārya Śaṅkara himself in the sense of the 'means of knowing' the nature of Indra (Brahman).[14] And, we have observed that so far the Sūtrakāra has been making ample use of the *Taittirīya* passages as the viṣaya-vākyas (statement for deliberation) in the preceding Adhikaraṇas.

4. It is only through the Scripture, the means of valid knowledge, that Brahman is known to be the cause of birth etc. of the world – this is the intended sense: This sentence gives in a nutshell the point that is sought to be established by the second explanation (dvitīya-varṇaka) of the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra. The use of particle 'eva' in the phrase *"śāstrādeva"* amply demonstrates that the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra is primarily meant to discount the possible view that a syllogistic proposition can be the source of knowing Brahman by virtue of what is indicated in the Janmādi-sūtra.[15]

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[13] Vide *"sādhyaviṣayakajñānakāraṇatvaṁ hetutvam* – That which leads to the knowledge of the probandum (sādhya) is termed 'hetu'."

[14] Cf. इन्द्रयोनिः इन्द्रस्य ब्रह्मणः योनिः स्वरूपप्रतिपत्तिद्वारमित्यर्थः। – तैत्तिरीयभाष्य (१.६)

[15] Cf. पर्यवसितं वाक्यार्थमाह—शास्त्रादेवेति। नानुमानादित्यर्थः। – प्रदीप

Also, cf. अनुमानादपि लाघवानुगृहीतादु ब्रह्मस्वरूपधीसम्भवादु न तत्र शास्त्रमेव मानमित्याशङ्क्याह—शास्त्रादिति। – न्यायनिर्णय

5. The relevant passage of the Scripture (*Tai.U.*3.1), commencing with "That whence verily these beings are born etc." has been cited in the context of the preceding aphorism: In the opening statement of the present section, the Bhāṣyakāra has stated that the entire corpus comprising the Scriptures, such as *Ṛg-veda*, constitutes the means of knowing Brahman. We noticed therein how the karma-kāṇḍa, the upāsanā-kāṇḍa and the passages which expound the Saguṇa-brahman (Brahman with attributes) all constitute the indirect means (paramparā-sādhana) and thereby help the aspirant to come to have the Knowledge of Brahman through śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana.

The Ācārya now cites the Śāstra, that is the Upaniṣadic passage, which is the direct means of knowing Brahman: *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante."* The same passage has already been cited as the viṣaya-vākya in the Janmādyadhikaraṇa. The Ācārya had indicated there that this passage stands for the entire Bhārgavī Vāruṇī Vidyā, that commences as *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante"* and concludes as *"ānandaṁ prayantyabhisaṁviśanti."*[16]

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[16] Vide *"śāstramudāhṛtaṁ pūrvasūtre—yato vā ityādīti. ānandavākyāntamiti śeṣaḥ."* (*Pradīpa*) Refer to Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Sections 7, 8, 14 and 15.

6

[आक्षेपभाष्यम्]

किमर्थं तर्हि इदं सूत्रं, यावता [1]पूर्वसूत्रेणैव एवञ्जातीयकं शास्त्रम् उदाहरता शास्त्रयोनित्वं ब्रह्मणो दर्शितम्।

6 A

[ĀKṢEPABHĀṢYAM]

kimarthaṁ tarhi idaṁ sūtraṁ, yāvatā pūrvasūtreṇaiva evañjātīyakaṁ śāstram udāharatā śāstrayonitvaṁ brahmaṇo darśitam.

6 B

किमर्थम् *kimartham* – of what purpose; तर्हि *tarhi* – then; इदम् *idam* – this; सूत्रम् *sūtram* – aphorism; यावता *yāvatā* – in as much as; पूर्वसूत्रेण एव *pūrvasūtreṇa eva* – by the previous aphorism itself; एवञ्जातीयकम् *evañjātīyakam* – of this nature; शास्त्रम् *śāstram* – the Scripture; उदाहरता *udāharatā* – that cites; शास्त्रयोनित्वम् *śāstrayonitvam* – the Scripture being the source of knowledge; ब्रह्मणः *brahmaṇaḥ* – of Brahman; दर्शितम् *darśitam* – it has been shown

6 C

[COMMENTARY RAISING THE OBJECTION]

Of what purpose then is this aphorism, in as much as by the previous aphorism itself, that cites the Scriptural passage of this nature, it has been shown that the Scripture is the means of knowledge of Brahman?

6 D

The Pūrvapakṣin raises an objection stating that if the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra is interpreted in such a way that the Śāstra (Scripture) alone is the means of knowing Brahman (i.e. śāstra-pramāṇakaṁ brahma), then the very Śāstrayonitva-sūtra stands divested of any true purpose. This is so because

[1] ASS, AA, NSP (I & II), CSS, KKK पूर्वसूत्रे एव

the above-mentioned sense of the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra, as expounded in the dvitīya-varṇaka (second explanation), has already been conveyed by the Upaniṣadic passage quoted under the preceding Janmādi-sūtra.[1]

In other words, the Pūrvapakṣin rejects the tenability of the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra as it has nothing unique to offer.[2]

[1] *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante...tad brahma...ānandaṁ prayantyabhisaṁviśanti iti."* (*Tai.U.*3.1-6)

[2] Cf. ननु एवं सति भवन्मतेऽपीदं सूत्रं वितथमिति शङ्कते—किमर्थमिति। निष्प्रयोजनमिदं सूत्रं स्यादित्यर्थः। – प्रदीप
Also, cf. पूर्वसूत्रे शास्त्रस्योक्तत्वे शास्त्रयोनित्वं पृथग् न वाच्यमिति शङ्कते—किमर्थमिति। – न्यायनिर्णय

7

[समाधानभाष्यम्]

उच्यते[1]—[1]तत्र सूत्राक्षरेण [2]स्पष्टं शास्त्रस्य [3]अनुपादानाद् जन्मादिसूत्रेण केवलम् अनुमानम् उपन्यस्तम् इत्याशङ्क्येत, ताम् आशङ्कां निवर्तयितुम् [4]इदं सूत्रं [5]प्रववृते, शास्त्रयोनित्वाद् इति॥

7 A

[SAMĀDHĀNABHĀṢYAM]

ucyate—tatra sūtrākṣareṇa spaṣṭaṁ śāstrasya anupādānād janmādisūtreṇa kevalam anumānam upanyastam ityāśaṅkyeta, tām āśaṅkāṁ nivartayitum idaṁ sūtraṁ pravavṛte śāstrayonitvād iti.

7 B

उच्यते *ucyate* – it is replied; तत्र *tatra* – there; सूत्राक्षरेण *sūtrākṣareṇa* – by the text of the aphorism; स्पष्टम् *spaṣṭam* – explicitly; शास्त्रस्य *śāstrasya* – of the Scriptures; अनुपादानात् *anupādānāt* – since it has not been stated; जन्मादिसूत्रेण *janmādisūtreṇa* – by the Janmādi aphorism; केवलम् *kevalam* – alone; अनुमानम् *anumānam* – inference; उपन्यस्तम् *upanyastam* – has been presented; इति *iti* – thus; आशङ्क्येत *āśaṅkyeta* – may be doubted; ताम् *tām* – that; आशङ्काम् *āśaṅkām* – doubt; निवर्तयितुम् *nivartayitum* – to obviate; इदम् *idam* – this; सूत्रम् *sūtram* – aphorism; प्रववृते *pravavṛte* – has set out; शास्त्रयोनित्वात् *śāstrayonitvāt* – because the Scripture is the means for the Knowledge of Brahman; इति *iti* – thus

7 C

[COMMENTARY DISMISSING THE OBJECTION]

To this, it is replied: There, since the Scripture has not been explicitly

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[1] AA, NSP (I & II), CSS, KKK तत्र पूर्वसूत्राक्षरेण

[2] Tel, ASS विस्पष्टम्

[3] Tel जगतो जन्मादिसूत्रेण केवलम्। ASS जगतो जन्मादि केवलम्। AA, NSP (I & II), CSS अनुपादानाद् जन्मादि केवलम्।

[4] Tel सूत्रमिदम्

[5] AA (fn.) प्रवर्तते

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[1] एतत्सूत्रार्थवत्त्वं प्रतिजानीते—उच्यत इति। – न्यायनिर्णय

stated by the very text of the aphorism, it may be doubted as to whether inference alone has been presented by the Janmādi aphorism. To obviate such a doubt, this aphorism has set out thus: Because the Scripture is the means for the Knowledge of Brahman."

7 D

When brahma-jijñāsā (desire to know Brahman) was introduced by the first Jijñāsā-sūtra, *"athāto brahmajijñāsā* – Then, therefore, the desire to know Brahman," the student would, as a natural consequence of this aphorism, desire to know the definition of Brahman in order that he can comprehend the true nature of Brahman. Hence, the next Janmādi-sūtra, *"janmādyasya yataḥ* – Brahman is that whence that which begins with the birth of this world ensues," offers the definition of Brahman as being the world's cause, sustenance and dissolution.

But reading the text of the Janmādi-sūtra, one may mistakenly construe that this Sūtra instead of defining Brahman, is merely adducing an inference, that is independent of the Scripture, to prove the existence of Brahman as the cause of the world on the basis of the analogy that products (kārya) in the world necessarily subsume the existence of their creators. Since Brahman is beyond the ambit of perceptual experience (pratyakṣa), one might be led to the presumption that the Sūtrakāra has found it appropriate to first prove the existence of Brahman by anumāna-pramāṇa (inference as a means of knowledge).

In the Bhāṣya section under deliberation, the two expressions *"āśaṅkyeta"* and *"tām āśaṅkāṁ nivartayitum"* can also be respectively rendered as "it might be objected to" and "in order to dismiss that objection."[2] The objection in this context is this: When the student actually needs to know a definition of Brahman, is it not inappropriate on the part of the Sūtrakāra to adduce an anumāna (inference) to prove the existence of Brahman?

We observe that the Bhāṣyakāra replies to this objection in this section by stating that it is to avoid such a suspicion or an objection of this nature that the present aphorism states explicitly that Śāstra (Scripture) is the sole

[2] The word 'āśaṅkā' can denote both 'doubt' (saṁśaya) and 'objection' (ākṣepa).

pramāṇa (means of knowledge) for comprehending Brahman as being the cause of the world.[3] In the light of this understanding, we can see that the second Janmādi-sūtra only contains the Scriptural definition of Brahman which was already expounded in the first Jijñāsā-sūtra as that which is desired to be known (jijñāsya).

At this juncture, an objection could be raised: The Bhāṣyakāra states this possible suspicion or objection in the Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa because the word 'yataḥ' of the Janmādi-aphorism (*"janmādyasya yataḥ"*), *per se* does not clearly indicate any Scriptural statement. But, did not the Bhāṣyakāra himself while commenting on the Janmādi-sūtra emphatically assert that the purpose of the *Brahma-sūtra* is to string together the flowers of the Upaniṣadic statements for deliberation so that one can arrive at their true purport?[4] And, in consonance with this fact, the purpose of the Janmādi-sūtra, evidently, is not to adduce any inference as a proof for the existence of Brahman but rather to offer the Scriptural definition of Brahman by expounding the Upaniṣadic passage commencing as *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante"* and concluding as *"ānandaṁ prayantyabhisaṁviśanti"* (*Tai.U.*3.1-6).[5] Thus, since the Ācārya himself has clearly established in the Janmādi-sūtra that the Scripture alone is the source of knowledge (śāstrayonitva) of Brahman, the second explanation (dvitīya-varṇaka) of the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra does not serve any meaningful purpose at all. Indeed, the objection raised by the Pūrvapakṣin in the preceding section (Section 6)[6] for the afore-mentioned reasons only stands vindicated.

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[3] Cf. तत्र शास्त्रस्योक्तत्वेऽपि सूत्रे तद्वाचकाभावाज्जन्मादिलिङ्गकं स्वतन्त्रमनुमानमुक्तमिति शङ्कां निरसितुमिदं सूत्रमिति तदर्थवत्तां समर्थयते—तत्रेति। – न्यायनिर्णय

Also, cf. जन्मादिलिङ्गकस्वतन्त्रानुमानोपन्यासशङ्कानिरासायेत्याह—उच्यत इति। – प्रकटार्थविवरण

Also, cf. तस्यैव तु लक्षणस्यानुमानत्वाशङ्कामपाकृत्यागमिकत्वोपदर्शनेन ब्रह्मणि शास्त्रं प्रमाणमुक्तम्—शास्त्रयोनित्वादिति। – भाष्यभावप्रकाशिका

Also, cf. पूर्वेणाधिकरणेन ब्रह्मस्वरूपलक्षणासम्भवाशङ्कां व्युदस्य लक्षणसम्भव उक्तः। तस्यैव तु लक्षणस्यानेन अनुमानत्वाशङ्कामपाकृत्य आगमोपदर्शनेन ब्रह्मणि शास्त्रं प्रमाणमुक्तम्। – भामती

Also, cf. जन्मादिलिङ्गकानुमानस्य स्वातन्त्र्येण उपन्यासशङ्कानिरासार्थं पृथक् सूत्रमित्याह—उच्यते इति। – रत्नप्रभा

[4] Vide *"vedāntavākyakusumagrathanārthatvāt sūtrāṇām. vedāntavākyāni hi sūtraiḥ udāhṛtya vicāryante."* (Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Section 8 D, n.1)

[5] Refer to the Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Sections 7, 8, 14 and 15.

[6] *"kimarthaṁ tarhi idaṁ sūtraṁ, yāvatā pūrvasūtreṇaiva evañjātīyakaṁ śāstram udāharatā śāstrayonitvaṁ brahmaṇo darśitam* – Of what purpose then is this aphorism, in as much as by

Also, under these circumstances, one may also be led to the suspicion as to whether the Ācārya is contradicting himself when he states here in the Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa that the Janmādi-sūtra may lead to a doubt as to whether it merely presents an inference – and not a Scriptural statement – when he himself has already established in the Janmādyadhikaraṇa that it is Śāstra alone that is being deliberated in the *Brahma-sūtra.*

All these above-mentioned objections do not stand the test of reason. A careful analysis of the Bhāṣyakāra's statements in the Janmādyadhikaraṇa and Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa would reveal that there is no real contradiction at all in the Bhāṣyakāra's statements occurring in these two adhikaraṇas. It may be noted that the Ācārya's statement about the Janmādi-sūtra presenting the Scripture as the means for the Knowledge of Brahman – that has been cited in the objection above – is found only in the section of the Bhāṣya wherein the Ācārya has concluded that the Śāstra (Scripture) alone is the means for the Knowledge of Brahman which he does in order to bring home to the student that the ultimate purport (tātparyārtha) of the Janmādi-aphorism is not to treat it as an inference to establish the existence of Brahman but is rather to be taken as the Scriptural statement presenting the definition of Brahman. Indeed, he makes this emphatic declaration only by drawing strength from this second explanation (dvitīya-varṇaka) of the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra. But this conclusion which the Ācārya voices here in the Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa does not in any way mean that the preceding Janmādi-sūtra, by itself, contains a definite reference to the Śāstra (Scripture) being the means for the Knowledge of Brahman.

This explains why, to begin with, in the *Janmādisūtra-bhāṣya,* the Ācārya gives guardedly the bare sense of the word (padārtha) 'yataḥ' of the Janmādi-sūtra (*"janmādyasya yataḥ"*) – the only word that could be construed to refer to the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad* passage *"yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante"* – and the sentence sense (vākyārtha) of the Janmādi-sūtra, without referring to the import of the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra or the influence of its import on

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the previous aphorism itself that cites the Scriptural passage of this nature, it has been shown that the Scripture is the means of knowledge of Brahman?"

the Janmādi-sūtra. To explain: The Bhāṣya giving the word meaning reads "yataḥ – whence (or 'from which')" as merely indicative of cause in general[7] and the Bhāṣya giving the sentence meaning of the Sūtra goes to merely state "whence ensues the conglomerate of the birth, the sustenance and the destruction of the world"[8] without expounding or asserting right there, in that very context, that this Janmādi-sūtra is just the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad* section pertaining to the Bhārgavī Vāruṇī Vidyā. Thus, when we compare what the Bhāṣyakāra has stated earlier in the Janmādyadhikaraṇa by way of explaining the bare meaning of the second Janmādi-sūtra with this second explanation (dvitīya-varṇaka) of the Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa, it is amply clear that he does not at all contradict himself.

What he is stating here in the second explanation (dvitīya-varṇaka) is merely that the Śāstra is not explicitly presented by the words of the Janmādi-sūtra. Verily, it is because of this ambiguity, that the Janmādi-sūtra comes to have a semblance of a regular inference, which the philosophers of other schools like Nyāya employ to establish the existence of the Creator of the world, the Īśvara, the Lord as being distinct from transmigrating beings. This fact, the Ācārya himself has taken special care to draw our attention to.[9]

The second explanation (dvitīya-varṇaka) of the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra lays down the fundamental principle of Vedānta that the Śāstra alone is the means to know Brahman (*"śāstrapramāṇakaṁ brahma"*). And, basing on this maxim alone, the Bhāṣyakāra avers that the Janmādi-sūtra gives the Scriptural definition of Brahman being the cause of the world by indicating the Śāstra pertinent to this context (*Tai.U.*3.1-6): *"yato vā imāni...ānandaṁ prayantyabhisaṁviśanti."* Without taking recourse to the import of this second

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[7] Vide *"yataḥ iti kāraṇanirdeśaḥ* – The word 'yataḥ' ('whence') is the indication of the cause." (Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Section 3)

[8] Vide *"asya jagataḥ...janmasthitibhaṅgaṁ yataḥ sarvajñāt sarvaśakteḥ kāraṇād bhavati* – Of this world...whence ensues the conglomerate of the birth, the sustenance and the destruction, that omniscient and omnipotent cause." (Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Section 4)

[9] Vide *"etadeva anumānaṁ saṁsārivyatirikteśvarāstitvādisādhanaṁ manyante īśvarakāraṇavādinaḥ* – Those, who maintain that Īśvara is the (efficient) cause (alone) of the world regard the above argument itself as the syllogism capable of establishing the existence and so on of Īśvara, distinct from the transmigrating being." (Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Section 6)

explanation (dvitīya-varṇaka) of the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra, the purport and purpose of Janmādi-sūtra would remain unclear and ambiguous.

In the light of the commentary presented by the Bhāṣyakāra on the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra, it becomes crystal clear that the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra understood in accordance with the first explanation (prathama-varṇaka)[10] as well the second explanation (dvitīya-varṇaka)[11] is very closely interlinked with the preceding Janmādi-sūtra. Yet, strictly from philosophical considerations, the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra, as explained in the second manner (dvitīya-varṇaka), it may be said is perhaps more intimately related to the Janmādi-sūtra. It seems so because, while defining Brahman as the cause of the world, the Janmādi-sūtra is made to conform to the maxim laid down by the second explanation (dvitīya-varṇaka) of the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra that the Śāstra (Scripture) is the sole pramāṇa for the knowledge of Brahman as being the cause, sustenance and dissolution of the world.

This is obviously the reason why the *Pañcapādikā* commentary remarks thus: *"ataḥ 'janmādyasya yataḥ śāstrapramāṇakam' ityetāvad idaṁ sūtraṁ sad asandigdham anumānaśaṅkānivṛtteḥ. pṛthakkaraṇaṁ prapañcāntaḥpātinaḥ śāstrasyāpi hetutvena brahmaṇaḥ sarvajñatvasampādanam iti vyākhyānāntareṇa kathayitum* – The second Sūtra itself might take the form 'Brahman is that whence that which begins with the birth of this world ensues which fact is known from the Śāstra'." This would certainly remove the doubt that by inference alone can Brahman be understood as the cause of the world. Yet, the single Sūtra of the above-suggested form is carved out into two Sūtras in order that we may also have the conclusion that Brahman is omniscient as It is the cause of the Veda; indeed Veda is a part of the world for the Veda too is created by Brahman alone."

[10] Because of Brahman being the source of the Scripture. (Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa, Section 2)
[11] Because the Scripture is the means for the Knowledge of Brahman. (Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa, Section 2)

Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇaracanā – Structure of Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa (Dvitīya-varṇaka – Second Explanation)

The Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa consists of a single aphorism, *"śāstrayonitvāt* – Because of the Scripture being the means for the Knowledge of Brahman."

(1) Viṣaya or Subject: The Upaniṣad passages such as (*Bṛ.U.*3.9.26) *"taṁ tvaupaniṣadaṁ puruṣaṁ pṛcchāmi* – I ask you of that Being who is known only from the Upaniṣads," which point out that the Śāstra (Scripture) is the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) of Brahman are taken up for deliberation in this adhikaraṇa (topical section).

(2) Saṁśaya or Doubt: The doubt that is sought to be dispelled by the present topical limb (adhikaraṇāṅga-saṁśaya) is whether such Upaniṣadic passages describe Brahman as an entity which is to be known from the Upaniṣad alone or can be known by other means of knowledge (pramāṇa), like perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna) and so on.

(3) Pūrvapakṣa or Prima Facie View: It is an accepted fact that Brahman is an existing entity (pariniṣṭhita- or bhūta-vastu). Such an entity, that is already existent, is capable of being known primarily through the non-Scriptural means of knowledge (pramāṇa) such as perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna) and so on. Verily, there can be no entity in this world which is not comprehended through inference. Therefore, it is erroneous to conclude that the Scriptural passage under deliberation describes Brahman as an entity that is to be known from the Upaniṣads alone.

The intent or purpose of the Pūrvapakṣa is to maintain that inferential logic (anumāna) alone must be studied in detail as Brahman is to be known primarily by means of inference. Hence, according to the Pūrvapakṣin, the *Vedānta-darśana*, that is the *Brahma-sūtra*, need not be commenced at all.

4. Siddhānta or the Established View: It is true that Brahman is an existing entity (pariniṣṭhita-vastu). But, Brahman has no qualities, such as colour, taste and so on (rūpa-rasādi). Therefore, Brahman cannot become an object

of pratyakṣa-pramāṇa (sense perception). Again, Brahman is totally free from attributes (nirdharmaka) and has no relation with anything (asaṅga) whatsoever. It is to be noted that inference as a means of knowledge functions only by depending upon the attributes (dharma) and the connections of the things which the inferable (sādhya) possesses such as the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between the probans (hetu) and probandum (sādhya). But, Brahman possesses no such attributes or relation. Hence, inference too cannot be the means for knowing Brahman. Therefore, the real nature of Brahman can be known by means of the Scripture alone (*"śāstrapramāṇakaṁ brahma"*). From the above discussion, it must be accepted that the Upaniṣadic passage under deliberation is to be understood as describing Brahman as an entity that is to be known from the Upaniṣads alone (upaniṣatsu eva vijñeyaḥ) and that it cannot be known through any other means of knowledge (na anyapramāṇagamyaḥ).

The intent or purpose of the Siddhānta view is to establish that a complete and detailed investigation of the Śāstra, that is the Upaniṣads (Vedānta), must be undertaken earnestly, because Brahman is known by means of the Śāstra alone.

(5) Saṅgati or Connectedness: A subject can be clearly comprehended if it is perfectly defined (lakṣaṇa) and the means for knowing it (pramāṇa) is also clearly delineated.[1] With regard to the subject matter of Brahman, these two requisites are presented respectively by the second Janmādyadhikaraṇa and the third Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa. Hence, the Janmādyadhikaraṇa and the Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa are interconnected by the connectedness in the form of a common purpose (samāna-phalakatvaṁ saṅgatiḥ).

[1] Vide *"lakṣaṇapramāṇābhyāṁ vastusiddhiḥ."*

Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇasāra – Essence of Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa (Dvitīya-varṇaka – Second Explanation)

The following two verses of the *Vaiyāsika-nyāyamālā* (17 & 18) of Svāmī Vidyāraṇya present succinctly the essence of the second explanation (dvitīya-varṇaka) of the Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa.

अस्त्यन्यमेयताप्यस्य किं वा वेदैकमेयता।
घटवत्सिद्धवस्तुत्वाद् ब्रह्मान्येनापि मीयते॥
रूपलिङ्गादिराहित्यान्नास्य मान्तरयोग्यता।
तं त्वौपनिषदेत्यादौ प्रोक्ता वेदैकमेयता॥

astyanyameyatāpyasya kiṁ vā vedaikameyatā,
ghaṭavatsiddhavastutvād brahmānyenāpi mīyate.
rūpaliṅgādirāhityānnāsya māntarayogyatā,
taṁ tvaupaniṣadetyādau proktā vedaikameyatā.

The first explanation of the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra has shown that the aphorism is meant to strengthen the view that Brahman is omniscient (sarvajña) since Brahman is the author of the omniscient Veda (sarvajñakalpa-veda). But, since it has already been established in the Janmādi-sūtra that Brahman, being the creator of the entire world – the all-knowing Veda too being a part of the world – Brahman is undoubtedly omniscient. Since the Veda comes in the ambit of the world alone, there is no cogent ground for the very being of the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra.

It is in this background that the Ācārya presents the second explanation (dvitīya-varṇaka) of the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra. He puts forward here that the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra is meant to propound that the Scripture is the means of the knowledge of Brahman (*"śāstrapramāṇakaṁ brahma"*). Upon this, the Pūrvapakṣin raises a doubt as to whether Brahman can be known through the Veda alone or if there are other means of knowing It too. He further justifies his doubt by declaring that any existent entity (bhūta- or pariniṣṭhita-vastu) in the world can be known by more than one means of

knowledge just as pot is amenable to more than one means of knowledge. The Siddhāntin retorts saying that since Brahman does not have any form (rūpa), indicator (liṅga) and so on, It cannot be known by any other means such as perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna) and so on. On the other hand, it has been declared in the Scriptural statements such as (*Bṛ.U.*3.9.26) *"taṁ tvaupaniṣadaṁ puruṣaṁ pṛcchāmi* – I ask you of that Being who is known only from the Upaniṣads," that Brahman can be known only through the Scripture as it can be expounded by the Scripture alone.

In a nutshell, it can be stated that there are two grounds for the composition of the Śāstrayonitva-sūtra's second explanation (dvitīya-varṇaka): (1) To set aside the hypothetical view that the Janmādi-sūtra is meant to present a syllogism to prove the existence of Brahman and (2) to establish that it is the Scripture alone that can serve as the means of knowing Brahman.

॥ इति द्वितीयवर्णकं समाप्तम् ॥

iti dvitīyavarṇakaṁ samāptam

Thus Concludes the Second Explanation:
Scripture Being the Source.

॥ इति शास्त्रयोनित्वाधिकरणं समाप्तम् ॥

iti śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇaṁ samāptam

Here Concludes the Topical Section:
Scripture Being the Sourced/Source.